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Abstract 
This thesis a1ms to reveal the very considerable extent of the 
power and influence of the clerk to the justices and court clerks in 
magistrates' courts, and to assess the nature of the balance achieved 
by clerks between the demands of the organisation of the courts which 
they run and their role as the court's lawyer with responsibility for 
upholding, inter alia, due process norms. 
The first section of the thesis examines the role of the clerk in 
the courtroom. After assessing the extent to which the clerk's 
behaviour is constrained by legal rules, the relationship between 
clerk and magistrates is examined and the impact of the clerk on the 
proceedings of the court and the decisions of the magistrates are 
considered. It is argued that the clerk has a significant effect on 
the experience of all of those who come into contact with the criminal 
justice system and to this end the relationship between the clerk and 
unrepresented defendants, the clerk and the legal profession, the 
clerk and the police, and the clerk and probation offiers and social 
workers is assessed. 
The second part of the thesis deals with the role of the clerk 
outside the courtroom. The influence of the clerk to the justices on 
the attitudes of magistrates through training is considered, and the 
impact of the clerk on policy decisions for the court is assessed. 
The quasi-judicial powers of the clerk are examined and the question 
of whether there is scope for future extension of the clerk's role is 
addressed. 
It is concluded that the role of the clerk 1S one of the most 
significant factors in determining the nature of summary justice, that 
1V 
the nature of the clerk's role is ready for re-assessment and that 
this may be most appropriately achieved by extension of the legal role 
of the clerk. The clerk does playa real part in protecting due 
process rights, but in relation to the protection of unrepresented 
defendants the clerk cannot be as effective as an advocate, and as a 
result represents a liberal compromise of 'good enough' justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"We know that magistrates deal with some 97 or 98 per cent 
of all the crime in this country. What is sometimes 
forgotten is that over 80 per cent of indictable offences 
are dealt with by those magistrates. I venture to think 
that they simply could not function without the help of the 
justices' clerks. The justices' clerk is in many ways the 
mos t important pers on in the adm inis tra t ion of jus t ice." 
Lord Parker of Waddington l 
The above quotation ~s one of the rare instances of a recognition 
of the importance of the role played in the administration of justice 
by the clerk to the justices and her/his staff. As Lord Parker 
indicated, magistrates deal with the vast majority of criminal cases 
~n this country, including a very large proportion of those cases 
which involve what are regarded as more serious offences. Even cases 
which are ultimately to be dealt with by the Crown Court are initially 
processed and sifted in the magistrates' courts by way of committal 
proceedings. 
An illustration of the amount and nature of the work done in 
magistrates' courts is provided by one large city court which was 
observed on one Monday to deal (in one way or another) with three 
hundred and eleven charges and summonses. These cases included one 
hundred and ninety nine traffic cases, and one hundred and twelve 
other offences. There were thirty two cases of the ft, ten cas es 0 f 
burglary, eight cases of criminal damage, ten drunks, three 
prostitutes, and one vagrant; there were two police constables 
allegedly assaulted, and two obstructed; one defendant was alleged to 
have criminally damaged a police car, and seven others to have 
criminally damaged other property. The court dealt with five cases 
of malicious wounding, two of possessing offensive weapons, and a 
1. In the debate in the House of Lords on the Justices of the Peace 
Bill 1968. Hansard H. of L. Vol. 292, Col. 102. 
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total of eight cases of alleged obscene language, or threatening or 
insulting words or behaviour. There were over twenty four different 
types of criminal offence dealt with, excluding the traffic offences. 
Besides these matters a juvenile court heard four applications for 
care orders and two applications to discharge care orders. 
The magistrates were the ones who took the decisions ~n all of 
these cases - they determined guilt or innocence, the appropriate 
sentence, bailor custody. However these magistrates, like their 
colleagues throughout the country are lay people. Qualified 
stipendiary magistrates are comparatively rare and are to be found ~n 
Central London and in a few large cities. The vast majority of 
magistrates have no legal qualification at all, and undergo very 
little training. Yet the body of legal and procedural rules which 
they must apply and with which they must comply is formidable. Lay 
magistrates need to be closely guided to ensure that their actions and 
decisions are within these rules, and this guidance is provided by the 
clerk to the justices and the court clerks at each court. 
Each magistrates' court is served by a clerk who sits close to 
the magistrates, guides the proceedings of the court, advises the 
magistrates on law, evidence and procedural rules, and who may retire 
with the magistrates when they deliberate in private. This clerk is 
not part of the tribunal of fact, or, ~n theory, the tribunal of law. 
However the dependence of a lay bench on the clerk's expertise ~s very 
considerable indeed. 
Most lay magistrates spend half a day, or a day, ~n court once a 
week or once a fortnight. They are, in a sense, regular vis itors to 
a complex organisation which they play little part in running. It ~s 
the clerk to the justices and the clerk's staff, who control this 
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organisation and who ensure that the hundreds of cases scheduled to be 
dealt with each day are properly processed. The clerk must organise 
the lists so that cases are heard without unacceptable delay, and 
ensure that there are sufficient resources to process the cases which 
are to be heard on anyone day. The clerk must organise enough 
magistrates to attend the court and ensure that they are glven cases 
which they are qualified and able to deal with. The clerk must 
ensure that cases where security is important are put in the right 
courts, that short cases are identified and dealt with early so as to 
release the maximum number of people from court, that prosecutors and 
defence advocates are not needed in two courts at the same time. The 
considerable amount of paperwork which attends criminal prosecutions 
is dealt with by the clerk's staff - committal papers, driving 
1 icences, legal aid orders, wi tnes s s ta tements, fine money and fees, 
documentary evidence et. al. must all be correctly processed. One 
large city court for instance (not the one described above) collected 
one million pounds in fines in 1980. 2 The way in which the court 
organisation 1S run profoundly affects all those who come into contact 
with it. The jobs of the police, the legal profession,the probation 
serv1ce, social workers and the experience of justice of defendants 
and witnesses are influenced by the policies, the efficiency, the 
sympathy of the court organisation. 
What we have said so far applies only to the criminal 
jurisdiction of magistrates' courts. They also have a domestic 
jurisdiction, and they deal with liquor licensing and betting and 
gaming licences. Additionally their criminal work includes 
jurisdiction to deal with juveniles, in relation to whom there are 
2. See the Annual Report for Bristol Magistrates' Court for 1980. 
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many special prOV1S10ns and requirements. The clerk's role 1n 
relation to the court hearings which deal with domestic and juvenile 
matters is in some respects even more extensive that her/his role in 
relation to ordinary adult criminal jurisdiction. 
Besides advising the magistrates and runn1ng the court 
organisation clerks to the justices are also responsible for training 
magis tra tes. It 1S clerks, for the most part, who teach magistrates 
their jobs, and by doing so influence the attitudes that those 
magistrates bring to their duties. 
The clerk therefore runs the court organisation, trains the 
magistrates and guides and advises them whenever they sit. All of 
these things add up to a very considerable degree of influence, and 
not a little power. The role of the clerk is such a pervas1ve one, 
that accounts of magistrates' justice can scarcely be complete without 
taking account of the clerk. 
However very little has 1n fact been written about the clerk, and 
1n particular no extensive study has been done to show what powers the 
clerk wields as a result of her/his not inconsiderable role in running 
magistrates' courts. Also there has been very little written which 
helps to theorise the clerk's role, to explain the clerk's role as 
part of the criminal justice process. 
It 1S the aim of this thesis to examine the extent of the clerk's 
power and influence in detail, to analyse the factors which impinge 
upon the way in which clerks exercise their power and indicate the 
pos s ibi 1 it ies for the future deve lopment of the job. (An outline of 
the job of justices' clerks and court clerks can be found at Appendix 
Seven. ) 
The existing literature on the clerk. 
There has been, 1n recent years a considerable amount of 
5 
attention paid to magistrates' courts by academic researchers. 
Unfortunately, despite the numbers of studies which have been made, 
comparatively little attention has been paid to the role of the clerk. 
This is perhaps particularly strange, in that many of the studies were 
directed at the problems faced by the unrepresented defendant when 
appearing before the magistrates' court, and the results obtained 
emphasised the bewilderment, lack of comprehension and alienation 
experienced by such defendants. In the magistrates' courts it is, of 
course, the clerk who should be the main source of help and 
explanation for the unrepresented defendant. (The magistrates are 
another source of help, but they are by no means as effective as the 
clerk because they do not have legal expertise, and because they must 
also be careful not to 'descend into the arena' of an adversary 
struggle of which they are the judges). If many unrepresented 
defendants come away from courts not even having understood what 
happened to them, then the clerks in those courts cannot be doing 
their job properly. However despite this, few studies have commented 
on the role of the clerk and none has examined the clerk's role in 
detail. Some studies simply do not seem to have perceived the 
clerk's presence or its s igni f icance. 
Pat Carlen's challenging and controversial work on magistrates' 
3· 1 1· . courts ment1.ons the c erk on y 1.n pass1.ng. This is on the face of 
it surprising since her work emphasises both the problems of the 
defendant and the 'staging' of magistrates justice, and the clerk 
plays a key role in these things. The explanation for this omission 
lies in the fact that Carlen's work was undertaken in central London 
courts which are served largely by stipendiary magistrates. The role 
3. Magistrates' Justice. Martin Robertson 1976. 
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of the clerk when sitting with a qualified and experienced lawyer 1S 
very different to the clerk's role when sitting with a bench of lay 
magis tra tes. There are only about 50-60 stipendiary magistrates in 
England and Wales serving very few courts. There are something like 
15,000 lay magistrates who sit 1n most of the country's magistrates' 
c ou r t s. Also, in central London courts the police have a very high 
profile and they do 'stage manage' the court, controlling the list and 
the order of cases and the movement of persons about the court. But 
this is also an atypical arrangement. In very many magistrates' 
courts, listing, determining the order of cases, and the job of usher 
are in the hands of the clerk and civilian staff. 
4 Susanne Dell's study of female offenders portrays very vividly 
the total lack of comprehension of many women about what had happened 
to them during their appearance before the magistrates, but does not 
point a finger at the person who should have been helping these women 
- the clerk of the court in which they appeared. The Justice Report 
on "Unrepresented defendants 1n 5 Magistrates' Courts" shows an 
awareness of the clerk's role 1n relation to legal aid, and 1n 
relation to the defendant 1n court - it should have done S1nce there 
was a Justices' Clerk and a lay magistrate on the Committee which 
prepared the report - but g1ves no systematic analysis of the role 
that the clerk plays in relation to those who are unrepresented • 
. d .. 6 d D S 1· . h 7 Michael King's work on ba1l eC1S10ns an on uty 0 1C1tor sc emes 
again shows an awareness of the clerk's presence, but not of her/his 
4. Silent in Court. Bell, 1971. 
5. Stevens 1971. 
6. 'Bailor Custody.' Cobden Trust, 1971. 
7. 'Duty Solicitor Schemes, an assessment of their impact on 
magistrates' courts.' Cobden Trust, 1976. 
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significance or importance. 
The works cited above are of course not an exhaustive listing of 
the many studies which have been done on magistrates' courts; they 
are simply some examples of the type of study where one might have 
expected that the significance of the clerk's role might have been 
more fully explored than it was. 
However the role of the clerk has not been completely ignored by 
academic researchers. Michael King examined the assistance offered 
to unrepresented defendants by clerks and magistrates in a study 
published in the journal "Rights"B. This study was conducted by law 
students who did not reveal their presence to the courts which they 
observed. The study showed that out of 410 unrepresented defendants, 
only 100 were given help by the clerk. The report of the research 
was however, a very brief one, and the analysis of the deficiencies of 
the clerk 1n relation to unrepresented defendants was not 
significantly developed. 
Elizabeth Burney's perspicacious and illuminating book, 'J.P. -
Magistrates, Court and Community9, however does develop and explore 
the role of the clerk. In the one chapter of her work which she 
devotes to the clerk she identifies many of the areas where the clerk 
. . fl . 1 10 1S 1n uent1a • Perhaps it is interesting that it was a journalist 
who first devoted more than a passing mention to the activities of the 
clerk in magistrates' courts. 
The only extensive work on the role of the clerk 1S an 
B. 'Magistrates' Courts Surveyed'. Rights. Vol. 1, No.2 
9. Hutchinson. 1979 
10. See Chapter 9. 
B 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis by Penny Darbyshire 11 . This is really the 
first study from the academic community which ~s a ser~ous recognition 
of the importance of the clerk in magistrates' courts. 
Darbyshire's work examines the history of the clerk's role, the 
function of the clerk in the present day court system, and the 
possible future of the job. This thesis ~s a valuable introduction 
to research on the role of the clerk and contains a fund of useful 
information which had not previously been assembled. However ~ t 
provides only a beginning to the research which is needed. It ~s 
basically descriptive of the activities of the clerk, and does not 
attempt systematically to analyse the power which is exercised by the 
clerk, or to theorise about the nature of his role. 
Theoretical Perspectives. 
One attempt however has already been made ~n the existing 
literature to theorise the role of the clerk. Although this was an 
analysis made almost in passing, it provides a valuable starting point 
for an explanation of the clerk's role. 
Bottoms and McClean in 'Defendants ~n the Criminal Process rl2 
exam~ne the defendant's perspective on the criminal court system, 
looking ~n particular at five key areas where the defendant has to 
make a decision - as to plea, venue, representation, bail and appeal. 
The results of the research emphasise the bewilderment, lack of 
understanding and feeling of helplessness and intimidation experienced 
by many defendants. The impact which the clerk may have on the 
defendant's ability to understand what is happening and make effective 
11. 
. , Penny Darbysh~re. The 
clerk.' PhD. thesis. 
Birmingham. 1978 
12. R. and K. Paul. 1976. 
role of the justices' clerk and the court 
Institute of Judicial Administration, 
9 
decisions about plea, venue etc. 18 touched upon 1n the research, 
although not systematically examined. However when Bottoms and 
McClean come to discuss their results, the role of the clerk is 
assessed. 
In order to explain their results Bottoms and McClean began by 
examining Packer's analysis of the criminal process which describes 
the process as a struggle from start to finish for the defendant 13 . 
However when Bottoms and McClean analysed the reactions of their 
defendants to the criminal process they showed that in fact very few 
defendants struggled to assert or claim their rights within the 
system. Defendant's reactions to the situation were very often those 
of helplessness, passivity, confusion or resignation. Bottoms and 
McClean therefore sought to discover why this should be so. 
Packer's analysis developed two ideal typical concepts of the 
criminal process - the due process model and the crime control model. 
The due process model stresses the possibility of errors in the 
criminal process. Because of the possibility of error an obstacle 
course must be erected of formal adjudicative, adversary processes 
designed to filter out these errors. Because of the potency of the 
criminal process in subjecting the individual to the coercive power of 
the state it must be subject to controls which place the accused in a 
position of equality in the adversary process. Those operating 
according to a due process model would stress adherence to rules 
designed to give the defendant a formal equality with the state as 
represented by the prosecution 1n a criminal case. Packer makes it 
clear that, whilst no-one would be likely to fit all the 
13. Herbert L. Packer. 'The Limits of the Criminal Sanction.' 
Stanford University Press 1969. 
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characteristics of one model (and none of the others) perhaps the best 
example of someone operating a due process model would be a defending 
lawyer. 
Packer's second model was the cr~me control model. This model 
stresses the importance of the repress~on of criminal conduct, and 
hence the maintenance of social order. In this model there is a 
prem~um on efficiency, speed and finality. One of the tenets of 
someone operating a crime control model would be that the system 
should not be cluttered up with time wasting ritual - the establishing 
of a plea of guilty before the defendant gets to the ritual of court 
proceedings is the preferred course. The criminal process for the 
crime controller should ideally be like an assembly line of routine 
stereotyped procedures, those who are innocent being effectively 
screened out, those who are guilty being passed quickly through the 
remaining stages of the process. Possibly the best example of some-
one operating according to a cr~me control model would be the police. 
Packer believed that the criminal process ~n a large number of 
cases approximated fairly closely to the dictates of the crime control 
model - the criminal process tending to be far more administrative and 
managerial than adversary and judicial. However he felt that the 
criminal process was mov~ng towards a due process model, - that the 
dominant trend was towards "judicialising" the criminal process and 
enhancing the effectiveness of the defendant in the process, and 
defendants were struggling to assert these rights. 
The system which Bottoms and McClean saw in operation ~n their 
study was however very different from the one described by Packer. 
They felt that in order to understand the system that they saw ~n 
operation, a third model of the process had to be introduced. This 
third model, the values of which they found everywhere ~n the actual 
1 1 
operation of the criminal process, and even in the formal rules of the 
English court, they called the Liberal Bureaucratic model. The 
Liberal Bureaucrat does not see crime control as the most important 
function to be performed by the criminal process. He holds rather 
that the protection of individual liberty and the need for justice to 
be done and be seen to be done must ultimately override the ~mportance 
of the repress~on of criminal conduct. The Liberal Bureaucrat 
accords with the due process advocate ~n agree~ng that formal 
adjudicative processes are very important - that it is better that 10 
guilty men go free than that 1 innocent man be convicted. But the 
Liberal Bureaucratic model differs from the Due Process model in that 
the Due Process model emphasises quality checks at all stages of the 
process to ensure that the outcome is the right one. The Liberal 
Bureaucrat, however, ~s a practical man who also realises that things 
have got to be done, that the system has to operate as efficiently as 
possible. Therefore the protections so dear to the Due Processer 
have a limit - the system must not become so bogged down that it does 
not operate. So it is right that the protections afforded to the 
defendant should have a limit. Otherwise the system of criminal 
justice, with all its value to the community in the form of liberal 
and humane crime control would collapse. It is also right that there 
should be sanctions to deter those who might use their due process 
rights frivolously or "try it on". Time wasting in an administration 
run at state expense should not be tolerated. 
This model of the criminal justice process, Bottoms and McClean 
argue, ~s the one typically held by humane and enlightened clerks to 
the justices - as well as by Crown Court administrators and many 
others. 
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Bottoms and McClean see Packer's cr~me control model as dominant 
before the defendant comes to court, but when the defendant comes into 
the court setting, the values of the Liberal Bureaucrat become 
powerful. 
They illustrate this point by referring to their research results 
which show that there are pressures on defendants to opt for choices 
which are administratively simpler for the court. They show that 
there are pressures on the defendant to chose summary trial, to plead 
guilty, and not to appeal. Even the typical due process advocate -
the defence lawyer - is constrained by the fact that he is working in 
a Liberal Bureaucrat dominated system. So he may for instance advise 
his client to plead guilty because the system offers advantages to 
guil ty pleaders. 
the court system. 
The values of the Liberal Bureaucrat thus dominate 
Bottoms and McClean also argue that despite its superficially 
similar value system to the Due Process model, the Liberal 
Bureaucratic model basically supports the cr~me control model, because 
of its emphasis on the plea of guilty. 
The clerk to the justices would, according to Bottoms and 
McClean, be a typical Liberal Bureaucrat. 
Many of those who have experience of magistrates' courts would 
find that Bottoms and McClean's description of the Liberal Bureaucat 
strikes many chords with them. Their argument that the Liberal 
Bureaucrat's values are dominant in the court setting also accords 
with experience and the results of the present research. It may thus 
be a useful tool to use to explain the role of the clerk. 
However Bottoms and McClean's analysis of the model ~n operation 
~s not developed in detail, and contains some problems. It needs 
some development if we are to be able to use it as an adequate and 
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appropriate tool to analyse the activities of clerks and others. 
Bottoms and MCClean's study is one which emphasises the situation 
and problems of defendants 1n the criminal process. It 1S therefore 
perhaps not surpr1s1ng that their examination of the Liberal 
Bureaucratic model in operation emphasises the bureaucratic aspects of 
the model, and the problems for the defendant created thereby. There 
is however in their study, very little development of the way 1n which 
the Liberal aspects of the model manifest themselves in practice. 
Also Bottoms and McClean exam1ne the 'bureaucratic' elements of the 
model from the point of view of the pressures on the defendant -
pressures to opt for summary trial because of fear of delay, heavier 
sentence or costs, pressures to plead guilty because of fear of delay 
and heavier sentence, pressures not to appeal because of fear of lost 
waiting time. 
If however we are to use the model to explain how the clerk as a 
Liberal Bureaucrat behaves, we need to know what makes a clerk favour 
the 'bureaucratic' aspects of her/his role, and what makes the clerk 
favour 'Liberal' aspects of her/his role. Bottoms and McClean do 
mention the Liberal aspects of the clerk's role when they relate that 
clerks can be observed from time to time to persuade defendants that 
they must plead not guilty. Bottoms and McClean say that this is an 
example of the Liberal aspects of the clerk's role becoming dominant. 
If the Liberal Bureaucrat model represents a compromise between two 
elements, when will the liberal due process linked aspects of the 
clerk predominate, and when will the bureaucratic, crime control 
linked aspects of administrative efficiency predominate? 
The pressures on the Liberal Bureaucrat which push her/him 1n the 
direction of bureaucratic measures are the pressures of organisational 
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maintenance. Failure to take organisational maintenance into account 
was the subject of Abraham Blumberg's criticism of Packer's crime 
control and due process models. 14 Bottoms and McClean do take 
organisational maintenance into account, in that they identify the 
demands of speedy and efficient administration as one of the most 
important factors of the criminal justice system. However they do 
not develop this in any detail because of their focus on the defendant 
and the defendant's key decisions. But if we are to develop the 
model of the Liberal Bureaucrat so that it becomes a useful tool to 
analyse the operation of the criminal justice system, the question of 
organisational maintenance needs to be considered in more detail. 
Organisational Maintenance 
Blumberg criticises Packer's cr1me control and due process models 
on two grounds. First he criticises them on the basis that they do 
not reflect reality. He alleges that Packer's models are ideal types 
which may help us to learn about reality but are not reality itself. IS 
As a criticism of Packer this is not very telling, S1nce Packer set 
out to do just what Blumberg is criticising him for, i.e., to build 
normative models which would be a tool in analysing reality. Packer 
did not set out to describe fully the reality of the criminal process. 
However Blumberg's second criticism of Packer lies in his 
argument that the nature of the criminal process is not determined by 
Due Process norms or Crime Control norms, but by the pressures of 
organisational maintenance. 
Blumberg does not share Packer's optimism that the criminal 
justice process is tending towards a due process model. He says 
14. Abraham Blumberg. "Criminal Justice" Chicago Quadrangle. 1976 
15. Criminal Justice. Chapter One. 
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"We may be suprised to find that formal legal structures, 
procedures and rules are not ultimately significant in 
discerning the nature of the criminal court. Instead the 
complex of organisational variables which defines the 
criminal court's social system and its interrelated 
occupational and bureaucratic networks is the key to its 
apprehension.,,16 
Blumberg analyses this "complex of organisational variables" in 
some detail. Most important in the British context is the factor of 
workload. Most courts, Blumberg points out, are striving to deal 
with a very large case load with limited resources, and the necessity 
of meeting their "production goals" - getting through their list of 
cases - is an overwhelming priority. 
"A criminal court's stated organisational goals may be 
couched in terms of 'justice' or 'the rule of law' but its 
or g ani sat ion, ins t rum en t san d res 0 u r c e s are com mit ted t 0 
priorities of efficiency and production.,,17 
Factors such as the predominance of pleas of guilty become all 
important, and collusion between all those involved in the process -
including those who are supposed to be the guardians of due process 
norms - takes place to ensure that defendants do plead guilty. A 
further consequence of heavy workload is that rules are broken and 
shortcuts are taken to meet production goals. Blumberg argues that 
" ••• there is an almost irreconcilable conflict; intense 
pressure to process large numbers of cases on one hand, and 
the stringent ideological and legal requirements of 'due 
process of law' on the other. The dilemma is frequently 
resolved through bureaucratically ordained shortcuts, 
deviations and outright rule violations by members of the 
court from judges to stenographers in order to meet 
production norms."lB 
Blumberg's description of individuals in the criminal justice 
system attempting to resolve conflicting pressures on them from due 
16. Ibid. Page iX. 
17. Ibid P.74. 
lB. Ibid. P. xi. 
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process norms on the one hand and the pressures of organisational 
maintenance on the other is an excellent description of Bottoms and 
McClean's Liberal Bureaucrat. It is an excellent description of many 
clerks to the justices and court clerks who feel every day the 
pressure to 'get through the list' of cases before the court and also 
to ensure that the proceedings are legal and fair. And of course ~t 
~s true that when the pressure of business becomes great, it will be 
the defendant - the only player who does not know the rules, but whose 
stake in the game is the highest - who suffers. What is implicit in 
Bottoms and McClean's analysis of the problems of the defendant in the 
criminal process is developed by Blumberg's analysis of organisational 
maintenance. 
What now becomes very clear ~n our model of the Liberal 
Bureaucrat, however, is that it contains within it a sharp conflict, a 
conflict between its due process ideology and the need to maintain the 
organisation of the court. In the ensuing chapters an attempt will 
be made to demonstrate these conflicts in the role of one particular 
Liberal Bureaucrat, and to examine the way ~n which they are worked 
out in practice. 
However a number of important general questions rema~n unanswered 
by the above analysis. The Liberal Bureaucratic model contains 
within it a conflict which must be resolved. The requirements of due 
process pull the Liberal Bureaucrat in one direction, and the demands 
of organisational maintenance pull her or him in the other direction. 
The reality of what happens ~n the courtroom must reflect the 
compromise made by the Liberal Bureaucrat between these conflicting 
demands. But what determines where this compromise is made? Is it 
possible that the system can be totally determined by the imperatives 
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of organisional maintenance, and for the values of due process to be 
ignored completely? 
Packer's analysis 1S optimistic about due process. He 
postulates that the system is developing further and further towards a 
due process ideal - that more protections for the individual against 
the state are being built into the system. 
Blumberg is not so optimistic. He believes that we have a 
constitutional model of the criminal justice system embodying due 
process and the rule of law, but in reality we have an administrative 
bureaucratic system which is perfunctory but efficacious. He sees 
the system mov1ng 1n the opposite direction - the ideological 
qualities of due process concealing a drift towards assembly line 
justice. However Blumberg does not see the system as totally 
determined by the priorities of organisational maintenance. 
Neither theorist explains what mechanisms operate to regulate or 
determine what the relationship between due process and organisational 
maintenance is in practice. The relationship is however to some 
extent explained and analysed by Isaac Balbus 19 . 
Balbus, relying on the work of Blumberg and Michels also 
emphasises the pressures of organisational maintenance and their 
ability to deflect any organisation - including the courts - from the 
pursuit of their original professed goals. Like Blumberg, Balbus 
also sees an ideological role for due process as the rhetoric which 
conceals the realities of the deviations from due process norms which 
take place in the criminal justice system. 
Balbus however points to the crucial role of due process norms 1n 
preserving the legitimacy of the liberal state. On his analysis it 
19. Isaac D. Balbus. 'The Dialectics of Legal Repression.' Russell 
Sage Foundation 1973. 
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1S necessary for the state to maintain law and order, but the 
legitimacy of the liberal capitalist state resides in its ability to 
do so according to the rule of law, and by the norms of due process 
which provide for the equality of all individuals before the law. 
Law and order must be enforced legitimately according to the rules 
which in theory protect each individual from the might of the state. 
This does not mean that the rules of due process cannot be ignored -
rather it means that they cannot be ignored with impunity. 
The operation of the criminal justice system 1S therefore 
governed by a balance struck between competing interests - the need to 
preserve law and order, the need to preserve legitimacy by doing so 
according to the rules of legality and due process, and the needs of 
organisational maintenance in the courts. 
Balbus' work analysed the response of the courts in three U.S. 
cities at the time of serious riots in those cities. There was then 
a real threat to the ability of the state to maintain law and order 
and a very considerable strain on the court organisation. The 
effects of these factors on due process norms was extremely 
. .. f d 1 . 20 1nterest1ng, 1 e eter10US. 
However the day to day operations of most courts are not strained 
by the results of riots, and the ability of the state to maintain law 
and order is not called into question - although magistrates' courts 
do, of course playa vital part in the maintenance of law and order by 
virtue of the fact that they deal with or process almost all criminal 
20. It appears that similar pressures may have similar effects upon 
courts in this country. The L.A.G. Bulletin for August 1981 
contained protests against erosion of due process rights by 
magistrates' courts dealing w~th riot cases.. Similarly the 
fragility of due process norms 1S clearly seen 1n Northern Ireland. 
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cases. 21 For the most part, however, little emphasis needs to be 
placed on the need to maintain law and order. 
So far as the day to day running of the courts 1S concerned, it 
1S the other two factors which playa large part in the routine 
operation of the court - the norms of due process and the demands of 
organisational maintenance. And our analysis so far has not told us 
very much about the factors which regulate the relationship between 
these two elements. We know that due process cannot be ignored 
altogether, at least it cannot be ignored without a threat to the 
legitimacy of the state. We know also that due process rules suffer 
when demands are placed on the court organisation. There must 
however be a day to day balancing of due process requirements and the 
demands of the organisation which determines the everyday face of 
criminal justice. In the case of magistrates' justice it is the 
clerk who is responsible to a very great extent for this balancing 
act. 
Michael King, 1n "The Framework of Criminal Justice,,22 
acknowledges this when he designates the clerk as adopting the 
approach of the liberal bureaucrat, 'to a greater or lesser degree'. 
Throughout the book, where he discusses the role of the clerk he 
shows, with the eye of one who has considerable experience of 
magistrates' courts in practice, the sort of impact that the clerk can 
21. Interestingly, however, when this argument was used by clerks 
attempting to persuade the government to increase their salaries, 
the government used the economically expedient argument that it 
did not regard magistrates' courts' staff as part of the process 
of maintaining law and order. So far there has been no attempt 
to cha llenge th is view, a 1 though one clerk closed his cour t for 
two weeks in 1974 because of overwork, and there have been some 
threats of strike action by clerks. 
22. Croom Helm. 1981. 
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have on the availability of due process rights. 23 The phrase 'to a 
greater or lesser degree' 1S an implicit recognition that the 
compromise that clerks make between the 'liberalism' inherent in their 
roles, and the demands placed upon them as managers of the 
bureaucratic machinery is not always made in the same place. 
The present research 
This thesis seeks to fill what, it 1S argued, 1S a ser10US gap 1n 
our understanding of magistrates' justice. In part it 1S an 
examination of the extent of the clerk's power. Thus it has been 
necessary to show how the clerk's role has developed to its present 
day state, and also to analyse the legal rules which determine the 
clerk's activities. These rules are, however, not particularly 
restrictive, and leave room for very considerable influence by clerks 
over the decisions of magistrates. 
The clerk in court does not only influence the bench, however, 
but all of those who are involved - in whatever capacity - in 
magistrates' courts. Out of court the clerk is responsible for 
managing the court organisation, and for training staff and justices. 
Besides analysing the clerk's impact on all of these factors we 
will seek to show how the pressures on the clerk to maintain the court 
organisation and to uphold due process norms are responded to in 
practice. It will be argued that the way in which the clerk 
exper1ences and responds to these pressures has a very considerable 
effect on the criminal justice process. 
Methodology 
The aim of the study was to exam1ne the work and attitudes of a 
group of people fulfilling a complex role ln a particular 
23. See for example at page 44, where he acknowledges the role of the 
clerk in the grant of legal aid. 
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organisation. This focus dictated the nature of the methods employed 
to collect data. Although there are those who would argue for the 
inherent superiority of one method of research over another, such 
methodological debates are essentially sterile and unproductive. 
Many have argued that the research problem under investigation should 
properly determine the methods used to investigate it. In 1957 
24 d . d b b . . . Trow argue aga1nst e ates a out the super1or1ty of qu an t1tative 
over qualitative methods, survey research over participant observation 
and encouraged researchers to 
" get 
wide s t 
possess 
on with the business of attacking our problems 
array of conceptual and methodological tools 
and they demand."25 
with the 
that we 
His recommendation has been echoed by others including Glaser and 
26 Strauss ,who, 1n their exposition of grounded theory, argue for the 
use of data collection techniques which best obtain the information 
desired. 27 
The nature of the problem posed for this research was one which 
dictated a qualitative approach. A study of the attitudes and 
practices of a particular group and its influence on a complex 
organisation demands techniques which provide for access to the day to 
24 • Mar tin T row. ' Com men ton " Par tic i pan t 0 b s e r vat ion and 
Interviewing" by Becker and Geer'. Human Organisation 16. pp.33-
5. Cited in Martin Bulmer ed. 'Sociological Research Methods' 
Macmillan 1977. 
25. Bulmer. p. 15. 
26. B. Glaser and A. Strauss, 'The Discovery of Grounded Theory.' 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967. 
27. See also S.D. Sieber. 'The Integration of Fieldwork and Survey 
Methods.' (1973). 78. American Journal of Sociology. pp. 
1135-59 who supports Trow and argues for a combination of 
research techniques. Colin Bell and Howard Newby argue for a 
methodological pluralism in 'Doing sociological Research'. Allen 
& Unwin 1977. 
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day behaviour of the group and to the op1n10ns of its members about 
their activities. By its nature therefore, the research did not 
collect a vast amount of quantitative data. 
The research strategy adopted was essentially one of participant 
observa t ion. However although the initial idea for the research was 
formulated at a time when the researcher was a complete participant, 
doing the job which was the subject of the investigation, the research 
proper was carried out using a strategy which has been described as 
'the participant as observer,28 where, in other words, the presence of 
the investigator was known to those under investigation. 
Data for the present research was collected principally by two 
methods - court observation and interviews. The activities of clerks 
were observed, and they were interviewed about their jobs and their 
attitudes to their work. 
However, previous experience as a 'complete participant' did have 
an effect on the research. Participant observers have noted that 
there may be several phases in the role of the observer. 29 Initial 
hostility is often overcome in favour of provisional acceptance by the 
group surveyed, and a period of discussion about the nature of the 
observer-observed relationship ensues before the observer 1S 
completely accepted. The fact that I had been employed as a clerk 
meant that the progression through these stages was very rapid. 
Clerks appeared to find it easy to accept my presence, any hostility 
being overcome when they discovered that I had done their job. 
It was, however, necessary to be aware of the temptations and 
pressures that past membership of the group under investigation 
28. Norman Denzin. 'The Research Act 1n Sociology.' 
Butterworths. 1970. 
29. See Denzin. p.191-2. 
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London. 
created towards identification within the group and co-option of the 
researcher to their views. 
Besides examining the nature of the clerk's role and the extent 
of the clerk's influence on the criminal justice process, the research 
aimed to relate what was observed to both legal and sociological 
theory. We have discussed the theoretical work which has had 
anything to say about the clerk's role. It was aimed to consider the 
adequacy of those theories, and to develop them. 
The period covered by the research 
The research began in 1978, and writing up was completed in the 
summer of 1983. Preliminary court observation at Court B was carried 
out in the summer of 1978, together with discussions with clerks and 
court staff. The bulk of the field work - the other court 
observations and interviews was done during a sabbatical year in 
1980/81. 
The court observations 
The courts ~n which clerks are employed are not uniform 
organisations, and the variations between them can affect the jobs 
tha t clerks do. It was therefore important to establish the nature 
of the differences which affect clerks, and to observe clerks at work 
~n all of the different types of courts. 
Experience of the job, preliminary discussions with clerks, and 
preliminary court observation suggested that the important factors 
which should determine the choice of courts observed were 
(i) The nature of the division served by the court. Some 
courts serve sparsely populated rural areas, some serve small or large 
towns, others serve cit ies of various s ~zes. In addi t ion London is 
exceptional in that it is divided up into several Petty Sessional 
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Divisions and there is a further division between the Inner London 
courts and the Outer London courts. 
The nature of the Petty Sessional Division has an impact on a 
number of areas discussed below. 
(ii) The workload of the court ~s affected by the nature of the 
division. A magistrates' court which serves a city which is also a 
port and has a University will process very many more cases than a 
court serving a small market town, and such a court will have a 
different workload again from a court serving a rural area. Courts 
with a high workload will have more magistrates and employ more court 
clerks. There may well be more pressure on court time. The 
managerial role of the clerk to the justices will be more onerous, and 
the degree of specialisation of court clerks is likely to be higher. 
Promotion prospects within the division for clerks may be higher. 
(iii) The nature of the division will affect the nature of the 
work. For example courts serving large cities deal with many cases 
involving prostitution; those with air or sea ports see customs cases. 
Both of these types of cases would be virtually unknown in a rural 
area. However the types of cases dealt with probably influence 
clerks very little. They quickly acquire the necessary expertise to 
deal with particular offences by learning the law and range of 
penalties. However there may be some differences - a petty sessional 
division in a city may offer greater experience with juvenile work, 
for instance or clerks ~n a smaller division may acqu~re a very broad , 
range of experience very quickly. 
(iv) Geography. Several clerks suggested that there were 
noticeable differences in the way in which clerks behaved, 
particularly towards their magistrates, between the South of England 
and the North. It was suggested that in the North clerks were much 
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more dominant than they were in the South. 
Taking into account all of these factors it was therefore 
considered important to obtain as wide a geographical spread of courts 
as possible, and for those courts to serve as many different types of 
divisions as possible. In approaching the courts I wished to observe 
I was assisted by Mr. Lawrence Crossley who was, at the time, the 
clerk to the justices at Uxbridge Magistrates'Court, where I had 
previously been employed. Bearing in mind all of the requirements 
explained above an appropriate range of courts was selected and an 
initial approach was made to the clerks to the justices at those 
courts by Mr. Crossley. 
All courts approached agreed to allow me to observe and 
interview, with the exception of one court. This court served a 
large city in the North of England. The reason g~ven for refusal was 
that the court had been the subject of very numerous pieces of 
research by staff and students from the city's university. The clerk 
felt rather jaded and unenthusiastic about another research project at 
his court. It was therefore decided not to press the matter and 
another court was selected of the same type. After initial agreement 
to participate had been given, the clerk to the justices at each court 
was contacted and the research explained in more detail, and a time 
for the observations and interviews was booked. All of the clerks 
surveyed were extremely helpful and welcoming. It ~s almost 
certainly fair to say that their willingness to agree to be part of 
the project was influenced by the fact that the initial approach came 
from a clerk who would have been known to them, and that they were 
told that the researcher had worked as a court clerk in the past. 
However neither Mr. Crossley nor any other clerk ever sought to place 
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any limitations on what I might observe, ask questions about or 
report. 
The courts observed were as follows. 
Court A 
Court B 
Court C 
Court D 
Court E 
Court F 
Court G 
Medium sized court serving a London sattelite town. 
A busy Outer London court. 
A medium sized court serv1ng a declining Northern 
industrial town. 
Served two divisions in the North of England 
Division 1 was a medium sized court serv1ng two small towns 
and several country villages. 
Division 2 was a very small court serv1ng a small market 
town. 
A very busy court serv1ng a large city 1n the West of 
England 
A medium sized court serv1ng a Midlands manufacturing town. 
A busy court serv1ng a city in Wales. 
Courts A and B were observed for a period of one month each. The 
other courts were observed for two weeks each. 
In addition two Inner London courts (Courts H and I) were 
observed for short periods to acquire greater experience of clerks 
sitting with stipendiary magistrates. 
A more detailed description of the courts can be found at 
Appendix Eight. 
During the periods of observation a range of court proceedings 
was observed, including juvenile and domestic courts. Whilst it was 
usually possible to see a range of court proceedings, some courts only 
held juvenile and domestic hearings once or twice a week, so that 
experience of these courts was much less than experience of adult 
criminal courts. All other things being equal particular attention 
was paid to courtrooms where there were unrepresented defendants in 
contested cases, to see how much assistance such defendants received 
f rom the clerk. 
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During the court observations the researcher was usually seated 
to one side of the court with press or probation officers, or in the 
body of the court with the advocates. Either position gave a clear 
V1ew of everything that happened 1n court, and in most courts enabled 
the proceedings to be clearly heard. In some courts, however, 
acoustics are extremely bad. In one court in particular the 
researcher could sometimes not hear either the clerk or the magistrate 
from a position closer to them than that of the defendant! At one 
court the clerk to the justices insisted that the researcher sit next 
to the clerk in court. This afforded a good opportunity to hear 
interaction between clerk and bench which was occasionally inaudible 
at some courts. However it had its problems, in that the clerks knew 
that the researcher had been employed as a clerk and sometimes they 
asked for advice, when it became necessary to avoid altering the 
course of events being observed. On one part icularly dif f icul t day 
the clerk to the justices asked the researcher to go into court with a 
trainee clerk and to "look after her". 
Whilst in court verbatim records were kept as far as possible, 
with particular attention to the part played by the clerk. The 
retirement of the clerk with the bench was noted to determine any 
pattern of retiring practices. 
Clerks and court staff at all the courts were extremely 
accommoda t ing. They offered help and advice, included the researcher 
in their day to day activities and gave generously of their time. 
The Interviews:- A total of fifty court clerks was interviewed. The 
a1m was to interview enough clerks to enable valid assessments of 
clerk's attitudes to be made regarding their jobs, the people they 
work with and who use the court, and the future of the clerk's role. 
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The priority 1n the selection of clerks for interview was to ensure 
that clerks of all levels of experience, qualifications and seniority 
were interviewed. It was particularly important to ensure that the 
sample included sufficient clerks to the justices, because of the 
importance of their role in managing the court organisation, training 
the justices and influencing policy decisions at their courts. 
Achieving such a spread of seniority, qualification and 
experience so that the views of all types of clerks were represented 
was considered to be more important than securing that every clerk was 
interviewed at each court surveyed or that the interviews be limited 
to the courts observed. In the event all, or the great majority of 
clerks at each court were interviewed. It was sometimes not possible 
to secure interviews with all clerks, since some clerks were away 
because of illness, on training courses or for other reasons. At 
Court E, for instance, it was not possible to do more than have a 
brief discussion with the clerk to the justices, since on my arrival 
at the court he had been required to go to London on work connected 
with the courts, and had thus no time during the period of court 
observation to allow an interview to take place. When the majority 
of observations and interviews had been completed the interview sample 
was rather short of clerks to the justices and sen10r clerks. 
Interviews were therefore included at Courts K and L - not to achieve 
a neatly rounded number of fifty clerks interviewed but to balance the 
sample more adequately. Interviews at Court H (which was observed 
for a short period) were included so that there were, in the sample, 
more clerks who had experience of working with stipendiary as well as 
lay magistrates. 
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The interviewees were: 
Clerks to the Justices 
Deputies 
Principal Assistants 
Senior Court Clerks 
Court Clerks 
Trainees 
Total 
8 
9 
4 
10 
16 
3 
50 
Full details of the qualifications, training and exper1.ence of the 
interviewees are included in the Table at Appendix Nine. 
The e sse n t i a 1 f 0 c u s 0 f the res ear ch was 0 n c 1 e r k s , the i r 
practices and attitudes. The interview schedule examined their 
op1.n1.ons on their relationship with magistrates, with defendants, the 
pol ice, the legal profes s ion, probation and soc ial serV1.ces. At all 
courts observed discussions with as many as possible of these court 
users were undertaken. It would have been most attractive to have 
been able to conduct formal interviews with magistrates, police 
officers, defendants, lawyers, social services and probation workers 
on their views of clerks. However to have done this would have 
mUltiplied the number of interviews needed by at least five and would 
have required a much more extensive project. The views of these 
other groups were canvassed and have been included 1.n the research, 
but it was not possible to interview them in a systematic and 
structured way. Inevitably this means that the project 1.S about the 
clerks and reflects their view of their world of work. But this was 
1.n essence what the research set out to do, to examine what clerks do, 
the extent of their power and influence and the enormous impact that 
their behaviour has on all other court users. 
The interview schedule 1.S at Appendix A. The interviews 
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themselves were structured, and covered a great deal of material on 
the relationship of the clerk to other groups in the court, and the 
nature and possible future developments of the clerk's role. The 
interviews took between 30-60 minutes or ~n some cases more. Very 
few clerks refused to be interviewed, and most were enthusiastic. 
The interiews were taped, with the exception of two where the clerks 
refused to be taped. Very many clerks found the tape recorder 
initially intimidating, but reported that they soon forgot that they 
were being recorded. However several asked at some point ~n the 
interview that the tape be turned off because they wished to say 
things which they did not want on tape. This was so even though they 
were all assured of confidentiality. At the time of the interview, 
interviewees were given a number, which was the only identification 
which appeared on the tape, on the transcript and on any other 
documentation. This was explained to all clerks at the beginning of 
the interview. They were also assured that they would not be 
identified in anything which was written. 
All interviewees were told that the researcher had worked as a 
clerk. This had two effects. It reduced the amount of simple 
explanation which had to be included in the interview. It also 
induced greater openness, in that clerks appeared to feel that it 
would be futile to be less than frank about their role since the 
interviewer anyway knew the difficulties involved. Thus clerks would 
preface remarks by saying "Well you must know ... " (that, for 
instance, magistrates ask clerks for their opinion on fact). 
Clerks are somewhat cynical about researchers. Clerks to the 
justices have, in recent years, become used to requests arriving 
through the post for them to give information which would take hours 
or even days to collect. They have also become used to researchers 
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spending time at their courts only to go away and write disparaging 
things about "their magistrates". This researcher was treated to a 
number of lectures from clerks about the inconsiderate and ignorant 
habits of other research workers, and at least some of the criticisms 
were justified. Despite this, clerks gave a great deal of their time 
and effort to ensure that I was enabled to do what I wanted at their 
courts, and many went considerably out of their way to be helpful. I 
am very grateful to them for their co-operation. 
The significance of the factors affecting data collection 
The main factor, which we have discussed, which affected the 
selection of clerks for interview was the need to obtain interviews 
with clerks at all levels of seniority, having a range of 
qualifications and experience. It proved easy to ensure th is, SInce 
it was possible, at the end of collecting the interview sample, to 
include more senior clerks to balance the sample. The attitudes of 
the clerks discussed throughout the thesis are thus those of clerks of 
all types. Where the seniority, experIence or qualifications of 
clerks are relevant this is explained in the text. The particular 
significance of the role of the clerk to the justices is discussed in 
Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten. 
The factors affecting the selection of courts were the nature of 
the division, the workload of the division, the nature of the work, 
and the geographical location of the court. In the event the factor 
of the workload of the court proved to be the most important, SInce 
the pressures on the court organisation created by a high workload 
affect the willingness and ability of clerks to help unrepresented 
defendants (discussed in Chapter four) and to a certain extent affect 
the clerks' relationship with police (discussed in Chapter Five) and 
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the legal profession (discussed in Chapter Six). The na t ure 0 f the 
division also influenced these things, and it affected the managerial 
role of the clerk to the justices (discussed in Chapter Nine) and the 
likelihood that the clerk to the justices would or would not spend 
time in court. As was anticipated, the nature of the work at each 
court affected clerks very little except where they changed jobs and 
had to familiarise themselves with new areas of law. 
What the field work did reveal was that although there were great 
differences in the size and nature of different courts, clerks to the 
justices have a very high degree of autonomy in the running of the 
court, and variations in practice depend much more significantly on 
the role of the clerk, the extent to which the clerk is innovative, 
the extent to which the clerk makes policy decisions and the way the 
clerk trains magistrates and court staff. 
The final factor taken into account 1n selecting courts was that 
of geographical location. This factor was important only to a very 
limited extent, 1n that it did affect the way in which clerk and 
magistrates related to each other. We show 1n Chapter Three that at 
courts C and D the magistrates were comparatively silent in court, 
often appearing unable to announce even their own decisions. Courts 
C and D were both in the North of England, and in this respect clerks' 
op1n10ns that their colleagues in the North of England were more 
prominent 1n court was borne out by this survey. 
However, there are other fac tors which are examined 1n detail 1n 
the text which we much more important in influencing the behaviour of 
clerks in court, and many of these created differences not from court 
to court but from clerk to clerk. To stay with the example of the 
balance between clerk and bench, it was possible anywhere 1n the 
country to find an inexperienced bench of magistrates headed by an 
33 
inarticulate chairperson being clerked by an experienced and confident 
clerk, and in the next courtroom the chair of the whole bench with an 
inexperienced clerk. The balance between clerk and bench would be 
very different 1n these two courts - as different as that between 
clerk and bench 1n the North compared with the South. 
The North/South divide was therefore important to a limited 
extent, but it was of little significance compared to other factors 
influencing the behaviour of the clerk which are analysed throughout 
the thesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE CLERK 
The historical or~g~ns of the clerk to the justices 
Nineteenth Century changes - the beginning of professionalisation 
and the problem of low pay 
Reform - salaries and professionalisation 
The legacy of the nineteenth century 
The twentieth century 
The results of the Departmental Committee's report 
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The Historical development of the Role of the Clerk 
The h is tory of jus t ices' clerks is a somewhat esoter ic interes t 
and therefore it 1S not surprising that comparatively few researchers 
have delved into it. Probably the most notable of the few are 
Stanley French, Keith Clarke and the Rev. Dr. W.J. Bolt. From their 
wri t ings and the few other re levant sources, it is pos sib le to build 
up a rather incomplete picture of the developments which have taken 
place in the role of the clerk. 
The available sources do not allow a great deal to be done in the 
way of relating the changes which took place in the role of the clerk 
to changes in society in any systematic way. 
needed on the subject. 
Further research is 
However, although what follows is little more than an outline 
with a few areas more fully drawn it is important to attempt an 
account of the history of the clerk's role because the clerk's present 
role has been shaped by its slow and uneven development over the 
centuries. There have been no revolutions 1n the history of 
justices' clerks, but since the job first came into being there has 
been an almost complete change in the relationship between clerk and 
magistrates. The relationship between clerk and bench is still a 
live and problematic 1ssue today, and the reason for this lies very 
much in the past history of the clerk. If we are to understand the 
present role of the clerk, we need to understand the historical 
development of the clerk's role. 
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The Historical origins of the clerk to justices. 
For the or1g1ns of the clerk we must look to the or1g1ns of the 
office of justice of the peace which lie in the breakdown of feudal 
society and the beginnings of waged labour. 
A statute of 1361 1 is usually cited as being the or1g1n of the 
justice of the peace. However it seems that there were several 
statutory provisions, prior to 1361 which appointed 'keepers of the 
peace'. In 1195 Richard I issued comm1SS10ns to var10US of his 
knights to preserve the peace in unruly areas of his kingdom. 2 In 
1285 the Statute of Winchester appointed keepers of the peace whose 
task was to arrest wrongdoers and preserve the peace. In 13283 these 
keepers were given the power to punish offenders. Such early moves 
towards the appointment of Justices of the Peace have been seen by 
Holdsworth4 as the measures by the Crown to curb the power of the 
sherrifs in the counties, and to oust the jurisdiction of the old 
manorial courts. 
The statute of 1361 certainly seems to have been part of an 
attempt to control labour and maintain the peace in an era of social 
unres t. At the time labour was very scarce as a result of the Black 
Death which had killed something like one third of the population. 
Also the army had returned from France after the Treaty of Bretigny of 
1361, and was roaming the country in marauding bands. Those 
1. 34 Ed. III C.l. 
2. Cited in 'Justices of the Peace through 600 Years' (author 
unidentified) P.7. 
3 •. 2 Ed.III C.6. 
4. Holdsworth. A History of English Law. Vol. 1. P 285. 
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labourers who had survived both the plague and the war into an era of 
scarce labour were asserting a right to sell their labour to the 
h ighes t bidder. 
The old feudal manorial courts could not deal adequately with 
this situation. Esther Moir asserts that 1n medieval England the 
general likelihood of riot and rebellion was never far distantS. The 
preservation of order depended upon a strong monarch controlling some 
sort of effective peace keeping force. The House of Commons, which 
represented the interests of the gentry urged the extension of the 
6 powers of the keepers of the peace. This was achieved in 1361, when 
the keepers of the peace became Justices of the Peace. The role of 
the new justices was described by the statute. They were to 
" ••• inform them and inquire of all those that have been pillors 
and robbers in the parts beyond the seas, and be now come again, 
and go wandering and will not labour as they were wont to do in 
times past; and to take and arrest all those that they may find 
by indictment, or by suspicion, and to put them into prison ••• " 7 
That the statute was a move in the direction of centralised justice 1S 
also plain from the provisions of the statute itself, which provides 
"First that in every county of England shall be assigned for the 
k e e pin g 0 f the pea c e, 0 n e lor d, and wit h him 3 0 r 4 0t the m 0 S t 
worthy in the county, with some learned in the law ••. " 
The new justices were thus to include a lawyer i.e. they were applying 
the law of the crown, rather than their own individualised conceptions 
of justice which had prevailed in the old manorial courts. 
S. E. Moir. 'The Justice of the Peace.' Penguin 1969. P.16 
6. Moir 1969. P.17 
7. 34 Ed III C.1. 
8. Ibid 
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It is important to note that this lawyer was one of the justices 
themselves. This provision is not the beginning of the system we 
have now with the clerk as legal adviser to the justices. It would 
seem that many justices acted alone and did not even have any clerical 
he lp in the ir dut ies. 9 
From the point of v~ew of the or~g~ns of the clerk, it was a 
s ta tute of 1362 wh ich was more s igni f icant. 36 Ed. I II C.12 provided 
for the newly created justices to come together to hold Sessions four 
times a year. It seems likely that whilst individual justices 
sitting alone could and did perform the not very onerous clerical 
duties themselves, when several justices sat together at Quarter 
Ses s ions, some clerical as s is tance became des irab Ie. In theory the 
clerical duties of prepar~ng writs, precepts, processes and 
indictments were g~ven to one of the justices named in the Commission 
as custos rotulorum. In practice these duties were not necessarily 
10 performed by that person, but could be delegated to a clerk. 
This clerk acting for the Justices at Quarter Sessions ~s still 
not the direct ancestor of the clerk to the justices, but the ancestor 
of the Clerk of the Peace . However the same clerk would sometimes 
. d' 'd I' . 11 act as clerk to an ~n ~v~ ua Just~ce. 
Alternatively an individual Justice would sometimes use one of 
his own employees to perform clerical duties for him. This could be 
9. The Report of the Departmental Committee on Justices Clerks 1944 
Cmnd 6507 asserts that in some cases the fees which were 
chargeable for certain of the justices' functions were claimed by 
the justices, but where the justice had a clerk it was customary 
for the fees to be handed over to the clerk. Para. 5. 
10. Ibid 
11. Stanley French. 'The Evolut ion of the Jus t ices' Cle rk.' [1961] 
Crim. L.R. 688 
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his steward, bailiff, estate clerk or indeed any of his servants who 
had the distinction of being able to write. If an individual justice 
did employ a clerk he would almost certainly have employed him to 
perform other clerical duties besides those pertaining to his job as a 
Justice. 
The evidence for the existence of persons undertaking such 
cler ical work for Jus t ices comes from financial records. Fees for 
clerks were occasionally laid down by statute. A statute of 138812 
provides for two shillings a day for Quarter Sessions work by a clerk. 
In 1390 13 a statute directs the justices to include the name of their 
clerk in the particulars they send to the sherrif. In 1542 an Act of 
Parliament dealing with justices in Wales provided that no Justice of 
the Peace, clerk of the peace, or "any other clerk of any justice of 
the peace" should take more than six pence for wr i t ing a warrant, or 
. 14 
twelve pence for a recogn1sance. Much later provisions (of 1753)15 
p lace the respons ib il i ty for fixing the clerk's fees on the Jus t ices 
at Quarter Sessions, and interestingly seem to have been designed to 
prevent excessive fees being charged, since the statute contains a 
provision for a fine of £20 for a clerk who took an excessive or 
unauthorised fee. 16 
The remuneration of the clerk by way of fees 1S important, 
because it led to the existence of a different type of clerk than the 
one who was the employee of the individual justice. By the beginning 
12. 12. Ric.2, c.l0. 
13. 14. Ric.2, c .11. 
14. 34. Hen.8, c.26 
15. 26. Ceo 2, c.14. 
16. French (1961 ) op.cit. 
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of the seventeenth century there had been a considerable 1ncrease 1n 
the work of the justices and such persons as school masters, parish 
clerks, sherrif's officers and even innkeepers, were taking on the 
duties of the clerk for the fees involved. 17 
By the seventeenth century then there were three types of clerks 
to the justices. There was the Clerk of the Peace who would 
occasionally also act as clerk to an individual Justice. There were 
clerks who were employed by individual Justices, and there were 
"freelance" clerks who did the job for the fees involved. 
These clerks were not legal advisers to magistrates. They were 
simply literate persons doing clerical duties. 
However the number and complexity of the legal prOV1S1ons that 
Justices had to deal with increased, and the need for some expertise 
on the part of the clerks increas ed. In 1591 Lombard's 'E irenarcha' 
was published, which was a manual for Justices and contained forms and 
precedents. In 1641 Shepherd's 'Cabinet of the Clerk of the Justice 
of the Peace' was published, and was the first textbook for clerks 
themselves. A certain amount of legal expertise would be also 
acquired by clerks by experience. 
There was therefore, it seems, a gradual transition from a 
situation where clerks were not expected to know any law at all, 
through a development of expertise motivated by increasing legal 
complexi ty, to the expec tat ion that the clerk would have a knowledge 
of the law and would advise the justices. , 
The available information as to how this transition took place 
1S, however, very scant until the nineteenth century. Here the 
sources become fuller and more research has been done on them. It is 
17. French (1961) p.691. 
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therefore possible to look backwards to some of the changes which took 
place and to trace the reasons for them. 
Nineteenth Century Changes - the beginning of professionalisation and 
the problem of Low Pay. 
A major change in the job of the clerk must have been prompted by 
the vast ~ncrease in the workload of the Justices. Their 
jurisdiction had steadily increased over the centuries. They were 
g~ven many of the duties which are now undertaken by local 
authorities, for instance the upkeep of bridges and highways, the 
levying of poor law rates, the apprenticeship of pauper children. 
They were responsible for the regulation of prices and labourers, and 
the licencing and regulation of almshouses as well as many other 
tasks. 
The nineteenth century, however saw a comparatively big increase 
~n workload. The growth of the bourgeoisie, the necessity for trade 
to be regulated, the process of industrialisation and the necessity 
for grow ing cit ies, transport sys terns etc. to be regula ted all meant 
increased work for the Justices. It was not until the end of the 
nineteenth century that the duties of the Justices and those of the 
County and Borough authorities were disentangled, and duties concerned 
with the administration of local areas g~ven to the local 
.. 18 author~t~es. By the end of the century, however, the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Justices had increased in volume and new duties, 
such as domestic jurisdiction, had been given to them. 
The Justices themselves had also changed. By the 19th century, 
the pattern of having a few local landowners acting as justices for 
18. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that they were only partly disentangled since the Justices still, somewhat 
anomalously, retain responsibility for liquor licensing and 
betting and gaming and latterly for the licensing of sex shops. 
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each county was inadequate 1n the face of industrialisation and 
urbanisation. The number of justices had increased as well as their 
jurisdication, and there had been a change in the type of person 
appoin ted. The changing social structure and the party warfare of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resulted in the appointment of 
Justices who were not from the traditional landed gentry. These 
Justices came in for a great deal of criticism and class antagonisms 
are apparent. In 1833, for instance, the Justices of Merioneth went 
on strike because the local squirearchy on the bench objected to the 
appointment to the bench of a man who "was a dissenter and had been a 
grocer ••• and was not entitled to be the familiar associate of 
gentlemen". 19 There was also a great deal of corruption. 20 
The Justices, whatever their class background or honesty, needed 
both clerical assistance and legal advice. Milton remarks that 
"The trouble was that even when the Justices were honest (and, 
outside Middlesex, most of them were), they knew so much l1 sS 
about law and procedure than they did about dogs and horses." 2 
The justices received their assistance from a variety of sources. 
There were, by the nineteenth century, still the same three types of 
clerk. However the days of the Clerk of the Peace acting as a clerk 
to the justices were numbered. By 1834 the Clerk of the Peace was 
prohibited from acting as clerk to the justices in the boroughs, and 
by 1857 was also prohibited from acting as clerk to the justices in 
. 22 the count1es. One of the three types of clerk therefore 
19. F. Mil ton. 'The English Magistracy.' O.U.P. 1967 Page 14. 
20. See for instance the records cited in 'Justices of the Peace 
Through 600 Years' at page 25 and in Milton (1967) 
21. Milton (1967) page 45. 
22. French (1961) p689 The article does not specify by what prOV1S10ns 
these prohibitions were made. 
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practically disappeared, although French (1961) tells us that as late 
as 1938 there were still four Clerks of the Peace acting as clerks to 
the justices in boroughs having a separate Commission. 23 
The private clerk to the justices did not disappear so easily. 
We know that in 1838 many justices were still using their own private 
clerks because a correspondent to the Justice of the Peace Newspaper 
sought the opinion of the editor as to whether it was proper for 
defendants to retain the private serv~ces of clerks who were advising 
the justices to plead their case for them!24 
The clerks who did the job for the fees were also present ~n the 
nineteenth century and many had as few qualifications as their 
predecessors. However the job of clerk was also being taken on by 
solicitors - by men who did have a legal qualification. 
There was a desire in the nineteenth century that clerks advising 
lay magistrates should have some qualification. 25 Criticisms made 
26 of clerks referred to them as "hedge-lawyers" and "broken attorneys" 
disparaging their lack of legal skills. However any moves to 
professionalise the job of the clerk were bedevilled by two things -
the low pay of the clerks and the low status of magistrates' courts. 
27 Solicitors were unwilling to take on the job for these reasons. 
The Rev. Dr. W.J. Bolt's researches into the early issues of the 
Justice of the Peace reveal constant complaints about the low 
23. Ibid p.689. 
24. 2. JPN (1838) 107. Cited by Keith Clarke in 'The nineteenth 
century justices' clerk and his critics' 132 J.P.N. 728. (1968) 
25. See Clarke (1968) at p.729. 
26. Milton (1967). 
27. Clarke (1968) at p.729. 
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remuneration of clerks. The Justice of the Peace was first published 
in 1837 (it was then called the Justice of the Peace and County 
Borough and Parish Law Recorder.) The correspondence in the first 
years issues complains of statutory rates of only one and a half pence 
for every folio of 90 words for certain documents.28 Also certain 
statutes did not prescribe fees to be charged and clerks were at a 
loss as to how to charge for their work. More than half the letters 
to the editor of the J.P. in the years 1937-9 concern the clerks' 
grievances over fees. 29 Keith Clarke cites one case of the clerk at 
Market Weighton 1n Yorkshire which illustrates the problem of low fees 
- as well as other problems - very well. Before 1831 there was no 
official clerk to the Petty Session, and one John Wake, a local farmer 
and the steward to one of the divisional justices had assisted in the 
c ler ical work. In 1831 Wake was appointed clerk. His annual fees 
totalled no more than £20, and from this he had to buy law books and 
rent the room used for the sitting of the bench. 30 
Such low remuneration meant that many clerks held more than one 
post. Sometimes these were posts which we would now regard as being 
highly incompatible. In Yorkshire one Mr. Wildman was a private 
clerk to two magistrates, surveyor of weights and measures, and Chief 
Constable of Stancliffe East, as well as being steward to one of the 
. 31 Jus t 1ces. 
The low fees meant that if a solicitor did take on the job of 
28. Bolt, The Rev. R.W.J., 'Complaining Clerks'. (1962) 126 J.P.N. 
205. 
29. Ibid. p. 253. 
30. Clarke (1968) at p.729 
31. Ibid. 
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clerk he usually did another job as well. We have mentioned that 
Clerks of the Peace acted as clerks to the justices. However another 
combination of jobs, which again we would now v1ew as quite wrong but 
which was then common, was for the clerk to act also as prosecutor of 
cases which had come before the Justices and which were sent to the 
Ass izes. Clarke sites the case of the Warwick County Magistrates in 
1820 where magistrates employed three local solicitors as their 
clerks. These solicitors made an annual joint income of £3,000 
because they undertook the work involved in the prosecution of cases 
commit ted from the magis trates court to Warwick Ass ize. What was 
even more disturbing was that four fifths of the work of the Assize 
came from the same magistrates' court, and that the Assize had to 
discharge a large proportion of those committed for trial!32 
Clarke's researches show that some clerks refused to undertake 
such work on principle, but many others were quite happy to do it, and 
indeed when criticised for doing it defended their actions vehemently. 
In the Justice of the Peace clerks pointed out that the inducement for 
them to take the office was the business arising from the practice at 
the Petty Sessions, and not the job of clerk to the justices. The 
opinion of the editor of the J.P. was against the practice but many of 
his contributors defended it.33 
The practice was curtailed by section 102 of the Municipal 
Corporations Act of 1835,34 which provided that a borough justices 
clerk or his partner should not be directly or indirectly interested 
or employed in the prosecution of offenders committed for trial by 
32. Ibid. p.714 
33. Clarke (1968) at p. 714, 725 and 728. 
34. 5 & 6 Will. IV. C 76. 
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borough justices. Such a prOV1s10n was workable in the boroughs 
where enough fees were paid to remunerate the clerk above poverty 
level. However no similiar provision could be introduced in the 
counties because the fees were too meagre. In fact it was even 
debated whether or not the two jobs could be combined, because it was 
feared that otherwise the remuneration would be too low to attract the 
right calibre of persons.35 This idea was opposed - for instance by 
the Attorney General in his evidence to a Select Committee on Public 
36 h b' . Prosecutors - on teo Vl0US ground of b1as. However clerks were 
never forbidden to perform both roles in the counties. The Roche 
Report of 194437 again condemned the practice and recommended that the 
prohibition should be extended to the counties. It never was, and 
surprisingly as late as 1968 according to Clarke, in a small number of 
county areas which still retained part time solicitor clerks the 
. ,38 
clerks still continued to act for the prosecut10n. This is almost 
incredible, particularly in view of the series of cases which began in 
1924 which lay down very firm principles against the clerk having any 
interest - particularly a financial one - in the proceedings before 
. 39 the mag1strates. 
The problem of low pay, and the consequent unwillingness of the 
legal profession to move into clerks' jobs meant, of course, that 
there were a large number of unqualified clerks doing the job who were 
35. Clarke (1968) at p. 728. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Report of the Departmental Committee on Justices' Clerks 1944. 
Cmnd. 6507. 
38. Clarke (1968) at p.728. 
39. Commencing with R. v Sussex Justices Ex parte McCarthy 
[1924] 1 K.B. 256. For a full discussion of these cases, 
Chapter Two. 
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see 
often unsuitable, and unable to deal with the growIng legal 
complexities of the magistrates' courts.40 This lead to a growing 
number of complaints about the standard of clerking. For instance in 
1836 the report of the County Rate Commissioners had some criticisms 
to make of the standard of the petty sessional courts, and their 
clerks 
" ••• complaints are made of the slovenly manner In which the 
business is transacted by the clerks from their education and 
situation in life ill qualified for their duties •.. 
Many remonstrances are made against the sittings being held at 
public houses and the want of regularity in the proceedings."41 
However a quite different type of complaint was also being made 
about clerks. There were those who were beginning to complain about 
clerks who did have a professional qualification - not on the ground 
of their incompetence but on the ground of their dominance of the 
bench. The solicitors of the 19th century were often quite powerful 
and influential members of middle class society. Their class 
position and their legal expertise must have put them in a position of 
some influence over their benches. A writer in the Westminster 
Review of 1825 was of the opinion that magistrates were appointed from 
those members of the bourgeoisie sufficiently wealthy to be on terms 
of equality with the landed gentry, that they were too idle to learn 
any law, and that they thus relied on having the advice of an attorney 
who led them by the nose.42 Complaints - ever more familiar to the 
20th century - were made that the clerk dictated policy to the bench. 
40. Clarke 1968. p. 729. 
41. Report of the County Rate Commissioners.p. 32. Cited by Clarke 
p.729. 
42. Cited by Clarke at p.713. 
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Certain of the irregularities in the petty sessional sittings 
were improved by the Summary Jurisdiction Act 184843 - for instance 
the magistrates could no longer hold their courts at the local public 
house as some had done - but there was, perhaps inevitably in an era 
of rising professionalism, pressure towards requiring some sort of 
qualification for clerks. 
The middle of the 19th century thus was a time of confusion for 
magistrates' clerks. The fact of the low pay of clerks together with 
low status of magistrates' courts meant that the legal profession was 
seldom interested in taking on the task of advising the magistrates. 
Where legally qualified persons did take on the task, it was sometimes 
only with a v~ew to acqu~r~ng other more lucrative work. Many 
magistrates were thus advised by persons with no legal qualification, 
and the quality of advice which they received must have been variable. 
Although it seems that clerks who were qualified attracted a certain 
amount of criticism on the ground of their tendency to dominate the 
bench,44 there was still a pressure towards requiring some sort of 
qualification for clerks. 
Reform - Salaries and professionalisation 
A significant pressure group pressing for the improvement of the 
remuneration of clerks was the Justices' Clerks' Society. The 
Society was formed in 1839 at the suggestion of one Charles Augustin 
Smith, Clerk to the Greenwich Justices.45 Smith felt that a society 
43. 11 & 12 Vict. c.43. 
44. For numerous examples see Clarke (1968). 
45. The letter to the J.P. which calls for the establishment of the 
Society was signed by Smith and Ffinch. However Mr. Ffinch 
appears to have taken no part in ~he Society. Hi~ name appears 
because Smith signed the letter In the name of hls firm. See 
James Whiteside, 'The Justices' Clerks' Society'. pindar and 
Son. 1964. p.8. 
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was needed because of the increasing jurisdiction of the Justices and 
, 
also because the problem of the remuneration of their clerks was being 
overlooked. 
Strangely it seems that the Society was initially opposed to the 
payment of salaries, rather than fees, to the c1erks.46 However the 
Society eventually changed its views, and became strongly in favour of 
salaries. It acted as a pressure group for the introduction of 
salaries and lobbied M.P.'s and the Home Secretary. The pressure 
from the Society, and the criticisms made of the inadequacy of many 
clerks did have its effect. An Act of 1851 47 made it possible for 
clerks to be paid a salary. 
However the most significant change did not come until 1877, with 
the Justices' Clerks' Act 48 of that year which made it a requirement 
49 that clerks be paid a salary. The Act also contained provisions 
relating to the professional qualification of clerks. Section 7 of 
the Act required clerks to be qualified in one of four ways. The 
clerk could be a barrister of 14 years standing, he could be a 
solicitor, he could be qualified by having worked as a clerk for 7 
years, or exceptionally by having been an assistant to a clerk for 14 
years. 
These developments did not, however, solve the problems. One 
might have expected that these provisions would have attracted 
46. See the response of 
Jurisdiction of the 
Whiteside at p.9. 
the society to the proposed Summary 
Justices of the Peace Bill, quoted by 
47. 14 & 15 Vict. c.55. Section 9. 
48. 40 & 41 Vict. c.43. 
49. Sections two, three and four. 
professional men to the job, and that good salaries would have been 
50 
demanded. This did not happen. The salaries paid to clerks 
remained low, particularly 1n country areas, where court sittings 
would be infrequent and the full time services of a clerk were not 
necessarily needed. In towns and cities with a larger population 
there would be sufficient business for a full time, or at least a part 
time professional clerk. 
Another problem with the salary system Was that the clerk Was 
paid a sum as a salary, from which he had to pay any assistants he 
might need, and all other expenses of the job, including the expenses 
of running the court, paperwork, postage etc. 50 The regrettable 
situation arose therefore that the fewer papers he issued the fewer 
stamps he used, the less work he did, the more his salary could be 
dedicated to his own personal remuneration! Also in some areas, over 
the years inflation devalued the clerk's salary and that salary was 
not increased. Many clerks continued to work conscientiously on the 
pittance they were paid. When the Departmental Committee on Justices 
Clerks began to collect evidence in the 1930's it noted that there 
were cases where clerks received little or nothing for themselves 
f · 51 a ter pay1ng necessary expenses. 
This situation did not encourage qualified people to take on the 
job of clerk to the justices, and many of the clerks who had been 
doing the job for over seven years and were thus qualified by 
exper1ence remained in office. Barristers were unlikely to be 
attracted to clerk's posts, g1ven the requirement of fourteen years 
standing. However, since no requirement of service was made of 
50. Justices' Clerks' Act 1877. Section 3. 
51. Report. Cmnd. 6507. para. 155. 
solicitors they were the obvious candidates for clerkships. We do 
5 1 
not know how many members of the Justices' Clerks' Society were 
qualified, but the prospectus of the Society proposed that it consist 
of " ••• the holders of all public appointments 1n England and Wales 
usually filled by attorneys and solicitors and their deputies .•• ,,52 
The Society therefore had an expectation - or wished to create 
one - that clerks would usually be qualified. However the low pay of 
clerks, and the low workload 1n some divisions often meant that 
solicitors took clerkships on a part-time basis, combining clerking 
with private practice. 
The pattern at the end of the nineteenth century therefore was 
that there were still many unqualified clerks and an increasing number 
of qualified but part-time clerks. Some busy courts would have a 
full time professional clerk to the justices. 
Even after the Act of 1877 it seems that old habits died hard. 
A contributor to the Justice of the Peace53 in 1938 cited his father's 
recollection that even after the passing of the Act several old men 
who had been clerks to individual justices were still to be seen 
attending a Lancashire court, each sitting below and advising his own 
Justice! The result of this was, of course, confusion and 
occasionally deadlock when the various clerks could not agree! But 
whether they were creatures of habit or statute, clerks did not go 
forward into the 20th century 1n a very healthy state. 
The legacy of the 19th century 
The legacy of the 19th century was predominantly an unhealthy one 
for clerks, and it 1S a legacy with which, in part, they are still 
struggling today. 
52. Whiteside, (1964) 
53. Ernest W. Pettifer. 'The Future of the Justices' Clerk' 102 
J.P.N. 294. 
52 
As we have said, not all clerkships by any means were taken over 
by professionally qualified men. The clause in the 1877 Act which 
permitted those with service 1n the job or with long service as 
assistants to qualify as clerks did not simply create a transitional 
period allowing those already in the job to retire and their places to 
be taken by those who were professionally qualified. It allowed the 
unqualified clerk to the justices to become a fixture. clerks 
qualified by experience were replaced in their job by assistants who 
had qualified by serving under them. There are in fact now, in the 
1980's still clerks to the justices who are not professionally 
qualified, but who are qualified under these rules.54 This is not to 
say, of course, that a professional qualification provides the only 
guarantee of a person's ability to be a good clerk to the justices. 
There are, and always have been, unqualified clerks who are very good 
at the ir jobs. The problem with professionalisation of the service 
was - and is - the problem of status. After the 1877 Act the job of 
clerk to the justices was only incompletely identified with that all 
important badge of the professional which brings with it status and 
the vital power to be the definer and judge of standards. A court of 
lay persons advised by an unqualified clerk looked unimpressive, 
particularly when the 20th century heralded an increasing workload, 
including motor traffic offences, which brought all classes of society 
into contact with magistrates' justice. 
Solicitors who did take on the job of clerk to the justices often 
did so on a part-time basis, since except in the larger boroughs there 
54. Michael King, in 'The Framework of Criminal Justice',. (Cr?om Helm 
1981) asserts that 20 per cent of clerks to the Just1ces are 
qualified by experience, on the basis of a letter to King from 
the Home Office. 
53 
was often not enough work to justify the full time services 
of a 
c 1 e rk. 
The Act of 1877 made no provision to alter any of the petty 
sessional boundaries to rationalise the workload of the 
varIoUs 
courts, so that it was inevitable that in the counties and smaller 
boroughs there would be insufficient work for a full time appointment. 
The pattern was therefore, for local solicitors In private practice to 
take on the job of clerk to the justices, advising the justices on one 
or two days of the week and attending to their own private clients for 
the rest of the week. This was a pattern which was to continue for 
some time, and it was a pattern which was not without its problems. 
One of the main of these was that the interests of the court and the 
interests of private practice could come into conflict in several 
ways. It might be for instance that the solicitor's private practice 
occupied too much of his time and attention, so that the court was 
again left to be run by the clerk's unqualified assistants. Another 
problem was that of bias, when persons connected with the solicitor's 
clerk or his firm appeared in one guise or another before the court. 
There was a series of cases in the 20th century which dealt with this 
problem. 55 
Many of the solicitors who were appointed clerks to the justices 
were paid a very small salary indeed - in fact some of the salaries 
. . . f I 56 paid to them can only be descrIbed as pitl u • Salaries were not 
revised as the years passed, and when the Departmental Committee on 
Justices' Clerks began its investigations In the 1930's it was 
discovered that some solicitors were continuing to do the job simply 
55. For full discussion see Chapter Two. 
56. S the report of the Departmental Committee on Justices' Clerks ee . h . 
Cmnd 6507 paras.150-l7ll and the eVIdence to t at commlttee. 
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because their firm had done it for many years and they regarded it as 
the ir publ ic duty.5 7 Al though many sol ic i tor-clerks obvious ly did a 
good job for practically no reward, such a situation provided no 
guarantees that the solicitors involved would devote a great deal of 
time or energy to their work. Also since the post of clerk to the 
justices was often handed down by custom within a firm of solicitors 
there waS no guarantee that the person who got the appointment would 
always be suitable to fulfil it. 
Increasing workload brought problems for the part time 
professional clerk, as well as for his unqualified colleagues. A 
solicitor clerk who was dependant on his private practice for the 
large part of his income would inevitably feel constrained to glve a 
great deal of the incrasing workload in the magistrates court to his 
unqualified assistants. Given that the clerk was usually paid an 
inclusive salary he would have had to pay his assistants from his 
salary. Since the pay of many clerks was abysmal it is unlikely that 
the standard of assistance would have been ideal. 
The reforms of the 1877 Act were quite inadequate to meet the 
needs of the situation. The fact that the job was incompletely 
professionalised, that salaries were paid on an inclusive basis, that 
no provision was made for payor qualification of the clerk's 
assistants, that no provision was made for the rapidly increasing 
workload of the magistrates courts all meant that magistrate's clerks 
went forward into the 20th century very ill prepared. So ill 
prepared were the magistrates' courts to deal with the problems which 
faced them that by the 1930's it was necessary to set up a 
Departmental Committee to completely overhaul the system. 
57. Ibid. 
55 
.. 
The 20th Century 
The Departmental Committee on Justices' Clerks was set up 1n 
1938. It reported in 194458 and one consequence of its report 1S 
that we know much more about the clerk as he was during the first 
three decades of the twentieth century than at any other time. A 
great deal of information was collected by clerks and others about 
clerks' condi t ions, salar ies, workload etc. 
The Departmental Committee seems to have been welcomed on the 
whole by clerks. It certainly gave them an opportunity to express 
their grievances and explain their problems - of which they had many. 
Not the least of their troubles was the question of pay. 
The Incorporated Justices' Clerks' Society in its evidence to the 
Committee was strongly in favour of stopping the practice of clerks 
being paid an inclusive salary from which they had to meet all their 
expenses. The Society was in favour of the clerk being paid a net 
personal salary and of a separate fund for payment of office expenses 
and assistants salaries. A questionnaire sent by the Departmental 
Committee to clerks asked for information about the size of their 
division, the amount of the clerk's salary and the amount of the 
expenses covered from that salary. The questionnaire produced some 
remarkable results. It revealed that well over one third of part-
time clerks received a net salary of less than £100 per annum. 
59 five part time clerks were paid over £1,000 per annum. 
Only 
The 
Incorporated Justices' Clerk's Society commented that some of the 
inclusive salaries paid to clerks were clearly inadequate and not 
58. Cmnd. 6507. 
59. Report of the Departmental Committee. para.I52. 
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calculated to promote efficiency.60 The Society reminded the 
Committee that the more zealously the clerk carried out his duties 
the less he was paid, and commented only that 
" ••• some of these salaries appear to us to have been fixed 
in the days when a man was passing rich on £40 a year.,,6l 
The Society requested frequent review of clerk's salaries. 
, 
The National Association of Justices' Clerks' Assistants was 
formed (on 13.1.39.) after encouragement from the Departmental 
Committee which wanted a body to express the views of justices' 
clerks' assistants. The Association expressed the view that the 
salaries of assistants in many boroughs were completely inadequate.62 
The Departmental Committee, whilst acknowledging the problem that 
1n some areas the workload was so low that a high salary could not be 
justified, was nevertheless extremely critical of the inadequate pay 
received by many clerks, and of the consequently inadequate pay 
received by their assistants. 
The Committee, in its report made no direct recommendations as to 
the level of salaries, contenting itself with making the point that 
salaries should be sufficient to attract the right quality of persons 
to posts as clerks and their assistants. It did however recommend 
that the clerk receive a personal salary, and that expenses and 
assistants salaries be met from a separate fund. But perhaps the 
most important recommendation of the Committee and the one which had 
60. Evidence of the LJ.C.S. to the Departmental Committee on 
Justices' Clerks. Access to the documentary evidence submitted 
to the Committee was provided by Mr. Gerard Sullivan, clerk to 
the justices at Bristol magistrates court, to whom I am most 
grateful. 
61. Supplementary Evidence of the LJ.C.S. to the Departmental 
Committee. 
62. Evidence of the National Association of Justices' Clerks' 
Assistants to the Departmental Committee. 
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the greatest effect on the job of clerking, as well as on the pay of 
clerks, was to the effect that the petty sessional divisions should be 
reformed so that divisions could be amalgamated under a full time 
C lerk.63 Th1" d" I 
s recommen at10n spe led the beginning of the end of the 
part time solicitor clerk. The Committee also recommended the 
establishment of Magistrates' Courts' Committees to appoint clerks, 
fix their salaries, review the boundaries of certain divisions and 
propose schemes for the grouping of divisions and boroughs. 64 
On the other all important question of professionalisation, the 
clerks themselves were divided in the evidence they gave to the 
Comm i t tee. The majority of the members of the LJ.C.S. were in 
favour of a mandatory professional qualification for clerks. They 
felt that a professional qualification was preferred by lay 
magistrates, and by solicitor advocates, that a professional 
qualification inspired greater confidence in general because the 
prestige of the qualification engendered respect, and also that the 
training of admitted persons better enabled them to deal with the now 
complex magisterial law. 65 
A minority of members took a different V1ew. They felt that 
long experience gave the clerk a better knowledge of magisterial law 
and procedure than that of someone with a broader legal qualification 
without such experience. They believed that unqualified clerks were 
trusted specialists who had the confidence of their benches and had no 
other interests to distract them. These unadmitted clerks set up 
their own society, the Associated Justices' Clerks' Society, in order 
63. Report of the Departmental Committee. para 79. 
64. Report of the Departmental Committee. paras. 99-102. 
65. Evidence of the I.J.C.S. to the Departmental Committee 
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to express their Vlews to the Departmental Committee. Members of the 
A.J.C.S. included the clerks to some large divisions.66 In their 
evidence to the Departmental Committee they cited some regrettable 
abuses of the system perpetrated to allow professionally qualified 
clerks to take posts. In one case a post was left vacant for a year 
to allow a law student to qualify as a solicitor and take the job.67 
The members of the A.J.C.S. were however, a minority of clerks. 
The Departmental Committee "after careful deliberation" decided that 
it could not accept their vlews, and concluded that "nothing but a 
f 0 1 10fo 0 oIl h 0 ,,68 pro eSSlona qua 1 lcatlon Wl meet t e clrcumstances • In taking 
this view the Committee was very aware of the predominance of the 
professions in other areas of public service, and of the very great 
reliance placed on their clerks by lay justices. The Committee 
therefore rejected the idea that specialist qualifications for clerks 
and the idea that qualification by experience was a better 
qualification, ln favour of compulsory legal qualification for clerks 
to the justices. 
The rejection of special qualification or qualification by 
experlence was something of a blow to the N.A.J.C.A., whose members, 
whilst prepared to submit to an examination in magisterial law, were, 
many of them, unable or unwilling to take a professional 
qualification. The N.A.J.C.A. in its evidence to the Committee had 
expressed the opinion that the tendency for clerks to be appointed 
66. Manchester, Hull,Leeds,Bradford,Portsmouth,Leicester and others. 
See E. Pettifer 102 J.P.N. 825. Mr. Pettifer was clerk to the 
West Riding Justices and gave personal evidence to the Committee 
in support of the A.J.C.S. position. 
67. Evidence of the A.J.C.S to the Departmental Committee. 
68. Report of the Departmental Committee. para 116. 
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from amongst qualified persons and not from unqualified but 
experienced assistants was becoming too prevalent. 69 The 
committee's recommendations put a stop to the career prospects of many 
assistants in service. 
The Committee 1n fact expressed the V1ew that it was 
unsatisfactory for assistants who had no legal qualification to sit in 
court as advisers to lay justices, and that especially in large 
offices principal assistants as well as the Deputy clerk to the 
justices should be qualified. The Committee felt that if assistants 
were not professionally qualified they should not sit in court if they 
were under the age of 30 or did not have 5 years exper1ence as an 
. 70 
ass1stant. 
Although the recommendation that clerks to the justices should be 
71 professionally qualified was put into effect, these recommendations 
about their assistants were not. The effect of this was to transfer 
the debate about professional qualifications from justices' clerks to 
justices' clerks' assistants. 
The results of the Departmental Committee's Report 
Although the Departmental Committee was set up 1n 1938 its 
deliberations were interrupted by the war, and it did not report until 
1944. Its main recommendations were brought into force by the 
Justices of the Peace Act 1949. 72 
Magistrates' Courts' Committees were set up (under Section 16 of 
the 1949 Act) and the amalgamation of divisions proceeded apace. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
Evidence of the N.A.J.C.A. to the Departmental Committee. 
Report of the Departmental Committee. para.126. 
Justices of the Peace Act 1949, s.20. 
13 14 and 15 Geo.6 c.l0l. , 
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Amalgamation was not always without its problems, it seems, especially 
in rural areas where amalgamation resulted 1n a less accessible, if 
full time, clerk.7 3 However the Act did eventually result 1n 
divisions viable for the appointment of full time clerks,and with the 
. . 
ever 1ncreas1ng workload, usually a number of full time assistants 
also. 
In fact these developments, (perhaps ironically in V1ew of the 
concern of the Committtee to provide magistrates with full time 
professional advice) meant that the role of the clerk began to change 
quite considerably. Amalgamated divisions and the increase in 
workload meant that the days when the clerk to the justices could 
attend almost every sitting of the magistrates were numbered. 
Increasingly the job of advising the magistrates 1n court became one 
for justices' clerks' assistants, and the clerk has had to take on, 
perforce, a policy making, managerial and administrative role which 
effectively keeps the clerks of at least the busier divisions out of 
court almost altogether. These factors also ensured that the 
question of the legal qualification of the clerk's assistants would 
become one of pres sing concern. As we said above, the 19th century 
dispute over the qualification of the clerk became the 20th century 
dispute over the legal qualification of the clerk's assistants. 
The fact that clerks became full time professionals opened the 
door for other changes which increased the power and influence of the 
clerk. We have mentioned the increase 1n the workload of 
magistrates' courts, and the consequent increase 1n administrative 
work. Magistrates became required to do a great deal of work outside 
73. See for instance the contributed article 'Where Torridge joins 
her sister Taw.' 120 J.P.N. 4 (1956) which discusses these 
problems in relation to one rural group of divisions faced with 
amalgamation. 
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outside their adjudicatory tasks 1n the court room. The 1S sU1ng 0 f 
process 1S an obvious (if currently controversial) example of a task 
which has increased enormously over the years. Other examples of 
1ncrease 1n workload are the advent of legal aid, and the collection 
of fines by attachment of earnings orders. 
Three factors pointed in the direction of the clerk taking 
responsibility for some of this work. First there was the fact that 
the increasing amount of work placed heavy burdens on lay magistrates 
who are essentially a body of unpaid volunteers. Secondly the clerk 
was now a full time professional constantly on hand to deal with such 
matters. Thirdly, the increasing workload meant increased legal 
complexity so that in fact lay magistrates relied heavily on the clerk 
to advise them as to the proper way to deal with their many new 
burdens. Inevitably the powers of the clerk were increased to give 
him - or her - the power to make certain judicial or quasi-judicial 
.. 74 deC1S1ons. 
The ever grow1ng complexity of magisterial law, amongst other 
things, produced a concern about the abilities of lay justices. The 
.. f· . d d 75 compulsory tra1n1ng 0 mag1strates was 1ntro uce . The clerk, now 
a full time expert was the obvious person to undertake this 
responsibility and thus 1ncrease his/her influence. 
The professionalisation of the clerk's job and her/his increased 
74. See inter alia the Justices' Clerks' Rules 1970. SI 1970.No.231. 
75. The Training of Justices of the Peace in England and Wales. 
Cmnd. 2856 announced the introduction of compulsory training for 
new magistrates who must now undertake to be trained when they 
are appointed. The issue of training is examined in detail in 
chapter eight. 
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influence was not without its consequences. We saw that when, 1n the 
nineteenth century, solicitors began to take on the job of advising 
the magistrates they were criticised for dominating their bench. In 
the present century the same concern has been expressed, and found its 
way to the Divisional Court 1n the case of R v. 
East Kerrier Justices ex parte Mundy in 1952. 76 In this case and 
others which followed it the courts attempted to restrict the clerk 
retiring with the magistrates, and to define the limits of acceptable 
conduct for the clerk in court. 
This section has attempted to show how the historical development 
of the clerks role has created the role that the clerk has today, and 
dictated the problems which clerks currently have to face. Most of 
the concerns of this thesis have already been revealed in which was of 
necessity a very brief and sometimes incomplete survey of the history 
of the clerk. 
The problems of qualification of assistants, of the 
professionalisation of the job, of pay, of the relationship of the 
clerk to the bench, the training of the bench, and the clerk's 
influence over his staff and the general runn1ng of the court are all 
issues covered by the research. These issues ar1se or arise in a 
particular form because of the historical development of the clerks 
role. 
76. [1952] 2 Q.B. 719. 
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THE LEGAL RULES RELATING TO THE ROLE OF THE CLERK IN COURT 
Introduction 
The purpose of this section 1S to exam1ne those legal rules which 
define how and when the clerk can carry out her/his job in court. 
The number of legal rules applied by clerks is very great. The 
sheer growth in size of Stones Justices Manual, the clerk's bible, has 
an Alice in Wonderland quality about it. However, the amount of law 
which influences the way clerks carry out their role is relatively 
small. 
For the purposes of the present work the body of law which does 
apply directly to clerks can be divided into two parts. The first 
part consists of those provisions (mainly contained in the Justices' 
Clerk's Rules 1970) which have developed the administrative role of 
the clerk into a quasi-judicial one, by empowering the clerk to do 
certain things which had previously been the prOV1nce of the 
magistrates. These Rules and other statutory provisions will be 
examined more conveniently when we come to look at the power wielded 
by the clerk out of court. They are, of course, extremely 
important, particularly in relation to the question of the ways in 
which the role of the clerk might develop in the future. 
The second part consists of those rules which define when and how 
the clerk can carry out her/his job in court. 
with which we are now concerned. 
It is this area of law 
One of the aims of this thesis 1S to demonstrate the extent of 
the clerk's power. Obviously legal rules which delineate the ways 1n 
which it is possible for the clerk to behave limit that power or 
prescribe the ways in which it can be exercised, and it is therefore 
most important to examine them in some detail. 
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However we are here not simply attempting a VIew of the law on 
the clerk in court. That has been done elsewhere l and it would be 
tedious to recapitulate it. We aim to take the analysis somewhat 
further in a number of ways. 
First, we wish to demonstrate the historical sense of the legal 
rules. The rules relating to clerks developed in the way that they 
did because of their social context and the processes of social change 
which operated In relation to them. Lawyers tend to analyse the 
development of a line of cases over time in terms of the legal 
principles arIsIng from them - not surprisingly since the lawyer's job 
IS to ext rac t those pr inc iples favourable to the ir client's cas e and 
argue them convincingly according to the doctrine of precedent. 
However an additional and instructive way of looking at the case law 
IS to examine the reasons why the principles became necessary, or had 
to change, or lapsed into disuse. This is what we aIm to do in 
relation to the law on the behaviour of the clerk in court. 
An important part of such a historically conscious aproach isto 
look at the impact of the rules upon those affected by them, and also 
at the impact of those subject to the rules on the development of 
those rules. We shall be examInIng therefore, the reaction of clerks 
to the cases that applied to them, their opInIons of those cases, and 
their attempts to influence changes in the law. 
We shall also attempt to assess clerks' opinions of the present 
state of the law relating to their behaviour in court, examining their 
1. Most of the cases can be found in 'Stones Justices Manual',in 
Brian Harris, 'The Criminal Jurisdiction of Magistrates', Barry 
Rose in numerous articles in the Justice of the Peace, and in P. , , 
Darbyshire, 'The Role of the Justices Clerk and the court clerk. 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. lnst. Judicial Admin. Birmingham. 
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objections to it and the changes they would like to see. These 
opinions give useful indicators of the ways in which clerks perce1ve 
their role and the future of it. 
Additionally we shall look at the effect of some of the rules on 
the way in which clerks actually behave, to discover whether they 
1n fact follow the rules in practice. 
The examination of the legal rules 1S divided 1nto three 
sections. First we look at the question of bias - the rules which 
determine when it 1S proper for the clerk to act as a clerk 1n court. 
Secondly we examine the most extensive area of case law on clerks -
the cases which define when it is proper for the clerk to retire with 
the bench. Thirdly we exam1ne other rules which relate to the way 1n 
which the clerk should conduct her/himself in court. Finally we 
examine clerks' V1ews on the law and look at the way in which they 
operate the law in court. 
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BIAS 
Introduction 
The problem of bias 1S, of course, a general one, not one 
peculiar to clerks. It involves defining when a member of a tribunal 
has a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the proceedings 
before the tibunal to disqualify her/him from acting. 
For the purposes of the decisions on bias the clerk has been 
regarded as a member of the tribunal. The clerk is not part of the 
tribunal of fact. S/he does not take part in decisions on guilt or 
1nnocence. Nevertheless the clerk does advise on the law and may 
well retire with the bench when they are deliberating. The 
relationship of clerk and bench is a close one, and therefore the 
rules on bias have been applied equally to clerk and bench. 
In fact many of the leading cases on bias are concerned with 
allegations of bias on the part of the clerk. This has not been 
because clerks as a breed have a low regard for the principles of 
natural justice, but because of a particular historical phenomenon -
the part-time clerk. Until quite recently very many clerks acted as 
clerk to the justices and were also in practice as solicitors, and 
their associations as practising solicitors with parties who came 
before the court led to allegations that clerks were biased. This 
particular problem is much less likely to arise now, but there are 
still problems of bias which beset full time clerks. 
The aim of this section is first to look at the development of 
the law on bias, examining the complications and contradictions of 
legal principle involved. We also seek to explain the cases in their 
historical context showing how the position of the part-time clerk 
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created particular difficulties in relation to bias. Finally we 
exam1ne the problems of bias which still affect the contemporary 
clerk. 
Bias - the legal principles 
Perhaps the most notorious case on the question of bias concerned 
a clerk. R v. Sussex Justices Ex parte McCarthyl in 1924 laid down 
the general principles according to which courts should decide the 
question of whether or not bias was present. The case concerned a 
motor vehicle accident between McCarthy and one John Whitworth. 
Whitworth's solicitors were Langham, Son, and Douglas. The clerk to 
the Justices was Col. F.G. Langham, and a member of the firm Langham, 
Son and Douglas. However Col. Langham had appointed a deputy for the 
day on which the case was to be heard. McCarthy's solicitor did not 
discover until that deputy had retired with the magistrates that he 
was Major Langham, the clerk's brother and a member of the same firm! 
When the justices returned to the court and convicted McCarthy his 
solicitor objected to the position of Major Langham on the ground that 
Langham's firm were acting for Whitworth to recover damages as a 
result of the accident. There was an application for certiorari to 
quash the conviction. 
In their affidavit the justices stated that when they retired, 
their clerk retired with them in case they needed his notes of 
"d d "e n the law but they d1"d not need him and he eV1 ence or a V1C 0 , 
refrained from referring to the case. Nevertheless the application 
for certiorari was granted and the conviction was quashed. 
1. [1924] 1 K.B.256. This is still a leading case, but not the 
first case in which the courts considered the issue of bias. 
69 
The bas is for the dec is ion and for a large number of dec is ions 
on bias which follow it was that 
" . . 
••• 1t 1S not merely of some importance, but of fundamental 
importance, that justice should both be done and be manifestly 
seen to be done.,,2 
Which in this particular case meant that it did not matter whether or 
not the clerk in fact said anything to influence the bench when he 
retired with them, but that because of his relationship to the case he 
was unfit to advise the justices. The important factor was not what 
actually happened but what might appear to have happened. It was 
held (by Hewart C.J.) that 
"Nothing is to be done which creates even a SUsp1c1on that there 
has been 1mproper interference with the course of justice." 
This dictum in R v. Sussex Justices was developed 1n a case 
decided three years later - R v. Essex Justices Ex Parte Perkins. 3 
The case again involved a clerk to the justices who attended the 
justices in a case in which his firm had acted for one of the parties. 
The clerk himself had had no contact with the party concerned, but he 
had seen the notes taken by the manag1ng clerk who had interviewed 
her. Again an application for certiorari was granted on the ground 
that it might reasonably appear that the tribunal was not impartial. 
R v. Sussex Justices Ex Parte McCarthy was cited by both judges in the 
case. 
Avory J., (having quoted the relevant parts of the judgment of 
Lord Hewart in R v. Sussex Justices) said 
"We have here to determine ••. whether or not there might appear to 
be a reasonable likelihood of his being biased." 
2. Ibid p. 259. 
3. [1927] 2 K.B. 475. 
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And further 
"If there might, then justice would not seem, to the applicant, 
to be done, and he would have a right to object to the clerk 
ac t ing as such.,,4 
Swift J. began by directly quoting Lord Hewart 
"'Nothing IS to be done which creates even a SUspIcIon that there 
has been an improper interference with the course of justice.' 
Might a reasonable man suppose that tfere had been such an 
interference with the course of justice?" 
These two cases might be described as notorious. They are 
certainly very often cited. The principle embodied in them has been 
used to decide the validity of decisions made by many other tribunals 
where the question of alleged bias by a member of the tribunal has 
been at issue. The alleged bias of a clerk to a local rating 
. 6 
assessment commIttee , f · 7 o magIstrates, of a watch committee8 , of a 
professional appeal body9, of a government minister lO , have all been 
scrutinised according to the precepts laid down in these cases. In 
fact the dictum of Lord Hewart in R v. Sussex Justices must be highly 
placed in any contest for the most quoted - or perhaps the most 
misquoted - dictum in history. It did not reign alone as the 
4. Ibid at p. 489. 
5. Ibid at p. 490. 
6. R. v. Salford Assessment Committee Ex parte Ogden [1937] 2 K.B.1. 
7. R. v. Caernarvon Licensing Justices Ex parte Benson and another 
(1949) 113 J.P.23 and Cottle v. Cottle [1939] 2 All E.R. 535. 
8. Cooper v. Wilson [1937] 2 All E.R. 726. 
9. R. v. Architects Registration Tribunal Ex parte Jagger [1954] 2 
All E.R. 131. 
10. Franklin and others v.Min. of Town and Country Planning [1947] 2 
All E.R. 289. 
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yardstick for deciding questions of bias, however. There was 
another, and still more stringent, test competing for this honour. 
This more stringent test is often characterised as the 'real 
likelihood' test. It originated with the case of R v. 
Rand and others ll in 1866. That case involved two Justices of the 
Peace who were trustees of a Friendly Society and a Hospital Board. 
These organisations had invested money with Bradford corporation. 
The corporation wished to take water from certain streams, but before 
they could do so they had to acquire a certificate from the justices 
to say that they had completed the construction of a reservoir. 
(This case of course takes place at a period of history when the 
relationship between the justices and the precursors of our modern 
local authorities was very different to that of today.) The 
corporation obtained their certificate, but the two justices we have 
mentioned sat on the bench which awarded it. The connection between 
the justices and the corporation was extremely tenuous, and not 
surprisingly the application for certiorari was not granted. the 
Divisional Court pointed out that any pecuniary interest, however 
small, in the subject matter of the proceedings would disqualify a 
justice from sitting in such proceedings. There was no pecun~ary 
interest here. But 
"Wherever there is a real likelihood (my emphasis) that the judge 
would from kindred or any other cause, have bias in favour of 
, .. lb' h' ,,12 one of the part~es ~t wou d e very wrong ~n ~m to act .•. 
However there was no real likelihood of bias in this case. 
11. [1866] L.R. IQB 230. 
12. Per Blackburn J. ibid at p.232-233 
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The 'real likelihood' test was applied ~n R v. Meyer 1874 13 
where the chairman of a local Board of Health sat on a bench of 
magistrates which heard a prosecution of the Board. The magis trate 
~n this case had been intimately involved ~n his capacity as chairman 
of the Board in the circumstances of the case and the Divisional 
Court, applying the test of R v. Rand found that there was a real 
1 ike 1 ihood of bias. 
The 'real likelihood' test has been applied in other subsequent 
14 
cases. Whether on the authorities there is really any substantial 
difference between the two tests is questionable. The dicta are not 
altogether clear. The two tests are usually characterised as 'the 
reasonable suspicion' test and 'the real likelihood' test, but such a 
characterisation is inevitably something of a simplification although 
an understandable and probably necessary one. The reality is 
somewhat more confused. 
The criterion of reasonableness was not ~n fact used ~n R v. 
Sussex Justices Ex parte McCarthy. As we have seen, it was sa id ~n 
that case that nothing is to be done which creates even a susp~c~son 
that there has been an improper interference with the course of 
justice. The reasonable man was not imported until R v. 
Essex Justices Ex parte Perkins, with 'Might a reasonable man suppose 
that there had been such an interference with the course of 
justice?tl5 The reasonable man, as is his wont, stayed on the scene 
13. [1875] 1 Q.B. 173. 
14. For example R. v. Sunderland Justices [1901] 2 K.B. 357. and 
Frome United ~eweries Co. v. Bath Justices. [1926] A.C. 386. 
15. [1927] 2 K.B. 475 per Swift J. at p. 490. 
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and was used in succeeding cases as a notional observer see1ng that 
justice was done. 
There 1S in fact an authority which suggests that an unreasonable 
man might do. Lord Esher in Eckersley v. Mersey Docks and Harbour 
Board in 1894 said that persons ought not to act as judges 'in a 
matter where the circumstances are such that people, not necessarily 
reasonable people, but many people - would suspect them of being 
biased'. However this view has been roundly attacked and condemned 
(by Lord O'Brien in R (Donoghue) v. County Cork Justices (1910 2 LR. 
271) and has not been adopted in subsequent cases. 
The 'real likelihood' test is also not without its problems. 
17 For instance in R v. Justices of Sutherland Vaughan Williams L.J. 
supported the principle in R v. Rand, say1ng 
'It appears to me that the whole law on the subject may refsly be 
found laid down in the cases of R v. Rand and R v. Meyer.' 
But later he goes on to say 
'We must judge of this matter ~ a reasonable man would judge of 
any matter in the conduct of his own business. Can one doubt 
that a reasonable man as a matter of business would, under the 
circumstances of the case, infallibly draw the inference that the 
justices who had negotiated and brought about this agreement 
would have a real bias in favour of grqnting a licence to Duncan 
. .. ?' 1 Y 
and Dalgle1sh Ltd. the part1es to 1t. 
This sounds remarkably like the dictum of Swift J. in the Essex 
Jus t ices case cited above, and sugges ts that there is pos s ib ly not a 
16. [1894] 2 Q.B. 667. 
17. [1901] 2 K.B. 357. 
18. Ibid at p.371. 
19. Ibid at p.373. 
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great deal of difference between the two tests. Indeed this is the 
opinion of Professor S.A. de Smith who says, in the fourth edition of 
his book 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action' 
'''R b 1 . . , . easona e SUsp1c10n tests look ma1nly to outward appearances, 
'real likelihood' tests focus on the courts own evaluation of the 
probabilities; but in practice the tests have much in common 
with one another and in the vast majority of cases they will lead 
to the same result.,,20 
Despite such arguments, however, the Divisional Court took the 
v1ew in R v. Camborne Justices Ex parte Pearce,21 in 1954 that there 
was a difference between the two tests, and that they were capable of 
producing different results. 
It would seem that the number of cases on bias com1ng before the 
Divisional Court had begun to irritate it over the years. This 
irritation was expressed, and a preference for the real likelihood 
test established in the Camborne Justices case. 
The nature of the bias alleged in the case was dissimilar from 
the others so far examined in that it did not concern the problems of 
the part-time clerk, but rather a clerk who was a member of a County 
Council and who advised the Justices in a case where a department of 
the council was prosecuting for a food and drugs offence. The clerk 
concerned had never been a member of any council body involved with 
food and drugs administration. Nevertheless it was alleged that he 
was biased and should not have advised the justices in the case. An 
application for certiorari was, however, refused. The court indulged 
1n a critical review of the authorities and decided firmly in favour 
of the real likelihood test. The mood of the decision is perhaps 
20. Stevens 1980 p. 264 
21. [1955] 1 Q.B.41. 
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best expressed 1n the following extract from Slade J. who delivered 
the judgment of the court. 
"The frequency with which allegations of bias have come before 
the courts in recent times seems to indicate that Lord Hewart's 
reminder in the Sussex Justices case that it 'is of fundamental 
importance that justice should not only be done but should 
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done' is being urged as 
a warrant for quashing convictions or invalidating orders upon 
quite unsubstantial grounds, and, indeed in some cases upon the 
flimsiest pretexts of bias. Whilst endorsing and maintaining 
the integrity of the principle re-asserted by Lord Hewart this 
court feels that the continued citation of it in cases to which 
it is not applicable may lead to the erroneous impression that it 
1S more important that justice should appear to be done than that 
it should in fac t be done.,,22 
The Camborne Justices case therefore emphasised heavily the 
pr1macy of the court's own evaluation of the facts, rather than the 
outward appearance of the facts. The 'real likelihood' test was 
preferred. 
It is perhaps rather ironical that in the Camborne Justices case 
the court rejected the allegation that there had been bias, and 
criticised the tendency of courts to find bias much too easily but 
during the application for costs at the end of the case Lord Goddard 
said 
'If the court were asked to express an op1n1on they would say it 
were better if Mr. Thomas (the clerk) were not to sit when 
prosecutions were conducted on behalf of the council of which he 
was a member! ,23 
The preference for the 'real likelihood' test did not have a very 
long history however. Fourteen years later 'reasonable suspicions' 
returned to fashion in Metropolitan Properties Co.(F.G.C.) Ltd. v. 
22. [1954] 2 All E.R. 850. 
23. Ibid. p. 851. This comment 1S not reported 1n the Law Reports 
reference at [1955] 1 Q.B. 41. 
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Lannon (1969 ).24 This case involved a sol icitor who chaired a ren t 
tribunal when it fixed a low fair rent on a flat comparable to a flat 
owned by the solicitor's father. The solicitor's father was 1.n 
dispute with the same owners over rent. Denning M.R. and Edmund-
Davies L.J. reasserted the principle of R v. Sussex Justices Ex 
parte McCarthy, and favoured the reasonable suspicion test. 
Once more, however, the differences between the two tests are not 
crystal clear. Denning M.R. states a clear preference for Hewart's 
dictum in the Sussex Justices case but also says 
' ••. in considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, 
the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself, or at 
the mind of the chairman of the tribunal or whoever it may be who 
sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there 
was a real likelihood that he would or did in fact favour one 
side or the other. The court looks at the impression which 
would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as 
he could be, nevertheless if right minded persons would think 
that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias 
on his part then he should not sit.,25 
This 1.S an extremely confusing use of the phrase 'real likelihood'. 
However it 1.S clear from the passage that the criterion of the 
reasonable man is the yardstick for deciding bias once again. And 
later in the same paragraph (despite other confusing phrases such as 
'Neverthe les s there mus t appear to be a real 1 ikel ihood of bias') the 
basis of the decision is made very clear 
'Justice must be rooted in confidence; 
destroyed when right minded people go away 
was biased",.26 
24. [1969] 1 Q.B. 577. 
25. Ibid p.599 
26. Ibid. 
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and confidence is 
thinking "The judge 
Very similar sentiments are expressed 1n the judgment of Edmund-
Davies L.J. Referring to the arguments of the respondents in the 
case that the real likelihood test was the correct test, he protested 
'But if Mr. Slynn (Counsel for the Rent Assessment Committee) be 
right, what becomes of the principle which remains transcendent 
despite its enshrinement in the excessively quoted words of Lord 
Hewart in R. v. Sussex Justices that ••• ' (We will not add to the 
already excessive quotation.)27 
Edmund-Davies then took up the cudgels with Professor de Smith, who, in 
an earlier edition of his book had expressed a tentative preference for 
the real likelihood test. Edmund-Davies said 
'With profound respect to those who have propounded the real 
likelihood test, I take the view that the requirement that 
justice must manifestly be done operates with undiminished force 
in cases where bias is alleged, and that any development of the 
law which a p pears 2g o emasculate that requirement should be 
strongly resisted.' 
We seem to be back then, with the reasonable suspicion test. 
The question which must be asked 1S whether a reasonable man, 
appraised of the material facts would reasonably suspect that the 
tribunal was biased. 
This preference for the reasonable SUsp1c1on test has also been 
of short duration, and indeed the conclusion which we have just drawn 
that Metropolitan Properties v. Lannon favoured the reasonable 
suspicion test was rejected by Lord Widgery 1n R v. 
. 29 Altrincham Justices Ex parte Penn1ngton. In that case Lord Widgery 
said that the Metropolitan Properties case applied both of the two 
tests and that it was not clear which of the two tests was the correct 
one. 
27. Ibid. p. 604. 
28. Ibid. p. 606. 
29. [1975] 1 Q.B. 549. 
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Lord Widgery had himself declined to express a preference between 
the two tests in a previous case30 , and he declined to express a view 
in the Altrincham Justices case. He said that the two tests overlap 
and that one may be appropriate to one situation and one to another 
s ituat ion. He contented himself with laying down a simple rule for 
magistrates to follow. 
The Altrincham Justices case had concerned a Chairwoman of the 
bench who was also on the Education Committee of the local authority, 
and who sat on a case where the defendants were being prosecuted for 
delivering short weight of vegetables to local schools. Lord Widgery 
said that where magistrates had a multiplicity of interests they 
should apply a simple rule when deciding whether or not they should 
sit on the case. This simple rule was in fact taken from Lord 
Denning's judgment in the Metropolitan Properties case, and it 
prescribed that magistrates should look at the day's list to see if 
any case involved an organisation in which they were actively 
involved. If such a situation arose they should disqualify 
themselves from sitting. If they were ln any doubt they should 
(literally or figuratively) ask a friend if, in the circumstances, the 
friend thought they should sit. If that friend (real or notional) 
said that they should not sit, then they should avoid that case. 
If we make the assumption that magistrate's friends are 
reasonable people, it may well be that this ln effect amounts to the 
reasonable suspicion test. However, since Lord Widgery specifically 
declined to choose between the two tests, we are hardly entitled to 
make such an assumption. 
30. R. v. Eastern Traffic Area Licensing Authority Ex Parte J. Wyatt 
Jnr. (Haulage) Ltd. [1974] R.T.R. 480. 
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The Altrincham Justices case may provide a working rule for 
magistrates who have a multiplicity of interests. It hardly provides 
a clear rule which can be applied to any situation of alleged bias. 
Indeed, Bridge J. in the same case supporting the general approach of 
Lord Widgery and Lord Denning was clear that the formula 'suggested a 
use ful approach' but was not 'a clearly art iculated tes t'. 31 
We shall see when we come to look at practical problems of bias 
faced by clerks that failure to provide a clearly articulated test 
causes problems in practice. 
BIAS AND THE PART-TIME CLERK 
As already indicated one of the situations which has repeatedly 
lead to allegations of bias on the part of the clerk has been that of 
the part- time clerk, acting not only as clerk to the justices, but 
also as a local solicitor or possibly holding some other public office 
in addition to the clerkship. 
To those more recently involved with magistrates courts the part 
time clerk will not be a familiar figure. Those now coming into 
contact with magistrates' courts are used to full time clerks to the 
justices, usually operating with a number of assistants. However, as 
we saw when examining the history of clerks, there used to be many 
more clerks who acted only part-time than there were full-timers. 
The Departmental Committee on Justices' Clerks made a valuable 
assessment of the situation. It surveyed the clerks serving in 1939 
and found that there were then 1037 divisions in England and Wales 
served by a total of 822 clerks. Of these clerks, 90 were full-time 
and served 104 divisions, and 732 were part-time and served 933 
31. [1975] 1 Q.B. 549, at p.555. 
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di vis ions. 32 Patently therefore there were some part-time clerks who 
we r e not 0 n 1 y par t- tim e but who s e r v e d m 0 ret han 0 ned i vis ion - 143 
served two divisions, 27 served three divisions, and 4 served four or 
more divisions. 
The distinction between part and full-time clerks was not crystal 
clear , however. Some were described as full-time because they had no 
other employment but they were required to do very little work as 
clerk. Some were described as part-time because they did have other 
employment, but were paid substantial salaries for doing the job of 
clerk to the justices and in fact devoted most of their time to the 
clerkship. 
The g rea t m a j 0 r i t Y 0 f par t- tim e c 1 e r k s we res 0 1 i cit 0 r s, but a s 
well as the combination of private practice with clerkships, many 
combined advising the justices with other public offices, for instance 
197 were clerks to the Commissioners of Income Tax, 139 were clerks to 
Local Authorities, 72 were County Court Registrars, and 91 were 
Coroners. A variety of other appointments were held, such as 
appointments to Burial or Pension Committees or Hospital Boards. 16 
1 . bl" 33 c erks held f1ve or more pu 1C app01ntments. 
The Departmental Committee reported a wide divergence of V1ews 
amongst those who reported to it as to the desirability of this 
s i tuat ion. The Committee's conclusion, as we have seen, was that the 
situation was r1pe for an extension of the full-time system, to be 
achieved by amalgamation of divisions where necessary to create 
sufficient business to justify the appointment of a full-time clerk. 
32. Report of the Departmenta 1 Comm it tee on Jus t ices' Clerks. Cmnd. 
6507 para.69. 
33. Ibid. para.74. 
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The desirability of extending the full-time system was partly 
motivated by an increase in the amount of business dealt with by many 
- if not all - magistrates' courts, and by an increase in the number 
of, and complexity of, the legal prov~s~ons which applied to 
magistrates' courts. The question of conflicts between the office of 
clerk to the justices and other public offices or private practice 
was, however, also an ~ssue which exercised the minds of the 
Committee, and helped to persuade them that the full-time system 
needed extending. The Committee recognised that conflicts between 
the duties of clerkship and private practice did arise. It said 
'It may be rare for such conflicts to affect the course of 
justice, but their existence may lead to a belief amongst members 
of the public that the court is not advised impartially •• 34 
Therefore although the Committee felt that it would create too many 
complications to ban the combination of clerkship and private practice 
it did recommend that it would be better if clerkship could be 
combined with some compatible public office. 
The Committee se tit down as a general pr inciple that' .•• ne i ther 
the clerk nor his assistant should act in cases where any client of 
h · . d ' 35 is ~s an ~ntereste party. 
Despite the fact that the combination of clerkship and other 
public office was preferred by the Committee, such combination also 
carried its own problems. Particularly, the combination of clerkship 
with employment by the local authority caused problems where the local 
authority appeared as a party to the proceedings before the 
magistrates' court. Although the Committee claimed to have no 
34. Ibid. Para. 81. 
35. Ibid. Para. 87. 
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evidence of clerks abusing this type of position it nevertheless felt 
that there was 'at any rate an apparent conflict of duties which 
cannot but give r1se in the minds of the public to suspicions which 
are no less desirable because they are founded on possibilities rather 
than actual facts.,36 The recommendation therefore was that there 
should be limitations on the holding of local authority appointments 
and clerkships. 
The Committee 1n its report of 1944 disclaimed any evidence of 
abuse of the system by clerks. However its deliberations did take 
place against a background of case law which indicated some problems. 
We have already seen that a number of the cases which troubled the 
Divisional Court concerned clerks who were also in private practice. 
There were other cases which were disturbing. 
A case of 1884 reveals if not an actual abuse of the system, at 
least a very primitive understanding of the nature of bias. In R. v. 
'd 37, h h I k h" 11 Brackenr1 ge 1t appears t at t e c er to t e Just1ces actua y 
acted as solicitor for one of the parties before his own bench of 
magistrates. Even if the resounding tones of R. v. Sussex Justices 
had not been sounded 1n 1844 at least the cautionary notes of R. v. 
Rand and R. v. Meyer should have been heard! 
Of course both R. v. Sussex Justices and R. v. Essex Justices 
involved part-time clerks who also practiced as local solicitors. In 
fact the clerk in R. v. Essex Justices is a splendid example of a man 
holding a multiplicity of positions. He was in private practice, 
opera t ing a total of three offices, he was clerk to the jus t ices, and 
36. Ibid. para 88. 
37. (1884) 48 J.P. Rep. 293. 
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he was a County Court Registrar. A closer examination of the facts 
of R. v. Essex Justices will give a clearer picture of the problems 
faced by a part-time clerk also in practice ~n the area as a 
solicitor. 
What happened was that one of the parties ~n domestic proceedings 
before the magistrates had gone to the clerk's firm of solicitors for 
advice. She was seen by the managing clerk. The clerk to the 
justices saw a brief reference to the interview in the notes of the 
managing clerk, but he never saw the applicant in the case, and Was 
unaware when the case came to be heard by his magistrates that his 
firm had acted for the applicant, since his only contact with the case 
had been the name in the list of business dealt with by the managing 
c le rk. The only action his firm had taken was to enter into a 
correspondence with the respondent, and this had been handled by 
another solicitor. It must nevertheless have seemed most unjust to 
the husband respondent when he had been engaged ~n correspondence with 
Messrs. Jones and Sons Solicitors, to find Mr. Jones advising the 
bench and retiring with them when they went to make their decision. 
Not only this, but the husband was unrepresented in court and appears 
to have made typically heavy weather of cross-examining, because he 
complained in his affidavit to the Divisional Court that he was much 
confused and embarrassed by the clerk telling him not to make 
statements but only to ask questions, and by the clerk's taking over 
the questioning. 
The clerk did only what any other clerk would have done in the 
situation. He had no knowledge of any connection between his firm 
and the parties to the proceedings, and he carried out his usual job 
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of eliciting the necessary evidence for the court, helping an 
unrepresented defendant, and advising the magistrates on the law. He 
was placed in an invidious position which arose purely by virtue of 
the facts of the situation - that he was playing the dual role of 
clerk and local solicitor. The divisional court pointed out that no 
moral blame attached to the clerk or the bench. The situation was 
one which was bound to arise from time to time. 
In this case the connection between the clerk and the case which 
was before the court was a direct one - the firm that the clerk 
belonged to was acting in the matter before the court for one of the 
parties. However in R. v. Lower Munslow Justices Ex parte Pudge 
195038 (a case which almost deserves notoriety solely because of its 
name) a challenge was made to the clerk on the basis of a much more 
tenuous link with the proceedings before the court. If the objection 
had been upheld, it would have made life very difficult indeed for the 
part time clerk. 
The case concerned a dispute under the Small Tenements Recovery 
Act 1838 as to whether a tenancy was a weekly or a yearly tenancy. 
There were two challenges to the clerk. The first alleged that the 
clerk had given evidence on the matter before the court to the bench 
during the case. This was a very ser10US allegation indeed - Lord 
Goddard pointed out in his judgment that if it were true it would not 
only be ground for certiorari, but it might be ground for putting 
forward strong recommendations to the bench that they had better get 
. f . 1 k 39 r1d 0 the1r c er • Fortunately this allegation was contradicted 
38. [1950] 2 K.B. 756. 
39. Ibid p. 757. 
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in the affidavits of both the clerk and the bench. It was admitted 
that after the justices had come to their decision, the clerk had 
commented that four years previously when he had been concerned with 
the property it had been - as the justices had just found - a yearly 
tenancy. However by this stage of the case the court was functus 
officio and it was adjudged quite proper for the clerk to have said 
what he did. 
The second challenge to the clerk was on the basis that he was 
connected with the case. The connection was that three years 
previous ly the clerk had ac ted for the vendors when the property in 
question was sold to the applicant. Again the clerk was exonerated. 
It was held that his connection with the subject matter of the 
proceedings was too tenuous to constitute bias. If the clerk had 
acted for one of the parties in the case then the decision would have 
been different - but to act for the vendor of the property three years 
previously was insufficient connection to constitute bias. 
It was very fortunate for part-time clerks that this decision 
went the way it did. Life would have been very difficult for them if 
any connection with a case at whatever distance had been adjudged 
sufficient to make them biased and thus unable to advise the 
jus t ices. Fortunately Lord Goddard was well aware of the problems 
caused by the local links of clerks - part-time and full-time - and 
his judgment was very direct and practical on this issue. He 
pointed out that everyone knows "that clerks to the justices in the 
country are normally leading solicitors in the district" and that they 
probably know "a great deal about everybody's affairs in the 
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ne ighbourhood". 40 He held that a preV10US connection with the 
subject matter of the proceedings, or a degree of local knowledge 
relevant to the case is not enough to disqualify the clerk on the 
ground of bias. 41 
In 1950 when the Lower Munslow Justices case was decided the 
recommendations of the Roche Committee were being put into operation, 
and the number of part time clerks was steadily decreasing. As We 
h a v e sa i d, the par t- tim e c 1 e r k is not now a fa mil i a r fig u r e • It 1S 
perhaps more likely that we will find that the contemporary clerk to 
the justices, far from having time to pursue a private practice, is so 
busy that he does not even see the inside of the courtroom very often, 
so great is the burden of the many other duties which slhe is called 
upon to perform in a busy court. However there are still a very few 
part-time clerks. The principles which arise from these cases are 
still important for them. They also form a backdrop to the problems 
of bias which are faced by the full-time clerk. 
BIAS AND THE FULL TIME CLERK 
Two situations can pose problems of bias for the full-time clerk. 
One occurs where the clerk has local connections or associations which 
may lead to allegations that slhe is biased towards one of the 
parties because of these connections. The second arises because 
40. Ibid. P. 758. It was certainly true when the case was decided, 1n 
1950, that many clerks were leading local solicitors. 
41. The question of these local links will be examined in detail later 
in this section. 
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clerks often have a very extensive local knowledge, which can include 
information about defendants or the circumstances of the cases before 
the court which it would be quite wrong for the bench to have. 
The clerk with local connections 
Looking first at the problem of local connections, perhaps the 
most obvious example of this is the situation which arose in R. v. 
Camborne Justices Ex parte Pearce. 42 This case, which we have 
already referred to in the previous section, concerned a prosecution 
by a food and drugs inspector who was employed by the local county 
council. The prosecution was for an offence of selling watered milk. 
The clerk who sat in the case was a Mr. Donald Woodroffe Thomas, and 
he was an elected member of the County Council. The clerk did not 
retire with the bench when they went out, but he was later sent for by 
them to advise on a point of law. Mr. Thomas was never a member of 
any council body involved in food and drugs administration. 
We have already observed that the test which was applied in this 
case was the 'real likelihood' test and that it was held that there 
was no bias in this case. We have also noted that Lord Goddard 
remarked during the application for costs in the case that it would be 
better if the clerk did not sit when prosecutions were being conducted 
on behalf of the council. 
To say that whilst there was no real likelihood of bias it would 
be better if the situation did not arise again sounds suspiciously 
like an 11th hour converSion to the reasonable SUspiCion test. 
However Lord Goddard's concern that it would be better if the clerk 
refrained from sitting when prosecutions were being conducted by the 
42. [1955] 1 Q.B. 41. 
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council is perhaps not surprising when it is viewed in the light of 
the law relating to the conduct of magistrates in similar situations. 
Section 3 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949 provides that a 
magistrate who 1S also a local councillor shall not sit when her/his 
local authority 1S a party to a case. This point was actually taken 
ln the Camborne Justices case, the applicant arguing that S1nce 
Section 3 disqualified magistrates when they were members of the local 
council it ought, by analogy, to disqualify the clerk since the clerk 
was a member of the tribunal. The Solicitor General, who had been 
asked to intervene as amicus curiae used the argument against this -
that the section did not apply by analogy to clerks because clerks 
perform a function different from magistrates and it is therefore 
unnecessary to disqualify them. The Solicitor-GeneralIs argument was 
perhaps not very strong since, as a general practice, the cases have 
applied the same principles about bias to clerks as they have applied 
to the bench. Whilst it 1S true that the clerk does not make 
decisions about the guilt or 1nnocence of the defendant, the 
relationship of the clerk to the bench is so close that it would be 
difficult to justify the application of different rules to the clerk. 
We shall show, in Chapter Three, how closely involved the clerk can be 
" ,.' 
ln the decision making process of the magistrates. 
In the event, the "real likelihood" test was applied, and it was 
held that the clerk was not biased. The Solicitor-GeneralIs 
argument about the applicability of the various provisions of the 
Iii 
Justice of the Peace Act 1949 to clerks was not taken up ln the 
judgment. This 1S perhaps regrettable, s1nce judicial 
pronouncements on the role of the clerk are few and far between. 
However, a proper examination of the issue would have involved a 
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considerable examination of the roles of clerk and bench, and this was 
perhaps an issue too extensive for the Divisional Court to take up in 
the Camborne Justices case. 
The Divisional Court has fortunately not been troubled on very 
many occasions by applications for certiorari based on the bias of the 
clerk arising out of a clerk's local connections. However problems 
do arise frequently 1n practice. A perusal of the Justice of the 
Peace Journal reveals requests for advice on such points at regular 
intervals. 
For instance, 1n 1924 a solicitor consulted the . , Journal s 
Practical Points column with a complex problem.43 The solicitor's 
manag1ng clerk had been appointed Chairman of the local council. 
This entitled the manag1ng clerk to sit as a magistrate. Not only 
did members of the firm appear as advocates before the court where 
their managing clerk would be sitting on the bench, but members of the 
firm acted as deputies when the clerk to the justices was absent. 
Fortunately such a situation would no longer arise 44 , but the 
potential was there for the court to seem not only biased but 
positively incestuous! The advice of the Journal was that the 
manag1ng clerk should not sit if a member of his firm were acting as 
advocate, and it would be better if he could avoid sitting when a 
member of the firm was acting as clerk. 
A more modern example from the many requests for advice on such 
problems can be seen in a letter to the journal in 1970. 45 A clerk 
43. 88 J. P • N. 306. 
44. Chairman of local councils are no longer ex officio justices 
since the Justices of the Peace Act 1968 5.1. 
45. 134 J.P.N. 633. 
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to the justices had a son who was just about to graduate in law. The 
clerk wished him to be articled to a local firm of solicitors for whom 
the clerk had a high regard. Unfortunately it was not possible for 
the clerk to arrange for a deputy to sit every time the solicitor made 
one of his regular court appearances. The clerk wished to know what 
he should do. The Journal replied that the principle of R. v. Sussex 
Justices applied, that it would probably not be a problem when the 
solicitor to whom the son was articled appeared in court, but that 
when the son himself began to appear with his principal, or with 
counsel the situation would be more serious. Unfortunately the 
journal was unable to offer any concrete advice as to what the clerk 
should do in these circumstances, except to say that he should consult 
his bench. 
Such advice cannot have been particularly helpful - especially 
since in 1866 it was held in the case of R. v. Rand that 
'Wherever there is a real likelihood that the judge would from 
kindred or any other cause have bias in favour of one of the 
parties it would be very wrong in him to act.' 46 
There is therefore in the case law a direct reference to bias caused 
by a family relationship. Certainly when the clerk's son began to 
appear in court one can envisage a situation where the bench might 
hear a case, the clerk advise them when they retire to consider the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant, and the bench find ~n favour of 
the clerk's son's client. In such circumstances it may well be that 
a reasonable suspicion of bias might arise, if not a real likelihood. 
These issues were not discussed in the journal, however. 
46. [1866] L.R. 1 Q.B. 230 at p.233. 
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The frequency with which problems of bias of this type ar1se 1n 
the columns of the Justice of the Peace suggest that the case law does 
not go very far towards solving the practical dilemmas of clerks. 
In recent years the problem of bias has become entangled with the 
problem of the status and remuneration of clerks. Clerks have fe 1 t 
for a very long time that they are not adequately remunerated for the 
work that they do. Discussion of salary problems in the Justice of 
the Peace takes up a great many column inches, and the majority of the 
clerks who were interviewed for the present study felt that they were 
not properly paid. As a result of this feeling, many clerks have 
left their jobs to take up others which are more lucrative. This has 
lead to problems of bias. For example in 1979 the head of a police 
prosecutor's office consulted the Justice of the Peace with the 
following problem. He had recently appointed a new prosecuting 
solicitor to his department who had been, until his new appointment a 
deputy magistrates' clerk in the area of the police authority. The 
prosecutor wished to know if any problem would arise as a result of 
the ex-deputy prosecuting before his former bench. He was advised 
that there were no regulations to cover the situation, that the cases 
were against the clerk holding two positions at once, but that there 
was nothing in law against a solicitor appearing after he had ceased 
to be a justices' clerk's assistant. The journal declined to lay 
down any guidelines since they felt that cases would vary so much on 
their facts. 
This request for advice prompted a lively correspondence in the 
Journal. Shortly after the answer had appeared in the Practical 
Points column, a letter was printed from the Association of 
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Magisterial Officers. 47 The Association expressed concern that 
clerks should be taking jobs as prosecuting solicitors. They pointed 
out that there were also instances of prosecuting solicitors taking 
jobs as clerks, and of police officers taking jobs as clerks 1n the 
area where they had previously been prosecuting. In the V1ew of the 
Association such situations were totally unacceptable, and represented 
a breach of the principles of natural justice. The Association felt 
'That court staffs should be seen to be independent of any person 
or body appearing before the justices 1S of paramount 
importance. ' 
A later correspondent on the same issue took the problem to its 
extreme by contending that it would be difficult for any clerk to 
claim that he was independent as clerks are paid by the local 
authority. The Journal was not impressed. It pointed out that the 
Magistrates' Courts Committees administer and determine the clerks 
salary, and that the connection of the clerks with the local authority 
48 
was extremely tenuous. 
The week following this rather thin argument that clerks were 
always biased an attack was made on the Association of Magisterial 
Officers position by a clerk who said that the Association's views 
reflected 'a failure to comprehend that independence of mind which is 
the product of professional training and the very basis of the English 
Legal System.,49 This clerk stated that he had prosecuted without 
embarrassment before a bench which he had previously advised as a 
clerk. He felt that the ability to keep an open mind on the part of 
47. 143 J.P.N. 411. 
48. 143 J.P.N. 411. 
49. 143 J.P.N. 494. 
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the bench, clerks and the profession constituted sufficient protection 
against bias. 
Such a position would seem to go a good deal beyond that of even 
the most enthusiastic proponents of the real likelihood test. One 
wonders why so much effort has been expended in developing tests 
concerning bias, if they are unnecessary because the "independence 0 f 
mind" of those concerned 1S to be relied upon. 
Apart from revealing some rather idiosyncratic V1ews held by 
those associated with the magistrates' courts on the question of bias, 
these examples demons tra te that such problems ar ise with frequency, 
and that the cases which have so far been decided on the point do not 
always give the necessary assistance to those clerks who have to 
grapple with the real problems of bias as they ar1se 1n practice. 
The seeming inability of the Divisional Court to agree upon the 
correct test for bias does not help the situation, but even if one 
test were to be clearly preferred it would still be difficult to see 
how some of the problems raised by clerks 1n the columns of the 
Justice of the Peace would be answered. 
We have considered the problems which ar1se 1n relation to clerks 
with what we have called 'local connections'. A further problem 
arises in relation to the local knowledge of clerks. 
The local knowledge of clerks. 
The duties of the clerk do not begin and end 1n the courtroom. 
The clerks in any court are concerned in the general management of the 
court's business, and clerks and their staff prepare all the paperwork 
which 1S ancillary to the court hearing. They may well see 
defendants, prosecutors, local solicitors, witnesses outside the 
courtroom when such people come looking for help and guidance. 
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The clerks may know many of these people very well. This 
applies not only to those whose jobs associate them with the court but 
also to defendants and their families. This 1ssue was discussed by 
the Departmental Committee on Justices Clerks in 1944 50 and also 1n 
1950 in R v. Lower Munslow Justices ex parte Pudge, 51 where Lord 
Goddard said 
'The clerk probably knows a great deal about everybody's affairs 
in the neighbourhood. He certainly knows a good deal about the 
defendants who appear before the justices occasionally - those we 
may call their regular customers ••• ' 
Magistrates, of course also get to know their regular customers 
quite well. An anecdote from the exper1ence of the author 
illustrates the sort of situation which may occur. The author was 
clerk in a court when one of the court's regular customers pleaded 
guilty to the offence of drunkenness. A problem arose in that the 
defendant had accumulated a large debt in unpaid fines. The 
situation was such that the usual practice of the court would have 
been a committal to prison or at the very least a suspended committal. 
The court staff knew the defendant well enough to know that the fines 
would remain unpaid Slnce he 'drank' all his available cash. The 
warrant officer, however, suggested that rather than commit the 
defendant to prison the defendant's brother might be willing to pay 
the fines. The brother was therefore contacted, whilst the defendant 
was taken to the cells and plied with cups of coffee to sober him up. 
Later in the day the brother arrived. He also was well known to the 
court staff. The brother paid the fines and took the defendant home 
50. Cmnd. 6507 at paras. 51-54. 
51. [1950] 2 K.B. at 758 
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with him, having been encouraged to dry him out. Thus by somewhat 
informal means the court avoided sending the defendant to prison, 
cleared a considerable amount in unpaid fines, and further kept the 
defendant off the streets for at least a short period of time. 
Although magistrates may know quite a lot about their regulars, 
it will almost always be true that the clerk will know more. The 
clerks will sit 1n court/almost every day, whilst a magistrate will 
sit once a week, or less. The clerk will often see a case through 
many bail applications, and over several weeks to a final hearing and 
sentence. During this time s/he will accumulate quite a lot of 
knowledge about a defendant. Clerks are frequently entertained by 
defendants who claim to have large liquid assets when they apply for 
" 
bail which later mysteriously disappear when they make a plea in 
mitigation or make arrangements to pay their fine before a different 
bench. 
Outside the courtroom clerks will be approached by confused 
defendants looking for advice, will be consulted by prosecutors and 
defence solicitors wishing to make arrangements about their cases, and 
by probation officers needing guidance. Much of the information 
which comes the clerk's way from such encounters will be of a purely 
functional nature - whether X is pleading guilty, or whether Y's plea 
of not guilty will take all morning to hear, or that constable 
Bloggins has been on night duty. However, some of it will be 
information of greater moment, information which the clerk may have 
been given but which it would be quite wrong for the bench to know. 
It may be, for instance, that a defendant aged 19 is pleading not 
guilty to an offence of burglary. The clerk may know that the 
defendant has three previous convictions for the same offence with the 
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same modus operandi 1n the Juvenile court. However it may well happen 
that no member of the bench dealing with the case is a juvenile 
magistrate. It would of course be highly improper for the clerk to 
tell the bench what s/he knows - although many defendants must wonder 
at what goes on in the retiring room if the bench call the clerk out 
to g1ve them legal advice, and the defendant has Seen the clerk many 
times before. 
More than not tell ing the bench tha t the de fendan t is known to 
the court, the clerk must also be careful not to indicate by her or 
his behaviour that s/he knows the defendant. Otherwise any magistrate 
endowed with a modicum of intelligence will soon realise that the 
defendant has been there before. Lord Goddard 1n 
( 1 ) . . 52 . R. v. Barry G amorgan Just1ces Ex parte Kash1m was at pa1ns to 
point out the dangers of this situation. That case concerned a clerk 
who retired with the bench when there was no question of law on which 
the bench needed his advice. Lord Goddard said 
'One of the considerations which the court had in mind in the 
East Kerrier case was the very thing that has happened in this 
case. The applicant has previous convictions in courts in which 
this very clerk has sat as a clerk. I do not impute to the 
clerk any misconduct in the justices room, but it is important to 
bear in mind that justice must not only be done but must 
manifestly be seen to be done. ,53 
1 · d 54 ~ v. Lower Muns ow Just1ce Ex Parte Pu ge 1S quite clear on 
:If the question of how the clerk should behave if s/he has information 
about the circumstances of the parties or the case. It does not 1n 
~ itself constitute bias, for 
" 
1, 
52. [1953] 2 All E.R. 1005 
53. Ibid p.1007 
54. [1950] 2 K.B. 756. 
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'It would be an astonishing doctrine to lay down that because a 
justices clerk knows something about the matter before the court 
and his knowledge has been acquired owing to a transaction he has 
had with some previous person connected with the subject matter 
of the litigation he is thereby debarred from acting as clerk. ,55 
However if the clerk has information pertinent to a case s/he must 
keep it to her/himself. 
'Of course if he communicates his knowledge to the justices and 
tells them facts which would mean that he was giving evidence 
behind the backs of the parties and not being subject to cross 
examination he would be acting most improperly. ,56 
If the clerk had information about a case and did surreptitiously g1ve 
evidence by informing the justices of matters within his own personal 
knowledge this would be most improper. 
' ••• it would be a matter of the gravest moment. It would 
certainly be a ground for certiorari, and it might be a ground 
for putting forward strong recommendations to the bench that they 
had better get rid of their clerk. ,57 
If, the ref 0 r e, the c 1 e r k has any in for mat ion abo u t the par tie s 
before the court, or the subject matter of the proceedings, s/he must 
keep such information strictly from the bench. This is of course a 
matter where it is necessary to rely on the integrity of the clerk, 
s1nce there is often no way in which the defendant can know what has 
been said in the retiring room. Also it 1S a matter for the 
sensitivity of the clerk, S1nce, as we have said,it is not always 
necessary for the clerk to speak to the bench 1n order for the clerk 
to communicate to them very effectively that s/he knows the defendant. 
If the clerk says, when the defendant comes into the dock, "Ah, its 
Mr. Fagin, isn't it? I see you are now living 1n Whitechapel, Mr. 
55. Ibid p.758. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid. p.757. 
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Fagin. Is that correct?" the magistrates will immediately know 
that the defendant has been there before several times, even if he ~s 
not known to them. 
A more recent case on the question of bias challenged not the 
information which the clerk had about a defendant, but the attitudes 
of the clerk! R.v. Uxbridge Justices Ex parte Burbridge58 concerned 
a defendant who was employed as a loader at Heathrow Airport. Mr. 
Burbridge was before the court in connection with alleged offences 
arising from an industrial dispute. His legal adviser, a Mr. 
Emonson, appears to have had a discussion with the clerk to the 
Justices concerning the hearing of his client's case which Mr. Emonson 
described as somewhat acrimonious. Mr. Emonson alleged that the 
clerk to the justices had said 'We know all about the loaders at the 
airport and the ir thieving.' When Mr. Burbridge's case came before 
the court on the following day Mr. Emonson reported the conversation 
of the previous day and requested that the court not try the case 
because it was biased. The clerk to the justices was not advising 
the bench on that day. The bench retired to consider the 
application, and came to the conclusion that there was no bias, that 
whatever the opinion of the clerk to the justices was, it could not 
extend to 60 or more Uxbridge magistrates. The bench had not spoken 
to the clerk to the justices and did not share what was reported as 
his op~n~on. They therefore proceeded to try the case. 
There was an application for certiorari, (which was heard by 
Widgery LCJ, Willis J. and Bridge J.) Lord Widgery, adopting the 
reasonable suspicion test and accepting Mr. Emonson's version of 
, 
~ 58. The Times, June 21st 1972. 
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events (i.e. being as generous to the applicant as possible) held that 
there was no bias. The case was decided entirely on its facts -
their Lordships feeling that the case was so far from either 
definition of bias that it was unnecessary to decide which definition 
of bias applied. 
It would have been an alarming extension of the doctrine of bias 
to have held that a remark made out of court by the clerk to a 
solicitor could influence the magistrates on the bench against a 
particular defendant or class of defendants, without the bench even 
having heard the remark. 
It is true however that the opinions of clerks, and more 
particularly the opinions of the clerk to the justices, do have an 
effect upon magistrates to some extent. The clerk to the justices 
will probably have been responsible for all or part of the education 
of the bench in their duties as magistrates. The clerk also is 
responsible for the general running of the court, and will have an 
impact on the education and attitudes of her/his assistants. The 
opinions of the clerk to the justices are inevitably powerful. 
Whilst it might be suggesting too much to allege that a justices clerk 
could inculcate a bias against a whole class of defendants in all 60 
magistrates in his division one should not underestimate the real 
influence that the clerk has. The influence of the clerk on the 
magistrates in court will be discussed in Chapter Three, and the 
influence of the clerk to the justices when training magistates is 
developed in Chapter Eight. 
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THE RETIREMENT OF THE CLERK WITH THE BENCH 
The decision 1n R v East Kerrier Justices Ex Parte Mundy, 19521 
The aspect of the clerk's activites which has attracted the most 
judicial notice 1S the retirement of the clerk with the justices. 
Prior to the very general provisions of the Justices of the Peace 
Act 1968, there was no statutory definition of the clerk's role. The 
behaviour of the clerk in court, the relationship of the clerk and 
bench, and the part the clerk should play in the proceedings was 
nowhere regulated. 
The clerk did her/his job - however each clerk chose to define it 
- 1n a legal vacuum. When the recommendations of the Roche Report 
began to be implemented the problems of bias, which had been for the 
most part a problem of part-time solicitor clerks, began to fade into 
the background. In the place of the part-timers came full-time 
professionals and with them came a concern that clerks might be too 
dominant, or might even be usurping the functions of the bench. This 
concern has focussed, for many reasons (which we will examine), on the 
question of when it is proper for the clerk to retire with the 
justices. The first, and undoubtedly the most notorious of the cases 
was R v East Kerrier Justices Ex parte Mundy decided in 1952. The 
case concerned an application for certiorari by a Mr. Mundy who had 
been convicted by the justices for driving without due care and 
attention. Mr. Mundy had been fined £5 and disqualified from driving 
for 3 months. Mr. Mundy had contested the case before the 
magistrates, and when the bench had retired to consider their verdict 
ilB' 
their clerk had retired with them. The clerk had later returned into 
1. [1952] 2 QB. 144. 
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court and spoken to a police officer from whom he had received a p1ece 
of paper. The clerk had taken the paper back into the retiring room. 
The justices had then returned to court and announced a conviction. 
They had asked for evidence of previous convictions, if any, and the 
police officer had given evidence of a previous conviction. The 
clerk had then told the bench what the maximum penalty was and the 
bench had announced their decision. 
The p1ece of paper that the justices received contained 
information about the defendant's preV10US conviction. The justices 
affidavit showed that pr10r to rece1v1ng this information they had 
decided to convict. The Divisional Court accepted that there had 
been no impropriety 1n fact. However, it was felt that justice was 
not seen to be done, that there was an apparent if not a real 
impropriety and the defendant's conviction was quashed. It was the 
then Chief Justice, Lord Goddard who reviewed the authorities and gave 
the principal judgment in the case and concluded that the conviction 
should be quashed. Hilberry J. and Devlin, J. somewhat hesitantly2 
agreed. 
However, it was not the substance of the decision in the case 
which gave rise to so much concern. It was certain remarks made 
obiter by Lord Goddard. Although he did not "comment strongly on the 
II', ,., 
conduct of the justices in this case because ••. they intended to act 
properly ••• "3 he did comment strongly on the conduct of the clerk. 
He said 
2. See [1952] 2 QB 146 at B, and F. 
3. Ibid. at 144. 
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"Another matter which I feel bound to mention is this. Although 
I cannot for the moment trace the authority, I think it has 
certainly been said more than once in this court that it is not 
right that the justices' clerk should retire with the justices. 
It has been said over and over again that the decision must be 
the decision of the justices, not the decision of the justices 
and their clerk, still less the decision of the clerk, and if the 
clerk retires with the justices, people will inevitably form the 
conclusion that the justices' clerk may influence the justices or 
may take some course which it is for the justices alone to take." 
He continued 
"The justices can always send for the clerk if they requ1re 
advice on a point of law, because that is what the clerk is there 
for, but it is not desirable and it is not, I would say, regular, 
for a clerk to retire with the justices as a matter of course at 
the time they are considering the facts. He should remain in 
court until the justices either return into court or send for 
him. ,,4 
He pointed out that although it was not necessary to decide whether 
this conviction should be quashed on the grounds of the clerk's 
conduct he believed this to have been done in one case. 
The effect of East Kerrier 
The remarks of Lord Goddard had considerable impact on 
magistrates' clerks. One writer, Cecil Latham, assessed the dictum as 
follows 
"This short, extempore, obiter dictum, uttered without any 
argument or submissions by counsel on the point made an immediate 
and lasting impact on the functioning of magistrates' courts. 
Unnecessary though the observation was for the decision in the 
East Kerrier case it was a statement of fundamental importance 
for magistrates a~d their clerks."S 
For all clerks, the decision in the East Kerrier case must rank as the 
most notorious decision ever taken by the Divisional Court - despite 
recent close competition. 
4. Ibid. at page 146 
5. 139 JPN 106 (1975) 
103 
At the time of the decision, however, the public reaction of 
clerks was extremely restrained. The Justice of the Peace first 
reported the decision without comment.6 It later cited the relevant 
passage from the report (that passage quoted above) with the comment 
"We think it is important to give the Lord Chief Justice's own 
words on this very important matter so that all readers may be 
left in no doubt as to the position. Both justices and their 
clerks should take heed and act accordingly.,,7 
A sensitive ear might suspect a heavy irony behind this seemingly 
formal statement. 
Later commentators were more forthright. For instance, 
J.N.Martin, in an article written for the Justice of the Peace shortly 
after the decision, whilst saying that he was prepared to award the 
greatest respect to the Lord Chief Justice, nevertheless proceeded to 
be extremely critical both of the premises of his argument and of his 
. 8 
reasoning. Mr. Martin was to be followed by many others over the 
years. 
It IS indisputable that the decision In East Kerrier caused a 
great deal of uncertainty and confusion In magistrates' courts. 
However, a number of questions need to be answered if an explanation 
is to be attempted as to why the problems were so great. First it IS 
helpful to establish what, if any, were the rules on the clerk's 
retirement prior to the decision. Secondly we need to know what the 
existing practice was and thirdly, we must discover what the effect of 
East Kerrier was on the practice of clerks. 
6 . 116 JPN 3 92 
7. 116 JPN 415 
8. J.N. Martin, 'The retirement of the Justices' Clerk with his 
bench'. 116 JPN 450. 
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To deal first with the issue of the existing rules. It was 
asserted earlier that East Kerrier was decided on a legal lacuna. 
Lord Goddard however believed that there were existing decisions on 
the point albeit ones he could not trace at the time of the decision. 
Were the magistrates' courts then ignoring previous decisions of the 
Divisional Court? 
It has been suggested that they were not, because previous 
decisions on the point did not in fact exist. 
Certainly the cases on bias discussed earlier established the 
fundamental and relevant principle that justice must not only be done 
but must be seen to be done. However, those cases do not delineate 
the implications of that principle for the practice of the clerk 
retiring with the magistrates. 
J.N. Martin, in the article cited above, claimed to have searched 
for relevant dicta which gave guidance to the clerk, but found none. 
One of the clerks interviewed for the present research, whose serV1ce 
extended back to 1952, also claimed that preV10US decisions did not 
ex i s t. The reverberations of the decisions in East Kerrier have 
still not ceased, but no cases pr10r to that decision have yet been 
cited. It seems unlikely that they would have remained hidden for 
three decades. 
However, whether or not reported cases existed there was at least 
one statement of some authority on the point, in the discussions and 
conclusions of the Roche Committee. A case had been raised by a 
question in Parliament in which inter alia it was complained that the 
clerk retired unnecessarily with the bench. The Secretary of State 
had referred this and the other issues arising from the case to the 
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Roche Committee,9 and the Committee had considered the 1S sue -
remarking that 
"The retirement of the clerk with his justices at the end of a 
hearing is not infrequently made a matter of criticism."lO 
We do, therefore have some evidence of concern over the practice of 
clerks retiring with the bench. The Roche Committee's conclusion was 
that it was "entirely natural and proper that justices may wish their 
clerk to retire with them" but "this is a matter for the discretion of 
the justices, and it is only on their request that their clerk may 
accompany them."ll 
J.N. Martin interprets this to mean only that the clerk may not 
insist on retiring with the bench if they do not want him. This does 
seem to be a rather liberal interpretation of the Committee's 
statement. 
The Committee went on to say that if the relationship between 
clerk and bench had been properly regulated in court there would be no 
good grounds for criticising the clerk's retirement. The Committee 
envisaged the clerk advising both on available penalties and the 
practice of the bench in relation to penalties, and also providing the 
note of evidence. However, the Committee were conscious of the 
danger that where a clerk was dominant in court his retirement might 
be resen ted. 
"There are few things more detrimental to justice than this, for 
the reason that it is universally and naturally regarded as an 
9. See Report of the Departmental Committeeon Justices' Clerks. 
Cmnd. 6507 at page 16. 
10. Ibid p.20. 
11. Ibid. 
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injustice by the parties concerned if their cases are determined 
by a person who has no right or duty to determine them.,,12 
The Roche Committee was therefore not laying down any specific 
rules as to when the clerk should retire with the bench. It was 
concerned that the magistrates should control the court, and appear to 
control it, and it felt that, if this were achieved, the retirement of 
the clerk would not be resented. Control by the bench was to apply 
to retiring also - the clerk should only retire when the bench wanted 
her/him. 
So much for the existing rules. What then was the existing 
practice? 
Any attempt to generalise about magistrates' courts is doomed to 
failure at the outset. There are so many courts and so many more 
clerks that to say what their practice was 1S impossible. It would 
seem, however, that it was accepted in many courts that the clerk 
should retire with the bench as a matter of course. Evidence of this 
comes from several sources. 
J.N. Martin's article says so directly. When justifying his 
attack on Lord Goddard's dictum, he says 
"When however the opinion is directly contrary to a practice 
which, while perhaps not universal, prevails in a very 
substantial majority of magistrates courts and hasso prevailed 
for many years it is (it is submitted) right that it should 
receive close examination ••• " 13 
A correspondent of the Justice of the Peace shortly after the decision 
confides that his bench have dealt with East Kerrier by the expedient 
. . . 14 
of having the clerk always ret1re w1th them after a short per10d. 
12. Report of the Departmental Committee. Cmnd. 6507 at para. 66. 
13. 116 JPN 450. 
14. 116 JPN 305. 
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Later a brave article by a solicitor supported the decision in East 
Kerrier, say1ng that there had been widespread and effective 
criticism of the automatic retirement of clerks by the legal 
profession and that the dictum in East Kerrier was probably the result 
of these cr i tic isms. This solicitor pointed out that there were some 
courts where there was no practice of the clerk automatically retiring 
with the bench and that this did not appear to have lead to any awful 
. h 15 errors 1n t ose courts. 
There 1S also an indication (it cannot be said to be anything 
else) that at least one prev10us Lord Chief Justice did expect the 
clerk to retire with the bench automatically. 
In R v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy 192416 the clerk retired 
with the justices when they considered their verdict in a case of 
dangerous driving. The objection 1n that case was not to the fact 
that the clerk retired, but that the clerk was biased by a connection 
with the victim of the action. In his judgment Lord Hewart says 
"It is said that when that gentleman (i.e. the clerk) retired 
in the usual way taking with him notes of evidence in case the 
justices might desire to consult him, the justices came to their 
conclusion without consulting him and that he scrupulously 
. f' h . ,,17 absta1ned from re err1ng to t e case 1n any way. 
But with or without such tenuous judicial acceptance, it 1S clear that 
in some courts at least the clerk did retire a~ a matter of course and 
equally clearly such a practice was not acceptable after the 
East Kerrier case. 
15. D.T. Thorne, "The retirement of the Justices' Clerk with his 
bench: another view" 116 JPN 599. 
16. 1924 1 KB 256 
17. At Page 234 B-C. 
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What was acceptable after East Kerrier? Although the 
prescription is variously phrased 1n the judgment, it can be 
summarised as follows:- the clerk should not retire with the 
justices as a matter of course at the time they are considering the 
facts. S/he should remain in court until the justices either return 
into court or until the justices send for him. The justices Can 
always send for the clerk if they requ1re advice on a point of law. 
One of the ma1n reasons for clerks' objections to the decision 
was that a number of problems were left unresolved by this statement. 
Perhaps the most serious of them was that Lord Goddard assumed - or 
appeared to - that magistrates would know when a point of law had 
ar1sen on which they should take advice. The clerks' experience told 
them that this was not always so. The magistrates were not - and of 
course are still not - lawyers, and their training in 1952 was even 
more rudimentary than it 1S now. What, then, was the clerk to do if 
she/he recognised that a point of law had arisen, but the magistrates 
did not, and did not ask the clerk to retire? Further, drawing a 
distinction between law and fact is an exercise which can defeat the 
most experienced lawyer, but the East Kerrier decision appeared to 
enVlsage that lay magistrates would be able to make such 
distinctions. Also if the bench asked the clerk to retire quite 
properly on a point of law, and whilst the clerk was giving his advice 
they began to discuss fact, what should the clerk do? And although 
the decision clearly allowed the clerk to advise on law did this 
include practice and procedure? And was it proper for the clerk to 
retire if all the magistrates wanted to see was the note of evidence? 
Also in domestic cases in the event of an appeal magistrates must be 
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prepared to state the reason for their decision. How was the clerk 
to assist the bench in framing the reasons for their decision if 
she/he had not heard their deliberations? 
The decision in East Kerrier, then, caused the concern that it 
did because it was the first instance of judicial regulation of the 
clerk's role 1n court, because it conflicted strongly with the 
existing practice of at least some courts, and because it created more 
questions than it answered about the behaviour of the clerk. 
Many of these questions had to be resolved over the next few 
years by other decisions which followed quite rapidly. The first of 
these - R v Welshpool Justices Ex parte Holl ey 18 in 1953 - contained 
some reassurance for clerks. 
In that case there was a prosecution for selling intoxicating 
liquor outside permitted hours. Some points of law arose in the 
case. The magistrates retired and asked the clerk to come with them. 
The magistrates considered the law, and then went on to consider the 
evidence. In order to confirm their impression of the evidence they 
asked for the shorthand writer. The clerk returned to court and 
asked the shorthand writer to retire. She did so, and read a 
relevant portion of her notes over to the bench. The justices found 
the offence proved and fined the defendant £5. The defendant moved 
for an order of certiorari objecting to the presence of the shorthand 
writer in the retiring room. 
Again Lord Goddard dealt with the case. He held that the motion 
failed. He said that the justices did nothing wrong 1n taking the 
clerk with them, because they needed advice on the law. The fact 
18. [1953] 2 Q B 403 
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that the clerk had remained in the room whilst the bench discussed the 
facts did not invalidate the justices' decision. Sending for the 
shorthand writer was not 1mproper. It would have been better if the 
bench had gone back into court and asked for the relevant portion to 
be read in case there was a mistake. But the fact that the shorthand 
writer had retired did not invalidate the decision. Particularly 
reassur1ng to clerks was Lord Goddard's demonstration that he 
understood the difficulty of distinguishing law from fact when he said 
"It is often difficult to disentangle what is purely a question 
of law from a question of fact and a discussion on law must have 
regard to the particular facts of the case to which it is desired 
to apply the law. We think it would be putting too high a 
burden on justices who had required, and legitimately required, 
the presence of their clerk for the purpose of taking his advice 
to say at a particular rgment 'Now you must leave the room while 
we deliberate further"! 
However, with the reassurance there was a warn1ng that 
"Justices will, I feel sure, recognise that it is their duty to 
obey a direction of this court not only in the letter, but in the 
spirit, and that they are not to get round the direction which 
was given on the East Kerrier case merely by pretending that they 
require the presence of their cler~oto advise them when there is 
nothing but fact to be considered." 
Any optimism which may - on balance - have been engendered by the 
decision in R v Welshpool Justices Ex parte Holley however was 
destined to be short lived. That decision was closely followed by 
R v Barry (Glamorgan) Justices ex parte Kashim 1953. 21 In that case 
there was a prosecution for a customs offence. At the end of the 
prosecution case the defence made a submission on law. The clerk 
properly retired with the justices at their request. The bench found 
19. Ibid at p.406 
20. Ibid. pp. 406-7 
21. [1953] 2 All ER 1005 
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against the defendant. After the defence case they retired agaln, 
and again took their clerk with them, although the matters which fell 
to be decided at this stage were matters of fact. Again Lord Goddard 
dealt with the case. He quashed the conviction, reminded magistrates 
that they should not have their clerk with them when they were 
considering fact alone, and that they should not try to get round 
East Kerrier by asking the clerk out every time they retired. He 
followed this reminder with a strongly worded warnlng. 
"It is well that clerks and justices should understand that this 
court requires them to follow directions which this court has 
given from time to time. Ever since there have been justices of 
the peace in this country they have been subject to the control 
of the Court of Queen's Bench ••• and if justices, knowing quite 
well the directions this court has given, act contrary to them 
this court will have no hesitation in sending their names to the 
Lord Chancellor calling attention to what has been done.,,22 
As well as this admonition - which could hardly have been more 
forcefully expressed - Lord Goddard did elaborate on his idea of 
correct behaviour for the clerk. He made it plain that if the clerk 
saw a point of law which he wished to bring to the attention of the 
justices he was not immobilised by East Kerrier. 
"We did not mean, of course, in the East Kerrier case that if a 
question of law were raised the clerk ~ught to stay in court till 
the justices said 'Come out with us,,,2 
But the justices were not to ask the clerk out if they were 
considering fact, and if they did so and the clerk discovered that 
there was nothing for him to advise on, he should leave the retiring 
room. 
22. Ibid at page 1007 
23. [1953] 2 All ER 1006 
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The response of clerks in the pages of the Justice of the Peace 
was very interesting. It was stronger than the reaction to the 
East Kerrier case. The J.P. talked of the "considerable concern" 
caused by the case. It pointed out that justices and their clerks 
have to obey the Divisional Court. 
"What they feel however is that there may be grounds for asking 
that the law should be altered so as to permit of what they 
consider a more helpful relation between the justices and their 
clerk.,,24 
It proposed that legislation should be drafted (without suggesting 1n 
what terms, however). 
Examined from the point of V1ew of legal principle it 1S 
difficult to understand why R v Barry (Glamorgan) Justices should have 
caused such consternation. 
It did not go any further than East Kerrier. Apart from a very 
strong warning that East Kerrier was to be obeyed it contained two 
helpful points - one that the clerk who realised that there was a 
point of law was to be able to retire to point it out to the justices, 
and the other that if a clerk found himself 1n a position of being in 
the retiring room when there was no issue of law slhe was to leave the 
justices. These points clarified some of the uncertainties which had 
been left by East Kerrier, and therefore were surely helpful. The 
facts of the case do not appear to constitute a particular cause for 
concern. It seems very clear from the report that the clerk did 
retire at a point when it was patent that there was no issue of law 
involved. 
24. 117 JPN 665. 
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The Justice of the Peace however, did not see the decision as a 
constructive one. It emphasised that justices would not know when a 
point of law would ar1se, that points could arise at any time during 
the justices' retirement, that if the clerk were there slhe would 
ensure that they did not go astray on matters of mixed law and fact, 
and that in long cases the justices might need to refer to the clerk's 
note at some length. 25 Examples were quoted of benches that had made 
mistakes because they did not have their clerk with them - One clerk 
described the occasion when his bench bound a defendant over 1n 
circumstances where they had no power to do s026, and another told of 
occasions when clerks had to stop their benches in mid pronouncement 
h f d · h' . 1 27 to prevent t em rom olng t 1ngs wrong 1n aWe 
Th e ten 0 r 0 f the sea r gum e n t sis, 0 f c 0 u r s e , t 0 jus t i f y the 
presence of the clerk in the retiring room even at times when there is 
no obvious point of law arising. The justification for it was that 
magistrates need their clerk because one never knows when lay persons 
may go astray through ignorance of the law. Clerks' experience tells 
them that they may be needed 1n the retiring room to ensure that 
inadmissible evidence 1S, 1n fact, not taken into account, or to 
relate the evidence glven 1n the case to the legal elements of an 
offence. 
An overview of these earlier cases suggests that for clerks the 
real problem was felt to be a problem of lack of trust. The 
impression is given that they felt that they should be trusted to be 
25. Ibid. 
26. 117 JPN 697 
27 • 119 JPN 422 
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In the retiring room and to behave properly. None of the cases 
suggested that a clerk had actually behaved improperly - In fact the 
clerks were of the opinion that because their benches quite properly 
needed them they should be trusted to be ln the retiring room without 
any appearance of impropriety arising. 
Although consternation was caused by East Kerrier it was possible 
for some clerks at least to relax after that decision, if the decision 
was to stand on its own as a reminder of the distinction between the 
roles of the clerk and the bench - a reminder that it was simply not 
necessary for the clerk to retire every time the bench went out - but 
not a decision which needed to radically restrict the clerk's ability 
to assist the bench. In such a context, R v Welshpool Justices ex-
E.~!..£~_ H 0 ..!...!.~ y was weI com ere ass u ran c e , but R v . B ~ r r y 
(Glamorgan) Justices ex parte Kashim was indeed cause for great 
consternation. Its reminder that East Kerrier was to be taken 
seriously could not be ignored. Clerks were to be called upon to make 
clear public distinctions between law and fact, as to when their 
advice was needed and when it was not. They were not to be trusted 
to make these distinctions in private In the retiring room. 
It is clear that after the Barry Justices case, that whatever its 
basis might have been, the uncertainty felt by magistrates courts was 
too great to be ignored and Lord Goddard felt the necessity to issue a 
practice direction in which he said 
"It is evident from letters received both by the Lord Chancellor 
and myself, and from correspondence in newspapers, that there is 
a degree of uncertainty in the minds of magistrates on this 
subject and indeed some degree of misunderstanding as to t~8 
effect of what was said in the cases to which I have referred." 
28. [1953] 1 WLR 1416 
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The First Practice Direction. 
This was Lord Goddard's attempt to clear up the problems. It 
addressed itself to two issues. 
First, it addressed itself to the question: on what matters may 
magistrates consult their clerk? The answer (succinctly) was law, 
mixed law and fact and the practice and procedure of the court, the 
sentence allowed by law, the level of sentences usually imposed for 
similar offences by the court or neighbouring courts. Further, if 
the clerk sees that a question of law does or may arise he can point 
this out to the magistrates who can then decide whether or not they 
want further advice. Magistrates can also ask the clerk to refresh 
their memory as to the evidence. 
Secondly, the practice direction addressed itself to the 
question: 1n what manner should the bench consult the clerk? Lord 
Goddard said that he regarded this question as being of equal 
importance to the first question. His answer was a restatement of 
East Kerrier - if the clerk retires as a matter of course the 
inevitable impression will be given that he may influence the decision 
of the jus t ices. Therefore the clerk should not retire as a matter 
of course, nor should the bench invite her/him out every time they 
retire. However, if they need the clerk they can send for her/him at 
any time. They should release the clerk, however as soon as s/he has 
. . h d 29 g1ven them the adv1ce t ey nee • 
The guiding principle to be followed 1S the principle that 
justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done. 
29. For the text of the Practice Direction, see Appendix 4. 
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If indeed it was the feeling of the clerks that it should be 
possible for them to retire without it leading to suggestions that 
they had improperly influenced the bench then it was made plain by 
this that their views were not shared. In order for justice to be 
seen to be done the Practice Direction prescribed that the clerk must 
make a public and scrupulous distinction between those occaS10ns when 
s/he might be in the retiring room and those occasions where it would 
be wrong to be there. At least however, the formula for making such 
decisions was clarified by the Practice Direction. The scope of the 
clerk's duties had received judicial attention, had been defined -
even if the definition was not to the liking of the clerks. 
Some were evidently satisfied. The Justice of the Peace 1n its 
Notes of the Week started the year optimistically when it expressed 
the opinion that the Practice Direction should have cleared up all 
problems, and that it should be possible for the courts to follow the 
rules without difficulty30. The retiring president of the Justices' 
Clerks' Society - Mr. Albert Marshall of Bath - expressed the view at 
the 1954 conference that he was not worried by the series of decisions 
beginning with East Kerrier. He felt that clerks should go even 
further and advise their. benches in open court so that the parties 
themelves knew the basis on which the court was acting. 
Further clarification - and reassurance - was to come. The 
Practice Direction already referred to did not deal with domestic 
matters since magistrates exercising matrimonial jurisdiction were 
subject to the direction and control of what was then the Probate 
Divorce and Admiralty Division. Lord Merriman therefore issued a 
30. 118 JPN at page one. 
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Prac t ice Note 31 • This note expressly endorsed the principles of the 
earlier Direction, and said that the clerk should not retire as a 
matter of course. However, Lord Merriman recognised that domestic 
proceedings were often lengthy and involved points of law. Also 
previous decisions of the Court had insisted on a proper note of 
evidence being kept and in domestic cases the justices were required 
to state the reasons for their decisions in the event of an appeal. 
Therefore he accepted that "more often than not" the magistrates would 
need their clerk with them. Perhaps most importantly - certainly if 
our earlier arguments are correct - he said that he trusted 
magistrates to carry out his Direction. 
"Having regard to the high standard of care which is generally 
shown by magistrates' courts in dealing with these domestic 
proceedings, I do not think it is necessary, for me to say more 
than that I am confident that justices taking part in them may be 
trusted to act, and to ensure that they appear to act, on the 
fundamental principle that they alone are the judges.,,32 
Hardly surprisingly the Justice of the Peace approved strongly of 
this direction, particularly because the direction recognised that the 
bench would want the assistance of the clerk in very many cases. The 
Justice of the Peace observed 
31. 
"The whole difficult question which has so much worried both 
justices and their clerks is now completely cleared up. 
Justices will study and comply in both the spirit and the letter, 
with the principles laid down, and clerks can feel that any fears 
that they might not be permitted to give the justices the best 
possible service should now be allayed.,,33 
More reassurance was to come from Lord Goddard 1n 1953 1n 
[1954] 1 WLR 213. For the text see Appendix 3. 
32. Ibid. 
33. 118 JPN 65. 
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Ex parte How 34 where a motion for certiorari on the grounds of the 
clerk's conduct was refused. In this case the defendant pleaded not 
guilty to driving a trolley bus without due consideration for other 
road users. After the evidence had been heard the chairman of the 
justices had leaned towards the clerk and said "Dismissed". The 
clerk had spoken to the chairman, and the justices had then retired. 
The clerk retired with them, and remained with them throughout their 
five minute retirement. When they returned to court they convicted 
the de fendant. 
Lord Goddard said that it was not 1n every case where the clerk 
had retired with the bench that a motion for certiorari would succeed. 
The fact that the court had not followed the Practice Direction did 
not necessarily go to the merits of the case. 
The role of the clerk under a new re1gn. 
It is possible that some of the exasperation felt by clerks about 
the East Kerrier decision and its sequel was prompted by a suspicion 
that Lord Goddard's views were not views which were held by all 
members of the judiciary. 
Lord Denning for instance was characteristically outspoken. In 
his address to the Annual Conference of the Justices' Clerks' Society 
in 1955 he said that the system of justice in this country depended on 
the close co-operation of laymen and lawyers, that laymen were 
inexperienced and could rely with utmost confidence on their clerks, 
with the result that justice is done. 
"I hope it will not become the case that clerks do not retire 
with their justices but simply are asked questions in open court. 
It seems to me that in many cases it is only right and proper 
34. [1953] 1 WLR 1480 
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that the justices should ask the clerk to retire with them ••• " 
And with reference to matrimonial cases he noted 
"I cannot myself see how magistrates can decide these cases 
without the help of an instructed clerk ••• It would be quite 
wrong to suppose that justices do not need all the help they can 
possibly get from their clerks in matters of this kind.,,35 
Lord Denning used perhaps even stronger words at the Annual Conference 
of the National Association of Justices' Clerks' Assistants in 1957 
"It is said that if the magistrates' clerk always retires with 
them, it may be thought that he influences the decision of the 
magistrates. I do not think myself that there is any fear of 
that or that the ordinary people in this country think that there 
is any fear of that.,,36 
In 1959 at the Justices' Clerks' Society's Annual Conference Mr. 
Justice Finnemore said that although he told magistrates to decide 
cases themselves and not do what the clerk told them he told clerks to 
be ready to guide magistrates and "keep them on the rails". He 
justified the ambivalence by saying that it stemmed from the fact that 
the bench and the clerk are partners.37 
The Justices' Clerks' Society in its memorandum of January 1974, 
'The Lay Justices and their Clerk', said "it is known that Lord Parker 
was of the opinion that the rule in East Kerrier should be abrogated". 
Certainly Lord Parker was most critical of the existing rules 
when he addressed the Annual Conference of the Justices' Clerks' 
Society in Harrogate in 1966. 
His view was that the present position of the clerk to the 
justices was "thoroughly unsatisfactory and thoroughly frustrating 
35. See the report of the Conference at 119 JPN 447. 
36. 121 JPN 598. 
37. 123 JPN 400 and cited by Latham 1n 'The Function of the Clerk 1n 
Magistrates' Courts' 127 JPN 548 at 549. 
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both for the bench and the clerk". He thought that the clerk could 
be a far greater help to the justices by assisting them not only 
outside the court and in law, but also on matters of sentencing. The 
clerk had the most experience and knowledge of sentencing, and should 
be able to advise generally. He even went so far as to say 
"Personally I think there is only one answer and that is that the 
clerk to the justices - and here I refer to ~ull time clerks only 
- should be on the Commission of the Peace." 8 
On the question of when it was possible for the clerk to advise the 
bench he pointed to the problems in drawing distinctions between law 
and fact, and said that often justices would not know that a point of 
law had arisen and the clerk might be in doubt whether to introduce 
his v~ews. 
More importantly Lord Parker's judgments ~n the cases concern~ng 
clerks that came before him show a marked difference in attitude to 
the judgments of Lord Goddard. 
Certainly Lord Parker was remarkably restrained in his judgment 
~n the case of R v Consett Justices ex parte Consett Iron Co. Ltd. 
196039 It would have been very difficult for him to have refused 
certiorari however, as the conduct of the clerk was quite astonishing. 
The case involved a prosecution under the Factories Act 1937 
which arose from an accident where a man was fatally injured. The 
company pleaded not guilty to two of the three charges against them. 
Counsel for the company made certain submissions on the law and the 
justices retired with the clerk to consider them. They returned, 
rejected the company's submissions on law, and proceeded to hear 
38. See the report of the Conference at 130 JPN 478. 
39. The Times, 14th May, 1960. 
121 
evidence of fact. At the close of the case the justices retired and 
after a very short interval the clerk made to follow them. Counsel 
for the company objected, but the clerk replied (according to the 
evidence of the company) "I don't know what you are worrying about. 
This case is as dead as a dodo." After four or five minutes the 
clerk returned and expressed the opinion to counsel that the 
East Kerrier case had been watered down by subsequent decisions and -
significantly - "Anyway what do you people object to? Don't you 
trust us or something?" Counsel repeated that the clerk should not 
be concerned with findings of fact to which the clerk replied that 
that was a matter of opinion! 
It was accepted by the Divisional Court after reading the 
affidavits of the clerk and the bench that the clerk had gone out to 
reassure the bench on a point of law, and that the clerk's reference 
to the case being as dead as a dodo was a reference to East Kerrier 
and not a reference to the case then before the court. 
Despite this the conduct of the clerk (not to mention his ability 
to assess case law) was not of the best. Lord Parker thought that a 
person in court might feel a real likelihood that justice was not 
be ing done. But nevertheless, the Lord Chief Justice hesitated, 
saying that certiorari was a discretionary remedy which was only for 
extreme cases. . b . P 40 He also c~ted R v. Cam orne Just~ces ex parte earce 
where it was emphasised that the continued citation of the principle 
that justice must be seen to be done was not to lead anyone to believe 
that this was more important than that justice was in fact done. 
Finally however he concluded that certiorari should go. , , 
40. [1952] lQB 4. 
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It ~s difficult to imagine such a mild and measured judgment 
being delivered on such facts by Lord Goddard had he sat on this case. 
Lord Parker's tolerance was later proved to be very great indeed, 1n a 
case 1n 1967 which involved the same bench and the same clerk - R v. 
C tt J t " l" d 41 onse us 1ces ex parte Posta B1ngo Lt • 
In this case it was said that the clerk took a very active part 
~n the proceedings. He cross-examined witnesses, he questioned 
prosecuting counsel and he gave instructions to witnesses. The 
picture was said to be one of a dominant clerk and a silent bench. 
The case involved some difficult points of law. The bench retired 
for two and a half hours. The clerk invited out the assistant clerk 
who had taken a shorthand note of counsel's argument and of the 
evidence, and the clerk and the assistant clerk remained with the 
justices throughout the retirement period. 
The case is interesting because it involves, inter alia, exactly 
the situation envisaged by the Roche Committee when it commented that 
if the bench appears to run the court, there will be no problem caused 
by the clerk's retiring, but if the clerk 1S dominant in court his 
retirement will inevitably be challenged. However, although all 
parties in the case admitted that the clerk took a very prominant part 
indeed in the proceedings and that he retired for the whole of a two 
and a half hour retirement it could not be denied that there were very 
difficult points of law and mixed law and fact to be considered which 
would justify the clerk's retirement. Counsel for the company did 
his best to suggest that the clerk's behaviour in the retiring room 
was improper by arguing that heated dialogue took place in the 
41. [1967] 2 QB 9. 
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retiring room, that the silent bench and dominant clerk were unlikely 
to have reversed their roles in the retiring room, that the long 
retirement suggested disagreement and that the disagreement could only 
have been on the facts. This was an argument based on speculation 
however. The strongest argument for the company was that the orders 
and convictions did not appear to be those of the justices alone, but, 
because of the prominence of the clerk in the proceedings, appeared to 
be the orders and convictions of the bench and the clerk. Justice 
was not seen to be done. A reasonable man seeing a clerk run the 
proceedings and then retire would think that he took a part in the 
dec is ion. 
Lord Parker however, was not prepared to accept any of these 
arguments. He said that it was abundantly clear that this was a case 
where the justices were entitled to have their clerk with them 
throughout to deal with the law. In that respect nothing wrong had 
taken place. So far as the dominance of the clerk in court was 
concerned he examined the instances of the clerk's conduct which were 
complained of in detail and found nothing fundamentally wrong. He 
pointed out that the practice of courts varied 
"There are some justices, some benches, who require their clerks 
to cross-examine to clear up ambiguities, and prefer that he 
should do it rather than do it themselves; there are other 
benches who desire to do the cross-examination themselves and for 
the clerk to remain silent. There is no general practice, there 
. d· ,,42 1S no accepte pract1ce. 
So far as ordering witnesses to the back of the court, one of the 
things the clerk did which was complained of, he said 
" ••• 1 myself think that it was for the clerk to conduct the 
ordinary arrangements inside the court and that3 he was not 
thereby usurping a judicial function of the bench." 
42. Ibid at p.18 
43. Ibid at p.18-19 
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Perhaps the most significant part of the jUdgment - because it 
answers the plea from clerks that they must be trusted to retire 
without an appearance being created that they are influencing the 
bench, and because it does appear to expand on the Practice direction, 
1S the following:-
"One thing that seems to me clear is that the spectator in court 
(i.e. the notional one who is the arbiter as to whether justice 
is seen to be done) must be taken to know that the justices can 
have the advice of their clerk and their clerk can retire with 
them in certain circumstances. If I am right they were entitled 
to have the clerk throughout on this occasion, and therefore the 
spectator must be taken to have known that there was nothing 
wrong ~~ his retiring with the justices for two and a half 
hours." 
This was very much in line with Lord Parker's V1ew expressed in 
the first Consett case, that it was possible to put too much emphasis 
on the maxim that justice must be seen to be done. It means that the 
test of whether justice is seen to be done 1S the test, not of the 
ordinary man of Clapham omnibus notoriety, but a man educated 1n the 
rules which prescribe when it is proper for a clerk to retire with the 
bench. And because such a man would be taken to know that the bench 
are entitled to their clerk's advice on law, and that law was involved 
in this case, no objection to the clerk's conduct in retirement could 
properly be taken. 
The strongest criticism made of the clerk's conduct in this case 
by Lord Parker was that it was not a model of how a case should be 
conducted, and that the clerk may have been officious and tactless but 
he was nevertheless within the law. 
44. Ibid. p.20. Words 1n parenthesis m1ne. 
125 
It is difficult to imagine a clerk playing a more dominant role 
1n court than the clerk played in this case, and yet his conduct was 
held to be - if not entirely desirable - acceptable, on the basis that 
this was the practice of the court. 
The effect of the decision is therefore to concentrate attention 
purely on the issue of the clerk's retiring with the bench - or rather 
on whether or not there was a point of law ar1s1ng when the clerk 
retired with the bench. The Roche Committee saw the 1ssue as one of 
a correct balance in the relationship of clerk and bench, and the 
behaviour of the clerk in court and the practice of the clerk retiring 
with the bench were simply aspects of this relationship. The 
Committee wanted the bench to be the controlling partner in this 
relationship. Such a view of the relationship of clerk and bench is 
desirable although we shall be arguing later that it is impossible for 
the bench to be the controlling partner. The second Consett case 
directed attention towards the narrow issue of whether or not there 
was a legal issue to justify the clerk's retiring, and away from the 
way the clerk conducted her/himself in court, although as will be seen 
45 later the conduct of the clerk has been taken up by other routes. 
Hardly surprisingly the second Consett case was enthusiastically 
received by clerks. In a contributed article in the Justice of the 
Peace "The Role of the Clerk in Court - or the Consett Justices Again" 
it was said that 
45. See Hobby v Hobby [1954] 1 WLR 1020, Marjoram 
1 WLR 520 and Simms v Moore [1970] 2 QB 327. 
these cases, see pp. 149-158. 
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v Marjoram [1955] 
-ror discussion of 
" h· T is case represents a great advance in the High Court's 
understanding of what actually goes on in magistrates courts and 
showed considerable sympathy with the difficulties of a clerk 
serving a lay bench.,,46 
The author also welcomed the understanding displayed by Lord Parker 
that the conduct of the proceedings in court depends on the character, 
inclinations, experience and ability of the bench and the clerk. 
A final case should be mentioned before this section can be 
concluded. However understanding Lord Parker may have been, he could 
not but grant certiorari in the cas e o f R v 
Stafford Justices ex parte Ross,([1962]. 1 W.L.R. 457.) The cas e 
does not develop the law but it is a reminder that highly improper 
behaviour by clerks is not unknown. In that case the clerk did not 
retire but he handed a note to the bench when they retired, which 
contained an explicit comment on the facts of the case! Not 
surprisingly his action was condemned. 
The 1960s - an era of reform 
The 1960s was a decade of change for clerks. The reforms of the 
Roche Committee were coming to fruition. Divisions had been 
amalgamated and full-time clerks appointed in many areas. The clerk 
to the justices was a full-time professional in most areas. 
The change over from a majority of part-time solicitor clerks to 
a majority of full time clerks seems on the whole to have taken place 
smoothly, although inevitably there were some problems. An 
indication of the problems may be seen in a debate which took place in 
the pages of the Justice of the Peace in 1965 on the issue of the 
usefulness or otherwise of qualification as a solicitor to a clerk to 
the justices. "A Whole Time Clerk" wrote criticising the part-time 
46. 131 JPN 291. 
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system, recommending that the reforms of Roche be continued that more , 
full-time clerks should be appointed - and paid properly! A touch of 
irritation with those who favoured part-time clerks was apparent 1n 
the tone of the article since the author described himself as having 
'~ad to unravel the tangle left to him by some four or five part-time 
clerks".47 
With a body of people who were (for the most part) professionally 
qualified, who were devoting their full attention to magistrates 
courts, and who were organised in the increasingly prestigious and 
influential Justices' Clerks' Society, questions about the nature of 
the future for clerks became important. 
The J.P. throughout the 1960s is full of articles which asked 
"What is the future of the clerk?" - and, of course, gave a number of 
answers. 
There are discussions about appropriate training and 
qualifications for justices' clerks' assistants since some career 
structure needed to be devised. And there are many discussions on 
the possibility of increasing the powers of the clerk, so that for 
instance she/he could issue process, authenticate orders of the court, 
rule on matters of evidence, or playa more active role 1n sentencing 
or even be on the bench. 
Yet these ambitious people were, 1n e ffec t, exis t ing 1n a lega 1 
vacuum. There was nowhere any statutory definition of what 
constituted the clerk's role. In fact it was (and still is) the case 
that a magistrates' court is properly constituted without the 
clerk's presence. What law there was on the clerk's role was felt to 
be negative. As the editors of the J.P. pointed out in 1965 
47 • 129 JPN 7. 
75. 
For the extended debate see also 128 JPN 816 and 129 
"(Yet) the exact status of the clerk remains, to say the least of 
it vague, while East Kerrier, the judgment which, for most 
magistrates' clerks is engraved on tablets of stone, has further 
confounded an already confused situation.,,48 
The Justices' Clerks' Society's Annual Conference for that year gave 
the Council of the Society a mandate to press for reforms to clarify 
the position of the clerk to the justices. 
The Council worked hard to this end, their most significant 
achievement being Section Five of the Justices of the Peace Act1968, 
which finally provided some statutory recognition of the clerk's role. 
The first subsection of section five provided a rule making power to 
enable the clerk to do things which a single justice could do. This 
enabled the Justices' Clerks' Rules of 197049 to be made. The second 
subsection provided a rule making power in relation to the 
qualification of justices' clerk's assistants - which enabled the 
Justices' Clerks' (Qualification of Assistants) Rules 1979.50 These 
provisions will be discussed at a later stage. 
So far as the conduct the clerk in court 1S concerned, Section 
five subsection three of the 1968 Act is significant. It 1S a 
declaratory provision which does not extend powers of the clerk. 
"It is hereby declared that the functions of a justices' clerk 
include the giving to the justices to whom he is clerk or any of 
them, at the request of the justices or justice, of advice about 
law, practice or procedure on questions arising in connection 
with the discharge out of sessions of their or his functions as 
justices, including questions arising when the clerk is not 
personally attending on the justices or justice, and that the 
clerk may, at any time when he thinks he should do so, bring to 
the attention of the justices or justice any point of law, 
practice or procedure that is or may be involved in any question 
48. 129 JPN. 337. 
49. 5.1. 1970 No. 231. 
50. 5.1. 1979 No. 570. 
so arising; but the enactment of this subsection shall not be 
taken as defining or in any respect limiting the powers and 
duties belonging to a justices' clerk or the matterson which 
justices may obtain assistance from their clerk." 
Although the subsection does not extend the powers of the clerk, 
his existence and basic function ~s now contained in statute. That 
this was seen as important to clerks can be shown by reference to the 
debate on this clause in the House of Commons. Mr. Oakes the member 
for Bolton West, who spoke a number of times on the clauses and had 
clearly been well briefed by the Justices' Clerks' Society said 
"It is estimated that in one way or another 3 million people come 
into contact, seek advice, come before, or act as witnesses in 
magistrates' courts every year and it is important that some 
definition is given to them and that they know who the man is who 
sitting in front of the justices, what his powers are, and that 
he can advise the justices on matters of law. Therefore from 
that point of v~ew, it is important that a statutory definition 
be given."S1 
Reference to the concern of the Justices' Clerks' Society that this 
clause should be passed are made throughout the debates ~n both 
Houses. 
However concerned the Justices' Clerks' Society was to have this 
provision on the statute book, it did not in reality take them any 
further than the existing case law. As already indicated, a 
magistrates' court is still legally constituted without a clerk. The 
51. H.of C. Standing Committee Session 1967-68 Vol.VI Co1.46. This 
speech is part of the debate on an amendment which was passed and 
which resulted in that part of the section being added which 
makes it clear that the clerk may, of his own volition, bring a 
matter of law practice or procedure to the attention of the 
bench. The other significant amendment was made following 
debate in the Lords where Lord Parker pressed for the section to 
provide that the clerk could advise on practice and procedure as 
well as law. See Hansard H. of L. Vol. 292 Cols. 101-103. 
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Practice Direction of 1953 still defines those things which clerks may 
advise on and how they may do it. 
The 1970s - a decade of protest 
It is not surprising therefore that during the 1970s a good deal 
of discussion was still taking place concerning the exact boundaries 
of correct conduct for the clerk, and criticism was still being 
levelled at the existing law. Certain remarks from current judicial 
figures were not guaranteed to ease the minds of clerks. 
In 1973 Lord Hailsham addressed the Cumberland, Westmorland and 
Furness branch of the Magistrates' Association. He said that the 
clerk was the justices' best friend - but should not be allowed to 
dominate the proceedings. He added 
" do not hesitate to decide against your clerk's advice and 1n 
favour of an objection if you think it well founded.,,52 
An irritated but unidentified clerk responded to this 1n an 
article "Keeping the Clerk in his Place".53 He conceded that the 
justices had the legal responsibility for deciding questions of law. 
However he went on to say that he would have regretted but understood 
if the Lord Chancellor had reminded them of this fact and pointed out 
that it meant that in the last resort, after the most careful 
consideration, it was 1n their power to go against their clerk's 
advice. But slhe felt that to advise justices to go against their 
clerk's advice without hesitation was a remarkably retrograde step. 
One can have a great deal of sympathy with this clerk's V1ew -
particularly since Lord Hailsham's words appear to have been seized 
52. 137 JPN 240 
53 • 1 2 7 JPN 369 
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upon by an advocate 1n that clerk's court. The advocate made a 
submission that there was no case to answer, which the bench rejected 
on the advice of their clerk. At the close of the defence case, the 
defence advocate re-opened the point and encouraged the bench to 
ignore the clerk's advice. Consequently the clerk did not retire 
with the bench, who then made an (unrelated) error to the detriment of 
the defendant arising out of their failure to understand the law. 
Indeed Lord Hailsham may have regretted his remarks three years 
later in 1976 when the case of Jones v Nicks 54 was decided. The 
defendant in that case had pleaded guilty to speeding, but submitted 
that there were special reasons for not ordering endorsement of the 
driving licence, since he would lose his job were his licence 
endorsed. The clerk advised the bench that special reasons under 
section 101 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 had to relate to the facts of 
the offence, not the offender and that the loss of the defendant's job 
should not be taken into account. The bench decided not to endorse 
the de fendan t' s 1 icence. The reason they gave was that if they did 
so, the defendant would lose his job. The case came before Lord 
Widgery who, of course, remitted the case to the magistrates with a 
direction to endorse. He pointed out that the justices were close to 
being asked to pay the costs of the case, and that the advice of a 
clerk should be accepted - to avoid waste of time and money. 
The only case 1n the 1970's concerning the retirement of the 
clerk with the justices was R v Southampton Justices ex parte Atherton 
197355 • In that case the applicant was charged with offences under 
54. [1977] R.T.R. 72, [1977] Crim L.R. 365, 1976 L.S. Gaz June 16th. 
55. 137 J.P.N. 571. 
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the Trade Descriptions Act 1968. There was a considerable amount of 
evidence given in the case and also a defence pleaded under section 24 
of the Act. The case took almost a whole day. When the justices 
retired they took their clerk with them. They retired for 20 
minutes. The clerk remained out with them for the whole of that 
time. In his affidavit he said that he advised on the law, and on 
the level of penalty for the offence, and also reminded the bench that 
they must hear mitigation before they announced sentence. The clerk 
and the bench returned to court. The bench announced a conviction 
and then a fine of £100. There was apparently a dead heat between 
counsel and the clerk to stop the chairman from saying any more. 
Counsel protested that he was in very difficult position - but he did 
mitigate. The bench retired for a short period again with the clerk, 
returned and announced a fine of £80 with £21 costs. 
There were two applications for certiorari: the first relating to 
conviction on the ground that the clerk had returned with the bench 
and stayed out with them for the whole of the period of retirement; 
the second related to sentence only and the fact that counsel had 
only belatedly been able to mitigate after the bench had wrongly 
announced sentence. 
The first application was refused. The Lord Chief Justice, Lord 
Widgery reviewed the cases relating to the clerk retiring with the 
bench and concluded that because of the length of the case, and 
because there was law involved the justices were entitled to have 
their clerk with them. He cited Lord Parker's dictum that the 
spectator in court must be taken to know that the justices can have 
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the advice of their clerk 1n certain circumstances. He added a 
contribution of his own 
" I think it must be stressed that 1n these days, when 
legislation becomes more, and more complicated and the problems 
of law and practice become more and more oppressive, justices 
should not be discouraged from seeking the assistance of their 
clerk within the legitimate field in which he can advise them."56 
The first application for certiorari therefore failed. However, the 
second succeeded on the basis that, because of the conduct of the 
chairman, justice was not manifestly seen to be done. 
This decision did not depart from the existing Practice 
Directions or case law, and it showed that the Lord Chief Justice was 
aware of the problems faced by lay magistrates grappling with 
increasingly difficult legal provisions, and their need for advice. 
Despite this, however, the case was not received with enthusiasm 
by clerks.57 The Justice of the Peace was very critical. Its 
comment was that although some benches might have thought that the 
often artificial convention of the clerk returning to court before the 
justices returned could be forgotten, they would be wrong S1nce the 
decision in R v Southampton Justices ex parte Atherton. This is a 
rather negative assessment of the case. Certainly Lord Widgery 
endorsed what Lord Goddard had said about the desirability of the 
clerk not retiring as a matter of course, and the desirability of the 
clerk returning to court after he had advised the justices. But he 
did do this 1n the context of his opinion that in these days of 
56. 137 JP 577 (ii-iii) 
57. The author of "Keeping the Clerk 1n his Place" 137 JPN 369 
(footnote 53) reacted strongly against the Southampton 
Justices case. However, his criticisms seem to be based on his 
reading of a very brief report of the case which did not give 
sufficient information to enable a proper assessment. 
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complex legal prOVISIons he would not wish to see justices discouraged 
from seeking the assistance of their clerk. 
The artificial convention referred to by the Justice of the Peace 
IS one which still exists In some magis trates' courts. It operates 
as follows. The bench invites the clerk to retire with them. The 
clerk advises on the law. Her/his advice enables the bench to come 
to a decision there and then. However, in order for it to appear 
that there has been some separation between the advice of the clerk, 
and the decision of the bench, the clerk returns to court whilst the 
bench sit idly in the retiring room for a few minutes before returning 
to court and announcing its decision. 
This practice IS, of course, a waste of time In a busy court. 
To the clerk who is responsible for listing, this charade which IS 
designed to make it appear that justice IS being done may well seem to 
be quite unnecessary. If clerks were trusted to behave properly In 
the retiring room, it would not be necessary. However, to select 
this problem as the focus of the decision in R v Southampton Justices 
IS not a very balanced assessment of the case. 
But perhaps in reality R v Southampton Justices was resented 
because it did not display any increased faith in the abilities of the 
magistrates' clerks. We return in fact to the problem of lack of 
trust. To an increasingly professional body of people performing 
increasingly onerous and responsible work and with an active pressure 
group in the Justices' Clerks' Society it must have been - and still 
IS - inexplicable that their status was not recognised. 
felt that it was time to change. 
The clerks 
The year following the Southampton Justices case Lord Justice 
Lawton addressed the Justices' Clerks' Society at their annual dinner. 
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He was reported as having most endeared himself to his audience by 
referring to East Kerrier as "that bloody case" and by criticising 
Section Five of the Justices of the Peace Act 1968 for not going far 
enough. He expressed the problem as one of lack of trust, saying 
that for some reason or other Parliament had taken the view that 
magistrates' courts were not to be trusted, and had attempted to draw 
. h 58 the1r teet • 
And indeed the feelings of clerks about these cases were 
expressed more strongly during the 1970s not because the case law was 
more restricting, but because the resentment against it was 
. . 1ncreas1ng. 
An excellent illustration of the truth of this contention 1S a 
ser1es of three articles written 1n 1975 by Cecil Latham, then a 
member of the Council of the Justices' Clerk's Society.59 Not only do 
these articles discuss the objections held by clerks to the cases, but 
significantly they link these objections to the question of the future 
of, and status of, the clerk. 
The first of Latham's articles 1S based, for the most part, on a 
memomorandum "The Lay Justices and their Clerk" issued in 1974 jointly 
by the Justices' Clerks' Society. The memorandum 1S strongly 
critical of the law on the clerk retiring with the bench, and puts 
forward proposals for reform. It is worth examining in more detail, 
as the first clear statement from clerks of the problems of 
East Kerrier et seq. and of the direction of change which they 
env1sage. 
58 • 138 JPN 3 1 0 
59. See 139 JPN at 106, 120 and 135. 
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One of the principal criticisms made of the case law and 
Directions was that it was wrong of the judiciary to concentrate on 
defining when it may be right or wrong for the clerk to retire with 
the justices, since this did not control what the clerk in fact did. 
It controlled what slhe appeared to do, but it was possible for the 
clerk to appear to act correctly within the case law and in fact to 
behave most improperly or conversely to appear to act incorrectly but 
in fact to behave with the utmost propriety. 
This criticism does have a great deal of force. The problem is 
that since it is impossible to control what the clerk says when slhe 
retires, control 1S instead perforce directed at when slhe retires -
which is susceptible to scrutiny. However, it 1S 1n practice 
impossible to make sure that the clerk only retires at those points 
when law 1S to be discussed S1nce law and fact may well be 
intertw ined. Effective control over the clerk (i.e. a control which 
ensures that slhe did not advise on fact) is thus not possible by 
limiting when the clerk can retire. 
In the place of East Kerrier et seq. the Justices' Clerks' 
Society recommended that the following rules be introduced. First 
that for the purpose of discharging his functions the clerk may, if 
the justices retire, retire with them, and second, that subject always 
to the right of the justices to retire and rece1ve the advice of their 
clerk in private, the clerk may advise the justices in the performance 
of his functions in open court so far as is convenient to promote 
expedition and effeciency in the administration of justice. 
We have, in this memorandum, clear criticism of East Kerrier and 
proposals for change which would allow the clerk and bench to take the 
decision as to when it was proper for the clerk to retire with them. 
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The effect of the proposals is that the only restriction on when the 
clerk retired would be those imposed internally by the clerk and the 
bench. They would have to be trusted to discriminate correctly 
issues where the clerk should properly advise and issues where the 
clerk should rema~n silent. Two things should be noted - one, that 
at no stage do clerks ask to be part of the decision on fact, and two, 
that they do not suggest that the clerk ought to retire with the 
justices as a matter of course. 
The memorandum concludes with a plea for a positive attitude from 
the High Court and an express~on of the willingness of clerks to 
accept scrutiny of the way they perform. The Justices' Clerks' 
Society were critical of the fact that the High Court had not 
attempted to ensure that the clerk did g~ve advice in situations where 
he ought to do so, or shown concern over the quality of the advice 
given by the clerk. 
The call for a more positive attitude was echoed by the Justice 
of the Peace when commenting on Latham's article. In its "N 0 t e s 0 f 
the Week" it said 
"When it comes to appeals concerning the conduct of the clerk 
these are all concerned with errors of commission; an appellant 
will never challenge the clerk for failing to intervene to 
correct a capricious bench or for neglecting to inform an 
ignorant one. Likewise the Divisional Court are (sic) never 
asked to criticise the clerk who fails to prevent his bench from 
doing something perfectly appalling or who through timidity or 
inadequ~bY hesitates to intervene where duty demands that he 
should." 
It concluded with a demand for a new Practice Direction from the Lord 
Chief Jus t ice phras ed in pos it ive terms, and recognis ing that clerks 
60. 139 JPN 116. 
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1n the retiring room "know how far their duties extend and where they 
cease to be competent". 
By the end of the 1970s the position can be summarised as 
follows. Clerks felt that the rules governing when they did or did 
not retire were aimed at appearance, not reality. They wished to be 
trusted to make the decisions as to when they retired in conjunction 
with their justices, and not according to rules which they saw as 
misdirected and artificial. They increasingly perceived the problem 
as one,not of an over dominant clerk, but of an inactive or supine 
clerk. They asserted that it was vital that magistrates receive 
proper advice and that therefore the main concern of the High Court 
should be the positive concern of ensur1ng that they got it. 
East Kerrier and all of its ensuing confusions should be scrapped and 
replaced with positive control. 
Many of the concerns of the rest of this thesis are linked to 
this discussion of the cases concerning the retirement of the clerk 
with the bench. The relationship between clerk and the bench is 
crucially affected not only by the mechanisms of the clerk retiring 
with the bench but also by the 1ssues it ra1ses about the dominance 
(or otherwise) of the clerk over the bench, the extent to which the 
bench can rely on the clerk to organise the proceedings in court, and 
what she/he may properly discuss with them 1n the retiring room. The 
question of the relationship between the clerk and the legal 
profession who are the real observers of the clerks' conduct - in that 
they make the decisions to refer the clerks conduct to the scrutiny of 
the Divisional Court - is raised by the cases on retiring. The whole 
question of the future of the clerk, the clerk's status, whether or 
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not the clerk should take on a judicial role, career and promotion 
prospects for clerks - all of these ~ssues are reflected in the 
concern of the clerks over the problem of retiring with the bench. 
These topics will analysed in detail. But in their context, the 
lack of trust implicit in the decisions on the clerk retiring were a 
ball and chain around the legs of an ambitious, professional and 
frustrated body of people, who were all too aware that their identity 
and their job had recently and radically changed and who wanted this 
recognised. 
They have so far been disappointed. 
R v Guildford Justices ex parte Harding 1981. 
Far from heralding any improvement in the clerk's position, the 
1980s saw a fresh cr~s~s 
Guildford Justices ex parte Harding. 61 
the decision ~ n R v 
The decision caused so much 
consternation that it necessitated yet another Practice Direction on 
the clerk retiring with the bench. 
Thus far our analysis of the cases has attempted to provide a 
historically informed view of the law, looking in particular at the 
reaction of the ruled to the rules as they were made. The responses 
of clerks have been traced through articles and letters, mainly in the 
mouthpiece of the magistrates' courts - the Justice of the Peace. 
However clerks, and others, who contribute their articles and opinions 
in print are presenting a considered and sober analysis of the problem 
they perceive. Such analysis ~s very valuable, but arguments 
carefully marshalled and prepared for print perhaps do not reflect the 
depth of feeling which existed amongst clerks about the restrictions 
61. 1981 The Times. Jan.20th. 
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on their retiring placed on them by the decisions of the Divisional 
Court. The irritation, frustration and even anger of clerks seeps out 
from between the lines of the Justice of the Peace rather than being 
directly expressed. However by a fortunate chance, the decision in 
R v Guildford Justices ex parte Harding was made at the time in which 
the bulk of field observations and interviewing was being done for 
this research, so that the immediate reactions of clerks came over 
very strongly in the interviews and in conversations with clerks at 
most of the courts observed. We therefore have direct evidence of 
the depth of feeling precipitated by the decision. 
The case concerned a conviction for driving without due care and 
attention. The applicant had pleaded not guilty. The justices had 
asked the clerk to retire with them. The ir af f idavi t showed tha t 
they wanted his advice on the correct standard of proof, and that they 
wished to consult his notes of evidence. Lord Justice Donaldson 
quashed the conviction. He criticised the clerk's retiring with the 
note of evidence, saying that justices ought to be able to take a 
proper note of evidence and not have to rely on the clerk's note. He 
also said that if the justices wished to refer to the clerk's note 
they should send for it and read it, but that it would lead to the 
wrong impression if the clerk retired so that the justices might read 
his note of evidence. 
He was also critical of the clerk retiring to advise on the 
standard of proof in careless driving. He pointed out that it was 
exactly the same standard of proof applied in most criminal cases, and 
that a knowledge of the standard of proof in criminal cases was wholly 
fundamental to the proper discharge of the justices' functions. The 
report in The Times said 
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"His Lordship was forced to the conclusion either that the 
justices were incapable of achieving the standard rightly to be 
expected of them or the explanation given was a pretence.,,62 
The reaction of clerks to this case was very strong. What 
underlay their objections was that they felt that the decision 
demonstrated a lack of understanding by the High Court of what 
actually happens in magistrates' courts. Even the usually restrained 
Justice of the Peace said 
" •.• the pill is not made any eaS1er to swallow when judgments 
come showing, putting it mildly, a rather remote knowledge and 
attitude to what actually goes on in magistrates courts.,,63 
The clerks interviewed for the present research did not put it so 
mildly. One said 
"The Magistrates' Courts' Rules were quite clear and shouldn't be 
messed about by High Court judges wh0 64if they've ever seen a magistrates' court it was 40 years ago." 
And another 
"I think probably the real problem is that people that make these 
decisions in the High Court with regard to what advice the clerk 
should and shouldn't give and how far they should go etc., are 
probably based on very little knowledge in fact." 
This general criticism was supported by more precise attacks on the 
dec is ion. On Lord Justice Donaldson's dictum that the bench should 
take their own notes the Justice of the Peace commented that many 
magistrates were not good at taking notes, nor was there any reason 
for them to be since the state provided them with a clerk to do it for 
them. As one of the clerks in the sample put it 
62. Ibid. 
63. 145 JPN 298. 
grammar here. 
We can only assume that emotion obstructed good 
64. This re ference to the Magis trates' Courts' Rules mus t be wish ful 
thinking. 
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"In a recent case the High Court said that magistrates shouldn't 
refresh their memory from the clerk's notes. That's buying a 
dog and barking yourself." 
The same clerk made the good point that if magistrates are busy taking 
notes they will not "really hear" the evidence in the sense of pay1ng 
attention to the demeanour of the witnesses when they g1ve evidence. 
On Lord Justice Donaldson's comment that the bench should take 
out the clerk's note and read it without the clerk being present one 
clerk commented that this was "ridiculous". He was considerably 
irritated that Lord Justice Donaldson did not understand that many 
clerks write shorthand, and others employ shorthand writers in court 
to take the note of evidence, thus usually making it impossible for 
the bench to read the note. 
The other issue in the case was the criticism made by the judge 
that the bench could not have needed their clerk's advice on the 
standard of proof in careless driving. The reaction of one clerk 
sums up the criticisms of this dictum very well. She said 
"I just find the Guildford case difficult to accept and respect 
because even on a careless driving which the judges in the 
Guildford case said was purely fact, ••. Wilkinson the authority 
on road traffic law devotes pages to careless driving. Well 
there's obviously some law on it - case law, the sort of 
standards to be applied - and from my experience magistrates 
often need guidance on the simplest things." 
This last phrase is the most crucial. The sentiment of clerks was 
overwhelmingly that it was misguided for Donaldson L.J. to believe 
that there were some points of law which were so simple that 
magistrates would not need advice on them. Over and over aga1n 
clerks said that it needed to be understood that magistrates are lay 
people, they do not understand the law, and they get things wrong. 
Two quotations illustrate this 
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" . 
••• maglstrates are only lay people and without guidance they 
arrive at some pretty horrendous decisions." 
"Time after time I find that even with experienced magistrates 
they do need to be reminded of the standard of proof." 
The Justice of the Peace also contained examples of situations where, 
following the decision in the Guildford Justices case, benches were 
deprived of advice they needed or showed their need for advice on 
basic issues. 
What the clerks said about the tendency of magistrates to make 
mistakes and the necessity of the clerk preventing this in relation to 
the decision in the Guildford Justices case is repeated many times. 
It is a crucial problem for clerks and one which will be examined in 
detail in the section on the relationship between clerk and bench and 
also later in this chapter when we examine the opinion of clerks about 
the law governing their activities. 
So far as the decision in the Guildford Justices case is 
concerned clerks saw it as an impediment to justice and yet another 
setback when they might have expected that they were to be more 
trusted than had been the case in the past. That clerks saw changes 
in their courts which merited recognition is evidenced when the 
Justice of the Peace editiorial responding to the Guildford case said 
"Surely it is time for the Practice Direction of 195365 0 be re-
stated in terms appropriate to present day conditions." 
The plea for a new Practice Direction was a prayer which was answered. 
A new Practice Direction was issued. Its style and approach 
were rather different, although its sentiments were essentially 
similar to the old one. 
65. 145 JPN 139 
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It dealt with one of the problems raised 1n the Guildford 
Justices case when it provided 
" . . Some Just1ces may prefer to take their own notes of evidence. 
There is however, no obligation upon them to do so. Whether 
they do so or not, there is nothing to prevent them from 
enlisting the aid of their clerk and his notes if they are 1n any 
doubt as to the evidence which has been given.,,66 
However, no carte blanche to rema1n in the retiring room if clutching 
a m in ute b 0 ok was imp 1 i e d in t his p r ov i s i on, s in c e it Was f 0 11 owed 
closely by another 
"If the justices wish to consult their clerk solely about the 
evidence or his notes of it, this should ordinarily and certainly 
in simple cases, be done in open court. The object is to avoid 
any suspig~on that the clerk has been involved in deciding issues 
of fact." 
The responsibility of the clerk to advise the justices and the 
need for the clerk(s) to retire to do this was phrased more positively 
in the new Direction. Instead of warning about not retiring as a 
matter of course, and about returning to court after advice had been 
given the new Direction said 
"The justices are entitled to the advice of their clerk when they 
retire in order 6Bhat the clerk may fulfill his responsibility 
outlined above." 
(The responsibilities of the clerk were exactly those delineated in 
the exis t ing law). Encouragement was given to clerks to advise the 
bench in open court rather than retiring with them. 
"If no request for advice has been made by the justices, the 
justices' clerk shall dischar..,ge his responsibility in court in 
. ,,6Y-the presence of the part1es. 
66. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1163 For text see Appendix 4. 
67. Ibid 
68. Ibid 
69. Ibid 
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Although no great departures from the existing rules were made in 
the Direction it spoke throughout of the responsibility of the clerk 
and of what the clerk should do rather than what he should not. 
The Practice Direction of 1981 was well received by clerks. 
Those interviewed after the Prac t ice Direc t ion (i.e. after 2nd July, 
1981) commented favourably. Some felt relief that they could return 
to the status quo after the hiatus of the Guildford case. Some were 
more enthusiastic, responding to the positive attitude of the 
Direction. Brian Harris in an article entitled "The Role of the 
Clerk: A New Direction" said 
"The principal advance of the new Practice Direction therefore, 
is that it speaks of the role of the clerk in terms of duties, 
.. ,,70 
not restr1ct1ons. 
He saw the positive attitude expressed by Lord Chief Justice Lane in 
the Direction as having a morale boosting effect on clerks since, 
although there are always defendants keen to challenge the intrusive 
clerk, there is no similar body of persons challenging the supine 
clerk who does not do those things which ought to be done. A 
positive attitude from the Lord Chief Justice therefore could be seen 
to be giving encouragement to clerks to act where the Directions said 
they have a "responsibility" to act. 
Harris's article is crisp, intelligent and forward looking. It 
1S an excellent analysis of the Direction and an expression of the 
attitude of the modern clerk who is professional and ambitious and 
wishes to see the job of the clerk developing new responsibilities. 
70. 145 JPN 403 
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To that end Harris along with other clerks is prepared to grasp the 
nettle and expose the clerk's expertise to public scrutiny by giving 
advice in open court. Harris says 
"There is an increasing willingness amongst court clerks to offer 
their advice to their justices publicly on matters of law and 
. . , 
th1s 1S to be welcomed, not least because the parties are made 
aware of the legal basis on which the court is acting and are 
thus able to challenge it where they believe it to be wrong.,,71 
One of the clerks interviewed expressed it as follows 
"The recent Practice Direction I don't think has altered much of 
the law as it was, apart from an attempt to encourage court 
clerks to give advice in open court... Although this is a 
difficult thing to do, the fact that something is difficult 
doesn't mean to say that it shouldn't be done." 
The Practice Direction of 1981 has not, however, signified any 
laxity in the attitude of the Divisional Court to the conduct of 
magistrate~ clerks. In 1982 the Divisional Court said that there 
mus t be no revers 10n to "the bad old days".72 In an unreported case 
R v Warley Justices ex parte Nash the justices had dealt with a 
trivial case of burglary. After the prosecution evidence they 
retired for coffee, and their clerk went with them. After the 
conclusion of the defence case, when the only question for the 
magistrates was whether or not the defence that the applicant had been 
in the shop the day before and left his finger prints about was 
believed, the clerk also retired with the magistrates. 
71. Ibid at p.405. An interesting point taken by Harris 1n his 
article is that the injunction to clerks to give advice in open 
court if not asked to retire appears in para.3 of the Direction 
which covers the clerks' responsibility to refresh the justices 
memory on evidence and to advise penalties. It does not appear 
after para.2 which covers advice on law, law and fact, and 
practice and procedure. 
72. Ormrod.L.J. in R v Warley Justices e~arte Nash LEXIS 
transcript. 13 Ju1y-1982. 
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Lord Justice Ormrod said that the case was clearly one where no 
actual injustice had occurred, but reluctantly he quashed the 
conviction because the appearance was created that the clerk had been 
involved in decisions on fact. The Justice of the Peace was not 
impressed with the decision in this case 73. 
case as a return to the days of East Kerrier. 
Its editorial saw the 
It is difficult to see 
why, Slnce the cases and Practice Directions have always been clear 
that the clerk should not retire when the only matter for 
consideration is a question of fact - and the clerk retired on a 
question of fact in this case. However the editorial does make the 
good point that if such a creature as an unjust or malignant justices' 
clerk exists, the Practice Direction and the cases will not stop 
her/him from wrongly influencing the magistrates, since the law 
focusses on appearances and not reality. Again we have, 1n effect, a 
plea for trust. The Justice of the Peace asserts that "The system of 
lay magistrates' courts rests as much on the lawyer clerk as it does 
upon the lay magistrate". Clerks feel that they play an important 
role which is usually not acknowledged, that the law deals with 
appearances and not with reality and thus implies that they are 
trustworthy, and that therefore decisions such as the one in Nash's 
case are counterproductive. 
However, although we have criticised the law on the clerk's 
retiring with the justices for lack of clarity, it is clear on some 
things. One of these things is that the clerk must not be involved 
or appear to be involved in decisions on fact. The clerk should 
therefore not retire if the only issue under consideration is one of 
73. 147 J.P.N. 209-210. 
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fact. If clerks do not show that they are capable of understanding 
and following this much of the law, they are perhaps not likely to be 
trusted. 
The Conduct of the Proceedings 
The Roche Committee contended, as we have seen, that the question 
of the clerk retiring with the bench was simply one aspect of the 
whole issue of the conduct of the clerk in court - if the clerk played 
a proper role in court her/his retirement would not be objected to, 
but if the clerk was over dominant in court problems would arise over 
retirement. 
The consumers of magistrates' justice and/or their lawyers may 
have agreed, since, shortly after the East Kerrier case, there were 
two appeals to the High Court challenging the conduct of the clerk in 
court 74 and later R v Consett Justices Ex Parte Postal Bingo [1967] 
linked the conduct of the clerk with retirement. 
However, although the retirement of the clerk with the bench has 
been carefully scrutinised and regulated by the decisions we have 
discussed, the conduct of the clerk in court - particularly the way 
the clerk relates to the bench in court - has not been similarly 
examined and ruled upon. The cases have settled a number of 
procedural points and stated the general principles to be applied 75 , 
but very little specific guidance has been given. 
74. Hobby v Hobby [1974] 1 WLR 1020 and Marjoram v Marjoram [1955] 1 
WLR 520. 
75. The cases referred 
R v Consett Justices Ex 
Simms v Moore [1970] 2 QB 
to are those at note 67 above 
Parte Postal Bingo Ltd (above) and 
327. 
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The first case concern~ng the conduct of the proceedings was 
Hobby v Hobby in 1954. This was an appeal to the Probate Divorce and 
Admiralty Division from a decision of a magistrates' domestic court. 
At the hearing before the magistrates the husband had attempted to 
establish adultery by his wife. Both parties had been legally 
represented. 
The clerk was alleged to have interfered with the Cross-
examination of the wife, and with the examination in chief of the 
husband. The wife's solicitor had handed the clerk the wife's proof 
of evidence and the clerk had used it as the basis of his notes. The 
clerk did not record the cross-examination of the husband by the 
wife's solicitor. It was also the clerk who announced the reasons 
for the decision of the court. 
The High Court's decision was that the clerk's conduct had been 
wrong and the case was sent back to be retried before a different 
court and a different clerk. Sachs, J. who delivered the leading 
judgment in the case held that as both parties were represented by 
solicitors it was for those solicitors to decide how best to conduct 
their client's cases and not for the clerk. However, Sachs did 
recognise that there were matters on which it would be proper for the 
clerk to intervene;, the freedom of the litigant to conduct their case 
as they wish must be balanced against the clerk's duty to assist the 
court as to what is and what is not relevant (although, of course, the 
clerk is not the one who makes a ruling as to what is or is not 
relevant). Sachs, J. commented that 
"Sometimes the dividing line between the part a clerk may, on one 
hand take in order to see that the time of the court is not 
wasted and the interventions on the other hand which in the , 
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interests of the justice appear1ng to be done, he ought not to 
make, is difficult of demarcation."76 
It was decided that the dividing line had clearly been overstepped by 
the clerk in this case, but no explicit guidance was given as to where 
the line should be drawn. The clerk's use of the proof of evidence 
as the basis of his notes was condemned and the clerk was reminded of 
the obligation to take a full and proper note in domestic cases. 
Two propositions, therefore, can be confidently stated after 
Hobby v Hobby: that if the parties to a case are represented the 
clerk should not interfere with the way in which they present their 
cases, subject to limits of reasonableness and relevance and the rules 
of evidence; and the clerk should take proper notes and not use a 
proof of evidence as the basis of notes. These propositions scarcely 
give the clerk a great deal of guidance as to what role is a proper 
one for her/him to play. How far should the clerk control the 
proceedings in court? What is the correct relationship between clerk 
and bench in court? How far may the clerk reasonably interfere with 
an advocate's conduct of a case? What procedures should be followed 
if the parties are not represented? None of these questions was 
dealt with. 
Nor was any further guidance to be obtained from 
Marjoram v Marjoram 77 in the following year. In that case the court 
committed a depressing list of errors - it misdirected itself on 
corrobora t ion in adul tery, it fa i led to g1 ve proper as s is tance to an 
unrepresented party in domestic proceedings as required by Section 61 
76. [1954] 1 WLR 1025 
77 • [ 1 955] 1 WLR 5 20 • 
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of the Magis tra tes' Courts' Ac t 1952, it allowed in evidence a Ie t ter 
written to the court by the husband without having gIven the wife's 
solicitor notice of its contents, it refused to allow the wife an 
adjournment to deal with the matters In the letter and it refused to 
allow the wife's solicitor to address the court on the law at the end 
of the case. The case was sent back for rehearing. The mos t 
telling phrase in the case comes at the end of the judgment of Lord 
Merriman where he says 
or 
"I might perhaps add, finally that we were told that an assistant 
deputy clerk was acting on this occasion. IS~ight be just 
as well if the real clerk acted on the rehearing." 
The unfortunate clerk In this case simply made mistakes - a 
regrettably large number of them In a short space of time. The error 
of his ways was pointed out and the case referred for rehearing. We 
can glean no general guidance from the case as to the proper conduct 
of clerks In court. We are certainly awakened to the problem of 
inexperienced clerks who get their procedure wrong, and warned to 
avoid the mistakes listed but we are not guided as to the proper role 
of the clerk in court. 
A much more helpful case, however, is R v Consett Justices ex 
1 · d 79 parte Posta BIngo Lt • In that case a complaint about the 
retirement of the clerk with the bench was linked to a complaint about 
the conduct of the clerk in court. It was contended that there was 
a dominant clerk and a silent bench and that this should be seen as 
relevant to the fact that the clerk later retired with the justices. 
78. Ibid. at p.529 
79. [1967] 2 QB 9. 
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It was suggested that the roles that had been played out 1n court were 
unlikely to be reversed in the retiring room. 
We have already seen that in this case the divisional court 
supported the retirement of the clerk on the basis that there were 
matters of law to be discussed. The conduct of the clerk in court 
was also, if not supported, at least viewed leniently, and some 
general principles govern1ng the conduct of the clerk were established. 
The first aspect of the clerk's conduct which was objected to was 
the fact that the clerk had interrupted the cross-examination of a 
prosecution witness and had taken over the questioning of the witness. 
There was a conflict in the affidavits as to whether the questioning 
by the clerk had continued for some time, or whether the clerk had 
asked a simple question which was answered at length by the witness. 
The divisional court did not find it necessary to find on the facts. 
Lord Parker instead made a general point - which contrasted sharply 
with the admonitions in Hobby v Hobby that clerks should not interfere 
where parties were represented. He said 
"There are some justices, some benches, who require their clerks 
to cross-examine to clear up ambiguities and prefer that he 
should do it rather than do themselves; there are other benches 
who desire to do the cross-examination themselves and for the 
clerk to remain silent. There is no general practice; there is 
no accepted practice. So far as this case is concerned, I am 
quite satisfied that anything the clerk did by way of questioning 
. . l· d f h b h ,,80 was done at the 1mp 1e request 0 t e enc. 
The second matter complained of was that the clerk had ordered 
witnesses out of court - even when both parties wanted them in court. 
80. Ibid. at p.18. 
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However, s~nce this was the settled practice of the bench Lord Parker 
did not object. 
The clerk had also refused to allow counsel to have a person (not 
his solicitor) sitting with him to assist with instructions, and 
further, he had ordered a witness to leave one of his company's files 
with the court until the bench agreed that the file might be taken 
away. 
Again, none of this was found to be objectionable. Lord Parker 
said 
"I myself think that it was for the clerk to conduct the 
arrangements inside the court and that he was not 
usurping a judicial functioning of the bench.,,81 
ordinary 
thereby 
His only criticism was that what had happened in the case "was not a 
model of how a case should be concluded in a court of summary 
jurisdiction,,82 but was not enough to justify quashing the conviction. 
It seems, then, that however prominent or even domineering the 
clerk may be, if the clerk does not usurp the judicial function of the 
bench and follows the accepted practice of the court her/his conduct 
will not be such as to produce, in the view of the reviewing court, 
the conclusion that justice has not been seen to be done. It seems 
that this is so even if the "accepted practice" of the court is for 
the clerk to cross-examine witnesses ~n the middle of counsel's cross-
examination! The clerk can take a very prominent role ~n the 
proceedings under what is almost a doctrine of "implied request". 
81. Ibid. at p.18-19. 
82. Ib id. at p. 19. 
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Lord Parker was perhaps somewhat less liberal, however, in the 
case of Simms v Moore 1970.83 Simms v Moore concerned a prosecution 
for possession of an offensive weapon. The defendant was 
represented. The prosecutor was the officer in the case and thus 
also a possible witness in the case. The officer therefore handed 
the witnesses statements to the clerk who proceeded to examine the 
prosecution witnesses. This was in fact the standard practice in 
some Metropolitan courts at the time. Objection was taken to this 
procedure on two grounds - first that it was contrary to rule 13 of 
the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1968 and second that justice was not 
seen to be done. Neither of these objections were upheld. Lord 
Parker dismissed the first on the basis that 
"Justices have always had an inherent power to regulate the 
procedure in their cour§e in the interests of justice and a fair 
and expeditious trial." 
He dismissed the second on the basis that the defendant was not 
prejudiced in any way since he was represented by counsel who could 
have seen the prosecution statements if he had desired to do so. 
However, Lord Parker, having been informed that the practice of the 
clerk thus examining prosecution witnesses was a constant practice in 
many magistrates' courts, laid down some general rules - which could 
hardly have been cheering to any clerk desirous of behaving in a 
domineering fashion. He said that neither the court nor the justices 
clerk should take an active part in the proceedings except to clear up 
ambiguities in the evidence, and so far as examining witnesses 1S 
83. [1970] 2 QB 327. 
84. Ibid. P. 331. 
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concerned, this should never be done if the party concerned is legally 
represented, nor if the party is unrepresented but is competent to and 
desires to examine the witnesses himself. 
Lord Parker then went on to define when it would be proper for 
the clerk to question witnesses, and how this should properly be done. 
He held that where an unrepresented party is not competent to examine 
witnesses properly the court has a discretion to allow the clerk to do 
so. This applies if the incompetence 1S on the part of the 
prosecution as well as defence. The clerk may use a proof of 
evidence or statement to assist him, but the other side should have 
sight of it and it should not be used as the basis of the note of 
ev idenc e. The general rules which should guide the courts when 
considering when and how the clerk should intervene are promotion of 
the interests of justice in the case, the rules of natural justice and 
the principle that justice should be seen to be done. 
The effect of these cases is to establish some guidelines on a 
limited number of areas, the obligation of the clerk to take a proper 
note of evidence in domestic cases, a prohibition on uS1ng a proof of 
evidence as a basis of the clerk's notes, and a rule that the clerk 
should not conduct the examination of witnesses either in chief or in 
cross-examination if the party is represented or competent to examine 
themselves. 
However, even this last point 1S hardly free from controversy. 
The general rule in Simms v Moore 1S not entirely consistent with 
R v Consett Justices ex parte Postal Bingo Ltd, S1nce 1n the latter 
case the clerk does appear to have taken a substantial part 1n the 
examination of witnesses. Therefore although Simms v Moore 
es tabl ishes some general rules, con t ravent ion of them wi 11 pos s ibly 
156 
not be a ground in itself to challenge the decision of the court. 
The general principle that justice must be seen to be done is still 
the guiding one and the notional line which the clerk must not cross 
lest s/he subvert this principle is still not very precisely defined 
so far as the conduct of the clerk in court is concerned. 
Many matters concerning the proper conduct of the clerk 1n court 
are left then for courts to determine their own practice. But the 
issues are far from simple ones and when "a court" consists of lay 
magistrates and a qualified and experienced clerk, it will almost 
certainly be the clerk who, cognisant of the case law and the 
procedural pitfalls, will be the one who decides the boundaries of 
correct conduct. 
The most frequently occurr1ng problem in practice 1S the problem 
of the unrepresented defendant who 1S not competent to cross-exam1ne. 
The rules of cross-examination are technical, and few unrepresented 
persons can successfully cross-exam1ne without considerable 
assistance. The clerk has difficult decisions to take here. S/he 
should not descend into the area by conducting a proper cross-
examination, s/he is not cognisant of the defendant's case but may 
well know enough to understand that a defence advocate would cross-
examine vigorously. The clerk may well be tempted to risk becoming 
"domineering", or open her/himself to the accusation of taking too 
prominent a role 1n the proceedings. The decided cases do not offer 
much assistance 1n resolving these common problems which confront 
clerks. 
The way 1n which clerks do conduct themselves in court will be 
examined in detail in later chapters when we examine the ways in which 
157 
the clerk relates to the bench, to the legal profession, to the 
unrepresented defendant, and to the other courtroom personnel. 
Clerk's Assessment of the Law 
Having traced the development of the law relating to the clerk in 
court, and shown the reaction of clerks to the cases as they were 
decided, what is intended in this section is to make an assessment of 
the opinions of clerks as revealed by the present survey, about the 
present state of the law relating to the clerk retiring with the 
bench. This area was chosen because as we have seen, it is the area 
of law in which most of the decisions relating to the behaviour of 
clerks have fallen. 
Clerks in the sample interviewed were asked what their op1n1on 
was of the present state of the law on the clerk retiring with the 
bench and also whether they thought that this law needed to be altered 
1n any way. Their replies were most instructive. 
34% (17) thought that the law was satisfactory and did not need 
altering. 63% (31) thought that the law was unsatisfactory and 
needed change. Only 4% (2) didn't know or had no opinion on the 
matter, and both of these were trainee clerks. 
It demonstrates, even at such a simple level of analysis of the 
questionnaire, a remarkable situation if almost two thirds of clerks 
are not satisfied with those rules which govern the basis of their 
relationship with the magistrates and their behaviour in court. It 
indicates that, despite the new Practice Direction, the problems of 
East Kerrier have not yet been resolved. We have already said that 
the lay magistracy deals with the vast majority of criminal cases in 
this country. These magistrates rely upon their clerks to run the 
courts and to give them legal advice. Their clerks feel that their 
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ability to carry out these important tasks ~s hampered by the existing 
law. 
What problems, then, do clerks see with the law, and how would 
they like it changed? 
Legal change in the period of research 
It is important to emphasise at the outset that the interviewing 
took place at a time of developments in the law relating to the 
clerk's retiring with the bench. The interviews took place over a 
period of 8 months, from January to August 1981. 
R v Guildford Justices ex Parte Harding was decided in January, 
and the Practice Direction was introduced on the second of July 1981. 
As we have seen, many clerks objected strongly to the decision in 
the Guildford Justices case, and it must be true to say that it was 
this decision which prompted many clerks to express dissatisfaction 
with the law. Certainly those clerks interviewed after the Practice 
Direction expressed less concern about the difficulties of operating 
the rules. Comments such as "I think the recent Practice Direction 
has almost got it right" were made by several clerks. However, 
whilst it could be said that the Practice Direction wiped out the 
unwelcome effects of the Guildford Justices case and expressed the 
rules in a positive fashion, it did not make any real changes in the 
law as it existed prior to the Guildford Justices case. It would 
certainly not be true to say that the Practice Direction of 1981 
solved all the clerks' problems or dispensed with all their objections 
to the restrictions on their retirement. Many clerks regarded the 
Guildford Justices case as a particularly objectionable decision in a 
line of cases which was anyway unsatisfactory. 
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The type of change desired 
Only one of the clerks 1n the sample thought that the law should 
be changed so as to make it harder for the clerk to retire with the 
bench. That clerk said 
"There are no set rules except for that direction we've had. 
Well I think they ought to be more strict. That would mean that 
if they (clerks) made mistakes they would be discovered more 
easily. I think it is very important that it should be very 
strict - after allmagistrates' courts deal with the bulk of 
criminal offences really. Very seldom do matters go to the 
Crown Court." 
This, however was very much a lone V01ce. No other clerk wanted the 
rules on retiring to make it more difficult for the clerk to retire. 
A sustantial proportion (28%) of clerks who wanted change in the 
law wanted change which would simply clarify the situation. These 
clerks protested that the Guildford Justices case was unhelpful and 
that they awaited a Practice Direction to clarify the situation. As 
one of them put it. 
"Personally I wouldn't be bothered what changes they made because 
I would work in accordance with the law as it's set down. The 
only thing I would ask is that the law is made clear." 
However the majority of clerks (65%), who saw the need for 
change, wanted a change which would make it easier for the clerk to 
retire with the bench. There were a number of reasons why this was 
so. 
The overwhelming reason for clerk's desire to be able to retire 
more often was to ensure that the bench did not make mistakes. Over 
and over again clerks emphasised that magistrates were lay people and 
that they did not know the law. It was stressed that even 
experienced magistrates have been known to make bad mistakes and that 
the clerk needed to be there to protect defendants - and prosecutors -
from those mistakes, and to preserve the legitimacy of the court. 
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Many clerks commented that if the bench made mistakes they looked 
ridiculous in front of all the people in the court. Ore clerk said 
that if the bench announced a wrong sentence. 
" ••• they look rather foolish and you look foolish as well." 
Another commented 
" ••• they can make mistakes and it only makes the bench look 
stupid and puts the law into disrepute." 
The clerks did not see such errors as necessarily being a 
reflection on the bench, although they could be. One clerk commented 
that the Practice Direction of 1981 was good, but that it didn't 
"cover the situation where your bench 1S not a bright bench". 
Another commented that his court could not provide experienced 
chairpersons in each court, so that often benches needed help. A 
third said that he saw the problem as being one of lack of training of 
the bench. Many clerks, however, simply expressed the view that lay 
persons operating a legal process needed help constantly because one 
never knew when a point of law might arise 1n a case. 
This was the central complaint of clerks - that it 1S not 
possible for any clerk to predict when a point of law may ar1se. 
Therefore to base the law around a requirement that the clerk should 
retire only when a point of law does ar1se does not make sense. Some 
examples from the many 1n the interviews illustrate the point. One 
clerk said 
"Until you know what their decision is on the facts you can't 
really know for certain that there is no technical legal point. 
And it is always possible in a case where you think the facts are 
perfectly straightforward - either they b~lieve the ~rosecuti?n 
or they believe the defence - for the mag1strates, w1thout th1s 
being anticipated, deciding that perhaps the dishonest intent 
arose halfway through the facts. Now you haven't anticipated 
this, but you would be in difficulties if they have based their 
decision on it. •• " 
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Another said 
"I think it's fraught with danger to expect lay justices to go 
out without any guidance at all. I always feel apprehensive if 
the justices have gone out on their own and they come back in. 
As I say, I try if I can to ask them what they've decided before 
they announce it in open court because one does get cases •••. I 
remember years ago when I had a very experienced chairman of the 
bench who had been on the bench for years who was sat in No.4 
court where the bench is so much higher than the clerk's desk -
unlike Courts land 2 where you're sitting in a position where 
you can hear what they are saying. We had a guilty plea - I 
can't remember the nature of the case but an advocate appeared 
for the defence and gave a long mitigation, and after 
con~ideration in c9urt tbe chairman .said 'We've l~stened tp what 
you ve sa1d and we re g01ng to d1sm1ss the case. So I Jumped 
up and said 'Of course you do mean an absolute discharge' - which 
was the best I could do in the circumstances." 
The interviews contain many examples of this type of situation 
arising, where magistrates went wrong because they did not have the 
guidance of the clerk. A few clerks felt that benches made mistakes 
because they were insufficiently trained. (The question of training 
1S of course very important, and will be discussed in detail in a 
la ter chapter.) However many clerks stressed that even experienced 
magistrates who knew the job well still went wrong, and that unless 
the clerk was with the bench in the retiring room to correct errors as 
they arose, problems and embarrassment would be caused. 
It must be stressed that none of the clerks interviewed wanted to 
be part of the tribunal of fact. They were very clear that this was 
an area that they were very glad was outside their prov1nce. But 
they were most anxious to ensure that decisions on fact were taken 
correc t ly, according to the re levant legal pr inc iples, and they fe 1 t 
that the only way to ensure this was for the clerk to be with the 
bench. 
The clerks in the sample were not asking for a change 1n the 
details of the provisions of the Practice Directions, or the decisions 
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1n the cases. They were looking for a fundamental shift in the basis 
of the rules. What they wanted was to be trusted, to be able to 
retire whenever they wanted - and every time if they felt it 
necessary. A few brief examples of clerks' op1n10ns will illustrate 
this: -
" .•• 1 think in that respect the clerk ought to be given far more 
latitude in using his own common sense in retiring." 
"My own opinion is - strictly my own opinion - is that I think 
the clerk should retire with the bench if he considers it 
necessary on any occasion." 
"I think we should retire every time, hear what their decision is 
and if there are any queries we can raise it and then once we've 
heard what it is and we feel it is correct in law and procedure, 
then we should leave them." 
"But after all you should be able to rely on the sense of the 
clerk that he's not going to go out and start making decisions 
for the justices." 
Another pointed out that if the clerk were to be able to use his own 
initiative about when to retire it would mean that the clerk would 
have to have the trust of those people appearing in court regularly, 
such as solicitors. However some clerks were confident that such 
trust was assured 
"I can't see what all the fuss is about because solicitors tell 
me in court in difficult cases 'Go and retire with them' because 
they - and I'm sure this happens in all courts - they trust me 
and they know I wouldn't become involved in matters that weren't 
my concern." 
These statements strongly reinforce the conclusions which were drawn 
from clerks reactions to the developing case law - the message that 
today's clerks feel that they are professional, responsible, and 
trustworthy. As one clerk put it 
"I think another historical aspect of it is that for many years 
in many divisions throughout the country certain clerks were very 
involved in all of the processes - recommending sentencing, 
recommending findings of guilt and innocence and so on and so 
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forth. I'm sure that happened certainly during the first half 
of this century and magistrates were guarding against that. I 
think latterly clerks have become far more prevalently qualified 
professionally, know their place, have a very good working 
relationship and I think there is no need now for the kind of 
detailed clarification of the clerk's role in retiring." 
So there may have been the bad old days when clerks were wayward and 
unprofes s iona1. Now, however,clerks claim that things have changed 
substantially. They feel that clerks can now be trusted to behave 
professionally. 
The theme that changes ~n magistrates courts necessitated changes 
~n the role of the clerk was taken up by another clerk who argued that 
the Divisional Court was out of touch with public op~n~on 
" .•• what public opinion is concerned about is not that clerks 
have too much influence with their justices, it's that laymen are 
required to take those decisions without professional advice. 
Now they have professional advice on sociological and other 
matters from the probation service, from doctors or whatever, but 
the legal advice - the principles on which they are meant to 
decide the case - must come solely from their clerk. I think 
the public would be happier to see the clerk retire as a matter 
of course with the bench throughout their decision in every 
possible case. In that way you would be then acknowledging a 
situation which should exist." 
Conclusions 
Many clerks are obviously content with the restrictions presently 
placed on their retirement with their benches. If the rules are 
clear they are willing to follow them. What they perceive to be 
unrealistic decisions by the Divisional Court cause exasperation, but 
with a new Practice Direction restating the old rules these clerks are 
content. 
There are however an equal number of clerks who are far from 
satisfied with the restrictions placed on their retiring, who want to 
be trusted to exercise their own discretion in these matters, and who 
resent the present rules. 
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It must be a matter for some concern that half of the clerks 1n 
the sample perce1ve the rules that govern their behaviour as 
inappropriate to their own understanding of their job. Whether or 
not such concern should lead us in the direction of recommending 
changes to make it easier for the clerk to retire will not be 
discussed here. As we have stressed, the question of the retirement 
of the clerk with the bench is intimately connected with the whole 
relationship of clerk and bench, with the relationship of clerk and 
other actors in the courtroom drama, and with the development of the 
clerk's respons ib i lit ies out of court. When these fac tors have been 
examined we will attempt at the end to make an assessment of the 
probable and/or desirable future. 
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The practice of clerks in relation to retiring with the bench 
Our aim here is to examine what clerks say they do so far as 
retiring with the bench is concerned and also from observations at 
nine different courts to assess what clerks actually do in practice. 
The clerks' accounts of their practice 
The clerks who were interviewed were asked two questions. They 
were asked what practice they usually adopted in court so far as 
retiring with the bench was concerned. Also, to discover what 
demands were made upon them by the bench, they were asked what sort of 
issues the bench asked them to retire on the most often. 85 
The replies of clerks to the first question about the practice 
they adopted were concerned mainly with the issue of whether or not 
they would take the initiative and retire with the bench when the 
bench had not asked them to retire. 
The reasons why this was the focus for clerks is interesting. 
In the Practice Direction of 1953, where Lord Goddard is discussing 
the question of on what it is proper for the clerk to advise, he does 
envisage the clerk taking the initiative 
"Moreover it would be proper for the clerk himself to call the 
justices attention to the fact that a question of law does, or 
may, arise if they do not appear to be already aware of it. It 
would then be for them to con~~der whether they wanted his 
further advice on that question." 
However when Lord Goddard ~s discussing the manner in which justices 
may consult their clerk it ~s clear that it ~s the justices who are to 
85. They were asked these questions before they were asked for their 
opinion on the law. 
86. [1953] 1 WLR 1416 
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be the initiators of the clerk's retiring. After warning that the 
clerk is not to retire as a matter of course and that justices are not 
to try to get round the decisions by asking the clerk out in every 
case, the Direction says 
"Sub jec t to this, it is in the dis cret ion of the jus t ices to ask 
their clerk to retire with them if, in any particular case it has 
become clear that they will need his advice. If in the course 
of their deliberations they find that they need him they can send 
for him." 
The Practice Direction of 1953 therefore appeared to envisage the 
justices being sole controllers of the clerk's retiring. The clerk 
could take the initiative in proferring advice, but the implication 
was that she/he should do this in open court. 
says 
The 
This is made explicit by the Practice Direction of 1981, which 
"If no request for advice has been made by the justices, the 
justices' clerk shall discharge his responsibility in court in 
the presence of the parties." 
problem with giving the justices control over asking the clerk to 
retire with them is the one already mentioned - that jus t ices do not 
always know when a point of law ar lses. Of course the clerk can give 
the justices her /h is view of the law they before retire, but as several 
clerks pointed out, Since law and fact are so closely intertwined, one 
often doesn't know what legal advice is needed until one knows what 
view of the facts has been taken by the bench. 
Many clerks therefore, in practice do take the initiative and 
retire without being asked in certain circumstances. 66% of the 
sample said that they would retire without being asked in some 
c ircums tances. Only 34% said that they would only retire when they 
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were asked, and 4% (two clerks) of these added the rider that this was 
because the bench asked them out all the time or very often! 
Clerks who never retired unasked 
Several of these clerks who said that they only retired when they 
were asked mentioned a factor which must have made it appear that they 
sometimes did retire unasked - and that was the existence of buzzers 
or light systems to summon the clerk to the retiring room. In many 
courts, the magistrates' retiring room is furnished with a light or 
buzzer switch which they can use to summon the clerk. In some of the 
courts this light or buzzer is invisible or inaudible. Therefore 
although the bench was taking the initiative in summoning the clerk, 
the observer 1n court may be unaware of this. 
Some of the clerks who said that they did not retire unless asked 
also said that they tried if possible to g1ve their advice in open 
court. One said 
"Well I don't [retire] unless they ask me. Sometimes certain 
advice is given in court and there are times when I want the 
parties to hear what I say as well, so if there is something that 
I feel the justices should know because it's a point of law and 
they haven't retired, I will say so in open court, so that if 
anybody particularly wants to disagree with it they can do SO." 
(This clerk was interviewed before the Practice Direction of 1981.) 
Another clerk said that where the sole question was a point of law he 
tended to offer his advice in open court, but he did point out that 
there were points where he could not do this until he knew what 
preliminary decisions they had taken. He explained the problem 1n an 
imaginative way 
" ••• if I can explain that the decision making in a bench of 
magistrates is rather like a flow diagram with a number of 
points, and I as clerk may well think that the critical point is 
point number three, but they may well be agreed that it's number 
four. I can't give public advice on number three because I'd be 
wasting my time because they in fact think it's number four. 
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And so on any question of mixed law and fact and on many 
questions of sentencing I think it's highly desirable that the 
bench have the advice of their clerk - with them when retiring." 
Clerks who would retire on their own initiative 
The replies of the two thirds of clerks who said that they would 
retire without being asked deserve closer analysis. Just under half 
of them said that they usually waited to be asked but that sometimes 
there was a point of law which had been raised and which they thought 
the bench needed advice upon, and that they would then retire unasked. 
A typical response from these clerks would be 
"We normally only retire when the magistrates ask us, unless 
there is an obvious point of law or something that we should 
mention to them." 
An example from the court observations will illustrate the problems 
confronting clerks which lead to this particular practice. A case 
was brought before the court involving a complaint of breach of the 
peace. A young man was alleged to have been behaving in a rowdy way, 
and to have been swearing in a local park. The defendant pleaded not 
guilty. He was extremely well prepared, articulate, and had his 
father with him as . 87 a McKenz~e man. The clerk dealt very 
sensitively with the case, taking time, explaining what was happening 
at every stage and assisting the defendant to frame questions in 
cross-examination. The bench eventually retired to consider the 
facts. They retired for almost an hour. During that time the clerk 
discussed the case with me. His concern was that the magistrates may 
well not have realised that because the case involved a complaint of 
breach of the peace the standard of proof was proof on the balance of 
87. McKenzie v McKenzie [1970] 3 All E.R. 1034 decided that a 
defendant is entitled to have with him any person to take notes, 
quietly make suggestions and give advice. 
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probabil it ies. He was afraid that the bench were deciding the case 
on completely the wrong basis. Several times during their retirement 
he said "I don't know if I should retire or not". Eventually the 
magistrates buzzed through and asked the clerk to retire. When he 
returned he reported that the magistrates had asked him for advice on 
the standard of proof, and his suspicion that they had not understood 
that the standard was proof on the balance of probabilities was 
confirmed. The bench had been undecided as to whether to acquit the 
defendant, but having been told of the lower standard of proof were 
then happy to do so. 
The clerk's dilemma 1n this case illustrates very clearly the 
problems that may ar1se, and the reasons why clerks who feel that they 
have a point of law which the bench should know about retire unbidden. 
The clerk in the example was at pains to point out after the case that 
it constituted a good reason for letting the clerk decide on his own 
initiative when to retire with the bench, and that clerks resented the 
lack of trust displayed by cases like East Kerrier and the 
Guildford Justices case. 
Apart from those clerks who would go out without any request from 
the bench, there were another group who also retired on their own 
initiative - but who had devised a method of circumventing the law. 
This group of clerks (about 20% of all clerks interviewed) adopted one 
of two approaches. Half of them simply told the bench that they 
wanted to retire. 
" ••• if there's a point of law involved or something which they 
may have missed - or not realised there is a point of law 
involved - then I will often say 'there is a point of law 
involved in this case and I'd be obliged if you'd send for me 
before you come back into court'." 
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The other half persuaded the bench to ask them to retire. 
"We always make sure that the chairman wants me out there, and 
will announce - get him to announce it publicly. It may be that 
I prompt them •••• 'Do you wish me to come with you?' and leave it 
to them. If they say 'No' then I don't go" 
This latter approach is perhaps a little more subtle, and of course 
leaves the bench with the decision ultimately as to whether they want 
the clerk. But it would be an unusually insensitive or stubborn 
bench who in the face of such an indication would neglect to take 
their clerk's advice. As one clerk said 
"If I think it's something that they need assistance with I'll 
say 'Do you want me to retire with you,' They always say 'Yes'. 
They get the hint." 
Playing the game 
Some clerks took a slightly cynical View of the whole process of 
the retirement of the clerk. Th e y took the vie w t hat it was 
necessary, if tedious, to abide by the rules. They believed that 
they should 'play the game' even if the game was unnecessary. 
Experienced clerks knew that if they wanted to retire they could 
almost always do so, that the initiative was often their own, but that 
they had to keep up appearances. As the clerk last quoted put it, if 
he wished to retire all he had to do was ask the bench if they wanted 
him, and they got the hint. Other clerks mentioned that they made a 
parade of retiring, so that it was clear to everyone that the bench 
had asked the clerk out 
"I wait for them to ask me to retire, and then I make it 
abundantly clear in court by replying myself in court, that this 
is the intention - and I say 'I will, Sir.' And it's abundantly 
clear to everyone in court that I've been asked out." 
This pantomime may be performed for a very select audience. 
" ••• (iO there is a special message which can be taken through 
completely unrelated to the case, in that case I would inform the 
solicitors why I was going in ••• So I tend to explain why I'm 
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going in. If it's solicitors I'm not familiar with I actually 
say 'I've been asked to retire.' With local solicitors 
. , 
they are used to the signs and they understand what's going on." 
It is, of course, the legal profession in court who constitute a 
danger to the clerk who does not play by the rules. Realistically 
they are the only people likely to challenge the clerk's conduct by 
taking a case to the Divisional Court. However they may not 
constitute a danger, but be a positive assistance to the clerk who 
wishes to retire unasked. At least one clerk said that the local 
profession would tell him to go out if they had a complex case under 
consideration. 
Knowing the Court and the Bench 
Several clerks interviewed mentioned differences in practice 
between variOUS courts, and indeed the fact that there are such 
differences was obvious from the field notes and observations. 
At least two factors are important here. One is the way in 
which the clerk to the justices approaches the question with other 
clerks. At this level the clerk to the justices can at least attempt 
to formulate policy - to decide what the details of the practice of 
the clerks shall be. Clerks to the jus t ices ment ioned, for ins tance, 
encouraging their clerks to give advice in open court. Certainly the 
influence of the clerk to the justices on new clerks, and clerks in 
training is considerable. But the clerk to the justices does not 
train all of her/his own staff. At most courts there will be clerks 
on the staff who were trained elsewhere, and whose practice will vary 
from that of the clerk to the justices. There were definite 
divergencies of practice between individual clerks at each court. 
The clerk therefore does not succeed in enforcing a particular pattern 
of retiring with the bench so far as all clerks are concerned. 
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However, the clerk to the justices does not only train the court 
clerks under her/him. S/he often has a very large part in the 
training of the bench; and what they are capable of doing without 
assistance will affect the pattern of retiring at a particular court -
even against the inclinations of clerks. One unwilling clerk said 
"My own opinion is that the clerk shouldn't re t ire at all unl es s 
he's requested to do so. I don't think the practice - which is 
her e, w her e a c 1 e r k will m 0 reo r 1 e s s bee x p e c ted tor e t ire - I 
don't think that's right at all. But it's something I've had to 
get used to doing since I came here. I think the main fault is 
the fact that the magistrates at this particular court are not 
well trained enough, and that's all there is to it." 
If all or many of the magistrates at a particular court lack training 
or confidence, they will be asking the clerk to go with them almost 
every time they retire. The court clerks will have to comply, even 
if they would rather not - they can hardly refuse help if it is asked 
for. The influence of the clerk to the justices 1S therefore 
crucial, particularly so far as the training of the bench 1S 
concerned, on the pattern of retiring at each court. 
The pattern of retiring will also be affected by another factor -
the experience of the part icular magis tra tes who are sit t ing. Over 
the years clerks get to know their magistrates very well. They know 
just how much exper1ence, confidence, and intelligence their 
magistrates have. The clerk will look at the line up behind her/him, 
and know how much help they are likely to need. Comments such as 
'I've got the chairman of the bench today. I can relax', or 'These 
are very experienced magistrates' were frequent, along with other less 
appreciative comments. 
Obviously an experienced bench will need less help. As one 
clerk put it 
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"I te~d to treat each bench individually, knowing, with my 
exper1ence of the makeup of the bench and my knowledge of them as 
to how much guidance they are probably likely to want ••• " 
The confidence of the bench has a direct effect on the number of times 
the bench ask the clerk out. One clerk said that, if a point of law 
was raised in a case, he would try to give advice in open court before 
the justices retired. However 
"Usually justices, when such a point has been raised, would ask 
me to retire with them so that it could be fully explained to 
them, rather than they be left with a public statement, but that 
depends on the confidence of the individual members of the 
bench." 
So the ability of clerks to follow the prOV1S10n of the practice 
direction and the exhortations of their colleagues, and to g1ve advice 
1n open court may well depend on improvements in the training of the 
bench. 
The Needs of the Bench 
The clerks who were interviewed were asked to make an assessment 
of what the issues were on which they were most frequently asked for 
advice by the bench. The aim was to find out what their demands on 
the clerk were - why clerks were being called on to retire. 
A depressing 10% said that they were asked out on anything and 
everything. One response was 
"Most of the time they ask you to go with them for everything." 
However it is obvious that the issue on which magistrates most 
look to their clerk for help is the issue of sentencing. Magistrates 
courts do deal with a high percentage of pleas of guilty, so they are 
likely to spend a proportionately large amount of time sentencing. 
But one might have thought that if they did such a lot of it, they 
might get used to doing it without advice. 
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70% of clerks said that sentencing was the issue on which they 
were most often called upon to advise. 50% mentioned points of law 
as being one of the issues they were frequently asked about, and this 
50% includes a number of clerks who were still guiding their benches 
through the new approach of the Bail Act 1976. 
The clerks interviewed were asked simply to state what issues 
they were asked to retire on the most often. 14% mentioned in this 
context that magistrates asked their advice on fact. sometimes this 
arose because fact and law are often closely linked. 
"It's surprising really the amount of time that's taken up by 
questions on evidence or relating to evidence. I'm a bit wary 
of the way I answer those because they're mixed - more fact 
questions - and really you have to shy away from the temptations 
they place in your way to comment on the facts." 
Sometimes it seemed that the bench was looking for advice where it 
certainly should not have been. One clerk said 
"I only advise on law. I get asked on fact often, but I only 
tell them on the law, the various legal rulings." 
Another 
"But occasionally you feel they ask you in to see what your 
reaction is. They'll say - sometimes the evidence is a bit 
involved - they'll tell you how their minds are thinking and you 
have to remind them and say 'Well it's your decision'. And you 
have to point out to them - I'll say 'Well this is a question of 
fact, I really can't help you'." 
The clerks who admitted that they were from time to time asked to g~ve 
advice on fact were all anxious to make it plain that they didn't 
oblige, that they would always point out that it was a matter for the 
bench and not for them. It may well have been that the clerks who 
were interviewed were motivated to admit that they were sometimes 
asked to give advice on fact because they felt it was pointless to 
conceal it since they were being interviewed by someone who was 
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initiated - who had herself been a court clerk. One clerk said he 
was most often called upon to advise on law 
" ••• but that isn't the only one obviously - you probably know 
that. If they ask me what do I think, then I say 'Well what do 
you mean what do I think?' You've got to be carefuL .• II 
It is clear from these observations that magistrates find it 
difficult to distinguish between fact and law - to put it at its best. 
Inevitably, therefore, one is relying on the integrity of the clerk 
not to comment on the facts, despite what appear to be open 
invitations to do so. 
This problem is part of the whole issue of the way l.n which the 
clerk relates to the bench, which is the subject of the next section. 
Questions were carefully designed in that section of the questionnaire 
to elucidate whether or not the bench asked advice on fact. They 
were scarcely needed. But these issues will be investigated l.n more 
detail in the next chapter. 
What do clerks actually do? 
As we have already detailed, one aspect of the field work 
consisted of court observation. 
Two courts were observed for a period of one month each, and five 
courts for periods of two weeks - a total of four and a half months of 
observa t ion. Verbatim notes of the proceedings were taken as far as 
possible, and particular attention was paid to patterns of retiring. 
The courts chosen were situated so that a geographical spread 
over England and Wales was achieved, and all sizes of courts were 
observed, so that the sample although not large was as representative 
as possible. 
The patterns of the clerk retiring with the bench varied a great 
deal between individual courts. For instance at one court, Court A, 
the clerks almost invariably retired. Over a period of a month's 
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observation there were only two or three occaSlons when the clerk did 
not retire with the bench. Many of these retirements were at the 
prompting of the bench, but many were not. One clerk absolutely 
invariably retired with the bench on every occasion, whatever they 
were considering, and whether or not they had asked him to retire. 
His colleagues retired much more often than not, but they occasionally 
stayed in court. At this court, a defending solicitor who appeared 
at the court almost every day commented that the practice of the 
clerks was to go out with the bench and have a cup of coffee "and 
decide sentence with them". He said "Usually I'm addressing four 
people not three". When I expressed doubt about this he was most 
emphatic that it was so. However this solicitor appeared very 
affable towards the clerks, and did not seem to wish to challenge the 
clerk's pattern of retiring. In fact at this court, the type of 
incident mentioned in the interviews occurred, where a defence 
solicitor asked the clerk to go out. There had been some legal 
argument in a case where there was a charge of assault against the 
defendant and a complaint for a bind over arising out of the same 
incident. The prosecution asked the magistrates to hear the evidence 
but submitted that the assault charge was inappropriate and that it 
was a proper case for a bind over. The bench heard the prosecution 
evidence, and retired, without the clerk. The defence solicitor 
approached the clerk and said 'Do they understand?' The clerk said 
'I think they will decide they have enough evidence for a bind over 
rather than the other'. The defence solicitor made another 
(inaudible) comment, to which the clerk replied 'Yes - I'll make sure 
they understand'. The clerk then retired with the bench. She 
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later returned to court and indicated to the defence solicitor that 
the bench were taking coffee but would return in five minutes and that 
he should not worry. Therefore despite the fact that the clerks' 
practice at this court was rather unorthodox, it did not seem likely 
to be referred to the Divisional Court. 
Two other of the courts observed, courts C and D, had a similar 
pattern of retiring - the clerk went out with the bench almost every 
time. However the pattern was certainly not as marked as it was at 
Court A, and the clerks left the magistrates to their own devices on 
many occaS1ons over the period of observation. 
A general picture of patterns of retiring 1S very difficult to 
draw. A simple count of how often the clerk retired with the bench 
would be meaningless for several reasons. 
At some courts it is simply not possible to tell if the clerk has 
retired with the bench. For instance at Court C the magistrates' 
retiring room was accessible from the public part of the building. 
If, therefore, the bench retired and the clerk later went out, one did 
not know, without shadowing him, whether he had gone to collect papers 
from another court, gone to his office, gone to speak to the bench, or 
gone to get the cricket score! 
At some courts the pattern of the clerk retiring depended on what 
type of court was sitting. At all courts clerks almost invariably 
retired in domestic cases, as was envisaged by the Family Division. 
The way 1n which courts divide up their list of the day's cases 
between the courts sitting can affect the pattern of retirement. A 
court dealing with rates, T.V. licences and postal pleas of guilty 1n 
traffic offences is less likely to need to retire to consider matters 
than is one dealing with a list of several contested cases. Also, 
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the larger courts sub-divide their work in a very specialised way. 
Court E, for instance, runs about eight courts per day. One of those 
courts might be a "reports court" where a series of defendants who had 
been remanded for medical and/or social enqu1ry reports would appear. 
Such defendants frequently pose complex sentencing problems, and the 
bench dealing with them would legitimately need the advice of their 
clerk in the retiring room in many instances. 
Similarly the question of whether or not the clerk had been asked 
out by the bench was not always clear cut. On many occasions the 
retirement of the bench was preceded by a period of inaudible 
whispering between bench and clerk. In each situations one could not 
tell if the bench has asked for the clerk, or if the clerk had decided 
that the bench needed her/him and gone out without being so requested. 
Despite this it was obvious that clerks do, consistently, retire 
unasked if they think that the bench may be experiencing problems, or 
may need advice. 
At some courts there seemed to be an established policy that if 
the bench retired, the clerk would give them a few minutes to discuss 
and would then retire to see if they needed help. Time after time 
the bench would retire, the clerk would remain in court chatting to 
ushers, or solicitors for a few minutes, and then retire to the bench, 
often re-appearing with or without the bench after a very short time. 
On many such occasions there would have been time only for the clerk 
to ask if help was needed and for the bench to reply in the negative, 
or for the bench to tell the clerk what sentence they were propos1ng 
and for the clerk to confirm its legality. However such a pattern of 
retiring is hardly that which was envisaged by the Practice Direction. 
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Again though, it must be said that it is dangerous to generalise. 
On many occaS10ns clerks retired with the bench only because the bench 
consistently asked them to. This was especially so where the 
chairperson of the bench lacked confidence or exper1ence. 
Inexperienced magistrates depended heavily on the clerk, in court and 
when they retired. It was not however always the case that it was 
the inexperienced benches who consistently asked the clerk out. 
Perhaps the most confident, intelligent and sensitive chairwoman 
observed during the field work - a magistrate of considerable 
exper1ence who certainly did not lean on her clerk - always asked the 
clerk to retire with her. This can only have been a matter of a 
policy decision on her part, since she certainly was not in need of 
help when she was in court and her experience of sentencing was 
extensive. 
There were numerous occaS10ns during the fieldwork when the 
clerk's contention that lay magistrates made mistakes if the clerk was 
not there to help them was borne out. In one case the bench imposed 
one fine for two offences and had to be corrected. In another, 
domestic, case the bench retired alone. When they returned to court 
and announced their decision it did not conform to the applications 
made by the parties. The clerk went through the applications 
correcting what the bench had said so that it conformed to the changes 
in the provisions for custody and access which were the subject of the 
appl ica t ion. The bench had obviously not fully understood the nature 
of the application. Both parties' solicitors looked to the clerk to 
get it right, nodding as he detailed the correct terms, whilst the 
bench also nodded to indicate that the clerk was conforming to the 
sense of their decision. In a further case there was argument 
between defence and prosecuting solicitors as to whether the 
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prosecution had the right to re-examine or not. The bench appeared 
to be unwilling to allow re-examination. The clerk was vigorously 
trying to attract their attention. She finally succeeded. The bench 
said that they would retire "and see what the clerk has to say". 
Th i s was, 0 f c 0 u r s e, ani d e a lsi t u a t ion for the c 1 e r k tog i v e a d vic e 
in open court. The clerk did not seem to want to retire. She 
grimaced at the two solicitors, but went out. She returned alone 
after a few minutes. Two minutes later the bench returned. They 
sat down and the chair said to the clerk "Will you explain what we 
have decided?" The very strong impression was therefore given that 
the decision was not that of the bench. One wondered, even, if they 
. 
understood what they had decided. The clerk explained that re-
examination was permissible if new matters had been raised 1n cross-
examination. So much was clearly legal advice. She then had to go 
on to detail what the new matter was which had, in fact, been raised 
by this cross-examination. This was fact - or at least mixed fact 
and law. It should have been a decision for the bench as to whether 
re-examination was permissible in the circumstances. It was laudable 
that ultimately the clerk's advice was made public. However one was 
left wondering how much advice the clerk had had to give and how far 
the bench had understood that advice. 
It must be obvious from the accounts of clerks about their 
practice, and from the above discussion of the court observations that 
all clerks do not follow the Practice Direction on retiring. A few 
clerks and a few magis t ra tes simp ly flout it. They are, however, a 
a minority. The majority of clerks respond not to the provisions of 
the Direction but to a complex set of variables, which include the 
1 8 1 
practice they were taught 1n the past, the assumptions of the 
magistrates at their court, the experience of their bench, and the 
difficulty of the issue being decided at the time. Other factors may 
also intrude - the encouragement of defence solicitors, or just that 
the coffee machine is in the retiring room for instance! 
The general relationship between the clerk and the bench is, 
however, the most important factor. This relationship is not a simple 
one, and has problems other than that of when the clerk should retire 
with the bench. 
We will be considering the whole relationship between clerk and 
bench in the next chapter. It is clear, however, fom the reactions 
of clerks, and from their behaviour in court that the rules contained 
1n the Practice Directions are considered inappropriate by many 
clerks, and are not operated in practice. Clerks respond to the 
needs of the court, to the needs of benches of lay magistrates, and 
they feel strongly that those needs would not be satisfied by the 
pattern of retiring prescribed by the directions of the Divisional 
Court. 
The problem is that when the clerk in a court takes a decision to 
retire s/he is responding to such a complex set of factors, that no 
rules devised by the Divisional Court could effectively prescribe for 
the situations which arise in fact. Clerks are asking therefore that 
reliance be placed on their integrity - to retire whenever they 
consider it appropriate without any adverse inference being drawn. 
They wish to be trusted. 
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The clerk and the bench 
We have seen ln the last chapter that the legal rules relating to 
the clerk and the bench are complex and are resented by clerks who see 
them as an unnecessary restriction which prevents them from carrying 
out their job effectively. The rules arise in part as a reaction to 
the complaint that the clerk in court is too dominant and the fear 
that clerks might influence their benches improperly. 
In this chapter we examine in detail the way in which clerks do 
relate to magistrates and assess how far they exceed their proper 
ro leo We shall show that the problem is not a simple one of clerks 
gOlng too far, but is bound up with the way clerks see their own 
roles, the ir ins is tence on the importance of due proces s e lemen ts 0 f 
their roles and the pressures of processlng cases. 
The first part of the chapter deals with the clerk and bench ln 
the courtroom. The second part deals with clerk and magistrates ln 
the retiring room. 
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The clerk and the bench 1n court - division of labour 1n the courtroom. 
One striking difference between magistrates' courts in different 
parts of the country is the variation in the balance between the clerk 
and the bench in court. In some courts the magistrate in the chair 
will playa prominent role and will, for instance explain matters to 
the defendant, put questions to the witnesses and explain the 
requirements of the courts decisions to the parties. In other courts 
the bench will be seen to remain silent throughout the proceedings, 
speaking only to announce a decision, and then often leaving the 
explanation of it to the clerk. 
One of the clerks interviewed for the present study gave an 
illustration of his experience. 
"Where I was before they were very strict in the way procedure 
was carried out ••• There the clerk would identify the accused 
and put the charge to him and that was more or less it unless 
they were asked some point of law by the magistrates or there was 
anything that arose during the course of the case. But here the 
clerk puts the matter to him, if there's anything that comes up 
during the course of the case it goes straight to the clerk who 
makes any decision in effect, of what can and can't be heard, and 
unfortunately its often announced here by the clerk rather than 
the chairman, and I don't think that's right. Also when it gets 
to sentencing point they will decide the sentence and it's left 
to the clerk to explain it and personally I don't think that's 
correct." 
These differences from court to court were mentioned by 
Darbyshire l and also by Elizabeth Burney in her book "J.P. 
. d' ,,2 Mag.lstrate, Court an Commun1ty. 
1. Unpublished Ph.D.Thesis. The roles of the Justices' clerk and 
the Court Clerk. University of Birmingham. 1978. 
2. Elizabeth Burney, 
Hutchinson 1979. 
'J.P. - Magistrate, Court and Community', 
See Ch.9. 
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Both of these writers expressed concern about discrepancies from court 
to court. The present study aimed to supplement their evidence, and 
to discover something of the nature of, and the reasons for, the 
differences observed. 
The question of the division of labour between the clerk and the 
magistrates in the courtroom is closely linked to the question of 
whether or not the clerk 1.S dominating the bench or not. An 
assessment of whether or not clerks dominate their magistrates 1.n 
court will develop from the discussion of the division of the 
'speaking parts' in court between clerk and chairperson. 
The clerks interviewed for the present study were asked for their 
general comments on the division of labour between clerk and bench. 
They were also asked to explain who would fulfil the task of speaking 
in three different situations. They were asked who would explain to 
the defendant about her/his right to trial, who would explain to the 
defendant the choices in methods of presenting a defence, and who 
would explain the meaning and effect of a decision about bail. The 
replies to these questions were very interesting, and g1.ve a very 
clear picture of the complexities and difficulties which can ar1.se 1.n 
relation to seemingly simple issues, and of some of the reasons why 
there is such variation between courts. 
The clerks were first asked who would explain to the defendant 
the right to trial - i.e. where the defendant has a choice between 
trial before the magistrates or committal to the Crown Court for trial 
there, who would explain this to the defendant and seek the 
defendant's election. This does not appear on the face of it to be 
a particularly difficult 1.ssue, but it does 1.n fact involve an 
astonishing amount of legal and procedural knowledge. 
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It 1S first necessary to know whether or not a particular offence 
carr1es with it a right to trial by jury, whether it must be tried by 
a Jury or whether it must be dealt with by a magistrates' court. The 
Criminal Law Act 1977 simplified the number of categories into which 
an offence may fall from five to three,3 indictable, summary and 
'hybrid' but it created a procedural quagmire around the steps to be 
taken in order to reach a decision as to venue for hybrid offences 
which can be dealt with either summarily or on indictment. Section 
20 of the Act has now been repealed and re-enacted in Section 19 
Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. It provides that the court must first 
take a decision as to whether the case is one which is suitable for 
summary trial. The prosecutor and the defendant have the right to be 
heard on this . 4 1S sue. There is also relevant case law. If the 
magistrates decide that a case is suitable for summary trial, then the 
defendant is put to her/his election. If the case is one involving 
criminal damage there 1S an additional stage of determination of the 
5 
value of the goods. An experienced clerk can look down the list of 
the days' cases and without hesitating say which are summary, which 
hybrid and which must be dealt with on indictment. A less 
experienced clerk might have recourse to Stone's Justices' Manual for 
a few infrequent ly occuring offences. A lay magis tra te is unl ike ly 
to know more than the most frequently repeated offences such as theft 
3. Prior to the Act, offences fell into five categories - summary 
offences, summary triable on indictment, hybrid offences, 
indictable offences triable summarily and indictable offences. 
There were different procedural rules in relation to each type 
of offence. 
4. See R v Horseferry Rd. Justices ex parte Constable. 
Times 27.1.81. 
5 • Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. Section 22. 
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or drunkenness. The clerk will have the procedural complexities of 
Section 19 at her/his fingertips. 
may find the procedure confusing.6 
The lay magistrate understandably, 
Taking these factors into account, it IS not surprIsIng 
therefore, that every clerk interviewed reported that explanations 
about the right of trial were undertaken by the clerk. One clerk 
reported that in the past, the bench had tried to do it "but they got 
into such a mess, really to be quite frank, that they had to let the 
clerk take over." 
Young & Clarke In their book Chairmanship In Magistrates' Courts 7 
envIsage that it will be the clerk who will explain about mode of 
tria 1. They see the division of work between clerk and bench as 
dictated by their respective roles - they see the magistrate in the 
chair as the mouthpiece of the bench and therefore responsible for 
accouncing the decisions of the court and the clerk "the chief 
executive officer" of the court and its professional adviser and 
therefore responsible for legal, technical and procedural items. 8 
Young and Clarke also expect that it will be the clerk who will 
explain to the defendant the procedural courses open to her/him in 
making a defence. (An unrepresented defendant must be told that s/he 
can remain silent or make a statement or give evidence on oath.) 
Contrary to this expectation, however, it would seem that some 
magistrates are asserting themselves on this issue. 
6. The question of how effective the clerk is at explaining the 
complexities of the procedure to the defendant is explored in 
Chapter Four. 
7. Agnes F.Young J.P., M.A., and Keith Clarke. 1976 Barry Rose. 
8. Ibid at p.28. 
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Although 76% of clerks said that they would explain to the 
defendant their choices in making their defence the other 24% of the 
clerks said that the bench might do it sometimes. Only two of these 
latter clerks said that it could equally be clerk or chairman who did 
it. The other ten said that the chair would only do it infrequently 
- one commented that "Very exceptionally the chairman might chip in 
and do it", another said that very experienced chairmen might do it. 
These clerks had no objection in principle to the magistrates 
fulfilling this task - with one proviso - that they did it correctly. 
Their one objection to benches explaining the choices to the defendant 
was that they sometimes did it incorrectly. 
Explaining to a defendant how she/he can make her/his defence is 
again more difficult than it might at first sight appear. It is 
necessary to explain, in a way that the defendant can understand, 
first that the defendant does not need to say anything unless she/he 
wishes to (i.e., the right to silence), if the defendant does wish to 
say anything, that s/he can either make an unsworn statement from the 
dock or that s/he can give evidence on oath, in which case s/he can be 
asked questions in cross examination by the prosecutor. None of 
these components should be forgotten, and the whole should be 
explained in a way that is comprehensible to a nervous, possibly 
unintelligent or intimidated defendant who may simply not know what is 
meant by "an unsworn statement" or have realised who "the prosecutor" 
is. None of this should be beyond the competence of a magistrate. 
There is however one araument which militates in favour of the clerk 
, , 0 
making the explanation. There will be a few cases where a defending 
advocate will wish to keep the defendant from giving evidence. 
However for the most part, an advocate will wish to put her/his client 
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into the wi tness box to gl. ve ev ide nee on oa th, for the s imp Ie reas on 
that sworn evidence tested by cross examination is much more likely to 
be be 1 ieved. Where the defendant has no legal adviser, slhe should 
still be made aware of this fact. Many clerks when explaining to the 
defendant what the choices are will say that if the defendant gives 
evidence on oath slhe is more likely to be believed, and on many 
occasions this information seems to tip the scales in favour of the 
defendant choosing to give evidence on oath. In most cases it will 
be advisable for the defendant to do so. In a few it may not. At 
any rate it is better that such a warning should not come from the 
bench from whom it sounds very much like an instruction to give 
evidence on oath, if not a proml.se to accept what the defendant says. 
These arguments do, of course, reveal that it is well nigh 
impossible for an unrepresented defendant to make such a decision 
correctly, in the circumstances and that defendants are in acute need 
of legal advice at this as well as other stages of the trial. 
However a desire for legal representation for all defendants pleading 
not guilty in magistrates courts is unlikely to be fulfilled in the 
foreseeable future, and therefore measures designed to assist those 
still unrepresented cannot be neglected. It may be of marginal 
advantage to the defendant if such an explanation comes from the 
clerk, the qualification being that the clerk is a good one and able 
to explain clearly and sensitively the choices before the defendant. 
The third issue relating to balance between clerk and bench which 
was examined in the questionnaire was the area of bail decisions. 
Clerks were asked who would normally explain the meaning and effect of 
a decision about bail to the defendant. The question of bail is of 
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course one for the bench to decide. Since the Bail Act 1976 9 the , 
defendant has a prima facie right to bail. Where bail IS granted an 
explanation must be given to the defendant that failure to answer to 
it is a criminal offence with penalties attaching to it. Where bail 
IS refused reasons for refusal must be given. Further, where bail is 
granted but conditions are attached, reasons for attaching those 
conditions must be given. 
Such explanations are not simple. They are nevertheless clearly 
part of the decision of the bench, and as such should be made by the 
bench. Young and Clarke lO certainly envIsage that the bench should 
announce and explain bail decisions. 
The results of our survey are therefore rather disturbing. 
First, 14% of the clerks interviewed said that the clerk would always 
explain the meaning and effect of a decision on bail to the defendant. 
This 14% included all of the clerks at Court C, and most of the clerks 
at Court D. 
One of the clerks at Court C, when asked to explain how "speaking 
parts" were divided between clerk and bench said 
"There is no division here, because the clerk says it all, more 
or less, really, apart from announcing sentence." 
At two of the courts in the sample, therefore, the clerk almost 
invariably explained the meaning of a bail decision to the defendant. 
These two courts were both courts in the North of England, and to this 
extent the contention that clerks playa more prominent role in the 
North was born out. However there was not a simple North/South 
divide. 
9. Section Four. 
10. In 'Chairmanship In Magistrates Courts'. Page 28. 
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At a number of other courts, the clerk fulfilled the function 
of explaining bail decisions. 44% of the clerks interviewed said 
that on some occaSions it could be either the clerk or the bench who 
gave the explanation. The reasons given to show why the clerk might 
give the explanation were as follows. Half of these clerks said that 
they would intervene if the bench missed something, or if the bench 
got into difficulties. Half of the clerks said that they would not 
need to speak on bail decisions if they were with one of the more 
confident or experienced magistrates, but with other magistrates they 
would need to give help. 
Only 42% of clerks said that explanations about bail decisions 
were always made by the bench. 
The implication of these figures is that around half of the 
magistrates taking the chair in their courts do not or cannot, explain 
the meaning and effect of their own decisions. It is true to say 
that the Bail Act 1976 had upset the patterns of decision making on 
bail to which benches has become accustomed and this may have 
contributed to the unwillingness of some benches to venture an 
explanation themselves. However, the Act had been on the statute 
book for some time before the fieldwork was undertaken. It was 
brought into force on April 17th 1978. One might reasonably have 
~xpected a well trained bench to have become used to the provisions of 
the Act by the summer of 1981. 
Is the division of "speaking parts" important? 
The replies to the questions relating to the performance of 
specific speaking parts in court confirm the evidence of observers 
that there 1S wide discrepancy in the division of tasks between clerk 
and bench. They also show that there are courts where the bench 
appears to be inadequate to explain even the meaning of its 
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deliberations, and where the clerk fulfils almost all of the speaking 
parts in court. 
Some clerks however were sceptical as to whether this was an 
importan t is sue. They queried whether it really mattered how much 
the magistrates spoke and some argued that it was good that the bench 
should say relatively little during the proceedings. Such contentions 
need to be examined. 
A few clerks said that magistrates should keep out of "the dust 
oft h ear e n a", rna in t a in i ng t hat ina n a d v e r s a r y pro c e e din g i twa s 
dangerous for magistrates to play too active a role in case they 
unwittingly appeared to ally themselves with one side or another, or 
otherwise got out of their depth. A rather lengthy but amusing 
example illustrates the sort of problem perceived by clerks. 
" •.•• 1 remember a man we had here - he was a very skilled 
electrician - he took the making of an order against his wife 
very badly, and gave up his work and refused to pay. A classic 
case of wilfull refusal, and he'd been sent to prison twice and 
he came up again, gave sworn evidence as to what he had done in 
the past, and as to what he would be able to do in the future, 
and the chairman said "Well you've told us about the pas t and the 
future, would you please tell us what you are doing now?" You 
can't think of a more innocent question - and he said to him 
"What am I doing now, I'm standing in this witness box answering 
your bloody silly questions." Quite rightly as he still refused 
(to pay) he got imprisonment. I'm sure everybody in the public 
gallery was saying that it was not for not paying, that it was 
for cheeking the judge. And there are always these pitfalls and 
if the clerk falls in it doesn't matter but it is essential to 
protec t the magis t ra tes." 
It is of course, true that there are dangers involved in 
"descending into the arena". Particularly in a contested case 
magistrates must take care not to create an appearance of bias in 
favour of one party or the other. However it is arguable that 
benches should receive sufficient training to be able to avoid giving 
an appearance of bias. 
The dangers of the bench "descending into the arena" are perhaps 
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most marked where the court has to deal with an unrepresented 
defendant who pleads not guilty. The court may wish 11 or be 
obliged 12 to assist such a defendant to present their case. It may 
well be that such assistance is better rendered by the clerk, Sl.nce 
the clerk is both expert and not part of the tribunal of fact. 
However, the bench should at least demonstrate patience with and 
understanding of the problems of the defendant who tries to defend 
her/himself without representation, and the bench should also be 
prepared to ask questions in clarification if these are needed. The 
dangers of descending into the arena cannot be used to excuse a silent 
bench, nor a bench which, at the end of a case cannot explain its own 
dec is ion. 
At some courts it was all too frequently the case that a 
situation arose where the clerk not only had to assist in contested 
cases but had to explain the simplest orders. In one case at Court 
C, the bench, having listened silently to an application for a bind 
over l.n a case of an admitted breach of the peace said that they would 
bind over the defendants. They then said "Now listen to our learned 
clerk". Their learned clerk explained what binding over meant. In 
the next case but one, the defendant had admitted several serious 
driving offences. The bench retired with the clerk to consider the 
penalty. They returned to court and announced the penalties. The 
clerk had to remind the bench that there was an application for costs 
11. 
12. 
In Simms v. Moore (1970) 2QB at 333 Lord Parker C.J. said that 
the~urt has a discretion here, and that the clerk should 
assist if there are reasonble grounds for thinking that it would 
best promote the interests of justice. 
Section 61 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952, now Section 73 of 
the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 provided that in domestic cases 
if an unrepresented defendant is unable to effectively examlne or 
cross examine a witness the court shall assist. 
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and a doctors fee, which they granted after this prompting. The 
bench fixed a period for him to pay, and then said "Now listen to our 
learned clerk", and the clerk explained to the defendant the mean1ng 
of disqualification from driving, how much the total fine was and 
where it should be paid. The sentence "Now listen to our learned 
clerk" was one heard frequently during that and other days at this 
court. 
Whilst it may be true that there are dangers in benches descend-
1ng into the arena during the determination of guilt or 1nnocence 1n 
contested cases, these dangers can be overemphasised. 
contested cases dealt with is anyway fairly small. 
The number of 
By far the 
majority of defendants plead guilty. Of the minority who contest 
the ir cases, fewer still will be unrepresented. The cases g1ven 1n 
the examples above are the typical face of magistrates courts, and it 
1S disturbing if benches have to, or as a: matter of policy do, fall 
back on their clerk to explain their orders. 
Another argument ar1ses from the example of the exasperated 
defendant imprisoned for non payment of maintenance. The clerk there 
was arguing that the magistrates should be protected from abuse which 
might later be said to have affected their decision. However, 
aggress10n and insolence from tense frightened defendants are a 
commonplace in magistrates courts. In one court during the fieldwork 
a defendant threw a bible at the bench, and in another the defendant 
spat his false teeth out at the prosecutor. Verbal abuse, often of a 
very colourful and imaginative type happens frequently. No matter 
who it is directed at, it is arguable that it is best dealt with 
calmly by the bench in a way which makes it obvious that they remain 
unruffled by it. Young and Clarke certainly envisaged that problems 
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of order should be dealt with by the chair. I3 
Another argument used by one clerk to explain why the magistrates 
should not take a very prominent role was the argument that importance 
1S not to be measured in number of words. 
"I think it is quite wrong to think that the importance of a 
member of the judiciary is going to increase in accordance with 
the number of words that he speaks, because it depends on what he 
is talking about." 
Again, although 1n essence correct, this argument hardly 
justifies benches who are so weak on quantity and content that they 
have difficulty in explaining the meaning and effect of their own 
decisions. 
Although there were some clerks who presented arguments that the 
balance between clerk and bench was not important, there were many 
clerks who did think that the issue needed to be taken seriously. 
One clerk lamented that at the court where he was currently employed 
the clerk was expected to do everything except announce verdict and 
sentence. His objection was that 
" ••. you end up getting defendants looking at the clerk all the 
time rather than the bench, and I think it makes their power not 
seem what it should be." 
This, of course, is the crux of the problem. If the bench 
remains substantially silent throughout the proceedings the appearance 
is given that it is a clerk's court and not a magistrates' court. The 
picture is one of a silent bench and a dominant clerk. It may be that 
technically the clerk is doing nothing wrong, and is not going beyond 
what it is proper for the clerk to do. R v. Consett Justices Ex 
parte Postal Bingo 1967 14 is, after all authority establishing that it 
13. Ibid. at pp. 15-23. 
14. (1967) 2QB 9 - see discussion above at pages 152-158 
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1S for the clerk to conduct the ordinary arrangements inside the court 
and to question witnesses at the implied request of the bench, so long 
as the clerk does not usurp the judicial functions of the bench. 
But, as one clerk said 
"If the clerk takes on all the speaking roles then he becomes the 
chief focal point of the court and I can see if the clerk did all 
the speaking actions apart from actually announcing the bare 
bones of the sentence then people would think that the 
magistrates had a secondary role and the clerk ran the place." 
It is very difficult to prescribe a general rule defining who 
should perform which functions. However, Young and Clarke, who are 
fairly conservative in the role they delineate for the magistrate who 
takes the chair in court env1sage that magistrate announcing any 
decision and explaining it, asking questions of witnesses 1n 
clarification of evidence and being responsible for order in the 
court. They see the clerk as helping the bench - possibly by 
suggesting appropriate ways of phrasing sentences or explanations. 
They do not see the clerk as acting as a mouthpiece for the bench. 1S 
It is disturbing therefore that 1n some courts it appears that as 
a matter of policy the bench does nothing except announce the verdict 
and the bare bones of the sentence, and in others there are at least 
some benches that are unble to explain their own decisions. 
If there are so many benches who are weak or lacking 1n 
confidence, the danger is that the clerk will dominate the court, or 
will be perceived to dominate. 
The dominant clerk? 
Clerks have been criticised for dominating their courts for a 
very long time. The report of the Roche Committee mentioned it as a 
problem. 
15. See pages 26 and 28. 
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"There is a temptation ever 
the most efficient of them, 
dominate, or as it is often 
present to clerks, and not least to 
whether part-time or whole time to 
styled to 'run the court,.,,16 
The Committee reminded the justices that it is their duty to see that 
the clerk does not exceed his authority, but this is a difficut task 
when the clerk ~s the expert and the bench consists of lay persons. 
The question of whether the clerk is dominant in court involves 
an assessment, not only of the way in which the clerk relates to the 
bench, but also the way ~n which she/he relates to the defendant, to 
advocates and to all of the other actors in the court-room drama. 
But the way in which clerk and bench relate is central, since the 
magistrates are supposed to be in control, to have power ~n the court. 
It is extremely difficult to make allegations that the clerk ~s 
dominant which will stand up to scrutiny. The question of whether or 
not clerk X dominates involves very subjective assessment. The 
pattern of the clerk's retiring can be noted as can details of who 
says what in court. But the question of whether these things add up 
to dominance is much more difficult to answer. It is always open to 
clerks to defend themselves (as they did) by saying that the observer 
is simply mistaken in his/her assessment of the situation. 
The issue was therefore approached by asking clerks the following 
q ues t ion. "It has been suggested that there is a tendency for clerks 
to dominate the bench ~n court. Do you think this is so?" 
Interestingly, 64% of clerks did think it was so. 
The question was a very sensitive one, and was open to a flat 
denial, but only 36% of clerks gave one - and for 4% of this 36% the 
flat denial only extended to their own courts, leaving one with the 
impression that they perceived problems elsewhere. 
16. Para. 64. 
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Understandably very few clerks were prepared to say that they 
themselves dominated their benches, although one brave man did say 
"Well if clerks do dominate I would be one of the more dominant 
clerks. I accept that. I wouldn't admit to dominating them, I 
would always be claiming to give the justices the options that 
~re open to them - and the options wouldn't be to do as I say or 
ignore what I say. I will try and spell out all the possible 
alternatives to them, and then if they sought further advice as 
to how to apply those options then I'd give it." 
Another clerk, whilst not actually admitting to dominance said 
"I regard it as my job anyway to be running the court ..•. I don't 
think that could be described as dominating the bench. I can 
see that it does occur. I can understand the criticism. I can 
understand circumstances where it appears that the clerk may be 
domina t ing the bench, but I wouldn't desc r ibe it as such myse If." 
This clerk was characteristic of a number of clerks who said that 
they believed that the appearance was bound to be created that the 
clerk was dominant. They felt that to an observer in court "it is 
almost inevitable that it will have that appearance", since, in order 
to fulfil her/his proper functions the clerk will of necessity have to 
take a large part in the proceedings. These clerks were for the most 
part satisfied that they were not in fact dominating the court - by 
which they meant that they were not usurping any of the judicial 
functons of the bench. Whilst it might be that an untrained observer 
perceived the clerk taking a very prominent part, doing a great deal 
of speaking and organising, would believe that the clerk was in 
control of or dominating the court, this was,to some clerks, not 
important because what might appear to be dominance was not real 
dominance. 
This of course ral.ses the question of who is to be the judge of 
the dominance or otherwise of the clerk. Obviously clerks felt that 
the unrepresented defendant, witnesses, and persons in the public 
gallery were not to judge them. An assessment of whether or not they 
overstepped the bounds of propriety and legality had for them, to be 
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based on the legal issue of whether or not they had usurped a proper 
function of the bench. Hence only the legal profession in court 
becomes the arbiter of the clerk's behaviour and the definition of 
what constitutes dominance becomes very narrow. The views of the 
clerks in this respect are however in line with the decisions in some 
of the cases. In R v. Consett Justices ex parte Postal Bingo Ltd. 17 
Lord Parker expressed the view that "the spectator in court" must be 
taken to know when the justices can legitimately have the advice of 
their clerk. 18 The judiciary's arbiter of equitable dealing, the 
reasonable man, is now presumed to know quite a number of rules, and 
can hardly be described as guarantor that judicial proceedings are 
accessible to an uninitiated observer armed only with 'common sense'. 
But clerks can scarcely be blamed for applying the same standards to 
their "dominance" in court as are applied by the Divisional Court to 
the issue of the retirement with the bench, particularly when the 
Divisional Court is so vague as to what does constitute correct 
behaviour for clerks in court. 
For some clerks then, the dominance that they admitted to was not 
'real'dominance. Real dominance - i.e. clerks usurping the proper 
functions of the bench - does happen but according to them it happens 
either at another time or in another place. They said, for instance 
"There was a day when clerks were God, if you will, and they 
ruled their benches with a rod of iron - that day has now gone." 
"I think that there were some clerks, particularly in the past 
who ran their own courts, and perhaps it happens in some country 
d 'k " courts, I on t now. 
17. (1967) 2 QB 9 discussed above. 
18. Ibid. at p.20. 
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" ••• I've seen it 1n other areas. It's so easy." 
"You do hear 
courts." 
gOSS1p with solicitors, you hear about other 
At all the courts surveyed, one heard stories of the unacceptable 
behaviour of clerks at other courts. '~ou should go up the road, (or 
into the country, or over the border) to X court" was an instruction 
received at all courts visited: something regrettable, scandalous or 
remarkable was always happening elsewhere, but never, of course 
admitted to at any of the courts in the survey. Regrettably however 
it was necessary to leave aside the inaccessible thrills of "other 
courts" and concentrate on the supposedly mundane happenings of the 
courts in the survey. 
Although the clerks denied that what they did constituted 
dominance, most admitted that they played a "prominent" role in court 
and believed that that prominent role was necessary. They argued 
that this was necessary in order to achieve two things - first to 
maintain the organisation of the court, and second to preserve the 
legitimacy of the court. 
Maintaining the court organisation 
Running the organisational side of court affairs 1S the 
responsibility of the clerk. Deciding which cases can be heard on 
any particular day, distributing them between courts with appropriate 
benches, and ensuring that the days cases are all heard without anyone 
having to sit into the next seSS10n, or late evening falls on the 
clerk. In a busy court the logistics of organ1s1ng several hundred 
cases between a few courts, cases having prosecutors, defendants, 
defence solicitors, witnesses, some of whom may need to appear 1n more 
than one case and more than one court during the day, are extremely 
daunt ing. Unless the clerks keep a tight rein on the problem, it is 
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possible for the day to degenerate into chaos with solicitors wanted 
1n more than one place at once, courts held up, or not guilty pleas 
building up unheard so that cases with witnesses in attendance have to 
be adjourned. The busier the court, the more pressure is exerted on 
the organisation. As one clerk said 
"There are occasions, such as a very heavy court day when there 
are a lot of people toing and froing in court, especially with 
the sort of courts we have here, where the clerk has to take a 
dominant role - in crowd control if nothing else, just to keep 
the place running smoothly. So he may appear to be taking 
rather a dominant role, but its the sheer effect of trying to 
keep cases running smoothly." 
This clerk was critical of clerks who played too prominent a role but 
nevertheless felt forced to do so herself because of the need to 
maintain the organisation of the court. 
In one of the courts observed during field work the clerk - 1n 
this case the clerk to the justices - started the morn1ng by 
announc1ng (to the bench) that he had sent for the duty solicitor. 
At that court the duty solicitor dealt only with defendants who were 
unrepresented and in custody, and it was the practice of the court to 
deal with defendants in custody first. When the duty solicitor 
appeared, he was not ready to proceed. The clerk reprimanded him. 
The solicitor explained that his wife had just had a baby and 
apologised for lateness. The clerk did not mellow, and said that in 
such circumstances another solicitor should have been sent. The duty 
solicitor said that he had ascertained that there was only one case in 
custody. The clerk turned to the court Inspector and said "Is that 
true?" The Inspector confirmed that it was and the clerk sent the 
solicitor away with the injunction to let him know when the custody 
case was ready. Throughout these exchanges the bench remained 
silent. The impression was created that the clerk was running the 
court, was making the rules and was the one affronted by the Duty 
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Solicitor's failure to arr1ve on time. The clerk was motivated not 
by a desire to take over from the bench, but by a desire to maintain 
an efficient and just court organisation. 
Preserving legitimacy 
The other major reason offered by clerks to explain why they 
might play a prominent role was that the legitimacy of the court had 
to be preserved. The court had to be seen to be playing according to 
the rules, and clerks argued that the rules were now so complex that 
lay magistrates needed a great deal of guidance. The following 
extracts from interviews illustrate this. 
"The impression (of a dominant clerk) may be gained by people 
wrongly. The clerk has got to take a fairly prominent role. 
He's just got to - its far too complicated now for the bench to 
control anything themselves." 
"You can leave your chairman to look as if he's in charge and 
create a good deal of embarrassment both to him and in the face 
of the court." 
A prominent role for the clerk was seen as necessary because the 
rules and procedures which have to be applied in magistrates' courts, 
and the organisation which has to be run is too complex for the lay 
person. The danger clerks perceived was that if magistrates took a 
more prominent role, they might make mistakes. The clerk's role is 
to ensure that the rules are followed, and mistakes are not made. 
Mistakes, however, are made by magistrates, and have to be dealt with 
by clerks. 
Young and Clarke point out 1n 'Chairmanship in Magistrates' 
Courts' that the clerk 1S the expert, that the clerk has the 
exper1ence, and 
"Above all the clerk will at all times keep before him 
highest traditions of justice ~nd try.to guaran:bee
l 
t~l§ these 
observed in every court for wh1ch he 1S responS1 e. 
19. Page 12. 
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the 
are 
"Try" is inevitably all that the clerk can do - there are 
occaSions when the bench makes an error which the clerk cannot 
prevent. Young and Clarke advise the magistrate taking the chair to 
take the clerk into her/his confidence and tell the clerk what they 
are proposing by way of verdict, or sentence. The clerk can then 
confirm that what is proposed is within the law and conforms to good 
practice and bench policy. 
In some courts surveyed it was the policy to follow such a 
procedure. But it seems that however carefully framed the policy may 
be, mistakes still occur. 
Often they are simple and easily remedied mistakes. 
"If its things they've omitted to do, for instance, forget to 
endorse his licence one can turn round and say "and licence 
endorsed?" without saying "You've made a mess of things, you're 
wrong"." 
Sometimes in a traffic court the clerk is called upon to say 'And 
licence endorsed sir?' rather frequently. There are clerks who, in 
such situations,express themselves so that it appears that they are 
clarifying the decision, or that the bench have made an understandable 
slip, and there are clerks who allow irritation to creep into their 
tones. Good clerks know not only the law but the vagaries of the 
bench, and know to prompt before sentence is announced by saying 'This 
one is endorseable your worships'. 
The forgotten endorsement is, however only a very small part of 
the clerks' worries. Benches do make more serious errors. Two 
examples from the many instances observed during the fieldwork will 
illustrate the nature of the problem. 
In one court the bench had been having a great deal of trouble 
with the provisions of the Bail Act 1976. A case arose where the 
prosecution asked for a condition to be attached to bail that the 
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accused not approach two named people. The clerk asked why such a 
condition was being requested. The defence solicitor volunteered 
that the named persons were relatives and that the case concerned a 
dispute between the defendant and those persons. The bench announced 
that bail would be granted with the requested condition. The clerk 
half turned in her seat and said "Your reason sir?" (A reason being 
necessary to comply with the Act). The Chair gave a reason which 
was inappropr iate to a bai 1 appl ica t ion. The clerk's eyes widened, 
and she sighed and said "Presumably that he might interfere with 
witnesses?" The Chair said "What?" The clerk rose and whispered to 
the bench. The Chairman said (to the defendant) 'Yes, yes - and make 
sure you don't commit any other offences unt i1... we 11... ever!' The 
clerk was perceived to sigh again. 
The rest of the morning proceeded 1n this ve1n. The Chairman 
was quite unable to distinguish between the conditions of bail 
themselves and the reasons for imposing them. He shuddered to an 
ignominious halt several times. Everyone in court looked 
uncomfortable and some school girls with their teacher observing at 
the back of the court giggled and smirked. 
In another court, the bench dealt with a ser1es of not guilty 
pleas in traffic offences, and several times announced conviction and 
sentence 1n the same breath without giving the defendant the chance to 
mit iga teo The clerk was inexperienced. In one case the defendant 
pleaded not guilty to an offence of pass1ng a red traffic light. A 
police constable was sworn and gave evidence in chief. A plan of the 
area was circulated. The defence solicitor began to cross exam1ne 
when the bench said "Is this a not guilty plea?" 
solicitor raised his eyebrows and confirmed that it was! 
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The defence 
After all the evidence had been completed the bench conferred. 
The Chair then said "This is a very dangerous junction and you are 
very lucky there was nothing coming. We are going to fine you £25 
and ••. " At this point the defence solicitor leaped to his feet and 
said "Ma'am perhaps before you endorse his licence perhaps you might 
give me a chance to address you on reasons for not endorsing". 
These are simply two examples of the sorts of errors from which 
the clerk must try to preserve the bench. 
To find out how clerks felt and reacted to benches who made 
mistakes clerks were asked how they dealt with the situation if the 
magistrates announced a decision which was wrong in law. The 
response of one clerk reflects the feelings of most clerks 
" ••• there are two ways of doing this. You can either stand up 
and make a spectacle of yourself by shouting "You can't do that 
sir", or you can lean over quietly to the chairman and explain 
that you can't do that." 
Not surprisingly most clerks took the latter course. They saw their 
role as one of putting the error right without making the magistrate 
look stupid. 
"I think the last thing you want to do is make the bench appear 
small or ridiculous in front of the public." 
Preserving the public image of the bench so that "they don't make 
fools of themselves and look ridiculous" was perceived as a crucial 
part of the clerk's job in such situations. Also maintaining a good 
relationship between clerk and bench was important. 
"I'm very diplomatic if I can be .•• If you are rude they will 
hate you for it for ever but they'll have confidence in you if 
you pick them up on it carefully." 
But the maintenance of a good relationship with the bench has the same 
end as dealing quietly and unobtrusively with errors - the end of 
creating a situation in which the business of the court is carried on 
smoothly and correctly. One clerk explained as follows 
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II I'd get up and have a little whisper and say 'You can't do 
that' - for example with sentence. Sometimes you can't help 
. , hear~ng, and I d rather stop them then than let them go ahead and 
make the court look slightly ridiculous because then it would 
look as if I'd made the decision ••• We've a very good relatonship 
here with the magistrates and there's a kind of electricity runs 
through it. Its funny how you can sense that they want to speak 
to you sometimes without them saying. There's a pause and you 
feel it. So I think things can run very smoothly." 
For this clerk a good relationship with the bench was important, 
but as one aspect of maintaining an efficient organisation. 
Clerks can develop a high degree of sensitivity to their 
magistrates in the interests of the smooth running of the court. 
They come to know which magistrates need help and which can manage 
alone without making errors. Clerks made comments such as 
" .•• you've got to adjust your procedure according to the bench 
that's sitting on that particular day." 
" with a bench consisting of 80 plus magistrates the 
permutations and combinations are numerous." 
"As you get to know the magistrates you have a pretty good idea 
how they can take over themsleves." 
. "It even varies from one stipendiary to another •.•.• " 
Some clerks are more skilled at this than others. Burney 
comments on the confusion caused when clerk and bench both began to 
. 20 
speak at the same t~me. Some of Burney's magistrates were critical 
of clerks who "jumped in,,21 and took over things they wanted to do 
themse lves. The clerks, however, were anx~ous ~n case the 
magistrates made a mistake. 
" ••. my personal feeling ~s, I don't like putting them in the 
embarrassing position of having to be corrected, or my having to 
re-explain." 
" some of the magistrates are more confident and burble on, 
and you have to prevent them from doing it too long." 
20. Burney. p.156. 
21. Ibid. 
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Clerks were also conSC10US of a wide range of abilities amongst 
those who took the chair. They would relax in confidence with 
experienced intelligent chairpersons, but had to work a great deal 
harder with timid and inexperienced magistrates. After a period of 
employment at any court, the clerks become familiar with their 
benches. In discussions just before court comments from clerks such 
as "I've got Mr. Bloggs in the chair - we'll be here all morning" or 
"This magistrate is very experienced - I can sit back today" may be 
heard. And within the same court building the chairman of the whole 
bench may be sitting with a young inexperienced clerk in one court, 
and the clerk to the justices in another courtroom with magistrates 
who have very little experience or confidence. The balance between 
clerk and chair will be very different in these two courts. 
The skills of the clerk in preserving the magistrates from making 
mistakes, and developing a sensitivity to the abilities of the 
magistrate taking the chair are skills which further the end of 
ensuring that the court runs smoothly and according to the rules. 
That it is essentially following the rules which is important is 
demonstrated by the fact that if the magistrates do not co-operate 
with the clerk and do not follow the rules then the clerk can abandon 
them, or "stab them in the back,,22 by exposing their mistakes. 
One clerk said 
"If they'd invited me out and taken no notice of my advice and 
gone ahead and done something wrong I think I'd simply stand up 
in court and say - publicly point out 'that that was contrary to 
the advice given by the clerk'." 
22. To use Carlen's express10n 1n 'Magistrates Justice'. 
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Another clerk - perhaps he had had a bad day - was even more severe. 
He said 
"I try to be tactful and n1ce to them". But 
"If the chairman had been particularly unpleasant and nasty 
during the course of the proceedings, I think I might throw tact 
to the winds and stand up and say "I'm afraid you can't do that." 
- because he might well have deserved it." 
If the bench makes a mistake it can of course be rectified under 
the provisions of Section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972. 23 
Technically there are no problems in correcting an error, and none of 
the clerks (except one who appeared to be 1n 19norance of the 
prov1s1ons of Section 41 and the pre-existing case law) would have 
allowed an error to remain uncorrected. As one clerk said, 1n a 
remark which has all the characteristics of the liberal bureaucrat 
"Normally you get a bench coming back and say1ng, you know, 'Our 
learned clerk has advised us that we did not act in accordance 
with the law on the last occasion and we have decided to make the 
following adjudication' and pray that no-one gets too upset about 
it because you can't have duff decisions drifting around the 
records." 
Where the bench 1S 1n error then the ma1n concern of clerks is to 
smooth the situation over. Their usual approach 1S to speak quietly 
23. The Criminal Justice Act 1972 S41(1) provides that "Subject to 
subsecton (4) of this section, a magistrates' court may vary or 
rescind a sentence or other order imposed or made by it when 
dealing with an offender; and it is hereby declared that this 
power extends to replacing a sentence or order which for any 
reason appears to be invalid by another which the court has the 
power to impose or make". Subsection Four imposes a time limit 
of 14 days and provides that the powers of subsection (1) are 
exercisable only by a court constituted in the same manner or 
having a majority of the justices as the court that imposed the 
original order. The Home Office Circular No. 230/1972 of 
December 8th, 1972 relating to this provision shows the 
government's recognition (if such be needed) of the possibility 
of fundamental errors being made. It reveals that the sort of 
situation the government had in mind was where a conviction is 
announced prematurely "perhaps because a submission of no case to 
answer is misunderstood as constituting the whole of the defence 
case". 
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to the bench, explain the problem and correct the decision without 
making the bench look foolish in the public eye. 
Almost all clerks interviewed spoke of a good relationship with 
their benches. Nevertheless it was obvious from some replies that 
clerk and bench can come into conflict, and that it 1S possible in 
such situations for the clerk to 'discipline' the bench by withdrawing 
some of her/his protection - by being less than tactful with the bench 
and exposing them to public ridicule. We will See later in this 
chapter that where clerk and bench come into conflict on law, clerks 
use a similar method - the threat (at least) of exposing the bench to 
the censure of the Divisional Court. 
To summarise the discussion so far we have first noted that there 
are, as other observers have said, wide variations in the division of 
speaking parts in court between clerk and magistrates. Clerks 
justify taking many of the speaking parts on the basis that the law 
and procedure surrounding such things as putting the defendant to 
her/his election are very complicated. It has been demonstrated that 
there is much truth in this. However it is very disturbing to 
discover that magistrates' lack of ability to deal with issues 1n 
court sometimes extends to an inability to announce and explain their 
own orders. The finding of this survey, that 1n some courts 
magistrates cannot explain their own decisions on bail is important 
and needs to be taken up. 
The question of whether or not magistrates can explain their 
decisions is affected most directly by two factors. The first 1S the 
training of the bench - and this 1S usually the responsibility of the 
clerk. The second is the policy of the court which can dictate to a 
large extent the division of labour between clerk and magistrates 1n 
an individual court. Again the clerk to the justices has a 
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significant effect on this. The questions of the clerk's role in 
relation to training and policy making will be discussed in chapters 
eight and nine. 
Clerks themselves do believe that there is a problem that the 
clerk can be too dominant in court. Allegations of dominance by 
researchers are difficult to support because of their subjective 
na ture. The clerks themselves drew a distinction between 'dominance' 
which they denied in themselves, and 'prominence', which they admitted 
to. Their denial of 'dominance' was on two bases. 
First, they said that real dominance was usurping the functions 
of the bench and that they did not do this. They might appear to be 
1n charge in the courtroom, but they argued that the appearance they 
created was not important. The reality of dominance - the question 
of whether or not they impinged on the judicial functions of the bench 
- was what mattered to clerks. The issue of whether or not clerks 
'dominate' thus becomes an 1ssue which 1S within the jUdgement only of 
lawyers. However such arguments are 1n line with those of the 
Divisional Court when it assumes that the reasonable man, arbiter of 
whether or not justice is being done, has a substantial amount of 
legal knowledge. 
The rhetoric that trial by magistrates' court is trial of the 
ordinary man by the ordinary man is here wearing a little thin. Very 
many unrepresented people pass through magistrates' courts. If they 
are to continue to do so, the accessibility of those courts' 
/ 
proceedings to them should be more than a pretence. Courts where the 
magistrates are so silent and take so little part in the proceedings 
that they cannot even announce their own decisions do not look like 
magistrates' courts. They look like clerks' courts. Such 
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appearances should be important. (The question of the extent to 
which clerks may exert what they call "dominance" i.e. influencing the 
judicial decisions of the magistrates is discussed in the second half 
of this chapter.) 
The second argument with which clerks justified their prominent 
role is an argument typical of the liberal bureaucrat. Clerks argued 
that it was their job to keep the court running smoothly. The 
pressures of workload, the logistics of providing each court with the 
necessary personnel they need to ensure that cases are called in the 
right order means for clerks that they must appear to be in control. 
When we examine, in Chapter Nine, the clerk's policy making role we 
shall demonstrate that the clerk in court is carrying out practices 
and policies developed and decided by the clerk to the justices 
outside court to deal with the court's workload efficiently. 
The third argument presented by clerks to justify their prominent 
role was that they had to preserve the magistrates from making errors 
and looking foolish. They were conscious that, as lay persons, 
magistrates are called upon to operate a very complex and difficult 
set of rules. Many examples of magistrates who were unable to do so 
were observed, and were cited by clerks. Clerks were anXiOUS to 
maintain the credibility of the courts. 
Clerks' anxiety to preserve the magistrates from error was, 
however, more than simply a wish to save the bench from embarrassment 
or diminution of reputation. It was fundamentally a desire to ensure 
that the values of due process were observed, and that the game was 
played according to the rules. This is confirmed because clerks 
would and did as a last resort abandon the bench, cease to protect , 
them from error or even intentionally make public their errors if the 
errors of the bench were leading them into irregularity or injustice. 
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The idea of the clerk as a liberal bureaucrat is thus confirmed. 
Clerks wanted to run an efficient organisation, but they insisted that 
it be run according to the rules. 
The clerk and the bench in the retiring room - the clerk and the 
verdict 
The discussion of the case law relating to the retirement of the 
clerk with the bench in Chapter Two showed that the magistrates 
retiring room is sancrosanct. Limitations are placed On the 
occasions when the clerk may enter the retiring room as well as on the 
things the clerk may do when retiring with the bench. The retiring 
room is therefore inaccessible to the researcher, since on the decided 
cases, the presence of a researcher in the retiring room would 
potentially invalidate the decisions in the cases observed. 
There is thus only one way in which it is possible to gain direct 
experience of the events which take place in the retiring room - that 
is by being a clerk or a magistrate. 
The writer was employed as a court assistant for five months, 
(April-September 1971) and as a court clerk at the same court for one 
year (June 1974 to June 1975) and consequently, was able to observe 
the way several clerks conducted themselves in the retiring room as 
well as experiencing the problem at first hand. These periods of 
employment however, took place before the present research project was 
formulated. Working as a clerk did serve to create an interest in 
th is area for research, as an unders tanding of the very grea t extent 
of the clerk's power and influence developed. It also constituted 
first hand knowledge and experience which was extremely useful in 
designing the project. It also affected the results of the research 
in a beneficial way. The clerks who were spoken to and interviewed 
during the field work were told that their interviewer had worked as a 
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court clerk and this did influence some at least to speak more openly. 
Their replies to questions sometimes indicated that they felt that 
avoidance of issues or any pretence on their part about difficulties or 
sensitive areas of their work would be pointless in the face of 
someone who had experienced their problems in practice. Almost all 
the clerks interviewed were extremely frank in their replies to what 
were rather delicate questions about their relationship with 
magistrates In the retiring room. 
To the researcher, the events which take place in the retiring 
room are crucial, fascinating and taboo. To clerks they are routine. 
Asking clerks questions designed to persuade them to describe what 
happens In the retiring room would probably have resulted In 
descriptions of the type of event which occurs routinely. For 
instance the bench retire to consider sentence. They call the clerk 
in to ask what the range of possible sentences for the offence is, or 
they tell the clerk that they are considering prison and want to know 
if they should have reports on the defendant. These are simple 
requests for the clerk to confirm the legality of the decision they 
have made, or to gIve information about things preliminary or 
collateral to their sentence. Occasionally the bench may be called 
upon to pass sentence on an offence unfamiliar to them and they will 
wish to know what their more experienced colleagues would do in the 
circumstances. Most of the requests made to the clerk by magistrates 
in the retiring room relate to sentence, simply because magistrates do 
a great deal of sentencing. 
guilty pleas. 
They deal with comparatively few not 
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When magistrates do have to deal with a plea of not guilty, 
however several interesting 1ssues arise concerning the relationship 
between clerk and bench. 
Superficially, the relationship between clerk and bench is clear. 
The clerk gives the legal advice, the bench take the decisions on 
fac t. Closer examination reveals problems. First the clerk is a 
legal adviser, but the bench is the tribunal of law as well as the 
tribunal of fact and technically it is the magistrates who take 
decisions on law. 
The points of law which benches of lay magistrates have to deal 
with can be complex. For instance on R v. Consett Justices Ex Parte 
Postal Bing024 Lord Parker said that the justices had been called upon 
to take a decision on a point upon which the House of Lords were 
unable to decide, Le. following, the decisions of the House of Lords 
in D.P.P. v. 25 Armstrong and the Divisional Court 1n D.P.P. v. 
Regional Pool Promotions Ltd. 26 under what circumstances could there 
. 
be said to be a playing of a game of chance, and what participation by 
players is necessary before there can be said to be a game of chance 
under S42(1) of the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963. 
The most trivial of cases can raise the most complex points of 
law. When such a situation ar1ses the clerk has to guide the bench 
very carefully. One clerk expressed his problem thus: 
" ••• often I've gone round in circles with a bench knowing that 
they didn't bloody understand the points that advocates were 
making and the points that I was making. So you would tackle it 
a different way - and I'm sure that one or two magistrates in my 
time as clerk will have thought that I was trying to persuade 
24. [1967] 2 QB.9. 
25 • [ 1 965] AC 1362. 
26. [1964] 2 QB 244. 
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them of a different approach and that maybe I was shifting my 
ground in some way in order to persuade them to go one way or 
another." 
Benches do have difficulty in grasp1ng legal argument on occaS1on. 
Another clerk explained that: 
"It's because advocates tend to go a little too far and a little 
too fast that they (the bench) get confused." 
Obviously in such situations the influence of the clerk is Strong. 
It would be asking a very great deal of a bench of lay magistrates to 
expect them to examine the legal arguments of prosecution and defence, 
weigh up the advice of the clerk and come to an independant and 
reasoned decision. For the most part on pure points of law, the 
advice of the clerk must be decisive (although we shall see later that 
conflicts can arise). This is a strong argument for encouraging the 
clerk to state her/his advice in open court so that the advocates can 
hear it and deal with any points arising from it. When pure points 
of law do ar1se 1n court, what takes place 1S often a three way debate 
between prosecution, defence and clerk with the arguments at a level 
and speed - as the clerk cited above explained - which excludes the 
bench and means that the clerk must then explain and interpret for the 
bench in the re t iring room. The bench may be the tribunal of law, 
but decisions of law must in effect be for the most part the 
responsibility of the clerk. 
This may be unexceptionable when the point 1S one of pure law. 
However, problems of a different order ar1se where the 1ssues are of 
mixed law and fact. In practice the onus must be on the clerk to 
make the separation as a judge should for a jury. Distinguishing 
between law and fact when, as a lay magistrate, one knows little law, 
is an impossible task to perform unaided. One clerk explained the 
approach he took in such situations: 
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"When it's a matter of interpretation of law with rules of 
evidence then I find that the easiest thing to do is to start off 
again - break it down into simple terms almost as if you are 
lecturing to them - give them each situation bit by bit. They 
make a dec is ion and you get them to go on to the next one. By 
doing that, 80% of the time they'll come to a common sense 
decision because they've had things explained to them in such a 
way that they can follow it." 
This clerk took an approach, variations on which are adopted by his 
colleagues in other courts, of explaining what the law says, and then 
explaining what decision on fact arises as a consequence for each 
element of the offence and so guiding the bench to an eventual verdict 
of guilty or innocent. Another clerk explained it similarly: 
"I'd be bound to point out 
say now do you find any 
procuration or whatever it 
the ingredients of an offence, and to 
evidence of dishonesty in theft or 
. " 1.S ••••• 
The situation may be further complicated by alternative propositions 
of law and fact. For instance the clerk may have to explain that if 
the magistrates find (a) as a matter of fact, then one legal 
proposition is relevant, but if they find (b) as a matter of fact then 
they must consider other legal propositions. The decision making 
process is therefore a closely co-ordinated exercise between clerk and 
bench. 
Apart from these di ff icul t dis t inc t ions be tween law and fac t a 
further problem can arise in assimilation and assessment of evidence. 
The clerk has not only to ensure that the bench understands the 
ingredients of the offence, but also that the rules of evidence are 
understood and adhered to. 
For ins tance if evidence has inadvertent ly been given, and then 
ruled inadmissible the clerk may need to ensure that the bench have 
understood, and do not take in into account. Or a statement may have 
been admitted as evidence that such a statement was made, but not as 
evidence of the truth of that which was stated. This is a difficult 
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distinction for a lay bench. The clerk must ensure that they have 
grasped the principle. One clerk said: 
" It can happen that during the course of the case some 
evidence has been produced which would appear to be strongly in 
favour of one side or another, and I know it would be one's duty 
to say 'It isn't evidence ••• '''. 
He continued: 
"One really has got, to Some extent, to protect the defendant 1n 
the circumstances." 
The clerk may not only have to ensure that the bench understand that 
evidence must be excluded but also why it must be excluded. Al though 
the magistrates are the tribunal of law, it has been suggested that 
the clerk should in certain circumstances deal with an evidential 
mat ter in the absence of the bench. In R v. Weston-Super-Mare 
Justices ex parte Townsend [1968]27 it was held that if, 1n a 
magistrates' court, it 1S desired to warn an accused that if he 
attacks prosecution witnesses he may be cross examined as to his 
character, the proper action is for the magistrates to adjourn and for 
the prosecutor to join with the clerk to explain matters to the 
accused in the absence of the bench. The clerk may thus have to ask 
the bench to retire, and when they return, will not be able to explain 
to them what has taken place or why a particular line of questioning 
has stopped. 
From the few examples g1ven above it should be evident that when 
magistrates are taking a decision as to the guilt or innocence of a 
defendant they are performing what is often an extremely difficult 
task on which a very great deal hangs, with little training or 
27. [1968] 3 All E.R. 225. 
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expertise. Not surprisingly they rely heavily on their clerk to 
assist them - to explain the many rules and to make plain the issues 
on which they must take their decisions. 
As we have already mentioned, some magistrates ask their clerks 
for help on matters which are not the province of the clerk. 
" and sometimes they say 'What do you think?' because they are 
in a bit of a state because they can't decide - for example in 
care proceedings where emotions are running high. It's an 
extremely difficult situation and you know they are looking just 
for an extra opinion to help them. And, I have said to them if 
they've asked me 'I'm glad I haven't got the responsibility. 
It's a difficult one and I'm afraid I can't help you'." 
Another clerk commented: 
"Very occasionally you'll be called in and they'll say 'Well what 
do you think?' and then it's up to you, it's your responsibility 
to point out to them that it doesn't matter what I think - it's 
not relevant." 
Magistrates do place temptations in the clerks way to exceed the 
clerk's proper role. Not because they are corrupt but because they 
are unsure. They are leaning on someone who has greater knowledge 
and experience than they have to help them. In such situations one 
relies on the integrity of the clerk to do what the two clerks quoted 
did - and decline to offer an opinion. 
Do clerks succumb to the temptations which are placed in their 
way? The conflicts must be greater for the clerk in a situation in 
which they are not in agreement with the magistrates, and therefore 
the clerks interviewed were asked what, if anything, they would do if 
they were asked into the retiring room, and when they got there 
discovered that the magistrates were gOing seriously wrong on a 
question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Their responses 
to this hypothetical situation suggest that clerks do not wish to 
become involved in the fact finding process - that they are glad that 
this difficult burden is not on their shoulders. Reactions such as: 
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"I wouldn't like to be a magistrate •••••• it's not your problem." 
"If they reach a decision 
have done, well so be it. 
wrong? 
which were I a stipendiary I wouldn't 
Who is to say who is right and who is 
were very common. On the whole clerks were satisfied with the 
division of labour between clerk and bench. They had no ambition or 
desire to alter the nature of the role. Indeed later in the 
questionnaire when they were asked if they thought the clerk ought to 
be on the bench, they responded overwhelmingly in the negative and 
although the issue has been canvassed many times, some reacted with 
absolute horror that such a thing was mooted. Even if the system 
produced decisions that they thought were wrong, they still supported 
the sys tem. 
"Let's face it, with years of experience behind you magistrates 
do make decisions that you don't agree with as clerk, but this is 
what it's all about." 
The clerks job as defined by clerks is to ensure that the rules 
are followed, and if they are, that 1S the extent of the 
responsibility that they have and want. One clerk to the justices 
commented: 
"But it is a sign of youth when a court clerk will come and say 
'They've just disqualified a man for careless driving, he's got 
three children he's going to lose his job what can we do?' And I 
ask them if the case was conducted regularly, and they say 'Oh, 
yes!!', and was the penalty a legal one - 'Oh, yes!'. 'Well 
you've done your job, and that's where it ends'." 
The clerks interviewed denied any desire to interfere with the 
magistrates' decision on the facts - but they obviously felt some 
confl ic ts. One commented: 
"I can only think of about twice when I've actually felt 
upse t go ing home and worrying about a dec is ion." 
Another: 
"If we diverged greatly on facts I would just feel ghastly and 
leave them to it." 
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It ~s obviously not easy for clerks if they feel that the bench is 
go~ng wrong. What they do in this situation is try to ensure that 
the magistrates are taking their decision according to the law. We 
have shown that often fact and law are closely intertwined and also 
that questions of evidence are also difficult. It is in this process 
of sifting fact and law and weighing evidence that the clerk can have 
a considerable influence on the bench. One clerk said: 
"If I thought they were going seriously wrong, you know, I would 
have to say 'Have you considered the weight to be attached to the 
evidence? Do you regard the witnesses as truthful? What about 
the cross examination? Do you think that in spite of the cross 
examination you still believe •••• ?' But in the end it may be 
that you've got to leave it to them even if they are going to go 
wrong." 
Another described his role thus: 
'~nless it's pure law where the absence of certain evidence must 
lead to acquittal - and then of course they would probably be 
looking towards you in any event - I would in that situation say 
'Well you haven't got the evidence therefore you must acquit.' 
But if it's on fact, then of course it's their decision. But if 
they are going seriously wrong then I would try to put them on 
the right direction and say 'Look at the evidence logically and 
sensibly' but other than that I wouldn't influence them on fact." 
Some clerks are very aware that this process of directing the 
magistrates' minds to the evidence can fundamentally affect the 
decision that the bench reaches. 
"I think I'd put it very politely - have they considered such and 
such a thing, such and such a point. I wouldn't put it as 
though I'm influencing them - if you put it politely you can get 
around it and give your opinion but as a suggestion to them. 
There are ways you can do it. And then they do think about what 
you've said, and in some cases you get 'Oh yes - we hadn't 
thought about that' and they do come round or at least consider 
it, which at least makes you feel better if you know they have 
considered it." 
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Another clerk said: 
"I think because the clerk points it out, not telling them there 
isn't any (evidence) but asking them in a questioning way 
. . , 
mag1strates w111 usually think 'That's right isn't it, there's no 
evidence for that'." 
What these clerks were doing was not setting out to change the 
magistrates' minds on fact, but trying to ensure that magistrates took 
their decision in a lawyer-like fashion, taking into account the 
ingredients of the offence and weighing the evidence properly. But 
by doing what they do they have considerable influence on the verdict. 
The problem is that there 1S a very fine line between what is 
proper for the clerk to do, and what 1S 1mproper behaviour. 
Influencing the magistrates' decision on fact alone is 1mproper and 
clerks seem not to set out to do this, but what they do do in the way 
of directing the minds of the bench to the law, the ingredients of the 
offence and the evidence may influence the magistrates verdict on 
guilt or innocence. 
We know that magistrates can be unsure of themselves and can look 
to clerks for help. But even where clerks are giving what to the 
clerk is bona fide advice on the law, they may well be giving out a 
great many clues or even broad hints as to what they think of the 
merits of a case, or of the facts of a case. Such clues and hints, 
com1ng from someone who has expertise, exper1ence and the respect of 
the bench will carry a great deal of weight. 
The two clerks last quoted were at least aware of the influence 
they could have on the bench. However many of the clerks interviewed 
described how they would go through the evidence with the bench 
without demonstrating any awareness that by doing this they might be 
influencing the bench. This is perhaps the most worrying thing -
that clerks do not realise that they can influence the bench, short 
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of a direct comment on the merits of the case. They do not realise 
that, for instance by directing the minds of the bench to one 
particular aspect of the evidence, they may possibly create doubts 
which were not in the minds of the bench before they spoke. 
It may well be entirely proper for the clerk to direct the bench 
to a particular ingredient of an offence, or to a particular aspect of 
the evidence. But we know that magistrates look for help where they 
should not and it is therefore desirable that clerks understand the 
less obvious ways in which they may influence the magistrates. 
Burney's magistrates admitted to asking the clerk to retire when 
they didn't need a clerk - for reassurance - they also admitted to 
some fairly devious ways of extracting an opinion from the clerk on 
. 28 the mer1ts or sentence. Benches faced with difficult situations 
can feel 1nsecure. They turn to the clerk for help. Clerks need to 
be aware that there are more ways of influencing a decision than by 
say1ng outright that they think the defendant to be innocent or 
guilty. 
Lack of awareness of their own power 1S one problem. Using 
their power improperly is another and, it seems, a real problem. In 
Burney's survey a clerk said that he would 1n court, put Stone's 
Justices' Manual face downwards as a sign that he thought a solicitor 
was making too much of a legal point and would say 'Huh' if he didn't 
believe a witness. This by-play was directed at the bench. One 
wonders how discreet the clerk was 1n the retiring room. Burney 
commented: 
28. See pages 158-159. 
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"This example does show how easy it is for the clerk merely by 
his demeanour to tell the magistrates something they ought not to 
know - especially when it is remembered that while somebody is 
pleading not guilty the clerk has in front of him a bit of paper 
with a note of any previous conviction, which must on no account 
be revealed until after a finding of guilt.,,29 
Again, one has to rely on the integrity of the clerk not to 
influence the bench - although this of course does not guarantee 
propriety if the clerk 1S not aware of the situations in which slhe 
may influence the magistrates. 
The clerk and sentence 
The Practice Direction of 1953 envisaged that the clerk should be 
able to advise the bench on sentence in a number of ways. Firs t, the 
clerk can advise on the penalties which the law allows 1n respect of a 
particular case. Secondly the clerk can advise on the sentences 
imposed by the bench or neighbouring benches for comparable offences. 
The Practice Direction of 1953 did not specifically mention that the 
clerk could advise on decisions of superior courts and other 
authorities on sentence. However, possibly this aspect of the 
clerk's advice was intended to be included under the umbrella of 
advice on the law. 
The Practice Direction of 1981 mentions advice on the range of 
penalties which the law allows and guidance relevant to choice of 
penal ty provided by the law, and the decis ions of super ior courts or 
other authorities. It does not specifically mention that the clerk 
can advise on the sentencing norms of the bench or neighbouring 
benches. 
29. At page 159. The clerk does not necessarily have details of the 
defendant's convictions during the trial, but may have them in 
some cases. 
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Despite these seem~ng inconsistencies clerks do advise on all 
three aspects, and this amounts to a considerable participation by the 
clerk in the sentencing process. One clerk interviewed gave an 
example of the sort of situation where he would advise on the policy 
of the bench: 
"For example here we have a s~x month pr~son sentence that 
normally follows the importation of two kilos of cannabis, so say 
here the importation was under a kilo or something like that, and 
they were going for a full six months then I would draw their 
attention to it and say well the rule is six months for two kilos 
without any aggravating factors and pro-rata thereunder, and I 
think if you're departing from the usual practice you ought to be 
in a position to give your reasons why. There may well be good 
reasons and perhaps its good for them to say." 
The same clerk gave a useful example of the way in which decisions of 
the Court of Appeal might be referred to the bench: 
"If it's something that's well outside the guidelines laid down 
by the Court of Appeal then we draw their attention - say theft 
by an employee, which is always difficult to deal with. The 
Court of Appeal say that there a custodial sentence is normally 
inevitable. If the person is not in a managerial position it 
can be suspended. Say they were going very very leniently on 
the theft of an employee I'd draw attention to the remarks in the 
Court of Appeal on sentencing on that type of case and say yet 
again 'You're departing radically from what's established as a 
norm and it might be a good idea to give reasons for such a 
departure.' They may not have appreciated ~n fact what 
sentencing practice is for that particular type of case." 
The clerk can thus play an influential role ~n sentencing, 
particularly in maintaining consistency of sentences whilst s/he 
remains within the guidelines laid down in the Practice Direction. 
However, it seems that some clerks do go further than was 
envisaged by the Direction. 
Temptations for clerks to exceed their authority and influence 
the bench must again be greatest where clerk and bench disagree and 
the clerks in the sample were asked what, if anything, they would do 
if they were invited into the retiring room and found that the 
magistrates were going serously wrong on penalty. Almost all clerks 
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mentioned one, two, or all of the aspects of advice laid down in the 
Practice Direction. Some were very clear that they would go no 
further than that: 
"I w ou 1 d n' tin t e r fer e, 
sentence then there's a 
if it's detremental to 
then I suppose it's not 
because if they go wildly wrong in 
method of putting it right isn't there -
the defendant. If it's not detremental 
justice but there's nobody hurt." 
"They've often made decisions as to sentence that I wouldn't have 
done, but there again there is always a right of appeal if they 
are too harsh and if they are too lenient it's just something you 
accept, its not part of your role." 
But others did not take such a philosophical V1ew - they took what 
might be described as a more robust V1ew of their role. 
"Sometimes if I think a sentence is very severe - if for example 
they wanted to send a man to prison for the first time, maybe for 
six months, I might ask 'Do you think three months would be 
sufficient?' And then very often suggestions are adopted like 
that, and they say 'Yes, three months is enough'. But if 
magistrates say 'No, this is a serious offence we intend to 
impose the maximum', well there we are! They can do it." 
It is doubtful whether or not one could say that this clerk was 
exceeding his authority. First he was making a suggestion to the 
bench. He was not telling them what he thought or what they should 
do. Also he was quite clear that if the magistrates rejected his 
suggestion that was perfectly correct, and purely a matter for their 
judgement. Further the clerk would have been aware of the 
discussions and research from many quarters focussing on pr1son 
overcrowding and encouraging courts to pass shorter sentences of 
imprisonment where they are appropriate. This would be quite a 
proper matter for the clerk to bring to the attention of the bench. 
Indeed the clerk is the best person to do this, since it may well be 
expecting too much of a lay bench that they will all be au fait with 
such research and discussion. Nevertheless it 1S clear that 
suggestions such as the one made by the clerk in the example above 
will be very influential with the bench - whether made properly or 
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improperly. Another clerk said: 
"If it was a serious type of offence, then if they were 
considering probation and I considered that it was a serious 
offence and didn't really merit it in view of the defendant's 
record and various other factors then I may well suggest that 
they were on the wrong course, but certainly there's no question 
of the clerk insisting and I've always attempted to ••• the 
magistrates do in fact have the final decision." 
The magistrates may well have the final say, but one wonders how often 
their final say in this clerk's court will differ from the clerks 
advice, S1nce the advice of an experienced and qualified adviser must 
carry a great deal of weight. It is difficult to say categorically 
that this clerk was exceeding his proper role, S1nce he may only 
profer the sort of advice he was speaking of where a sentence of 
probation would be out of line with the sort of sentence passed by the 
rest of the magistrates at that court. He did not refer to bench 
policy however. Nor did the clerk who made the following remark: 
"You'd then probably suggest to them what punishment is best 1n 
this case - tell them all their powers and then tell them what 
probably you think would be most suitable and why." 
Another clerk was aware of the temptations but seemed not to be about 
to fall into them. 
"It's very difficult to draw a line between saying 'Decisions of 
the Court of Appeal say that's not a suitable sentence' and 
telling them which sentence is suitable - which they all like you 
to do. A lot of them are almost begging and pleading 'Tell me 
what we ought to do.' It's more easy to tell them what they 
ought not to do." 
Two of the clerks who were interviewed said that although they took a 
restrictive V1ew of their role, they knew that others went further. 
One said: 
"If it was something they clearly had no power to do then I'd 
tell them so. If they queried, of course, the sentence they were 
giving compared to the majority of cases then I'd tell them what 
the normal course of action is likely to be ••.. I know for a fact 
that some clerks would go a lot further than that but I don't 
like to because of the way I've been taught." 
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The other: 
"I wouldn't at any time say 'You're doing it wrong!' 
some clerks do." 
I know 
14% of the clerks interviewed (i.e. 7 out of 50) gave replies to the 
question on sentencing which implied that they, or other clerks they 
knew might go further than was envisaged in the Practice Direction. 
Again, this is not because magistrates' courts allover the 
country are staffed by power hungry clerks. For the most part it is 
because sentencing 1S an extremely complex task. The factors which 
must be taken into account, for instance, before a bench passes a 
sentence of imprisonment are very numerous. Added to this there are 
many policy considerations relating for example to length of prison 
sentence, prison overcrowding, the necessity to consider alternatives 
to prison, and criminological research relating for example to the 
suitability of prison for particular types of offenders. It is 
expecting too much of lay magistrates to require them to study and 
learn all of the information relevant to each sentence. They mus t 
depend on the clerk. 
A Home Office Research Study on sentencing practice In 
magistrates' courts acknowledged that the potential influence of the 
clerk on sentencing was considerable. 30 It observed also that the 
extent of the influence which the clerk exerts depends upon how the 
clerk sees his role. Although many of the clerks in the Home Office 
Study are satisfied with the way the role was defined, there are 
others were are not satisfied. 
30. Tarling, R. 'Sentencing Practice in Magistrates' Courts'. 
Home Office Research Study No. 56. 
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In 1976 1n an article in the Justice of the Peace Journal 31 a 
clerk argued strongly for clerks to take a greater part 1n sentencing. 
Sihe pointed out the enormous body of law, policy and research on 
sentencing and argued that the only person in court who could have it 
at their fingertips was the clerk. The clerk should not, it was 
argued, decide sentence. The magistrates should determine sentence -
but should do so after receiving the advice of their clerk on all 
aspects of the sentence. Similar points were made at the Justices' 
Clerks' Conference in 1978. 
The author of the article 1n the Justice of the Peace did 
acknowledge that it would be difficult to play such an important role 
in the sentencing process without influencing the magistrates in any 
way. However, slhe pointed out that the difficulty of this task was 
no different to the difficulty of the task when the clerk assists the 
magistrates 1n deciding the issue of guilt or 1nnocence. We have 
already argued the difficulties attached to the process of the clerk 
advising on guilt or innocence. The same problems of the persuasive 
power of an expert assisting lay people, of benches need for help and 
their tendency to ask questions they should not, apply also to the 
clerk's influence on sentencing. 
One of the clerks in Burney's survey said: 
"It's very easy to tell them •.• for instance on sentence its 
proper for them to want to know what's open to them, but the way 
you answer could influence them. For instance you could say 
'Obviously, you could send him to prison - or you could (ironic 
intonation) give him a conditional discharge ••• Sometimes I think 
of something fairly ingenious and I'm biting my31 0n g ue not to tell them. You mustn't give them that solution." 
31. 140 JPN 496 (1976) 'Sentencing and the Justices' Clerk.' 
32. Burney, P. 157-8. 
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But the argument in the Justice of the Peace article is still very 
persuasive - if the magistrates cannot be expected to know all the 
factors which need to be taken into account in sentencing they must 
have advice from someone who is expert, and the only person available 
1S the clerk. 
It seems from the replies to the questionnaire for the present 
research, that clerks not only take the robust role proposed for them 
by the author of the Justice of the Peace article, but that some of 
them sail very close to participation in the ultimate decision of the 
bench. If the clerks are to be awarded the right to play an 
increased role in sentencing this is one thing that they must not do. 
One situation where it is proper for the clerk to give her/his 
opinion on sentence 1S after the sentence has been passed. The clerk 
can have a very important influence in educating the bench on 
sentencing policy and practice, not just 1n the formal training now 
received by all magistrates, but also in discussing with the bench 
after the court. One of Burney's magistrates said: 
"It's not fair to try and test yourself against the clerks -
they're supposed to give the legal answer. They won't say if 
they think the sentence you're proposing is too heavy but 
occasionally one might say afterwards 'Coo you stung them, 
Sir' .,,33 
One of the clerks interviewed said: 
"If it's a question of the kind of penalty I may advise them. 
Some courts do get justices who are mini Judge Jeffries and want 
to put everyone inside. I do have a chat with them." 
The clerk can therefore help to mould magistrates attitudes by 
discussing sentencing with them out of court. The clerk to the 
justices will also have a great deal of influence when bench 
sentencing policy, or sentencing norms are decided. These matters 
33. Burney p.2S8. 
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will be elaborated further when we discuss the influence of the clerk 
out of court. 
Overstepping the mark 
Our discussion of the role of the clerk in the determination of 
verdict and sentence has demonstrated that the clerk has considerable 
influence when she/he ~s acting quite properly within the established 
rules. We have also seen that clerks are consc~ous of the ease with 
which they could overstep what is acceptable, and indeed that some of 
them do so. 
Not being entitled to expect such frankness from clerks, the 
question of the clerk exceeding her/his proper role was also 
approached rather more directly. Clerks were asked whether, if 
they wished to do it, they could influence their benches on matters 
which are outside their proper role. The replies to this question 
revealed to an even greater degree the extent of the clerk's potential 
influence on the bench, and the extent of clerk's consciousness of the 
limits and possible abuses of their power. 
Only 12% said that they could not improperly influence their 
benches and the answers of even some of these clerks were rather 
equivocal. One, for instance said that he could not do it, but in 
the next breath that he could not bring himself to do it. Another 
said "Do I have to answer that?" When told that there was no 
compulsion to answer he said "Well I won't then!" It may be that 
such a refusal merited classification with those who felt that they 
could influence the bench if they wished to! 
88% said that, if they wished to, they could influence the bench 
improperly. About a quarter said that it could not be done with 
every clerk and every bench, but that with some benches it would be 
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possible. One said he could do it 
"To an extent, yes. But I'd have to pick the magistrates." 
another: 
"But certainly, we've got 160 justices here, there are bound to 
be a wide spectrum of characters - strong, not so strong - and 
Yes it certainly is pos sib le to do it." 
These clerks were not admitting that they did influence their benches 
- but that they knew that they could if they wanted to. One of them 
put it: 
"I've no doubt that, without meaning to be big headed, John Doe 
with certain magistrates most certainly could. But John Doe 
beng the type of lad he is, wouldn't wish to do so." 
Again we see that it is the weaker, less confident magistrates that 
clerks know are vulnerable to influence. 
"Some magistrates want help, and they will sometimes look to you 
for it when they shouldn't. But then its entirely up to the 
clerk not to respond to that - most of the magistrates know they 
mustn't ask." 
Interestingly the three clerks interviewed who sat mainly with 
stipendiary magistrates all gave the same answer to the question -
that it would be possible for them to influence the magistrates, but 
that it would be noticed either immediately or very soon. Clerks who 
sat mainly with lay magistrates were conSCIOUS that the onus was on 
them to stay within the rules. 
Several clerks emphasised that they knew that they must be very 
careful not to exert improper influence because of the great respect 
for the clerk who is viewed by a lay bench as their trusted 
professional adviser. 
"I believe there are times when I could do it. I think far too 
many justices ask clerk's opinions. It's an easy mistake to make 
and it's a mistake you could criticise justices for, but you 
can't blame them. Obviously the clerks are there five times a 
week. The justice probably sits once a fortnight - so they want 
to know what's going on - they want to know what they should do. 
I feel I could do it. I'm scared to - basically I don't think 
it's right." 
232 
Other clerks said that it would be possible for them to influence 
their benches that "It is possible for any professional adviser." 
Another factor stressed by several clerks was the influence of 
the clerk to the justices. 
"It would be very easy to do it. I think in this court anyway 
because the clerk has such a great deal of respect and 
standing •••• The clerk's advice •••• carries a great deal of 
weight and you don't often find they go against the clerk's 
decision. As I say I think thats because of respect generally 
held - it filters down like that. And it would be very easy to 
abuse it - it's up to individual's integrity I think". 
One of the clerks to the justices who was interviewed said that he had 
been at his court since before all of his bench, and that his 
experience was many times that of most magistrates. In these 
circumstances it would be "the easiest thing in the world" for him to 
influence the bench. He had been responsible for training, educating 
and sitting with nearly every magistrate at the court. 
The influence of a clerk to the justices can be detremental as 
well as positive. One clerk commented that at his previous court he 
had been expected to retire with the bench and playa large role ~n 
the retiring room, and that it would have been very easy at that court 
for him to have influenced the bench. At his present court, with 
different traditions he thought it would be very difficult. 
Another rather distressing story came from a different clerk. 
"In fact I know a court where the clerk ran the court to such an 
extent that you could have said it was his decision. It was 
very bad ••••• but what he and the bench decided was very just, 
and that's the only reason that I can think he never got found 
out. But his magistrates now are left without a leader, and 
what do they do then? They are on their own basically. It was 
very funny because they don't know basics really." 
With lay magistrates at any rate, the onus is squarely on the 
clerk to make sure that slhe stays firmly within the bounds of 
acceptable conduct. This applies particularly to the clerk to the 
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justices who can affect the policy and attitudes of the whole bench, 
and who certainly needs to be aware of the extent of her/his influence 
and the limits of acceptable behaviour. 
Defining those limits was acknowledged to be very difficult by 
many clerks. The ease with which benches could be influenced was 
mentioned several times. A clerk to the justices said that 
"A little word or phrase, or even a grunt or raised eyebrows 
could influence them. But you've just not got to do it. An 
enormous amount depends on the professional integrity of the 
clerk and his own standard of self discipline." 
A total of six clerks mentioned that they were aware that they did not 
need to intervene directly to influence their benches. 
"If you mean do I sort of raise my eyebrows and not say anything? 
I think I've been told that I voice my opinions like that." 
"I mean all you would have to do is put a few words in here and 
there and put the seeds of doubt and you would be away. I don't 
think you should do it." 
Perhaps the most constructive thing to ar1se from this section of 
the questionnaire was not the knowledge that clerks have a great deal 
of power in the retiring room - we had shown this already - but that 
clerks are aware of their power. They know the extent to which they 
can influence their benches, and they know what they must avoid doing. 
Perhaps also it would have been reassuring if more had shown a 
realisation that they can influence some benches without directly 
telling the magistrates what they should do, but that their influence 
can be exerted more subtly and even non-verbally. 
The dependance of the courts on the clerks integrity 1S obvious, 
and was stressed by several clerks. In court, and in the retiring 
room, the opportunities frequently present themselves for clerks to 
influence the bench. Clerks said that they knew that the 
opportunities were there, but that they did not take them. 
There is, of course, no guarantee that clerks do not influence 
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their benches. It 1S necessary to trust them, Slnce their activity 
1n the retiring room is concealed. This is why clerks in their 
reactions to cases limiting their opportunities to retire were asking 
that they be trusted - and why they saw such limitations as 
inappropriate. The only poss ible "guarantee" of integrity which 1S 
glven credence may be a professional qualification. Not all clerks 
are qualified, and the debate around professionalisation has been an 
important issue for clerks 1n recent years. It will be discussed 1n 
the second section of this thesis. 
Conflicts with the Bench 
The last three parts of this chapter have been concerned with the 
dangers of the clerk going too far. It would be wrong however to 
forget that there can also be a danger of the clerk not going far 
enough. There are occasions when the bench needs advice and may not 
get it. The converse of the dominant clerk is what has been called 
the weak or supine clerk. 34 
We have already glven an example of the weak clerk 1n court, who 
allowed his bench to convict and sentence unrepresented defendants 1n 
the same breath without giving them a chance to mitigate. Such 
events are just as worrying as situations where the clerk appears to 
go too far. 
Similar problems can also ar1se 1n the retiring room. The 
examples given of magistrates who are lacking in confidence and who 
look to the clerk for too much help are examples of events which do 
happen, but they are not descriptions of what invariably happens. 
34. By Brian Harris 145 JPN 403. 1n 'The Role of the Clerk: A New 
Direc t ion' • 
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Situations also ar1se where the clerk may not g1ve advice when the 
bench need it. 
Also it should be noted that benches are not invariably receptive 
to what the clerk has to say and they may make it difficult for the 
clerk to give them the advice they should have. One clerk gave a 
graphic example. 
"It's a very difficult position to be in because sometimes you've 
got to give them advice they don't want to know. I mean I've 
found that in the past - not so much now but when I was younger -
I found I was supposed to be either keeping quiet and thinking to 
myself "Well you might as well let them get on with it", or I was 
saying to myself "Well you can't let them do it you know, you 
must tell them, its your duty to tell them". And many a time 
I've said something and they haven't liked it. And of course, in 
an extreme case it could make you rather unpopular .•• There are 
magistrates who have got hobby horses. I mean I have known 
magistrates in the past who have thought - I know it sounds old 
fashioned but its true - they regarded poaching as a heinous 
crime which should be severely punished. On the other hand they 
didn't see anything wrong with a chap driving around when he was 
obviously drunk because they may have done it themselves." 
Benches are not all inexperienced and timid. There are 
occasions when the clerk will wish to give advice, and the bench will 
not want to hear it, or take it. 
Of the clerks in the sample a total of 38% said that the bench 
had never disagreed with their advice on the law and refused to take 
it. But of these one had been a clerk to the justices for a long 
time, and felt that because he had so much exper1ence benches would 
always listen to him although he believed there to have been m1nor 
disagreements in the past. Another was a qualified but new clerk who 
had been taking courts for only a month. 
62% of clerks had experienced conflicts with their benches, when 
their benches did not wish to accept their advice. There were 
numerous strategies for dealing with the problem. 
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Given that clerks are, and see themselves as, the guardians of 
legality in the court they are not surprisingly extremely concerned to 
ensure that the rules are followed, and that benches do take their 
advice. Very few were therefore prepared to simply forget a 
disagreement with the bench and let the bench proceed unchecked. 
Only four clerks said they had simply let the matter drop. One of 
these reported that: 
" •••• it was only a road traffic offence and it was to the 
benefit of the defendant and the prosecution raised no objection 
and I didn't think it necessary to take it any further." 
He felt then, that there was another guardian of legality to protect 
the side whose rights were unfringed and it was not solely his 
responsibility to ensure that the rules were observed. 
Two others said that the situations 1n which they had found the 
bench refusing to take advice had been situations where they had 
agreed with the bench that the law and justice did not co-incide, and 
they had allowed the bench to do justice. One of these clerks gave a 
dramatic example of the situation which had ar1sen in his case. 
"It was an extreme case. It was a 16 year old boy who had a 
little 'pop-pop' bike and he'd knocked a man over and the man had 
been killed. So he faced a charge of death by dangerous 
driving, and when the news reached the boy's father, who had a 
heart condition he had a heart attack and he died. At the time 
the delay at the Old Bailey, where it should have been committed, 
was 9 months to a year. I advised the magistrates that they had 
no jurisdiction in the juvenile court to deal with homicide -
homicide was man killing; it was their decision as to whether 
causing death by dangerous driving was man killing. If they 
thought it was, they would have to send it to the Old Bailey, if 
they thought it wasn't they could deal with it. They retired by 
themselves and they came back and said "We do not think it is 
homicide, we are going to deal with the case" which they did. 
The boy pleaded guilty, he was fined and disqualified and I may 
say both sides were represented and both sides hoped this would 
happen. Afterwards the magistrates said 'please don't think we 
didn't accept your advice as correct, because it obviously was 
correct, but we made our decision to avoid what we thought was an 
appalling injustice of hanging this over this boy's head for that 
length of time'." 
In this instance then, all the lawyers present had colluded to avoid 
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the rules in favour of a just and humane decision. 
Not all refusals on the part of the bench to take the clerk's 
advice have such a happy ending. It is very rare that a clerk will 
be pleased that the magistrates have gone against her/his advice. 
Perhaps the mildest strategy adopted by clerks where they find 
themselves faced with a recalcitrant bench is to make a note on the 
papers or in the minute book that the bench has taken a decision 
contrary to their advice. This was a strategy adopted by clerks who 
sit with stipendiary magistrates. 
" if a stipendiary magistrate doesn't always accept your 
advice there is nothing you can do about it, and I just make a 
note, 'Clerk's advice not accepted'." 
But it was also a strategy of many clerks who sat with lay benches. 
One of them said nostalgically: 
"In the days when the magistrates wrote the register themselves, 
going back 40 or 50 years, the clerk at that time used to make 
the magistrates write on the register 'Fined £10 contrary to the 
advice of the clerk'." 
Another strategy open to less sen10r clerks is to call on the 
support of the clerk to the justices. The exper1ence of one trainee 
was 
"I actually went out and sought confirmation of my advice from a 
more sen10r clerk. They just wouldn't accept what I was 
saying!" 
Q. "Was it O.K. once you got confirmation". 
A. "Yes". 
But this is not a strategy available to clerks to the justices or even 
easily available to their deputies or older clerks and experienced 
assistants. What 1S available to all clerks is the threat of the 
Divisional Court. If a bench take a decision which could be argued 
to be wrong in law, the case can be appealed to the Divisional Court 
by way of case stated. In such a situation the magistrates must 
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respond to an application to state a case within 21 days and must set 
out the facts found by the court and deal with the question or 
questions of law on which the application is based. 35 Usually such a 
case is prepared by the clerk, who then discusses, develops and amends 
it with the bench.36 And of course the assistance of the clerk 
is invaluable in such a situation. However, if the bench are given 
advice on the law by the clerk, they refuse to follow it and are taken 
to the Divisional Court, they will not be able to count on the support 
of the clerk. What is more, they may find that they become liable 
for costs in the Divisional Court. 
The threat that a case may be taken to the Divisional Court if 
they do not follow the advice of the clerk can therefore have a 
salutory effect. 
"I've had benches which have said 'Right we accept the advice you 
are giving us, but we don't like the advice, can we ignore it?' 
And I have said 'You depart from my advice at your peril'. 
Remember Lord Hailsham said on one occasion to the justices at 
the Magistrates' Association 'He's not God, if you want to 
disregard his advice you may do so'. What he didn't say was if 
justices deliberately disregard their clerk's advice they may 
become liable for costs in subsequent proceedings, and there was 
a case reported in the last few months where justices were upset 
on appeal where the clerk gave an affidavit that the court had 
gone against his advice and the Divisional Court, I believe it 
was, said the justices had gone as near as they could to 
incurring costs in their own cause." 
The threat that if the justices don't accept advice they will have to 
go to the Divisional Court unsupported usually, it seems, persuades 
them that they should conform. But not always. One clerk actually 
had to carry out the threat. 
35. See 5.87. Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 and Rules 65-68 
Magistrates' Courts Rules 1968. 
36. Such a procedure was envisaged by Home Office circular 55/1975. 
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"The bench disagreed with my advice on the law in X town in 
particular and I let them have their particular way and we ended 
up with a case taken to the Divisional Court and the bench 
quashed on appeal." 
Q. 'Were you responsible for prepar1ng the case stated?' 
A. 'I wa~, yes.' 
Q. 'Did you support the decision?' 
A. 'No. I said it was completely contrary to the law as I advised 
them, since there was a reported case on the particular subject. 
They were following a more common sense argument - and saying it 
was bureaucratic and just matters of paper and that it shouldn't 
be so. But the law was clear and they went against it. '" 
Of course the point of the clerk making a note in the minute book 
would be so that the clerk could, in the event of the decision being 
challenged, know what her/his attitude to the decision had been. It 
may be that the same clerk might make a note in the minute book on an 
issue on which s/he did not feel particularly strongly and use the 
threat of no support in a case stated in a case where s/he felt more 
strongly. 
There are occaS10ns when clerks feel so strongly that they may go 
further even than this. We saw that when clerk and bench come into 
conflict, clerks may do what Carlen called a "stab in the back,,37 and 
withdraw their protection from the bench and show them to be at fault 
in public. The threat of the Divisional Court represents the same 
mechanism - a threat that the clerk will withdraw her/his protection 
to persuade the bench to follow the rules. The clerk's allegience to 
the rules may be stronger than her/his allegience to the bench, and it 
is possible for the clerk to 'go public' about a disagreement in the 
retiring room. One clerk said he would 
"Just make a note in my notebook, and if I had an approach from 
either advocate I would say my advice had been against it. In 
the interests of justice I would feel duty bound to do that 
37. (Magistrates' Justice.) Martin Robertson 1976. 
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although I probably wouldn't go out of my way to draw attention 
to it unless it was more gross and obvious and I felt that great 
injustice had been done. I would then say to someone, look I 
think this is wrong in law and the justices have gone against me, 
I've told them this, I've made a note of it, and I would support 
any application you might make in another court. I would feel 
it my duty to do that." 
Thus the clerk can go a long way towards creating a situation where 
her/his advice is actually re-inforced by the Divisional Court. 
Two clerks interviewed said they would take a very strong V1ew if 
they gave their considered legal advice and the bench refused to take 
it. One of them said 
"Tradi t ionally when I was under art ic les the clerk there... said 
that 'If you give them your considered op1n10n it is a considered 
opinion and they are not prepared to take it, then you put your 
coat and hat on and go home'." 
The other said that if he gave an opinion and the bench categorically 
refused to go along with what he told them, then 
" ••• one has to think about packing one's bags and doing something 
else." 
These clerks clearly did not expect that such a situation would ar1se, 
and they would have found it very difficult if it had. But other 
clerks took a different view. One stressed that it was a magistrates' 
court, not a clerk's court, and the bench had every right to disregard 
his advice. Another - a clerk to the justices said that he always 
told his magistrates when training them that they could, if they 
wanted, disregard the clerks advice. 
It seems that all clerks use some strategy to protect themselves 
or ensure that the bench follows their advice. It does appear 
however, that there are some very considerable differences 1n 
attitudes of clerks to benches who disagree with them - which ranged 
from philosophical resignation to considering alternative employment. 
It is an area which does rouse strong feelings. At least partly this 
is because of the strange position of the clerk - the clerk is the 
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lawyer to the bench, yet the bench of lay persons with little 
training and possibly minimal experience, is the tribunal of law. 
Technically the bench takes decisions on law. In practice they must 
rely heavily on the clerk. If the bench decides to reject the 
clerk's advice, the clerk has no authority to resist it. Only the 
Divisional Court can reprimand and even penalise. 
insist that her/his advice be followed. 
The limits of the relationship 
The clerk cannot 
Burney found that the relationship between bench and clerk 1S a 
very personal thing, varying from court to court. She asserted that 
although the way bench and clerk related was very different at each 
court, benches all believed that the balance struck at their court was 
38 good. 
Satisfaction amongst clerks about their relationship with their 
benches is also high. All of the clerks interviewed, when asked to 
describe the ir re lat ionship with the magis trates repl ied pos it ive lye 
Burney surmised that satisfaction amongst magistrates was high because 
the bench is educated by the clerk to the justices as to the best 
relationship between clerk and bench, and this must be true. So far 
as clerks are concerned, we have reported statements from clerks who, 
having moved from court to court, noted great differences in the way 
clerk and bench related both in and out of court. But nevertheless, 
despite the fact that some clerks obviously had doubts about the 
balance struck at their courts between themselves and the bench, they 
still described their relationship with the bench as good. In 
general it seems that clerks have a high regard for their benches, 
despite the magistrates who lean too heavily upon them, or who refuse 
38. Burney 1979 at p.252-3. 
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to follow their advice. 
One striking difference from court to court IS the extent to 
which the clerks actually know the individual magistrates. Court C 
for instance was a comparatively small court, with few enough 
magistrates for all of the clerks to know them. Also it was the 
tradition at Court C for the magistrates and the clerks to take coffee 
together. All courts sitting retired at roughly the same time and 
coffee and biscuits were served. Clerks and benches chatted about 
the business of the day, general matters relating to the court, and 
purely personal matters. The magistrates addressed clerks by their 
first names. The clerks usually addressed the magistrates as Mr. 
Smith or Mrs. Jones. A great deal of light hearted banter went on 
and several of the magistrates went out of their way to say how well 
they related to their clerks, how good the clerks were, and how much 
better it was at Court C than what they had heard of other benches. 
At Court G however, the clerk to the justices said 
"I've currently got 145 magistrates. 
what some of them are occupied at." 
I only have a vague idea 
The clerk to the justices is likely to know the bench rather better 
than the other clerks, SInce s /he is like ly to have played at leas t a 
part In their training, will playa role in meetings of the bench, 
will be referred to by magistrates for help during their service, and 
will see them at social events. The deputy or deputies will probably 
participate in some of these events. Also it may well be that a 
long serving clerk has given many years of service to a particular 
court, and will thus know all the bench. But at a very large court, 
even the clerk to the justices cannot hope to know all of the bench, 
and ordinary clerks will know them even less. 
There was a great divergence of opinion amongst clerks as to 
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whether the way they related to the bench outside court affected their 
relationship in court. Some clerks felt that a good personal 
relationship with the magistrates meant a good relationship in court. 
Others strongly disagreed 
" Th ere are s 0 mel rea 11 y dis 1 ike , but I'm qui t e in d iff ere nt, I 
just take it as a job and go through the whole sitting with 
them." 
was one clerk's assessment. He was supported by the op~n~ons of many 
other clerks who felt that whatever you knew of the members of your 
bench outside court, you related to all of them in the same formal way 
in court. One clerk to the justices knew several of his bench 
through the Rotary Club, had magistrates as personal friends, played 
squash regularly with one of them, but said that even if they were on 
firs t name terms outs ide court they were s till 's ir' in court. 
Another clerk said that he would not wish to know the magistrates 
~n any way outside the court, because he believed that "familiarity 
breeds contempt". 
Other clerks were more positive about the situation and felt that 
if one knew the magistrates characters one knew how much help they 
might need in court, whether they would be confident, or tentative and 
in need of support. One said that she knew which were the more 
confident ones and which were lacking in confidence 
" ••• and they will confide in you and you say 'Are you going to 
take the chair?' and they say 'Oh my goodness, I can't take the 
chair!!' - you know nervously - 'You'll help me?' And there of 
course where you have a magistrate taking the chair for the first 
time they might say "Will you check everything, will you check 
what I'm going to say is right?' And of course I do that. And 
then of course you playa more active role. You are getting up 
more often and trying to give them confidence in what they are 
doing." 
This must be a positive aspect of knowing the bench well - although 
interestingly this latter clerk came from Court G which has a very 
1 a r ge bench. 
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The personalities of clerk and bench must playa role. There are 
inevitable clashes of personality between clerks and some members of a 
bench - even it seems between the clerk to the justices and 
magistrates. There are also some clerks who are personally more 
sensitive and aware, and this shows through in the way they handle 
the i r benches. 
But as ide from such personal cons iderat ions, at the core of the 
relationship between clerk and bench are the traditions of the court. 
These will have a crucial influence on the extent to which the bench 
have a role in court, on what the bench will expect from the clerk in 
the retiring room, and on how well bench and clerks know each other. 
To an extent such traditions will be formulated by the bench. 
To an extent they will be formulated by the clerk to the justices, 
particularly if she/he has been at a court for a long period of time 
and has educated the bench and the clerks into her/his principles. 
Again we emphasise the influence of the clerk particularly in the 
process of education as a crucial influence at the court. 
Conclusions 
In the retiring room as 1n court, clerks take their role as 
guardians of 'due process' seriously. Whilst they identify with 
"their" magistrates, and in general speak highly of magistrates their 
ultimate allegience is not to the bench, it is to the rules. This 1S 
shown clearly by the fact that they will abandon their protection of 
the bench if the magistrates threaten to break or ignore the rules. 
Clerks are prepared to expose the errors of the bench, both in court 
and to the scrutiny of the Divisional Court if magistrates fail to act 
according to the clerk's sense of justice and her/his understanding of 
the rules. 
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We have shown that clerks frequently take a robust attitude to 
their role, exploiting all of the possibilities that exist to guide 
the magistrates and sometimes exceeding what is envisaged by the law. 
However, the country is not full of megalomaniac clerks eager to usurp 
the functions of the bench. Clerks do not want to be part of the 
tribunal of fact. The case law, the present study and those of 
Derbyshire and Burney show that there are - as perhaps inevitably 
there must be - clerks whose behaviour is designed to influence the 
magistrates decisions on the facts. However, if one takes a cross 
section of clerks and examines their relationship with the magistrates 
in detail it becomes clear that clerks do not want to encroach on 
decisions of fact. Their desire to have free access to the retiring 
room, and the way they behave when they are in it are motivated by 
their wish to ensure that the magistrates take decisions ~n accordance 
with substantive law, the rules of evidence and procedure and the 
principles of sentencing. 
However there are some problematic aspects of the clerk's 
relationship with the magistrates. It is clear that many clerks do 
not realise that it is possible to influence magistrates in very 
subtle ways. Some clerks were aware that they needed to take care 
not to affect their magistrates decisions by giving them subtle clues 
about their own opinions, but others were not conscious of this as a 
problem. Magistrates faced with difficult decisions do look to their 
clerks for reassurance and for help with verdict and sentence. 
Clerks said that they avoided these requests to become involved. But 
conscientious avoidance of requests to state an opinion are of little 
use if c lerks g~ ve themse 1 ves away by the way they say th ings, the i r 
intonation, their gestures. 
Dealing with the problem of those clerks who overstep the mark 
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and exceed their role in the retiring room 1S effectively a matter of 
training of the magistrates. The clerk in court will be observed by 
any number of people, including the legal profession. In the 
retiring room the clerk's behaviour is only open to the scrutiny of 
the bench. Clerks interviewed were in no doubt that if they exceeded 
their role with a stipendiary they would be stopped very quickly. 
Lay magistrates must be effectively trained to do the same thing. 
The 1ssue of training will be explored in Chapter Eight. Suffice it 
to say at this stage that the magistrates are trained by the clerk! 
The converse of the clerk who oversteps the proper boundaries of 
her/his role is the clerk who does not go far enough. Interviews and 
court observations did show that magistrates did not get enough help 
from some clerks, because those clerks were insufficiently qualified, 
or trained or lacked experience. The question of clerks' 
qualifications and training will be examined in Chapter Ten. 
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THE CLERK AND THE DEFENDANT 
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The Clerk and the defendant 
The focus of this chapter 1.S the way in which clerks deal with 
defendants who are not represented. The reason for concentrating on 
the unrepresented defendant 1.S that where the defendant does have 
representation by solicitor or counsel, the clerk has very little 
direct contact with the defendant. The advocate will make 
applications for remands or bail, or will mitigate in relation to 
sentence. Even where there is a not guilty plea, although the clerk 
will put the formal matters relating to charge, venue and plea to the 
defendant, the defendant's choices will have been informed by 
consultation with her/his advocate, and throughout the case contact 
between court and defendant will be mediated by that advocate. Should 
the clerk be tempted to play a more active role in proceedings where 
the defendant 1.S represented, s/he would be discouraged by the 
decision in Simms v. Moore 1970 1 where Lord Parker C.J. said that 1.n 
general neither the court nor the justices' clerk should take an 
active part in the proceedings except to clear up ambiguities 1.n the 
evidence, and that the court should certainly take no part 1.n the 
examination of witnesses where the party concerned was legally 
represented. 
Where the defendant 1.S not represented, however, the situation 1.n 
both theory and practice 1.S rather different. 
So far as the law goes, where a party 1.S not represented and is 
not competent through a lack of knowledge of court procedure or rules 
of evidence, or other matters to examine the witness properly, "the 
court can, at its discretion permit the clerk to do so".2 Where the 
1. [1970] 2 Q.B. 327, see discussion 1.n Chapter 2 above. 
2. Ibid. at pp.332-3 
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clerk exam1nes the witnesses s/he must do so only to promote the best 
interests of justice, and must take care to see that nothing is done 
which conflicts with natural justice or the principle that justice 
must manifestly be seen to be done. 3 In relation to domestic 
proceedings the rules are expressed rather more positively in Section 
73 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980. That section provides that, 
1n domestic proceedings if it appears to the court that an 
unrepresented party is unable to exam1ne or cross-exam1ne a witness, 
the court shall find out on what matters the witness may be able to 
give evidence, or on what matters the witness should be cross-examined 
and put those matters to the witness. 
The theory, therefore, is somewhat limited. The court is to 
help the unrepresented defendant or party with the examination of 
witnesses if the defendant or party to domestic proceedings cannot do 
it him or herself. 
The prac t ice 1S rather di fferent. Undoubtedly the examination 
and cross-examination of witnesses 1S difficult for someone who is not 
represented, but the problems of unrepresented defendants are not 
confined to problems of cross-examination. The defendant 1n a 
criminal case will have a ser1es of very difficult decisons to take 
which may necessitate application tO,or explanation to, the court. 
The defendant may wish to be granted bail against police objections. 
S/he will have to decide in some instances where the case should be 
tried, and whether it is appropriate or not to plead guilty. S/he 
may, if convicted, wish to say something in mitigation of penalty. 
Not only do many unrepresented defendants not know how to do such 
things, they may well not even know that they will have to do them. 
3. Ibid. 
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Many will be completely unprepared to take the decisions or make the 
explanations required of them. Therefore they need help, and that 
help must come from the court - from the bench, and probably for the 
most part from the clerk. 
A large percentage of defendants who appear before magistrates 
criminal courts are not represented. A study in 1976 4 showed that 
46% of defendants are represented at Some stage during their case, 
although even this 46% may have appeared before the court without 
representation possibly at the early stages of the case. 
There has recently been a proliferation of duty solicitor schemes 
designed to provide representation for defendants. At some of the 
courts studied, such schemes were in operation, but there were 
nevertheless still many defendants without representation. A study 
1n 1982 of S1X magistrates' courts with duty solicitor schemes 
nevertheless found that 38% of defendants on their first appearance 
who were charged with criminal offences were unrepresented. 5 
A number of defendants, therefore, at some stage of the process 
depend upon the clerk to help them to present their application or 
case to the court. Whilst one should argue for representation for 
those who appear before the magistrates, it is highly unlikely that 
extension of legal aid or duty solicitor schemes will ever cover all 
de fendan ts. It seems remote that any government would, for instance 
grant legal aid for traffic cases, yet endorsement can affect job 
prospects - too many of them together can result in loss of livelihood 
4. M. King. 'Magistrates Courts Surveyed'. Rights. Vol.1 No.1 
(1976) This study covered 76 courts and 782 cases. It included 
some traffic cases, but only those where the defendant appeared 
in court. 
5. Bridges, Carter and Garbing. 'The Impact of Duty Solicitor 
Schemes in Six Magistrates' Courts'. L.A.G. Bulletin. July 1982. 
p .12 
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- and the only person likely to help a defendant to do justice to 
her/himself in an application to find special reasons why her/his 
licence be not endorsed is the clerk. Indeed in the present climate 
it does not seem likely that legal aid for more serious matters is 
1 ike ly to be extended - perhaps the oppos i te 1S more probab Ie. The 
standard of help that the clerk is able to give to unrepresented 
defendants is likely to continue to be important. 
Research has shown very clearly the considerable problems faced 
by unrepresented defendants. Bottoms and McLean's study of 
'Defendants in the Criminal process,6 and Susanne Dell's study of 
female offenders 7 showed that unrepresented defendants were nervous, 
afraid and often did not understand what was happening to them. 
Research done for the Interdepartmental Committee on the Distribution 
of Business between the Crown Court and Magistrates' Courts 8 showed 
that a significant proportion of defendants dealt with summarily (8-
16%) were so confused that they did not know that they had been 
offered a choice of forum for the trial of their cases. 9 Pat 
, '"'" .10 1 d h 1" " Carlen s study of Mag1s trates Jus t 1ce a so s t resse tea 1ena t 10n 
of the defendant. 
Since these defendants rely on the court to explain matters to 
them, the courts are seemingly not succeeding. A great deal of the 
blame for this would appear to lie with clerks who should, with the 
6. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976. 
7. S. Dell, 'Silent in Court'. Bell. London, 1971. 
8. Cmnd. 6323,1975 
9. J. Gregory 'Crown Court or Magistrates' Court'. O.P.C.S. Survey 
1976. 
10. P.Carlen. 'Magistrates' Justice'. Martin Robertson 1976. 
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magistrates, be making the proceedings as clear as possible. Th is 
study set out to discover how aware clerks are of the problems of 
defendants, how they deal with defendants who are not represented, how 
effective they thought they were in helping defendants and also the 
nature of the factors which influence the way the clerk deals with 
unrepresented defendants. 
The clerk's awareness of the problems of unrepresented defendants 
The clerks interviewed were questioned to determine how aware 
they were of the likely state of mind of unrepresented defendants. A 
very few (8%) did display an astonishing lack of insight into the 
problem. One clerk remarked 
"I think they're often unrepresented by choice. 
to be bothered. You explain the procedure. 
normally seem quite calm about it." 
They don't seem 
I think they 
However 92% of clerks were aware that defendants who appear 
before the court unrepresented are nervous and afraid. One, for 
instance, said that he knew defendants were frightened -
"They don't always give you that impression, but having talked to 
a lot of people, ushers particularly - and that's the best way of 
finding out what the reaction is - the defendants will go out and 
not realise what has been told them in court. I think you've 
got to be aware of this." 
Others showed an ability to identify with the fears of the defendant 
and commented that they would be afraid in the same circumstanes. 
" put a court clerk in the witness box as a witness 1.n a 
strange court following a motor accident and see how nervous they 
are. You'd be amazed." 
It was also reassur1.ng to find that clerks realised that the 
defendant's demeanour does not always reflect her/his true state of 
mind. 
"Yes - a lot of people are unrepresented. 
assume from the smirk, smile or giggle of the 
And one mus tn' t 
defendant that he 
1.S therefore amused at the proceedings. This 1.S very often a 
mani fes ta t ion of h is nervousness." 
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A clerk to the justices said about truculent defendants 
"I always tell the young court clerks that the worse the defendant 
is, the better they must be - that if they keep their cool and 
become completely polite the storm will blowout. He finds 
himself bashing his head against a brick wall and what he is 
conciously or subconsciously wanting is an irritated reaction, 
and if he doesn't get it he'll pack up." 
On the whole, there is a high level of awareness amongst clerks that 
defendants may be disabled by nerves from understanding the 
proceedings in court. 
Clerks were also asked if they thought that defendants had 
difficulty in understanding court procedure and jargon. 
Only 10% of the clerks interviewed thought that defendants did 
not have difficulty in understanding the language and procedure of the 
cour t. This, however was a totally different 10% from those who 
denied that defendants were nervous or afraid. However these clerks 
took the view that they did more from confidence in their own 
abilities than confidence 1n the understanding of defendants! One of 
them said that defendants do not have difficulty -
"Not in my courts. One puts a charge in layman's English 
which they'll understand and I don't try to blind them with 
science by any means." 
It may be that this clerk (and others like him) does therefore try 
very hard to explain things to the defendant in a way which is simple 
to unders tand. But what such clerks do not understand is the factor 
pointed out by one of their colleagues 
"Yes in fact I'm convinced sometimes that defendants have gone 
, , 
through the entire procedure and not known what s happened to 
them at the end ••. I've asked people if they've understood the 
election for instance, and they just nod their head, and I think 
they just do that because they think its expected, and I don't 
really think they've understood it." 
Another clerk made the same point, showing aga1n an ability to 
identify with the problems of the defendant:-
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"If I came to court and I stood there and I was unrepresented and 
somebody turned round to me and said 'Do you understand?' I 
wouldn't, for the sake of showing myself up say 'No'. I'd say 
, , d I ° Yes an et 1t all carryon above me." 
Many clerks were conscious of the jargon which 1S used 1n the 
courtroom, and the necessity to explain it to the defendant. 
"I don't use words like 'election' - I use 'choice' ••• if you 
started talking about res ipsa loquitur or something like that it 
throws them a bit!" 
"For instance with juveniles you have to explain the charge to 
them. I have said 'They say you nicked it?' 
"I personally feel Latin phrases and what have you have got no 
place really, and if they're used in court I would normally say 
"Oh what you mean is so and so, don't you?" and encourage people 
not to use that sort of thing." 
Again several clerks showed an awareness that the defendant might 
appear to be agressive or amused as a mask for nerves. 
"Sometimes you find people come over as very ungrateful. One 
thing you learn with experience - sometimes you get someone very 
agressive or with a big smile on their faces as if they can't 
stop laughing, and with experience you learn that that is nerves 
as well. It's not that there is any disrespect to the court. 
Because your first reaction is to get shirty and start being 
rather school teacherish in your attitude to them. The more 
polite and patient you are with them the less ••. well they tend 
to relax and you get on much better." 
An interesting factor which emerged from clerks' replies to these 
questions is the stereotypes which some clerks seem to operate in 
relation to defendants. 
Pat Carlen found that the police 1n magistrates courts 
categorised defendants into five main types - the villains, the 
regulars, the nuts, the immigrants and foreigners and the normal 
d o 11 or 1nary person. Clerks seems to operate a simpler classification. 
12 They divide defendants into repeat players and one shotters. 
11. 'Magistrates' Justice'. Martin Robertson, 1976. 
12. To adopt Marc Galanter's terminology 
(See Law and Society Review. Vol.9 No.1 (1974» 
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The repeat players they see as not nervous and confused, not 1n 
need of help. They are "the hardened types" or 
"the seasoned campaigners with a list of previous convictions as 
long as your arm." 
Such defendants may even be perceived as a threat 
"Qui te a lot of unrepresented defendants know nearly as much as 
we do ••• " 
"You get one or two who seem to enjoy having a go - barrack room 
lawyers ••. " 
They are to be contrasted with the one shotters, (who may also be 
"normal ordinary people".) One clerk put it thus 
"There again you always get the one person Who's done one thing 
wrong in his life and he's sorry about what he's done, and he 
comes in and they tend to be nervous. The people you get back 
every week have got used to the proceedings and they're very 
chuffed about it." 
Clerks use these sterotypes to decide who is deserving of time and 
attention. Such stereotypes carry with them considerable dangers of 
misclassification. The defendants who have been before the court on 
previous occasions may well not be used to the proceedings. They may 
never have understood what goes on in court, and their light hearted 
manner may mask nervousness. Ai s 0 i f c 1 e r k s' be h a v i 0 u r tow a r d st h e 
defendant differs markedly on the basis of such stereotypes there is 
the danger that the clerk will unwittingly communicate to the bench 
that the defendant has previous convictions. 
In general, the level of awareness amongst clerks is high, if 
rather uneven. Clerks on the whole do understand that unrepresented 
defendants are nervous and afraid, and have difficulty 1n 
understanding the language and procedure in court. How, then, do 
they use this knowledge in their practice in court? 
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Explaining the proceedings to the defendant 
The task which confronts the clerk 1S an extremely difficult one 
- much more difficult than the task of the defence lawyer. A 
defendant's solicitor will be able to see the defendant in private, 
and discuss the case with her/him at length. The clerk must deal 
with a defendant who is probably nervous and afraid, who is the focus 
of attention in a very public setting, and who is called upon to make 
instant decisions on a number of matters for which s/he is, in all 
probability, not prepared. 
The defence advocate can listen to the defendant's story and can 
then advise as to whether or not the defendant should elect for trial, 
plead guilty or whatever decision is needed. The clerk cannot 
advise. S/he must explain to the defendant sufficient to allow the 
defendant to make a choice. Such choices may involve many variables 
or require the understanding of difficult concepts. A few examples 
will illustrate the difficulties. 
Explaining the meaning of the offence with which a defendant is 
charged, may cause problems. One clerk said that the most difficult 
thing to explain to a defendant is 
"The legal concepts contained in what they are charged with. 
Trying to explain to a 13 year old recklessness in criminal 
damage is one of the most dreadful jobs going because they really 
don't know what it is all about". 
The mental element of offences was mentioned many times by clerks 
as being something which defendants found difficult to understand. 
Several clerks reported particular problems with middle aged women 
accused of shoplifting who come to court saying that they were guilty 
of theft but that they did not intend to steal. Explaining to these 
defendants that their plea of guilty could not be accepted if they did 
not intend to take the goods clerks found to be almost impossible. 
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However, undoubtedly the worst difficulty reported by clerks 1S 
explaining to defendants the procedure for determining mode of trial 
of a hybrid offence - 1.e. one which can be dealt with by the 
magistrates or by the Crown Court. 46% of clerks interviewed said 
that this procedure was the most difficult thing for them to explain 
to unrepresented defendants. 
The procedure is now contained 1n Section 19 of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act 1980. 13 The Act prescribes a two stage process. First a 
decision must be taken as to whether the offence is suitable to be 
dealt with summarily. Both prosecution and defence have the 
opportuni ty to make representat ions on this ques t ion, but of cours e, 
an unrepresented person will have no idea what makes a case suitable 
for summary trial. In most cases to a lawyer it will be quite clear 
cut which is the most suitable forum. If the case 1S one of the few 
which are really marginal, representations can involve a knowledge of 
relevant case law and possibly the policy of the bench. An 
unrepresented person cannot realistically be expected to make such 
representations effectively. 
The second stage of the process 1S to put the defendant to 
her/his election explaining that even if s/he decides to be dealt with 
by the magistrates they can still send the defendant to the Crown 
Court to be sentenced if they feel that their powers are insufficient 
having heard more about the defendant. 
If the case 1S one of criminal damage, the procedure is even more 
compl ica ted, s 1nce there 1S a prel iminary stage of de te rm ina t ion 0 f 
the value of the goods. 
13. At the time of the field work 
Criminal Law Act 1977. This 
Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. 
the procedure was contained in S20. 
section is now repealed by the 
Schedule 9. 
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Hardly surprisingly most defendants are utterly confused by this 
procedure. It appears to the defendant who is first asked for 
representations as to mode of trial, and then put to their election, 
that slhe is being asked the same question twice. As one clerk said 
"You say it, and after the defendant has gaped at you for 5 
minutes you give the long caution, and it seems to them to be the 
same thing twice. The judges don't see it that way, but the 
fact is that the defendant is utterly confused by it." 
The reference to "the judges" was a reference to the decision 1n R 
v. Horse ferry Road Jus t ices Ex parte Constable 1n 1981. 14 In that 
case the court granted an application for judicial review by a 
defendant who had not, it appeared, been glven the opportunity to make 
representations as to mode of trial. Lord Justice Donaldson said 
that 1n such cases it was of fundamental importance that the 
procedures 1n what was then Section 20 of the Criminal Law Act be 
followed, and that it should be recorded by the court that the 
defendant had been given an opportunity to make representations. 
This insistence that the letter of the section be followed 
results in a large number of very confused defendants. One clerk 
said 
" they just think you are repeating yourself, and they look at 
you as if you are quite mad." 
Another commented 
"The mode of trial procedure brought in in 1967 is just a joke. 
Even the most intelligent defendant couldn't understand it." 
Some clerks even resorted to explaining to defendants that the 
procedure was bound to be confusing 
" ••• so that one, in quite a jocular way, tries to tell him 'We're 
about to embark on something that's a bit silly - but it has a 
point and I'll explain it when we get to it'." 
14. The Times 28.1.81. 
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Perhaps the ultimate irony for clerks is that there will almost never 
be any representations for the unrepresented defendant to make. If 
the case were one where the seriousness of the offence possibly 
merited trial on indictment the court would have taken care to see 
that the defendant saw a solicitor. This would have happened either 
when the defendant applied for legal aid, or if there was no such 
application, at an early court appearance, since the quick section 1 
Criminal Justice Act 1967 procedure is only available for represented 
defendants, and neither court nor prosecution would wish to go through 
the extremely lengthy and complicated procedure of an old style 
committal with an unrepresented defendant. Thus if the offence were 
so serious that there was a possibility of committal on that basis it 
would be in everyones' interest to provide the defendant with legal 
representation. 
The difficulties that clerks reported in explaining the procedure 
under Section 19 Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 to unrepresented 
defendants were confirmed by the court observations. It was patently 
obvious that most defendants did not understand the choices they were 
confronted with, however carefully they were explained. R 
v. Horseferry Road Justices Ex Parte Constable 15 where Lord Justice 
Donaldson insisted that the letter of the Section must be followed had 
been decided just before the bulk of the field work took place. Some 
clerks were, therefore, faithfully following the correct procedure and 
giving the defendant the chance to make representations as to mode of 
trial before putting them to their election. 
that many defendants were extremely confused. 
The result of this was 
There were other clerks who simply did not follow the procedure. 
15. The Times 28.1.81. See discussion above. 
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Where the case was clearly suitable for summary trial the clerk simply 
did not ask the defendant to make representations, but asked 
prosecution and bench, and then put the defendant to her/his election. 
A typical example from the field notes is provided by the case of two 
defendants charged with stealing two car batteries. The clerk having 
read the charge, said 'Suitable summary trial, your worship?' the 
bench responded 'Yes' and the clerk proceeded immediately to ask the 
defendant if he elected trial by the magistrates or at the Crown 
Court. This happened at many of the courts observed. At one court 
a clerk sitting with a stipendiary magistrate attempted several times 
to ask the defendant for representations as to venue, only to be 
interrupted by the stipendiary magistrate who proceeded straight to 
election. 
Section 19 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 and the decision 
1n the Horseferry Road Justices case of 1981 are generally regarded by 
clerks as unworkable and as unfair to unrepresented defendants. In 
some courts and by some clerks they are generally not followed. 
Clerks have been criticised for not helping unrepresented 
defendants 16 , and we shall shortly be criticising them for bypassing 
the unrepresented defendant and taking decisions in which the 
defendant should be involved but is not. However in relation to the 
mode of trial procedure it is very difficult to see how they can offer 
effective help. The procedure is such that it 1S only accessible to 
lawyers. With the best intentions it is difficult to see how the 
clerk can be affective in these circumstances. Despite the problems, 
the provisions which were introduced in Section 20 of the Criminal Law 
Ac t 1977 were re-enac ted in the Magis tra tes' Cour ts Ac t 1980 without 
16. For instance by M. King,Rights. Vol 1 No.1 above. 
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amendment. Indeed one would not wish to deprive the defendant, 
represented or not, of a right to make representations as to mode of 
trial, but the problem of understanding the procedure for 
unrepresented persons does re-inforce the need for representation and 
illustrates the inadequacy of the help that it is possible for the 
clerk to give. 
Another area where clerks have a great deal of difficulty is in 
explaining to the the unrepresented defendant how to cross examine. 
One clerk said 
"I try to explain it as well as I can, and I know that in some 
cases perhaps even my explaining just isn't good enough and they 
still don't understand." 
A familiar sight to anyone with exper1ence of magistrates' courts is a 
puzzled defendant, who has just heard the evidence of the first 
prosecution witness against him, and who is invited to ask questions. 
Almost invariably the defendant begins to tell his side of the story, 
only to be stopped and told that he will have a chance to speak later, 
but that now he should just ask questions. Many defendants have no 
idea at all of what they should do. One clerk explained his problem 
thus 
"The biggest problem I think I find with unrepresented defendants 
is that when you ask them if they have any questions they wish to 
ask a witness they won't ask a question, they just launch into a 
statement that's their version of the facts. It's very 
difficult to control them ••• because its so difficult for them to 
frame a question, and generally you've got to let them say what 
they want to say, so you get an idea of what their case is and 
from that hopefully try and put a question to the witness." 
Even if the clerk helps in this way, slhe cannot, of course actually 
cross examine, since to do so would be to descend into the arena. 
The clerk can only assist the defendant to frame questions to ask the 
witnesses. There are also technical problems, in that the defemce may 
involve an attack on the prosecution witnesses' character. It is 
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extremely difficult for the clerk to explain to an unrepresented 
defendant that if he calls the policeman a liar or suggests that the 
stolen property was placed in the boot of his car by the prosecution 
witness then her/his character is in issue, without running the risk 
that the defendant will say things which s/he would be ill advised to 
say. 
In R v Weston Super Mare JJ. Ex parte Townsend17 it was said that 
1n such circumstances the prosecutor should ask for an adjournment 
and, in the justices' absence, enlist the help of the clerk in warning 
the defendant of the risk he runs. This, of course may solve the 
problem if done promptly, but may be difficult if the prosecutor is 
not a qualified lawyer, but is a policeman conducting his own 
prosecution. 
Many other 1ssues where defendants have difficulty 1n 
understanding were mentioned by clerks. They included understanding 
the choices open to them in making their defence, understanding the 
nature of hearsay evidence, unconditional and conditional bail and 
special reasons for not disqualifying a motoring offender. 
Where defendants continue to be unrepresented, the way the clerk 
goes about explaining all these issues, the amount of skill and 
patience displayed by the clerk will be extremely important. How 
well do clerks do these jobs? 
How well do clerks assist the unrepresented? 
As we have already mentioned, the existing research suggests that 
clerks may not be very good at assisting unrepresented defendants. 
The O.P.C.S. Survey of 1976 18 carried out for the Interdepartmental 
17. [1968] 3 All E.R. 225. 
18. Gregory J. 'Crown Court or Magistrates' Court.' O.P.C.S. 1976. 
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committee on the Distribution of Criminal Business showed that 
significant numbers of defendants charged with hybrid offences did not 
even realise that they had made a choice of venue. The Report of the 
Interdepartmental Committee stressed that "It is of the utmost 
importance that in deciding whether to consent to summary trial the 
defendant should be provided with the information necessary to enable 
him to make an informed decision,,19 and it proposed that the wording 
used by clerks should be simplified. 20 However the provisions of 
Section 19 of the Magistrates' Courts' Act 1980 complicate the problem 
rather than simplifying it by adding the procedure for making 
representations as to mode of trial • The wording of the section as 
to procedure for election is still very similar to the original 
wording in Section 19 of the Magistrates' Courts' Act 1952. 
19. Cmnd 6 323 Para. 188 
20. Ibid Appendix 1. 
PROPOSED WORDING OF THE EXPLANATION GIVEN IN COURT BY THE CLERK 
TO A PERSON CHARGED WITH AN INTERMEDIATE OFFENCE 
You are here to answer a charge than can be tried either by the 
magistrate(s) here or by a judge and jury at the Crown Court. 
Have you had a notice explaining this? 
You have the chance now to say whether you agree to be tried here 
or whether you would rather your case was heard before a judge 
and jury. 
[Before deciding, you may want to see a solicitor. 
court can adjourn to enable you to do that.] 
If so, the 
You should know that if you ask this court to deal with your case 
now and if you plead guilty or are found guilty, the 
magistrate(s) has(have) the power to send you to the Crown Court 
for a sentence which might be higher than the one he is (they 
are) allowed to give you here. 
Now would you answer this (these) question(s). [Do you want to 
see a solicitor? If not, where do you want to be tried, here or 
before a judge and jury?] 
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Bottoms and Mchean's study of unrepresented defendants reported 
clerks delivering the caution as to choice of venue with little regard 
for the comprehension of the defendant and at great speed, with the 
result that many defendants who chose summary trial did not realise 
what they had done. 21 
A study by Michael King22 covered 76 courts and had the advantage 
of taking place when the courts surveyed did not know that they were 
being observed. Students recorded aetails of a total of 782 cases. 
The cases observed ranged from murder to more serious motoring 
offences, the criteron for inclusion 1n the sample being that the 
defendant appeared in court. 410 cases were cases where the defendant 
was not represented, and in 300 of them the defendant pleaded guilty. 
When asked if they had anything to say in mitigation 62% of defendants 
said nothing or simply apologised. In only about one third of cases 
(loa) was the defendant helped by the clerk. The magistrates gave 
help in 60 cases. In some of the cases clerks were observed to help 
over plea, and mitigation. In other cases, although the defendant 
appeared to the observer to need help, slhe got none. 
The results of such studies reveal cause for concern. It 
appears from them that some defendants who need help are not being 
as s is ted by clerks, al though other de fendan ts are be ing he lped. It 
is interesting therefore, to try to assess what factors may affect the 
question of whether or not the clerk assists unrepresented defendants. 
In the courts observed for this survey there was no real 
difference in attitude or approach to unrepresented defendants between 
courts. It was not the case that all or most clerks at one court 
21. A.L. Bottoms and J.D. McLean. 
Process' Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
'Defendants 
1976. 
1n the Criminal 
22. Magistrates' Courts Surveyed. Rights Vol.1. No.1 (1976) 
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were helpful, and all or most at another were unhelpful - but there 
were striking differences between individual clerks. It was possible 
to find, for instance, a court where the clerk to the justices was 
remarkable for his patience and kindness to unrepresented persons, and 
who made it plain that he stressed the necessity of taking such 
trouble to his staff, but where nevertheless there would also be One 
of those staff who characteristically dealt with defendants in a 
perfunctory and offhand manner. 
To give a more detailed example, one could go into one court, and 
find a clerk who put choice of venue to an unrepresented party thus 
"Mr. Jones, you can either have this case dealt with summarily or 
on indictment. If you chose summary trial then I must tell you 
that the magistrates may, when they have heard about your 
character and antecedents, commit you to the higher court for 
sentence. Where do you wish to be dealt with?" 
- all this delivered at speed 
However one could go into the courtroom next door and find a clerk who 
would say 
"Mr. Jones, you have got a choice. You can have this case dealt 
with by this court, by the magistrates here. Or you can have it 
dealt with at the Crown Court, which means you will go before 
judge and jury. Do you understand? Now if you decide to have 
it dealt with here, and you are found guilty, I should tell you 
that the magistrates can still send you to the higher court to be 
sentenced, if they think that their powers to sentence you aren't 
enough." 
- this delivered slowly and carefully with frequent checks to see that 
the defendant heard and understood. 
We shall later (in Chapters 8 and 9) argue that the clerk to the 
justices has a very considerable influence on the policies operated by 
her/his court, and certainly the attitude of the clerk to thejustices 
towards unrepresented people will affect that of junior staff that 
s /he trains. However it seems here that the character and aptitude 
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of the individual clerk is a more important factor ln affecting how 
sympathetically that clerk deals with people who are unrepresented. 
Undoubtedly the court observation did reveal some examples of 
very bad clerking. In one cas eat Cour tEa de fendan t appeared who 
admitted an offence of uSlng a vehicle without tax, but disputed the 
amount of back tax he was liable to pay. The clerk administered the 
oath and proceeded to examlne the defendant. His manner was 
irritable, he continually interrupted the defendant, snapped at him, 
used jargon which the defendant patently did not understand and made 
the defendant look stupid. The defendant was then cross-examined by 
the police inspector. 
unrepresented party. 
It was a perfect example of how not to help an 
At Court B another regrettable incident illustrates the problems 
of a bad clerk. A woman - an ordinary citizen - was bringing a 
prosecution for assault occaslonlng actual bodily harm. She and the 
defendant were ushered into court. The clerk asked the woman 'What 
is happening today?' The woman looked confused and said 'I just want 
him dealt with for pushing my son ln the river.' The clerk said 
sharply 'What is happening today?' The woman obviously did not 
understand. The clerk sighed. 'Perhaps the police can help us?' 
A policeman said she should ask for summary trial. The woman 
obviously did not understand and stood silent. The defendant was 
represented by counsel, and counsel submitted that it was a suitable 
case for the defendant to be bound over. A conversation between the 
clerk and counsel took place as to what should be done with the 
charge. Eventually the clerk said to the woman 'Do you understand 
what is happening?' She,not surprisingly, said 'No, not really.' 
The clerk exp la ined, and invi ted he r to wi thdra w her cha rge. She 
said 'Alright I just don't want it to happen to any other child'. 
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The defendant was bound over, but the woman obviously had not 
understood what had happened to her case. 
In Court A a plea of not guilty in a driving case was taken. 
The clerk said that in view of the plea the case could not be heard on 
that day and he and the prosecutor between them fixed up a date for a 
hearing. Several times the defendant tried to speak, but was 
ignored. Eventually he said 'Can I say something about that?' The 
clerk replied 'No - you can't waste our time now.' The defendant 
said 'But I'll be in America on that date!' The clerk snapped 'Well 
why didn't you say that!' 
some time! 
The defendant had been trying to do so for 
However incidents such as these were balanced by incidents where 
clerks went out of their way to be helpful. In another case at Court 
B, a clerk helped two unrepresented lads to make a submission of no 
case to answer which secured that the case was dismissed. At Court 
A, a clerk never once failed to speak gently and considerately to a 
defendant who screamed abuse at him, refused to answer his questions, 
and finally spat his false teeth out at the prosecuting solicitor! 
At Court D, a lad of 18 denied a complaint for breach of the peace. 
The clerk took trouble to find out if the lad wanted to be 
represented. The lad said he had been refused legal aid but "I have 
been told there is a precedent called McKenzie's friend whereby I can 
have someone with me, and if that's so I'd like my father." The 
clerk smiled, rose and explained to the bench what a MacKenzie's 
friend was and asked if they agreed to the father so acting. They 
did. Throughout the case the clerk was extremely helpful to the 
defendant. The defendant was very articulate, and very competent as 
an advocate. When the time came for the defendant to give evidence 
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the clerk said 'It seems to me you are very competent to go through 
the evidence yourself'. The defendant did so. There came a point 
where he began to give hearsay evidence. The clerk stopped him, and 
said 'Now - just a minute - there are rules of evidence about say1ng 
what other people have said'. The defendant said 'Oh - well - if I 
can just say quickly what I wanted to say.' Th e c 1 e r k sa i d 'Well if 
it's inadmissible it doesn't matter how quickly you say it. Will it 
help if you say what you did as a result of what you were told?' The 
defendant replied 'Yes, that will help' and proceeded with his 
evidence. Throughout the clerk's manner was patient and gentle and 
he assisted the lad in the presentation of his case, explaining 
carefully and in words that the defendant would understand. The case 
against the defendant was dismissed. The clerk commented afterwards 
that the defendant had done very well indeed, and that he had enjoyed 
seeing how a MacKenzie man case worked in practice. He regarded the 
case as an interesting change in routine, not in any way as a nu1sance 
or a waste of time. 
This study did not a1m to quantify the cases where the clerk 
helped the unrepresented defendant. However the field notes, which 
are mostly verbatim records, contain far more examples of clerks being 
helpful than of clerks being obstructive. Certainly defendants who 
were not represented were helped on more than one third of the 
occasions when help might be needed and so the results compare 
favourably with those of King's study. The quality of help was very 
variable - it varied with the individual clerks, their sensitivity, 
patience, confidence, rather than from court to court. 
However having said this, the opinion of some clerks as to the 
quality of serV1ce they gave to unrepresented defendants was 
unrealistically high indeed. 
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Clerks op1n10ns of their effectiveness 
Clerks in the sample were asked whether or not they thought that 
the clerk could help an unrepresented defendant to present his case as 
effectively as if the defendant were represented. Not surprisingly 
76% of clerks said that they could not be as effective as a solicitor 
or barrister appearing for the defendant. The reasons they gave were 
that the clerk had had no instructions. One put it 
"However much the clerk can try and assist him it can never be as 
good as having had a solicitor who knows what he wants to say, 
and knows how best to put it to the court in his client's 
interests - because the clerk has not interviewed him beforehand 
and the clerk doesn't know if there might be some real terrible 
reason that he doesn't want to tell the court. If you try and 
help him to come out with some explanation you might be making 
things worse for him." 
Another reason mentioned was that the clerk "Can't serve two masters", 
and cannot act as an advocate would in challenging the prosecution's 
case. 
"The best the clerk can do 1S ensure that no miscarriage of 
justice 1S carried out." 
Amongst this 76% of clerks, there were however some who thought 
that the service provided by the clerk was, despite its limitations, 
good enough. 
"I think he can do it well enough usually ••• I'm talking about 
the sort of case where the ordinary prudent man wouldn't waste 
his money on a solicitor. Where he would, then legal aid would 
normally be granted." 
"... taking in to cons iderat ion the cos ts, the time, publ ic funds, 
I think a clerk is quite a reasonably good substitute in simple 
cases." 
There were others who thought that the serV1ce was not only good 
enough, but better than that which defendants might otherwise receive! 
One clerk, although he thought that theoretically the clerk could not 
give as good a service as a solicitor or barrister appearing for the 
defendant, nevertheless said 
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"I . can think of a lot of cases where a clerk's done a lot better 
than a solicitor or barrister would have done in my view in that 
particular case." 
This clerk's reply was very close to those of the 24% of clerks who 
did think that the clerk could be as effective as a solicitor or 
barrister appearing for the defendant! 
Some of the 24% qualified their answers by saying that the clerk 
could only be as effective if the case was not very complicated. one 
clerk said that assistance from the clerk was better because the bench 
were better able to appraise the defendant. 
"I can't help feeling that sometimes an unrepresented defendant 
will come over more sincerely in his story than perhaps an 
advocate who the bench have heard standing up on his feet giving 
mitigation three or four times before that morning - and every 
day for the last week. It has a ring of truth about it perhaps 
if the defendant puts it forward in his own stinted words." 
Other clerks had a very low opinion of the level of help given by the 
legal profession. 
"I think very frequently the clerk can do a lot better than a 
young barrister who is doing legal aid and hasn't prepared his 
case." 
" ••• with some advocates its often been said that he's better off 
with assistance from the clerk than he might have been being 
represented by a particular solicitor." 
But however one rationalises it, it does seem rather an 
overestimation of the clerk's abilities to say that the clerk will be 
as good as a defence advocate. We have examined the sorts of problems 
that the clerk faces in assisting unrepresented persons. Add to 
these the fact that the clerk has taken no instructions and thus does 
not know the nature of the defence, or mitigation and it is obvious 
that the clerk has a formidable task if s/he is trying to be as 
effective as a defence advocate. 
The attitude of some of the clerks, that they could not be as 
effective as a legal representative but that the help they gave was 
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good enough, ~s absolutely typical of the liberal bureaucrat. These 
clerks felt that the justice that defendants were getting was "good 
enough" in the c ircums tances. The clerk who said that "taking into 
cons iderat ion the cos ts, the time, and publ ic funds" he thought that 
the clerk's help was satisfactory was typifying the attitude that 
whilst it is important that the defendant be protected, nevertheless 
the system does not need to become bogged down with unnecessary 
frills. The clerk's help is "good enough" in the circumstances. 
By limiting legal aid ~n magistrates' courts governments have,in 
effect, taken the decision that the clerk's assistance is sufficient. 
Even duty solicitor schemes do not solve the problem for a significant 
number of defendants. In reality sometimes the clerk's help is 
good, sometimes it is not. 
defence advocate would be. 
It cannot be as good as an efficient 
We have ~n fact, a system of "good 
enough" justice which is sometimes not even "good enough"! 
The frustrated advocate 
We have shown that the assistance g~ven by the clerk to 
defendants who are unrepresented varies from abysmal to good. 
Similarly the attitudes of clerks towards the task of helping 
unrepresented persons varies from enthusiastic to negative. The 
clerks in the sample were asked if they enjoyed helping unrepresented 
defendants. Most seemed rather taken aback that this question should 
be asked - but the results were interesting. 58% responded 
positively, saying that they did enjoy the task; 22% responded 
negatively and the other 20% said that it was "just part of the job". 
The replies of this last 20% were very uniform - they professed 
no feelings about the task, it was something that was part of the job, 
so they did it. 
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The reasons g1ven by those who did not enJoy helping 
unrepresented defendants were very varied. Some said that they 
simply did not want to have to do it. 
" ••• I find it a bit of a bind actually if the truth were known." 
Others said that they didn't enjoy it because it was a "a pretty 
thankless job" and that defendants were aggressive and ungrateful. 
However two of the clerks who said they didn't enjoy helping 
defendants said that their lack of enjoyment sprang from the fact that 
they were always conSC10US that they could not do a proper job, that 
they were unable to be as effective as a legal representative of the 
defendant. 
The majority, who responded positively, contained a fair 
proportion of "frustrated advocates" - clerks who enjoyed helping the 
defendant because they enjoyed advocacy, they saw it as a challenge, 
as 'helping the underdog'. 
"I get enjoyment out of helping the person as against the 
solicitor on the other side and I feel its only in the interests 
of justice that he should be helped to an equal extent as the 
other party." 
"Absolutely - I mean first and foremost I'm an advocate ••. I 
welcome the opportunity to help unrepresented defendants - and 
unrepresented prosecutors. And its a great challenge and very 
satisfying, and its a sort of frustrated barrister coming out." 
One clerk who had practised at the bar before becoming a court clerk 
said that his problem was that he was tempted to go too far in helping 
defendants. Th e s e "f r u s t rat e dad v 0 cat e s" pIa c e d a g rea t de aIm 0 r e 
emphasis on the due process aspects of their role than other clerks. 
Those clerks who did not enjoy helping unrepresented defendants tended 
more towards a crime control model emphasising a desire to process 
cases as smoothly and quickly as possible and see1ng nervous 
unrepresented people as hampering their task of processing the day's 
list. 
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By-passing the defendant. 
The problem of the pressure under which courts operate has a 
significant effect on the help that unrepresented defendants receive. 
The pressure to get through the list conflicts with the clerk's duty 
to protect the unrepresented defendant. 
The clerk's job is defined by statute (in a prOVISIon fought hard 
for by clerks)23 as that of legal adviser to the magistrates. The 
clerk is the court's lawyer, and as such has to preserve the lay 
magistrates from mistakes - preserve their legitimacy in the face of 
attacks upon it. The clerk is also responsible for running the 
organisation of the court, and often this entails processing a long 
list of cases under pressure of time. We have seen that maintaining 
the organisation of the court can come into conflict with protecting 
the bench, and that in some circumstances the bench may be abandoned. 
Protecting the bench, and runnIng the organisation can also come into 
conflict with the third aspect of the clerk's role - the role of 
guardian of due process. The clerk must see that the rules of due 
process are followed to a greater or lesser extent, and this becomes a 
particularly difficult problem In relation to the unrepresented 
defendant. By their nature, unrepresented defendants have no-one to 
protect their due process rights except the clerk. But the clerk has 
to balance the need to assist unrepresented parties against the need 
to get through the list of cases. And if unrepresented parties are 
to be given full protection a great deal of time must be taken up - a 
far greater amount of time than if they were represented, since if 
they were given solicitors or counsel the usual time saving jargon and 
procedures could be used without the necessity of explaining every 
step to the defendant. 
23. Justices of the Peace Act, 1968. Section 5(3) 
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This can result in the clerk, usually in collusion with the bench 
and with legal representatives bypassing the defendant and arriving at 
a solution which all perceive as just, but which saves the time of 
explaining the situation to the defendant. 
An illustration of this process is afforded by the case cited 
above of the woman who was prosecuting a defendant for actual bodily 
harm after an incident in which she alleged that the defendant had 
pushed her child into the river. The result - of binding over the 
defendant - was possibly a just one, but it was arrived at 
consensually by clerk, advocate and bench, bypassing the lack of 
comprehension of the woman making the complaint. 
The same type of incident occured 1n many cases - the clerk's 
definition of protecting the defendant being to arr1ve at what the 
clerk and possibly other lawyers agreed to be a just result, without 
regard for the fact that the defendant did not understand what has 
happened. 
In one case at Court C a 17 year old was charged with criminal 
damage - breaking a window. When asked for his p lea he waved his 
arms around vaguely and said 'Er - guilty' 
Clerk: I'm sorry, did you say guilty or not guilty? 
Defendant: Err ..... 
The defendant's friend from the back of the court shouted "Yer guilty 
Jim!" 
De fendan t: 
Jailer: 
Defendant: 
Jailer: 
Clerk: 
I just tapped it. 
Did you do it, or didn't you". 
Yes 
Guilty Sir 
We can always change it S1r. 
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Bench: Yes, yes. 
The policeman in charge of the case outlined the case against the 
defendant 
Clerk: 
Defendant: 
Clerk: 
Defendant: 
Clerk: 
(to defendant) Do you agree? 
No - I didn't mean to smash it. 
Did you hit it and not care if it smashed? 
No, I just tapped it. 
(to bench) In that case I would advise you not to 
accept the plea. 
The clerk then explained to the defendant that the case would have to 
be adjourned. 
Defendant: Do I have to pay a fine? 
Clerk: No, no not yet - if at all 
Defendant: Am I getting sent away? 
Clerk: Sighs 'No - you aren't getting sent anywhere' 
(Indicates probation officer) Just speak to this man. 
He'll explain it to you. 
Defendant: Yeah - am I gettin' sent away? 
Clerk: No, no no-one's sending you away. Just go with this 
man and he'll explain what happened. 
Patently the defendant did not understand what had happened - but the 
decision was taken without his participation and the time for 
explanations had to wait until he was outside the court. The 
decision could in itself hardly be described as an unjust one - had 
the defendant been represented it would almost certainly have been the 
same since the prosecution did not have its witnesses at the court and 
could not have proceeded on that day. Yet it was a decision arrived 
at whilst the defendant was no more than a bystander to the process. 
Explaining to the defendant would have taken a great deal of time, and 
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the court was not prepared to spend that amount of time on the 
defendant's comprehension of events. The clerk, the bench, the 
prosecution were satisfied that justice had been done. That was what 
mattered. 
Due Process and Organisational Maintenance 
We have shown that most clerks do understand the problems faced 
by unrepresented defendants, and that although they have an inflated 
idea of their own effectiveness many clerks do help the unrepresented 
and enjoy doing it. It is also obvious from our discussion of the 
data so far that there are clerks who are not helpful to the 
unrepre s en ted. There are those who are obstructive and impatient, 
who are lacking in understanding or sympathy and who are prepared to 
bypass the defendants lack of comprehension. These variations cannot 
be accounted for on a court to court basis, as individual clerks at 
the same court vary widely in their approach. 
What then makes some clerks enthusiastic and more effective 
protectors of the defendants rights and others less effective? 
The answer to this question lies not only with the individual 
personalities and talents of clerks, but also with the way in which 
clerks respond to the pressures of organisational maintenance. 
Even though clerks might be keen to help an unrepresented 
defendant, doing so takes up time. If the court is operating under 
pressure to get through a list of cases, time is at a premium. One 
clerk's comment sums up the difficulties. She said that it was too 
easy to forget that defendants were nervous and did not understand 
what was going on around them. 
"You've got to be prepared to repeat things. In a busy court it 
is difficult because everybody else is so anxious to get on and 
get through - even the magistrates sometimes." 
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A clerk who wishes to spend time helping a nervous inarticulate 
defendant has to do so in the face of advocates, police oficers, 
witnesses, magistrates, other defendants who wish to have the day's 
business dealt with quickly. Their sympathy for what the clerk is 
trying to do may not be very great. 
How much help the defendants recel.ve will depend on where the 
clerk makes the comproml.se between the conflicting demands of 
protecting the defendant's rights and processing cases quickly. 
Where the compromise is made depends on many factors. 
One is the confidence and status of the clerk. At Court B for 
instance the clerk to the justices was known to lean heavily in favour 
of the liberal due process aspects of his role. He was known always 
to take a long time helping unrepresented parties, and was very 
unpopular with police because he occasionally secured an acquittal 
against them and because he took such a long time in court. His 
attitude strongly conflicted with the crime control values of the 
police. No-one could hurry this clerk - not even the bench since he 
had trained them, and was a much respected figure. At the same 
court, however a heavy workload put pressure on the clerks to hurry, 
and police, ushers and even the bench could pressure other, less 
experienced and respected clerks to get through the list quickly. 
The actual pressure of business is a very important factor. 
Several clerks mentioned, for instance, that they very much enjoyed 
helping juveniles since there was less pressure of business in the 
juvenile court. The adequacy of staffing, a sufficient number of 
magistrates to sit on cases, and he adequacy of accommodation may also 
be factors which affect workload l.n a court, and affect the 
willingness or ability of clerks to give proper help to those who are 
not represented. 
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It may also be that clerks who are professionally qualified and 
experienced as advocates will be more confident in helping 
unrepresented defendants. Apart from any such professional 
experience, clerks are not likely to have experience or training in 
the art of advocacy. 
The ability to express complicated ideas, and jargon in simple 
easily understood words is crucial to the clerk's role and is also 
another part of the clerk's job for which they rece1ve no training. 
All of these factors determine where the individual clerk makes 
the comprom1se between the competing demands of her/his role - and 
determine the quality of help received by that percentage of 
defendants who are dealt with by magistrates' courts and who are not 
legally represented. 
The implication of this 1S that if we are to protect the 
interests of unrepresented defendants effectively, it 1S necessary to 
pay particular attention to the quality of clerking. This must 
include not only examining the training and qualifications of clerks, 
but also the pressures of the court organisation. Inadequate 
facilities, insufficient staff, increasing workload are not simply 
crosses which clerks to the justices have to bear. They affect the 
. ., . question of whether defendants 1n mag1strates courts are gett1ng a 
minimum of help - are getting the possibility of justice. 
Duty Solicitors - a gift to the Liberal Bureaucrat 
The attitude of clerks to their role as guardian of due process 
rules is perhaps best revealed in the attitude of clerks to duty 
solicitor schemes. 
64% of the clerks interviewed had exper1ence of duty solicitor 
schemes. Only 4% found them unsuccessful. The rest were 1n favour 
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of them, and many were enthusiastic about them. 
One might have thought that clerks would have reservations about 
such schemes. Not all courts have duty solicitor schemes, and we 
shall see later that the relationship between clerks and advocates 1S 
not good. However clerks did not have reservations about duty 
solicitor schemes. They reported that such schemes made their jobs 
easier for three basic reasons - the duty solicitor relieved them of 
difficult defendants, allowed them to stop worrying about injustices 
to confused defendants and saved time. 
So far as difficult defendants were concerned, many clerks 
explained that the problem of equivocal pleaders could be solved by 
referring them to the solicitor. Clerk after clerk mentioned the 
problem of the lady shoplifter - typically a middle aged woman charged 
with stealing small items from a store who comes into court and pleads 
guilty, but then says that she did not intend to take the goods, she 
is "under the doctor" nervous, confused. Such defendants simply 
cannot understand what the clerk is explaining to them in open court 
about intention 1n theft, and will often oppose entering a plea of not 
guilty because it means an adjournment, with the case hanging over 
them for several weeks. The clerk will also be aware that such women 
will probably consult a solicitor and appear aga1n 1n court a few 
weeks later, represented and pleading guilty. Where a scheme 1S 
opera t ing, such de fendan ts can be re ferred to the duty sol ic i tor for 
immediate advice. The clerk 1S relieved of a difficult task and the 
defendant's rights protected. Clerks also mentioned disturbed 
defendants and defendants with speech impediments as candidates for 
referral to the duty solicitor. 
Clerks were not necessarily cynical about uSing the duty 
solicitor in such circumstances. Many were genuinely concerned that 
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the situation ~n court did not allow defendants to do themselves 
justice. One clerk said 
"It makes you happier because you know things are all right and 
people have had advice if they've needed it." 
Another pointed out with satisfaction that 
"Remanding people in custody without representation no longer 
exists here." 
However the most significant factor about duty solicitor schemes 
for clerks was that they saved time. One clerk said 
"I t mus t be be t ter for the clerk if the de fendan t ~s represented. 
It saves a lot of time wasting." 
Another said that if a defendant came up with a point of law 
"Rather than explain all that, which takes a long time because 
you have to go into three or four areas of law and it gets quite 
complicated,it's best to refer him to a solicitor. It saves a 
lot of time." 
Representation, or on the spot referral relieves clerks of the burden 
of difficult explanations, but above all saves the time that such 
explanations take, and also allows clerks to plan the work of the 
court. 
"It makes sure and certain at the earliest moment in time - like 
the first hearing or at least the second hearing - absolutely 
what is happening in that case, and in fact promotes the 
avoidance of delays and efficient despatch of business, within 
courts. Fantastic! Fantastic scheme, and most welcome in 
these courts." 
These were the words of the clerk to the justices of a busy court. 
Clerks feel the conflicts of their roles very sharply - and thus 
are only too pleased to shed their role as protector of due process 
for the defendant where this is possible. 
The clerk as prosecutor 
"There is one situation ~n which even the mildest of clerks 
assume a tough manner and brusque ones really let rip. This is 
when the court is dealing with fine defaulters or husbands who 
have refused to pay maintenance, where terror inducing tactics 
are the normal tool,,24 
24. Burney. p.145. 
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This was Burney's observation of situations where the clerk acts 
as prosecutor. It is the responsibility of the clerk to the justices 
to collect the fines and other monies due to be paid into the court. 
If defendants default in their payment, there are procedures for 
inducing them to pay. This process and the influence of the clerk 
over it will be discussed in Chapter Nine. One part of the process is 
to bring the defendant back before the court to discover why slhe has 
not paid. The powers of the court to dispose of those who have not 
paid include, in certain circumstances, imprisonment - either 
suspended or immediate. 
When such defendants come before the court, the clerk is the one 
who has brought them there, and is the one responsible for discovering 
why they have transgressed. The clerk is therefore placed in a 
situation very much like that of a prosecutor. 
Burney's observation that usually mild clerks can become tough in 
such situations appears from this survey to be quite accurate. For 
instance in one case in Court C, a clerk with a usually patient and 
gentle demeanour, and who had half an hour earlier taken much time and 
trouble with an inarticulate atheist defendant who did not wish to 
take an oath, proceeded to deal with a fine defaulter. The defaulter 
was brought before the court and the clerk outlined fines which had 
remained unpaid for several months. The defendant said he had had a 
cold. The clerk asked sarcastically if he had had a cold Slnce 
December. 
as follows: 
Clerk: 
Defendant: 
Clerk: 
The defendant said he had. The exchange then proceeded 
You just ignored this, didn't you? 
Umm, yeah. 
Is there any reason the magistrates shouldn't send you 
to prison now? 
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Defendant: 
Clerk: 
Defendant: 
Clerk: 
Bench: 
Clerk: 
What? 
(with emphasis) Is - there - any - reason - the -
magistrates - shouldn't - send - you - to - prison -
now? 
Uunn ••• er ••• 
It carries 51 days s~r. 
You will go to prison for 51 days. 
Go with the officer. 
The clerk's manner throughout was sarcastic, and uncompromising. 
Doubtless the court knew what the defendant did not - that the police 
would not wish to take the time and trouble to transport the defendant 
to prison, and that he would be encouraged to borrow the money and pay 
the fine then and there. However the exchanges reported above were 
the sum total of the case and no enquiry took place as to what the 
defendant's means actually were. 
Such cases were by no means unusual. Clerks were, almost 
without exception, severe and uncompromising with fine defaulters. 
They were, and acted as if they were, prosecutors. They los t any 
identification with the defendant. Despite the fact that sentences 
of immediate imprisonment were passed far more frequently on fine 
default cases than in any other type of case - or in fact all other 
types of case put together - there was almost never anyone in court to 
ensure that the defendant's rights were protected. Research by 
NACR025 has shown that a significant proportion of short stay 
prIsoners are in prison for non-payment of fines and maintenance. 
Those who are there for non payment of fines have been, In effect 
'prosecuted' for their non-payment by the clerk to the justices, and 
, .. have been sent to prison without even the clerk s protectIon In 
25. G. Wilkins. 'Making them Pay', NACRO 1979 
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putting their case. (The influence of the clerk to the justices on 
court policy in relation to fine defaulters is discussed in Chapter 
Nine.) 
Not only did clerks behave like prosecutors towards defendants 
they also suggested means of disposal to the bench, whispered to the 
bench whilst the bench reached a decision, and retired with the bench. 
Such a state of affairs is highly unsatisfactory. 
However even clerks who appeared severe with fine defaulters had 
their limits. One was unfailingly sympathetic to single parents with 
small children. At another court, court B there was a magistrate who 
became noticeably enlivened when she had to deal with fine default 
cases. She was responsible for a large number of immediate 
committals to pr1son. After one such case she was heard to remark in 
open court that it would teach the defendant a lesson and it was a 
pity that they did not glve them haircuts nowadays! She was observed 
to commit forthwith for non-payment a young woman whose baby and 
toddler were just outside court waiting for her. She had neglected 
to make any enqu1r1es as to the circumstances of the defendant before 
committing her. Clerks who sat with this chairwoman took a tolerant 
and helpful attitude to defendants - as if to redress the balance. 
It was not that they objected to defendants being imprisoned, but 
that they wanted it to be done only after the correct procedures had 
been followed, and other alternatives explored. 
At some courts fine default cases were dealt with by a separate 
court. 
cases. 
At others fine defaulters were dealt with in between other 
Any unrepresented party observing the clerk dealing with fine 
defaulters in the way some clerks did could have had little confidence 
1n the clerk's sympathy or willingness to help them. 
Dealing with such cases 1n a separate court 1S therefore to be 
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encouraged but it does not dispose of the problem of the high number 
of immediate committals to pr~son which occur in these courts without 
defendants having the benefit even of assistance from the clerk. 
Conclusion 
There ~s a large number of factors which affect the likelihood 
that the unrepresented defendant will be given effective help by the 
clerk. 
First there is the complexity of the law itself. Clerks rightly 
po int to the d iff icul ty 0 f exp la in ing s orne procedure s, concep t sand 
skills to unrepresented defendants. The procedure for determining 
mode of trial is the example which was examined in detail. It must 
be difficult, if not impossible, to explain this procedure to a 
nervous defendant who is called upon to take a decision slhe may well 
be unprepared for. It is perhaps not surpr~s~ng that surveys found 
defendants who had not understood this procedure. It may well have 
been that the complexity of the procedure and their nervousness meant 
that they would not have understood, however well the issue was put to 
them. This is a strong argument in favour of representation for 
defendants charged with hybrid offences, because the assistance given 
by the clerk will rarely be effective. 
The second factor is the attitude of the clerk to the justices 
and the training slhe gives to court clerks. The clerks to the 
justices can, and do, have significant effect on the attitudes of 
their staff, particularly those staff who are articled to them or 
trained by them. A clerk to the justices who emphasises the need to 
take time and have patience with people who are unrepresented will 
produce trainees with different attitudes to one who emphasises the 
need to get through the list of cases. However the clerk does not 
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determine the abilities of her/his staff, and it certainly appears 
that the clerk to the justices attitudes do not have such significant 
effect that there are noticeable differences between different courts. 
The variations are more marked from clerk to clerk than from court to 
court. 
An important factor is the aptitude of individual clerks. Some 
are sympathetic, patient and adept at explaining things in simple 
terms. others are not so skilled. These are factors which should 
be taken into account when selecting clerks for the job. However if 
courts are to have a healthy number of properly qualified applicants 
from which to choose clerks, improvements in status and salary are 
needed. There 1S no specialist training for court clerks except the 
Diploma course, which covers magisterial law. The Diploma is not 
taken by all clerks - more and more of them are professionally 
qualified. Clerking 1S a specialised skill even for the legal 
profession and specialist training including the aspect of 
assistance to the unrepresented, would help. 
The character of the individual clerk is, however, a small part 
of the problem. Possibly the most influential of all the factors 
which impinge on the quality of service offered to defendants is the 
pressure of work at the court. The clerk is, as we have said, 
responsible for running the court organisation. Many courts operate 
under pressure. The need to process a lengthy list of cases 
conflicts with the needs of defendants for time and patience. The 
greater the pressure of work, the less time there 1S for the 
defendant. Therefore factors such as availability of staff, 
availability of magistrates, court accommodation, all affect the 
likelihood that the unrepresented defendant will receive the help s/he 
needs. 
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The likelihood that the clerk will take the time 1n court to help 
people who are not represented can also be affected by the experience, 
confidence and status of the clerk. The pressures of work affect 
many court users. The magistrates, the legal profession, the police 
and the queue of waiting defendants all want their cases heard and to 
get away to other tasks. They can exert very direct pressure - even 
on a clerk who is willing to be patient with defendants - to speed up 
the proceedings. However these pressures are more easily exerted on 
younger less experienced clerks than on more senior clerks. This 
factor can account in large measure for the differences which may be 
perceived in different courts in the same building. No-one will be 
able to hurry a clerk to the justices who thinks it worth spending 
time on a case. Very many people may pressur1se a new or 
inexperienced or less than confident clerk. 
The clerk's ability to protect the due process rights of the 
defendant is therefore affected by many variables. If a substantial 
number of defendants 1n magistrates' courts are to rema1n 
unrepresented, protection of their rights depends upon relieving 
pressures of workload, and on prioritising improvements in the clerk's 
relationship with the unrepresented defendant, including procedures 
for selecting and training clerks and magistrates and educating other 
participants in the criminal justice process. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CLERK AND THE POLICE 
The range of police participation 1n court 
Control of time - manipulating the court list 
Problems of police advocacy 
The clerk as legal adviser to the police 
The relationship between clerk and police out of court 
Conclusions 
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The Clerk and the Police 
In her analysis of 'Magistrates' Justice,l Pat Carlen emphasised 
the importance of control of time in court. She showed the courts 
working under pressure, and demonstrated the advantages that accrue to 
those who work in the courts from completing the list of cases 
quickly. She stressed the problems for defendants unable to 
understand the reasons for the order in which cases are called, unable 
to see the logic behind transfers of cases from one court to another 
or the reasons why they had to wait several hours for their cases to 
be heard. 
Control of timing 1n magistrates' courts she ascribed to the 
police. 
"Dur ing judic ial proceedings in magis trates' courts the timing of 
events is monopolised by the police. They are the ones who set 
up the proceedings, it is their responsibility to see that 
defendants arrive at court; it is their job to draw up the charge 
sheets; it is their job to ensure that all relevant documents are 
in the hands of the clerk of the court. And policemen are very 
jealous of their competence in programming the criminal 
business." 2 
Carlen was perfectly correct 1n pointing to the importance of the 
control of time - particularly control of the list of cases and when 
they are called. In all courts, for each court session, there will be 
a list of cases to be heard. All of the participants in these cases 
will be summoned to appear at the same time (usually 10.00 or 10.30 in 
the morning.) Inevitably some cases will be taken early in the list 
and some later, the participants in the later cases having to wait 
unproductively for their case to be called. Most participants will 
wish to get away from court quickly. Defendants and witnesses will 
wish to return to their jobs. Advocates will wish to get back to 
1. Carlen P. 'Magistrates' Justice', Martin Robertson 1976. 
2. Carlen p.2S 
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offices or other courts. The police will have duties elsewhere. Most 
people waiting in court will want their case to be given priority, so 
that they can get away. Also there are advantages for everyone if the 
court deals speedily with the list. A slow court can mean that cases 
have to wait until the afternoon to be heard, and this may mean missed 
lunch appointments, los t pay, cl ients waiting for sol ic i tors who are 
still at court. Control of the list is therefore a powerful position 
to hold - both in respect of the order in which cases are called, and 
in respect of the speed with which they are called. 
However, Carlen was mistaken in ascribing control of the list to 
the police. Carlen's research took place in courts in Inner London 
and to a large extent the role played by police in Inner London courts 
is different to their role in most magistrates' courts throughout the 
country. The police may have controlled the timing of cases in the 
courts surveyed by Carlen, but they do not do so in all courts. In 
the majority of courts it is in fact the clerk or the court staff who 
control the calling of the list of cases. The participation of the 
police in courts is very different from court to court. In some the 
police do very little, in others they do a great deal. The extent of 
their participation in court is very important in determining how much 
control or influence over the court proceedings they actually have. 
We therefore need first to look at what jobs police actually do 
in court. 
The range of police participation in court 
The police can, and do, have a wide range of different roles in 
court. In some courts they do very little, in other courts they cb a 
great deal, including controlling the list of cases. 
At all of the eleven courts studied the police were, hardly 
surprisingly, responsible for serving summonses and executing warrants. 
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Even 1n relation to this task, however, there were variations from 
court to court, 1n that at some courts the "warrant office" (the 
police office from which summonses are served and warrants executed) 
was in the court building and its staff had other jobs in the court, 
but at others the warrant office was entirely separate from the court. 
Also common to all courts was that the police acted as gaolers 
dealing with all defendants in custody. 
At only two courts the police played no role in the prosecution 
of defendants in court. At the other n1ne courts the police played 
some role in the prosecution of cases, but the nature of this role 
varied very widely indeed. At five of these courts the police 
supplemented the work of the local proecuting solicitor's department. 
The prosecutor's department would supply one or more solicitors to the 
court on each day, and these solicitors would be assisted by police 
prosecutors. The nature of this assistance was not the same for each 
court. At most of the five courts the prosecuting solicitors dealt 
with contested cases and more serious crime, whilst the policemen 
dealt with minor traffic cases. However a different system operated 
at Court E where a policeman (not in uniform) sat with the prosecuting 
solicitor in every court, feeding the prosecutor relevant information, 
files, records, but did no prosecuting himself. At Court F the 
prosecuting police inspector enjoyed a good reputation with the 
clerks, one of whom said 
"I personally prefer to see the police inspector in court. I 
think very often they are as competent if not more competent than 
the prosecuting solicitor." 
It appeared that, because of this man's reputation the division of 
cases between the courts sometimes meant that he dealt with the more 
serious cases. 
291 
The rema1n1ng four courts were London Courts. In these courts, 
although the Metropolitan Police Solicitor sometimes represented the 
police, more often than not each policeman or policewoman prosecuted 
her /h is own cas es. Court B, however, had police presenting officers 
who dealt with uncontested matters. The other three courts had no 
court presenting officers although the court inspector advised 
inexperienced officers. 
At only five courts out of the eleven surveyed the police acted 
as ushers. They collected and collated information about who was 
present at court and what was happening in their cases. They ushered 
people in and out of court, administered oaths and shuffled papers 
back and forth to appropriate courts. Of these five courts, four were 
the courts 1n the London area. The other was a large city court, 
Court G. 
At only four courts were the police in charge of calling the 
list, i.e. determining the order in which cases were dealt with by the 
court. Court G was one of these, and three of the four London courts 
were the others. 
The above information 1S more easily digestible 1n diagrammatic 
form. [See page 293, over] 
These variations in the role of the police 1n court were very 
important in determining the impression created by the court. 
Magistrates' courts used to be called police courts. Some older 
court buildings have the words 'Police Court' engraved 1n the 
stonework. It is, however, an 1mage that magistrates' courts have 
tried to escape. Some courts have done so much more successfully than 
others. 
At Court D, for instance, the only role the police played was 
that of gaolers. During the court observation it was very rare to see 
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Pol ice ac t as. Pol ice 
gaolers & serve Prosecute their 
summoneses etc. own cases 
Police assist 
prosecuting 
solicitors 
Police act 
as ushers 
Police call 
the list 
court A x x 
Court B x x 
Court C X 
Court D X 
Court E X X 
Court F X X 
Court G X X 
Court H X X 
Court J X X 
Court K X X 
Court L X X 
*Some courts at Court B had civilian, some police ushers. 
X 
Mixed* 
X 
X 
X 
X 
a uniformed police officer in court. They did appear with defendants 
in custody, but they just as rapidly disappeared. The police 
department which dealt with service of warrants and summonses was not 
in the same premises as the court. The police presence was so 
unobtrusive that on one occasion a defendant was sentenced to a period 
of imprisonment forthwith for non-payment of a fine, and the clerk had 
to ask him to sit at the back of the court whilst someone went to find 
a policeman to take him into custody. The defendant complied with the 
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X 
X 
X 
X 
request to wait what would have happened had he not done so 1S an 
interesting point! 
In contrast at Court G the police prepared the list of cases, 
called them on 1n the order they thought fit, acted as gaolers and as 
ushers. In Court One at this court, the police officer in charge of 
list sat next to the bench and the clerk. The acoustics in court were 
so bad that what passed between police, clerk and bench could not be 
heard by the defendant - or by anyone else. The speed at which cases 
were processed was phenomenal. Many of the cases observed were timed 
at less than one minute. The speed at which cases were dealt with at 
this court and the fact that the acoustics were bad meant that 
defendants were completely confused. On more than one occasion in one 
morning defendants (fortunately represented) were remanded in custody 
so quickly that they had not even time to get from the cell door to 
the dock before the police pushed them back down to the cells again. 
The police directed the whole process. They called the cases on, they 
brought the defendants into court, they interpreted the words of the 
magistrate to the defendants who (because of the acoustics) did not 
hear, they ushered defendants out of court aga1n. Their only 
difficulty appeared to be keeping up with the rate at which the 
magistrate disposed of cases. The police appeared to control this 
court. 
Court D and Court G were at different extremes so far as police 
presence was concerned. The other courts observed fell somewhere 
between these two. What factors determine the extent of police 
participation in, and control over the court? 
The actual physical properties of a court may affect its image. 
At one tiny country court observed the court sat only twice a week, 
and the courtroom itself was a room on top of the police station. The 
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image of the police court was rather difficult to escape, although the 
police presence in the courtroom itself was minimal. Another of the 
courts observed was housed in the same large building as both a police 
station, and the Crown Court. 
Another very significant factor in determining the level of 
police presence was the existence or non-existence of a prosecuting 
sol ic i tor's department. In the Met ropol i tan Pol ice area, for ins tance 
the police conduct their own prosecutions, and the number of police in 
court is very high. The problems that police advocacy creates for 
clerks will be discussed later in the chapter. At courts where there 
wasa prosecuting solicitor's department (i.e. most out of London 
courts observed) there were fewer pol ice in court, and they played 
less part in the proceedings. 
The physical properties of the court are outside the control of 
the clerk, unless slhe is fortunate enough to have a new court 
building planned. The existence or non-existence of a prosecuting 
solicitors' department is also beyond the control of the court. 
However, probably the most important factor in determining whether 
or not the court appears to be a police court or a magistrates' court 
is whether or not the police have jobs in the court organisation 
itself. If the police act as ushers, and if they call the list of 
cases the appearance is created that the police are part of the court, 
and that their interests are the interests of the court. The question 
of whether or not the police do jobs in the court organisation is a 
question over which the clerk to the justices at the court has some 
control. At those cour ts where pol ice s till do these jobs, reduc ing 
the police presence in court requires policy decisons to be taken and 
put into practice. It requires the hiring and training of civilians 
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to do the jobs the police do 1n court. Responsibility for such 
measures lies with the clerk. The enthusiasm with which the clerk to 
the justices pursues a policy of 'civilianising' the court can 
determine whether or not the police do act as ushers, or call the list 
of cases in court. 
One should not underestimate the difficulties faced by clerks in 
seeking to change a system which has operated for years or even 
decades, or m1nlm1se the difficult ies of persuading the Magis trates 
Courts Committee to provide money for staff to perform those functions 
previously undertaken by police. However clerks can and do have an 
impact. 
At Court B, for instance, unlike the other London Courts, the 
pol ice did not cal 1 the 1 i st. Th e y did act a sus her s, but the c 1 e r k 
was 1n the process of acquiring and training civilian ushers, so that 
the police would cease to be needed. As one of the clerks at Court B 
put it 
"They're nice people, but the sooner the warrant office leave the 
building and just become gaolers the better." 
The same clerk to the justices had been vigilant when the police 
introduced "presenting officers" to prosecute guilty pleas. He said 
" ••• as they are the same officers coming day after day there is a 
possibility they will acquire an aura of being part of the court 
set up, and t his is d iff i cui t. Th e y did ref e r tot hem s e 1 v e s as 
court presenting officers,but as people may think that they were 
then part of the court we have now asked them to refer to 
themselves as the police presenting officers." 
A clerk who is determined to minimise police control over, or 
police presence in court can have a considerable effect. This will 
not be an overnight effect, and may take many years to put into 
practice, but it is yet another area where the clerk to the justices 
has a crucial effect on the nature of the court. The attitude of the 
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clerk to the justices to the police is important. 
Many court clerks were aware that there were dangers 1n too high 
a pol ice presence in court and, in part icular, dangers 1n the pol ice 
doing jobs in the court organisation. However they were also 
consc1ous of the need for the protection provided by uniformed police. 
One commented 
"I think magistrates and clerks are entitled to be protected from 
criminals. Let's face it there are dangerous criminals com1ng 
through the courts. One never knows what they might do." 
But despite this they were anxious that the image of the police court 
should be dispelled. 
"I expect that defendants get a bad impression if the first 
person they meet, who asks them who they are, if they are 
pleading guilty or not guilty, are they represented, is a 
uniformed police officer, albeit in shirt sleeves and carrying a 
clip board." 
This clerk also pointed out that where police do jobs in the court 
organisation it is too easy for court staff to forget that the people 
they work with every day are policemen. 
"To us they appear different. Its almost as if they've been 
dunked in a barrel of dye .•• and it comes as a tremendous shock 
w hen, a t the end 0 f a cas e, the war r an t 0 f f ice r will say, ' You 
awarded costs against us!' And I say 'What do you mean, us?' 
And they say 'Well we're police too,' and you lose sight of it." 
Court staff may forget that the cheerful friendly man with whom they 
work every day is, simply by virtue of a uniform that they have become 
blind to, intimidating, or simply part of the enemy or "the other 
s ide" to many who come to court. 
Clerks were also conscious of the fact that where police worked 
as ushers and pos sib ly also called the 1 is t of the day's cases, cour t 
staff and uniformed police could appear to be far too familiar. We 
have already mentioned Court G where the policeman who called the 
list sat very close to the bench and the clerk. At Court B where the 
clerk called the list but the police acted as ushers, the uniformed 
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police ushers (known as the warrant officers) could frequently be seen 
holding whispered conversations with the clerks. These conversations 
would concern the state of the list - perhaps a suggestion that a 
case be transferred to another court, or information that a defendant 
was heavily pregnant and should be taken early. However such 
conversations were not audible to defendants. All that the defendant 
could see was the clerk - who might later proceed to retire with the 
bench - whispering to a policeman during the course of the defendant's 
case. 
Suggestions have been made that, because a high police presence -
a court full of blue uniforms - can be intimidating, the police should 
not wear uniform if they are working at the court. Clerks were, on 
the whole dismissive of such ideas. 
"In many little ways we try to stop the court having the 
appearance of a police court, and its not so much the fact of 
people being in uniform - perhaps more it is what they are 
doing." 
If police are go~ng to do jobs ~n court, clerks feel that they should 
be recognisable as policemen. 
"I think it is better that they are easily identified. In the 
juvenile court they wear uniforms here as well, though in the 
past they have worn a casual jacket - but even there I think it 
is only fair that the juvenile knows who they are dealing with, 
and the parents know who everybody is. It's confusing enough 
without having to try and figure out who the police are." 
Control of time - manipulating the court list 
We have said that a high level of police participation ~n court 
1S problematic, particularly where the police do jobs for the court 
itself. The appearance is created that the interests of the court 
and police are the same, that police and courts have the same purposes 
and the same ends. We have also said that although clerks are aware 
of these problems, they nevertheless come to forget the need (which 
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they do recognise) to separate themselves and their role from the 
police, and that they become too intimate with police in court. 
Besides these problems, however, there is another and more 
serious issue, which is that where the police act as ushers and call 
the list of cases ~n court they acqu~re real power to influence events 
to their own ends. 
Calling the list of cases is far from being a simple operation. 
We have mentioned already the fact that at the commencement of a court 
sess~on all the participants in the listed cases should be present at 
court, and they will wish to get away as soon as possible. For most 
people, waiting time at court is unproductive. 
to sit around until their case is called. 
They will simply have 
All courts have a set of priorities for calling cases, usually 
based on the assumption that short cases will be dealt with first so 
that the maximum number of people can be got away from court as soon 
as possible. Therefore remands, pleas of guil ty, quick commi ttals 
will be dealt with before contested matters. However there are cases 
which may demand priority - police officers who have been on night 
duty, people who are ill or disabled. Also the basic priorities of a 
court may apply only in a limited way - a court may not have any 
contested matters listed for that session, or there may be a contested 
drunk and disorderly case which will take much less time than a five 
handed remand with five different advocates applying for bail against 
police objections. 
The person calling the list therefore is ~n a position to operate 
her/his own set of priorities on the day. The person calling the 
list is inevitably inportuned by people waiting to get away, and is in 
a position to do them favours. If the police call the list, they can 
call it according to their priorities and they can grant or refuse 
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time bonuses to those who want to get away. 
Another very important aspect of listing is information about 
which cases are ready to be heard. Although all cases are in theory 
supposed to be ready when the court commences they are never all 
ready. Advocates may wish to speak to their clients, defendants may 
not have arrived from pr1son, solicitors may be engaged in another 
court. The person calling the list needs to be 1n posession of this 
information to call the list effectively. Even if the police do not 
actually call the list, they retain some power if they are 1n 
posess10n of information about which cases are ready to be heard by 
virtue of their acting as ushers. 
This problem is illustrated by an incident at Court B. Court B 
was particularly interesting since it was part way through the process 
of civilianisation. The clerk at that court had decided as a matter 
of policy that the clerk in court should control the list - 1.e. 
determine the order in which cases were called on. Police, however 
still acted as ushers in the court, and had been used to control the 
order in which cases were called. There was therefore something of a 
power struggle between the clerk and the "warrant officers" (as the 
police ushers are called) to control the list. 
The basic problem for the clerks at this court was that, although 
they had nominal control over the order in which the list was called, 
the warrant officers in fact had the information necessary to call the 
1 is t. Warrant officers could, and did, feed information on which 
cases were ready to be called on selectively to clerks. For 
instance on one occasion the warrant officer had suggested that a , 
particular case be called, but the clerk had extra information and 
vetoed calling it. The clerk himself called another case, but in 
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that case the defence solicitor was on his feet in another court. 
Since that particular defence solicitor was renowned for having too 
large a number of cases on each day he was reprimanded by the court. 
After the court had finished its business and bench and clerk had left 
the court an altercation took place between the warrant officer and 
the defence solicitor involved, in which the defence solicitor 
upbraided the warrant officer for calling on his case when the warrant 
officer had agreed not to do so. The warrant officer protested that 
it was not his fault, that the clerk had overridden him and called the 
case anyway. So that whilst the clerks were discouraging solicitors 
from having a large number of cases on one day because it made listing 
difficult, the warrant officers were colluding with the solicitors by 
feeding the clerk selected information about which cases could be 
called on. 
Clerks were aware of the problem. One of the clerks remarked 
" ••• one can have difficulties with warrant officers who do want 
to have some control. II 
and pointed out that it was sometimes difficult for younger clerks to 
control the warrant officers. One of these younger clerks said 
II ••• I've bee n rem in de d qui tea few tim e s by my C 1 e r k tom a k e 
sure that I'm seen to be controlling things and not the officer." 
Control of the list is therefore only real control if the clerk 
is also controlling the supply of information which allows that list 
to be called according to the policy of the court. The clerk to the 
justices at Court F, where the list was called by the clerk, said he 
had experienced courts where the list was called by the police, but 
that he wouldn't allow it - not only because it gave the impression of 
a police court but because one never knew how the police would control 
the list and what priority they would in fact give to cases. 
The dangers that Carlen pointed to of police controlling the list 
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of cases are very real. They are by no means common to all courts, 
however, and are mainly, but not entirely, problems of London courts. 
In most courts the list is controlled by the clerk, and it is 
controlled within a general policy laid down for that court. The 
priorities which prevail will be those of the clerk to the justices 
and the bench, and within this the preferences of individual clerks. 
It is the clerk therefore who has the power to grant favours, or not, 
in re lat ion to each day's 1 is t, and the clerk's in teres ts are those of 
the court organisation. Clerks are likely to be affected by the 
desire to get through the list expeditiously and to achieve an even 
division of cases between the courts. They are, of course open to 
pressure from many quarters. We shall discuss in the next chapter 
the way clerks deal with pressures from the legal profession to accede 
to advocates requests for priority. Where the police do not call the 
list themselves there is also pressure from police. 
In all but the biggest city courts clerks come to know the police 
who appear regularly in court, and occasionally the police attempt to 
exploit their relationship with the clerks. 
"A lot of people would try to get priority with listing. 
Certain people will try, you just don't have to let it happen." 
A young female clerk said 
"Yes, I had that problem when I originally started work at the 
court, and I think its more of a problem for female clerks, 
especially with the young P.C.'s. They're very friendly when 
you see them out of court and they'll try it on in court as well. 
It's necessary to put them to the back of the list several times, 
even if it means becoming rather unpopular in order to make clear 
the point that you're not going to call his case first because 
you're mates." 
The c le rks who had expe r ienced pre s sure f rom po 1 ice they kne w we r e 
adamant that they would not yield to it if it was improper. 
"They ask to get on early if they've been on night duty. 
don't do it unfairly. They have usually got a reason. 
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They 
know that we won't slip one in." 
The problem mentioned earlier of police who work at the court 
behaving in a familiar way towards clerk and bench and thus giving the 
impression of a police court can apply also to police regulars. One 
clerk commented. 
"I don't like police officers talking to magistrates particularly 
if there are people in court at the time. I think it looks bad. 
I always try and have a quiet word if that occurs." 
However at the courts which had become the most civilianised, the 
problems were the least, because police simply did not appear at court 
very often. At Court D, for instance, police appeared as gaolers in 
custody cases, occasionally as witnesses if there was a plea of not 
guilty, and there was a court inspector, but that was all. 
"Apart from a prosecuting inspector one very rarely sees a 
policeman these days. So they haven't got the 'same links and 
relationships with the clerk and his staff to be able to take 
advantage." 
Thus, the lower the police presence 1n court, the less the 
likelihood that they will retain any power to influence events in 
court improperly, either directly or indirectly. 
Problems of Police Advocacy 
Not only do problems ar1se where the police have jobs in the 
court organisation, but they also ar1se 1n relation to policemen 
acting as prosecutors 1n their own cases. 
At all the courts observed, except the four London courts, 
solicitors from the local prosecuting solicitor's office were in court 
every day. Any difficult or contested matters were dealt with by a 
qualified prosecutor. 
In the four London courts, the Metropolitan Police Solicitor's 
Department was sometimes instructed, but more often than not cases, 
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including pleas of not guilty, were prosecuted by individual police 
officers. 
This caused many problems for clerks, S1nce police officers would 
sometimes find difficulties 1n conducting the prosecution, and expect 
to rece1ve help from clerks. 
Such assistance used at one time to be forthcoming. It used to 
be the practice for the police to hand to the clerk the prosecution's 
witness statements in a contested case. The clerk would then take 
the prosecution witnesses through their evidence. This practice was 
disapproved of in 1944 by the Departmental Committee on Justices 
Clerks,3 which said 
"It is the practice in some places, including one important city, 
for the clerk to conduct all, or almost all the examinations in 
the absence of professional advocates; this is not in accordance 
with the law and is moreover unnecessary and undesirable. The 
clerk should have as little to do with the conduct of the case 
for either one party or the other as is consistent with 
reasonable lucidity and despatch and the police in particular 
ought to be in a position to conduct their cases or4 to secure the professional assistance necessary for the purpose." 
The practice was also disapproved of in Simms v MooreS (discussed 1n 
Chapter Two) which case was brought 1n 1970 to challenge this 
prac t ice. Lord Parker, C.J. held that it should not be done except 
where the other side had a copy of the witnesses statement, and that 
the clerk should not use the witness statements as the basis of the 
note of evidence. However even if these precautions are taken,if the 
clerk has a proof of evidence for a prosecution witness who then 
diverges from it, the clerk may be in possession of information that 
3. Cmnd. 6507. 
4. Ibid para. 38. 
5. [1970] 2 QB 327. 
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slhe should not have. 6 
Despite the considerable problems involved in clerks taking 
prosecution witnesses through their evidence, the practice has only 
recently stopped. One of the clerks at Court H said 
"When I came to this court I was horrified to find that you were 
handed a bundle of statements in order to take the police through 
their evidence. However it became obvious that it was not our 
policy to prosecute cases, and I would only ever do it if the 
defence was represented and had a copy of the statements." 
But despite the fact that clerks do not now take police witnesses 
through their evidence, there are still problems caused by police 
advocacy. 
Although some police officers become quite adept in court, others 
do not. It 1S not unknown for young and inexperienced officers to be 
expected to deal with quite complex cases with no assistance except 
from a more sen10r pol ice officer. The most unexpected cases can 
throw up points of law. For instance, at Court H a policeman had 
arrested a man who had been attempting to throw himself into the 
Thames in order to commit suicide. Arrest had been the only way to 
prevent the man from jumping. The officer charged the defendant with 
breach of the peace. The stipendiary dealing with the case expressed 
his sympathy but said that he could not see how trying to kill oneself 
was a breach of the peace. He put the case back for the policeman to 
think about it. The policeman thought - but could not obtain any 
legal advice and had no idea how to argue the point himself. The 
defendant was released. 
Several London clerks recollected cases where the police had 
missed a vital element in their case, and defendants had been released 
on a submission of no case to answer. 
6. This point was made 1n article by Glanville Williams in an 
article 'Advocacy by police,and Justices' Clerks' (1956) Crim. 
L.R. 169 
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One clerk commented 
"The Metropolitan Police let themselves down by expecting police 
officers to be advocates. They should follow the countrywide 
view, I think - the practice of having a police prosecutor and 
solicitors prosecute all cases." 
Clerks faced with inexperienced and floundering policemen are in a 
difficult situation. The police may well feel that they should be 
assisted by the clerk. They may actually rece1ve some assistance _ 
for instance as 1n the example from Court H where police were granted 
an adjournment so that they could seek advice, but even this may not 
be possible if an adjournment would be unfair to a defendant. Clerks 
do not feel that they can, or that they want to, go very far. A clerk 
at Court B said 
"We have never considered that it is part of the clerk's job to 
bolster up an inadequate or inefficient police prosecution." 
The problem is one which is peculiar to those courts observed 1n 
the London area. All other courts had prosecuting solicitors -
although some of those prosecuting solicitor's departmentshad only 
recently been established. 
The Royal Commission on the Police in 1962 recommended that the 
use of police as advocates for the prosecution be reviewed. 7 It 
deplored the use of police officers as prosecutors, except for minor 
cases and it said 
"Anything which tends to suggest to the public mind the suspicion 
of an allian%e between the court and the police cannot but be 
prejudicial. " 
The establishment of prosecuting solicitor's departments in many areas 
followed these recommendations. But there are still some courts 
where police prosecute nearly all of their own cases. The Royal 
7 . Cmn d • 1 7 28. Par a 381. 
8. Ibid. 
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Commission on Criminal Procedure9 has therefore said 
"We consider 
establishing a 
police force." 
that there should be no further delay in 
prosecuting solicitor service to cover every 
Clerks would welcome the enforcement of this recommendation in 
areas where there are not now prosecuting solicitor's Departments. 
The evidence shows that most clerks take seriously the need to avoid 
bias or the appearance of bias in their relationship with police. 
Although some clerks are more sympathetic and helpful to police than 
others, clerks in general would wish to be relieved of difficult 
decisions as to how far they can go in helping policemen who are 
inadequate to the task of dealing with their own prosecutions. 
Also, apart from such 'due process' reasons for desiring 
representation for police, clerks also have organisational reasons. 
Unrepresented prosecutors can slow down proceedings almost as much as 
unrepresented defendants. There are time bonuses from represented 
prosecutors. Even though the allocation of cases between courts may 
be made a little more complex because of the need to accommodate 
prosecutors, clerks are still positively in favour, on the whole, of 
representa t ion for po 1 ice. 
The clerk as legal adviser to police 
Almost all clerks said that the police came to them for advice. 
The few who said that police did not do so (12%) were mainly younger, 
less experienced clerks. 
For the most part, these requests for advice concerned procedural 
matters such as warrants to be checked or issues of court security. 
One clerk gave the illustration of an officer who had telephoned him 
because a witness in his case was on the Isle of Man and he wished to 
9. Cmnd. 8092. Para 7.3. 
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know how to compel attendance at court. Frequently also requests for 
advice concerned the policy of the court. Another clerk said that 
sometimes an Inspector would ring up to ask a question such as 
,,' Th ,. f ere s a case com1ng to court next week, and the value 0 the 
property stolen is £3,000, two defendants involved, its all 
recovered. Will the magistrate insist on trial by indictment?' 
Its borderline - we can only tell him its borderline - and the 
magistrate will decide on the day." 
Several clerks also mentioned requests for advice on Licensing matters. 
On areas of law such as procedure in magistrates' courts, Licensing 
law and, of course, the policy of the bench, the clerks are the 
experts. This expertise is exploited by the police, but also by the 
legal profession, by probation and social services and even 
occasionally by defendants. One clerk said he didn't mind who he 
helped: "It's a sort of open shop". 
Where requests for advice from the police were confined to 
questions about the correct procedure to follow, clerks readily gave 
the advice requested. However, there 1S a need for clerks to take 
care that they do not allow themselves to be put in the position of 
becoming a legal adviser to the police. The Departmental Committee 
on Justices Clerks said about this 
"It is essentia1... that the clerk, whilst courteous and helpful 
alike to public and police and ready to facilitate convenient 
procedure should never allow himself to act as if he were the 
solicitor of either party, least of all the police ... that which 
the clerk should not be tempted to do is to help the police in 
the preparation of their case, or to use a lawyer's phrase, 
"advise on evidence" for them. The proper person to do that 1S 
a superior police officer, sr where the case demands it, a 
solicitor acting for police."l 
Clerks were approached by police for this sort of advice, and 
most were very reticent about giving it. 
"If it goes to the fundamental points of a case that 1S something 
I wouldn't seek to become involved in." 
10. Report of the Departmental Committee. Cmnd 6508. para 51. 
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" ••• well if its a matter of licensing I might help them. If 
its something else I say 'Well you've got your prosecuting 
solicitor's department, what are you paying them for?' 
"I mean obviously if the clerk gives them some advice and it 
happens to be wrong then they might very well blame the clerk for 
that if the case were dismissed. It puts the clerk in a 
difficult situation if he happens to be in court dealing with the 
case when he happens to have given the police advice about it." 
To a certain extent clerks felt that they were breaking the 
police of a bad habit. At Court C where a prosecuting solicitor's 
department had just been set up one clerk commented 
"Well quite often now we tell them that they've got their own 
legal department - to go and see them." 
Where there was no prosecuting solicitor 1n court regularly, clerks 
were tempted to give advice. This was so especially in London where 
the police might need advice quickly, or on the spot. Clerks thought 
that the Metropolitan Police Solicitor's Department was slow in 
providing advice. Even so, there were some clerks who took a hard 
line. One clerk at Court B said 
"It's not my job to act as a police solicitor." 
There were other clerks who saw no problems about g1v1ng advice 
to police, and this appeared to be so even where that advice was on 
the merits of a particular case. One clerk confessed 
"I can see that it can arise - where I've given the police advice 
as to the case and found myself dealing with it in court." 
Such a situation should not arise. It is exactly the problem to 
which the Departmental Committee addressed itself. Advice on the 
preparation of a case or on evidence should not come from the clerks. 
Whilst a clerk might have a discussion with a solicitor about the view 
s/he would take of the law 1n a case due to come up in court, this is 
very different to advising the police 1n the way that a prosecutor 
might, about the preparation of a case, or the evidence 1n it. 
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In many courts, clerks get to know some of the local police 
officers. The police in turn know the clerks by name, and may even 
have social relationships with them. It can become very difficult ln 
this situation for clerks to avoid requests for help from police. 
The relationship between clerk and police out of court 
The clerks who were interviewed were asked to describe their 
relationship with the local police outside the courtroom itself. The 
responses varied widely. 
Two refused to answer - because one was engaged to a policeman 
and the other was married to a policeman. 
Almost all described their relationship with the police as good -
but what they meant by such an assessment was different from clerk to 
clerk. Some clerks were enthusiastically friendly. 
"We've got to work toge ther in here so I th ink it he Ips to have a 
good relationship outside of court. I'm not saying that we go 
out boozing with them every night or anything like that. I mean 
its good to have a friendship with them. It helps when we come 
to court." 
"In court, so long as the rules of natural justice are applied, 
what happens out of court has absolutely no bearing as far as I 
am concerned." 
Some clerks, particularly clerks to the justices socialised with 
senior police officers regularly. One described his relationship 
with police as 
"Very, very good, but then as a member of Rotary I'm there with 
the Chief Superintendent. I've been to their policeman's bal1." 
Other clerks to the justices discouraged socialising with police. 
"We get invited out to various social events,and as a rule you 
don't go, which is slightly boring but its safer." 
This clerk pointed out that if he was seen socialising with police the 
local solicitors would accuse him of being prosecution minded, and if 
he was seen drinking with solicitors the police would complain that he 
was defence minded. Clerks were aware that they had reputations 
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amongst the police and that the police might seek to exploit those who 
had a reputation for being soft. One clerk whose father was a 
retired police officer said that this fact was known to the local 
police but 
"Some of the clerks do have some semblance of a reputation, and I 
don't think I'm regarded as easy - and that is how it ought to 
be." 
At courts where a policy of civilianisation has been pursued, 
clerks expressed fewer problems over police approaching them for 
advice, and fewer problems over police attempting to exploit a social 
relationship. 
Where social relationships do exist, then obviously clerks must 
be vigilant that such relationships are not used improperly, and that 
their familiarity with police out of court is not expressed in any way 
in court, or in relation to court proceedings. Whilst some clerks 
were very aware of the dangers of familiarity with police, there were 
others who were much more complacent, and appeared not to see the 
difficulties. 
The clerk and the police - Conclusions 
We have seen tha t po 1 ice part ic ipat ion ln magis tra test cour ts 
var les very wide ly. Carlen's assertions tha t control of timing ln 
magistrates' courts lS important are perfectly correct, but her 
ascription of this control solely to the police is not correct for 
most courts. For what is probably the majority of courts in the 
country, control of timing both at the level of policy and immediately 
in court, is in the hands of the clerk. 
The extent to which police appear in court and have control over 
aspects of the courts operation depends on a number of factors, 
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including the v1gour with which the clerk to the justices pursues a 
policy of 'civilianising' the court. 
Some courts still look very much like police courts. Others 
operate very efficiently with police doing little except serv1ng 
summonses and warrants and acting as gaolers. Such a minimal role 1S 
desirable,sinc e we have shown that where police have other jobs 1n 
court, at least an appearance 1S created of police control or of 
identification of interests between the police and the court. We 
have also seen that the police can exploit their position, so that 
their own ends are served, rather than court policy being followed. 
Where, for ins tance, the clerk is nominally in control of the call ing 
of the 1 is t, if the pol ice regulate the informat ion neces sary to call 
that list, then the police effectively retain a high degree of 
control. 
Where police are employed in the court or appear there regularly, 
they may attempt to take advantage of their familiarity with the 
clerks to attempt to negotiate favours such as priority in listing. 
In the Metropolitan area, where police frequently prosecute their own 
cases without legal advice, it may be that police expect assistance 
from clerks which it would be improper for the clerk to give. 
The less the police are called upon to do in court, the less the 
danger that the police will retain any real or apparent influence over 
the court. 
Even out of court it seems that police may expect help from 
clerks. The fact that the clerk is expert on magisterial law and 
procedure means that slhe will inevitably be used as a legal resource 
by all who use magistrates' courts. It may be innocuous for police to 
request procedural advice from clerks, but the replies of clerks to 
questions about their relationship with police seem to indicate that 
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police ask for, and some clerks g~ve, the sortof advice on the 
preparation of cases that police should properly get from their own 
legal advisers. This may be much less likely to occur where there 
is a police prosecuting solicitor's department, but it seems that such 
departments may be too small or as yet too inexperienced to advise 
police on all matters. Before police prosecuting departments became 
sO widespread, police obviously developed a habit of consulting 
clerks, and this habit seems not to have been broken. 
There is a strong, if unevenly distributed tendency for the clerk 
to take over jobs which used to be performed by police ~n the court 
organisation, particularly calling the list of cases. 
The question must be asked whether it is better that these jobs 
are performed by clerks. Where the police control the listing and 
calling of cases, the danger is that they will arrange matters to the 
conven~ence of police and prosecution. Where the clerk controls 
listing and calling of cases her/his interests will be, ultimately 
those of the court organisation. The clerk will a~m to even the load 
of cases between the courts, to look after the needs of the bench and 
to get through the list of cases quickly. Achieving these ends will 
not necessarily favour any particular group within the court (although 
it may do, as we see in the next chapter.) Certainly court regulars 
will have readier access to the clerk to request priority ~n listing 
and this inevitably disadvantages unrepresented defendants. However 
the clerk's interests will not be served by favouritism to any 
particular group, but by achieving the most expeditious disposal of 
cases. Control by the clerk is therefore to be preferred to control 
by police, particularly if the clerk is prepared to subordinate 
pressure of case load to the needs of the unrepresented defendant. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CLERK AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
Conflicts between court organisation and advocates 
"Getting away from court" 
Professional double booking 
"The Learned Clerk" 
The clerk as cynical legal adviser 
Conclusions 
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The Clerk and the legal profession 
The pattern of legal professional practice var1es markedly from 
court to court. Some courts, for instance, rarely see a member of 
the Bar, others see many barristers each day. Court C, one of the 
courts in the survey serves a provincial town. At the time of the 
survey, clerks estimated that there were about fifteen local 
solicitors who practised at the court regularly. There would also 
be the occasional appearance by a local solicitor who did not usually 
do criminal work, and sometimes they would see a solicitor from out of 
town. Barristers hardly ever appeared at the court. 
In contrast Court E serves a large city. Clerks there estimated 
that there were forty or fifty solicitors practising at the court. 
The city has a large bar, and barristers - particularly the less 
experienced members of the junior bar - were to be seen in court every 
day. 
Court B 1S an Outer London court. The clerks estimated about 
twelve local firms of solicitors practising there regularly and many 
other firms appeared occasionally. Court B is one of the courts in 
which the London bar cuts its teeth, but it also, occasionally, sees 
the stars of the London criminal bar. 
Common to all of the courts in the survey, however, was that a 
very large proportion of the representation of defendants was done by 
a comparatively small number of local solicitors. At Court C there 
were three or four regulars. At Court E clerks reported that five or 
six firms did 70% of the work and, similarly, at court B about six 
firms did the majority of the work. 
At each court therefore there was a small group of lawyers who 
knew, and were known by, the clerks very well indeed. These 
solicitors would appear in court regularly several times a week, and 
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some of them every day. A very substantial proportion of their 
practice consisted in representation of defendants in magistrates' 
courts, often on legal aid certificates. Many of the courts also had 
a small group of prosecuting solicitors who appeared consistently in 
the same court several times a week. 
The conditions of work for these lawyers depend,to a large extent, 
on the efficiency with which the court is organised, and the extent to 
which clerks are prepared to take into account the legal profession's 
needs and problems. Unfortuna te ly, the needs of lawye-rs prac tis ing 
in the court often conflict with the needs of the court itself, and 
the relationships between clerks and advocates is often strained. 
Conflicts between court organisation and advocates 
(1) "Getting away from court" 
One of the first desires of any lawyer with a case 1n a 
magistrates' court 1S to get away from court quickly - not necessarily 
because the experience of appearing there will be an unpleasant one, 
but because of the desire to return to the office, to the chambers, or 
to get to another court, to deal with other pressing business. The 
bonus may be financial - in being able to accomplish more work - or it 
may be a leisure bonus in being able to get away from the office 1n 
the even ing. At another level it may be said that the waiting area 
of magistrates' courts is not the most pleasant place to spend a 
morning, and the waiting time paid under a legal aid order not the 
most lucrative way to pass one's time. 
We have demonstrated, in Chapter 5, that for most courts control 
of the list of cases and the order in which they are called on 1S 1n 
the hands of the clerk. The clerk will be required to juggle a 
number of competing priorities in calling the list. S/he will wish 
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to get the greatest number of people away from court as soon as 
possible, but freedom to transfer cases from court to court may well 
be restricted by security considerations, by membership of the bench 
by the deployment of prosecuting solicitors and other factors. The 
order in which cases are heard will also be affected by the readiness 
of parties to proceed, special needs such as officers on night duty 
and the likely length of cases. The legal profession competes for 
priority amongst these considerations. Clerks in busy courts are 
consistently importuned by impatient advocates with optimistic 
assessments of the length of their cases. 
The clerk to the justices and her/his staff will not only have 
control of the day by day decisions about order of hearing, they will 
also have a very important effect on the court's policy about 
priorities in hearing the list. All courts have such a policy -
usually, very basically, that the quickest cases are glven priority. 
This generally means that remands are deal t with firs t, followed by 
pleas of guilty, followed by contested matters. Committal 
proceedings are usually dealt with early if they are paper committals, 
applications for occasional licences and the daily retinue of local 
drunks at the beginning of the day. But the exigencies of the day 
and the actual length of cases can reverse the order suggested by the 
policy. As was indicated in the last chapter, a drunk who still 
retains some of the previous evening's beligerence and pleads not 
guilty may well take less time to hear than an application for a 
remand with five defendants all separately represented and all 
applying for bail against police objections. 
The policies of courts in relation to the listing demands of the 
legal profession differ markedly from court to court. Within the 
basic policy for order of cases, some courts will award priority to 
317 
the legal profession and some will not. An examination of the 
contrasting policies of courts D and B will illustrate this. 
At Court D, the legal profession were given priority. One clerk 
explained that 
" ... 1 think solicitors do come to expect that their cases, 
irrespective of legal aid, will be dealt with before 
unrepresented defendants, and they do in fact complain if it 
works the other way - whether or not there's a good reason for 
you dealing with an unrepresented defendant earlier." 
At this court, the clerks were extremely sympathetic to the needs 
of local solicitors, to the extent of operating a sort of unofficial 
appointments system for them. 
"So on a busy day with several solicitors waiting we can send 
solicitors back to their office and tell them we'll phone them 
ten minutes before they are wanted, and they undertake on that 
basis to be here." 
At this court, therefore, if there were s~x cases waiting to be 
heard where the defendants were pleading guilty, and three of those 
defendants were represented, the represented defendants would be given 
priority irrespective of the length of their cases. 
At Court B however, the legal profession were not so 
sympathetically catered for. Clerks dealt with cases strictly ~n 
order of their length. One clerk explained that in the traffic 
court, for instance, she might take unrepresented defendants first, 
because where a defendant was represented (perhaps in order to put 
forward special reasons why s/he should not be disqualified) the 
represented defendant would be likely to take longer, so 
" .•• you take it on a little bit later ~n the day and get rid of 
as many defendants and police officers as you can." 
No priority was given to the legal profession at this court. 
Clerks on the whole took the view that it was just as important for 
defendants to get back to their jobs as it was for solicitors to get 
back to theirs. 
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The policy at this court had caused some consternation amongst 
advocates but the clerk to the justices at court B explained that the 
profession had, for the most part, become used to the situation and 
had learned that by jumping up in court and requesting that their 
cases be taken out of order they only delayed matters. 
At some courts, therefore, the regular advocates - the few 
solicitors who appeared frequently - could be given preferential 
treatment by the court as a matter of policy. Within the general 
policy order of cases, represented defendants got priority over 
unrepresented, ln effect, and even an unofficial appointments system 
operated. At other courts no preference was glven, even to the 
regular advocates. 
But even at courts which were unwilling to glve advocates 
priority as a matter of policy, lawyers were accorded some preference, 
so that at least between two cases of equal length, the one with a 
represented defendant would be taken first. For the most part 
however this was not out of a sympathetic concern for the needs of 
their professional brethren, but because clerks have been reminded of 
the pressures on the legal aid fund. As one clerk put it 
"If they are on legal aid, for instance, they get paid waiting 
time, and it's money down the drain." 
Also ln relation to individual cases, solicitors are able to 
bargain for preferential treatment where unrepresented defendants are 
less able to protest or to seek to influence the decisions of the 
c ou r t. At an individual level the court's regular solicitors will 
know the clerks well, and will attempt special pleading if they are in 
difficulties and need to get away from court. They will know which 
clerks are like ly to be suscept ib le to such persuas ion, and wh ich are 
not. 
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At a different level, the local Law Society may seek to influence 
the listing policy of the court. For instance, at Court F, when the 
Duty solicitor Scheme was set up it was agreed between the court and 
the local profes s ion that the Duty Sol ic i tor's cases should be deal t 
with first. The justification for this was that as the Duty 
Solicitor was doing a public service s/he should get priority, The 
clerk to the justices had agreed to this and enforced it, although he 
was somewhat cynical about it, pointing out that if the Duty Solicitor 
came to court and saw six or seven defendants who consequently became 
her/his clients on legal aid certificates s/he had performed a public 
serv1ce which was nevertheless very lucrative to the solicitor. This 
clerk adhered closely to the agreed policy - he not only gave the duty 
solicitor priority but insisted that the duty solicitor's cases be 
heard at ten o'clock when the court began. This strict adherence to 
the policy was not of course always convenient for the duty solicitor! 
Some Law Societies had urged the court to instigate an 
appointments system, so that all cases were not listed for the same 
time in the morning. This was one of the most contentious 1ssues 
between clerks and the profession. In the smaller courts it was 
sometimes possible for the clerk to release a solicitor until a later 
period 1n the day. The reason why this was possible 1n smaller 
courts was because the clerk would be able to make an accurate 
assessment of the likely timetable of all courts in the building and 
predict with some certainty that none of them would be able to hear a 
particular case or cases before a particular time. In a larger 
court, however, running five to ten courts at once it was impossible 
for the individual clerk to know what was happening in all other 
Courts. If the clerk in Court One released some cases until later in 
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the day, Court Five, scheduled to hear a contested case with eight 
witnesses, might instead find itself dealing with a last minute change 
to a plea of guilty and a consequent remand for reports. It would 
thus be able to take the cases released from Court One. If the clerk 
in Court One had let the parties go, Court Five might then contain 
three irate magistrates called in to do nothing, and Court One would 
later contain three irate magistrates sitting on into the afternoon 
when their colleagues had gone home. Clerks felt that efficient 
listing depended on their having the patience of a saint and the 
foresight of a prophet, and that the demands of the legal profession 
for an appointment system were unworkable in practice. 
Clerks were also impatient of inexperienced advocates who 
expected their priorities to be automatically accommodated by the 
courts. One clerk complained 
" we get young barristers who come here ••• and say I've got 
two contested dangerous drivings and I must be in the High Court 
at 12.00 and of course that is quite ridiculous." 
Clerks are also under pressure from other groups. The police 
for instance may request to be given priority - possibly there will be 
officers ln court who have been on night duty. Although 
unrepresented defendants often do not know enough to complain, they 
may present genuine requests to clerks - so if the clerk is approached 
by "A man (sic) coming along with a babe in arms needing a feed or 
somebody who is diabetic needing insulin" slhe will need to 
accommodate their requirements. 
Whatever the policy of clerks, and however sympathetic they may 
be, they may find themselves unable to accommodate lawyers who wish to 
get away from the court. This inevitably leads to discontent. It 
seems that at many courts, the legal profession is not satisfied with 
the listing arrangements and clerks equally feel that lawyers' demands 
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are unreasonable. A clerk to the justices reported that 
"S ome sol ic i tors wr i te me rude letters afterwards and say they 
don't really see why they should have to hang around all day 
waiting for applications to be dealt with. But I tend to ignore 
those." 
No court appeared to have solved this problem of the incompatibility 
of the court's needs and the advocates' needs. Indeed the 
relationship between clerks and advocates was complicated further by 
disputes over advocates who came to court with several clients to 
. . 
represent 1n one seSSlon. 
Conflicts between court organisation and advocates 
(2) Professional double booking 
All clerks interviewed were united 1n identifying as a problem 
the fact that local solicitors with a healthy practice in the 
magistrates' court frequently expected to be able to represent several 
clients in one court seSSlon. 
This created a problem because the court may have planned its 
list of cases for the day to be distributed conveniently and evenly 
between the number of courts available. If a solicitor was 
represent ing three clients on that day, that sol ic i tor's cas es may be 
listed in three different courts. One of those courts may wish to 
calion a case in which the solicitor is involved, but be unable to do 
so, because the solicitor is on her/his feet in another court. 
One of the clerks interviewed illustrated the problem thus 
" ••• there might be a case where there are four defendants, and 
those four defendants are represented by four different 
solicitors. They are occupying one court for quite a length of 
time. Each of those four solicitors might only have one other 
case that morning but because of the length of time they're 
spending in one court, two other courts can be kept waiting." 
Clerks reported that solicitors with several cases 
" •.• expect to come along to the court on the morning of the court 
with all of their cases 1n one court." 
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often there are too many courts, and too many other considerations to 
be taken into account for this to be possible. The clerk may have to 
weigh up many constraints in distributing the day's cases between the 
available courts. There may be a limited number of courtrooms; there 
may be a limited number of magistrates - possibly one or more have 
been unable to fulfil their rota duty. It may be that there are 
cases where the Local Authority appears as prosecutor, with the result 
that such cases can only be listed in one court since some magistrates 
may be local councillors. There will be a limited number of 
prosecuting solicitors so that other cases must be fixed in particular 
courts. Certain cases with defendants in custody may have to remain 
ln those courts with direct access to the cells. 
These are only a few of the more obvious listing problems faced 
by clerks. Accommodating the desire of a solicitor to have all 
her/his cases in one court may simply be impossible. 
The clerk will be responsible to the bench for efficient listing, 
and may well come under pressure from the bench if courts are held up 
" ..• sometimes it's the magistrates champing at the bit, waiting 
to get on and blaming the clerk. The clerk obviously justifies 
his existence, and blames the solicitor, and the solicitor gets 
it when he appears." 
The magistrates may even decide to take the matter out of the 
clerk's hands, and take action themselves. 
"We had some justices a while ago who took a great stand on this 
and when the case couldn't come before them because the solicitor 
wasn't ready they said "Right, we're going" and one can't blame 
them. " 
Several clerks felt that solicitors took an irresponsible 
attitude to the problem. 
" the solicitor doesn't mind, it's like water off a duck's 
back I suppose. He will take his telling off and carryon his 
case because he is probably on legal aid and getting paid for it 
and he's not worried particularly." 
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Clerks felt that solicitors were not sympathetic to or co-operative 
with the needs of the court organisation. The solicitors who were 
spoken to at the var~ous courts did not believe themselves to be 
irresponsible. They pointed out that their double booking was not 
always premeditated. They did not always have control over the date 
to which cases were remanded, nor could they control clients who 
consulted them for help at the last minute. 
Clerks made the point that in such situations the solicitor 
should send another member of the firm to court or instruct counsel. 
But solicitors were unwilling to do this, at least partly because, in 
order to show an acceptable profit from their work in the magistrates' 
court, they needed to be able to represent several clients in one 
court session. 
Clerks understood the reasons why solicitors wished to take 
several cases in one court session. One commented 
"It is suggested to solicitors that they instruct counsel if 
they've got more cases than they can handle but I don't know that 
that goes down very well. Ultimately I suppose its a matter of 
money." 
Some clerks were most unsympathetic to solicitors 
"Why should you organise the cases to the convenience of someone 
who is grabbing money right left and centre?" 
The strategies of courts for resolving the problem were var~ous. 
Some courts encouraged solicitors to telephone in advance to let the 
court know the various cases that the solicitor was involved in. The 
court would then try to accommodate the solicitor, or if this was not 
possible the court would press the solicitor to instruct counsel. 
At other courts the liaison between court and profession seemed 
not so efficient and a more aggressive line was taken. A clerk at 
one court said 
324 
"We try and make it so bloody unpleasant for them that they don't 
do it too often." 
The clerk will influence the attitudes of magistrates to solicitors 
who delay court hearings by being needed in two places at once. At 
a different court a clerk reported that at a meeting of the bench,the 
clerk to the justices had pressed for solicitors who kept the court 
waiting to be reprimanded by the magistrates. 
At some courts liaison meetings between clerks and the local Law 
society had taken place, but did not seem to have solved the problem. 
Where certain members of the profession had, in the eyes of the court, 
behaved particularly badly the clerk had reported that solicitor to 
the Law Society, but this strategy seemed ineffective also. 
The problem is undoubtedly a very real one - it seems for all 
magistrates' courts. If local solicitors are to make an acceptable 
living from criminal litigation they need to take on large numbers of 
cases. They are unlikely to accede to requests to instruct counsel 
on every occasion where they find themselves with several cases. 
Clerks are responsible for running the court efficiently. Their 
magistrates, who are at court voluntarily, resent the inconvenience of 
being kept waiting for solicitors who are occupied elsewhere. Clerks 
are unlikely to be g1ven staff and premises to take the pressure off 
the court organisation. Efficient liaison between solicitors and the 
court's listing office may alleviate the problem. There do not seem 
to be any realistic solutions to it. 
"The Learned Clerk" 
The tension which exists between clerks and the profession makes 
itself felt in another area - in the way 1n which advocates and clerks 
relate to one another in court. 
The clerk is the legal adviser to the magistrates. S/he 1S 
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doing a legal job. If advocates wish to ra1se points of law during 
their case, they know that they are, 1n effect,addressing them to the 
clerk who will advise the bench. However, despite their 
responsibilities, clerks are by no means all professionally qualified. 
58% of the clerks interviewed for the present survey were 
professionally qualified. The rest were qualified by having a 
Diploma in Magisterial Law, or by having Part One of the Law Society's 
examinations, or by experience. l (The question of clerk's 
qualifications is dealt with fully 1n Chapter Ten.) 
Clerks believe that this has an effect on the way 1n which they 
are regarded by the legal profession. They feel that advocates look 
down upon clerks who are not professionally qualified. One clerk 
said that advocates sometimes tried to give her a hard time but 
"I think possibly once they are aware of your qualifications, 
that may make a difference." 
A clerk to the justices reported 
'~lsewhere I've experienced court clerks who are not lawyers and 
they have much greater difficulty in dealing with members of the 
profession." 
The bar came in for particular criticism from those clerks who came 1n 
into regular contact with barristers. One clerk said 
"M em b e r s 0 f the Bar are eve n 1 e s s 1 ike 1 y tot rea t you a seq u a 1 s 
unless they know you or unless they suspect that you might be 
legally qualified. Then their attitude subtly changes." 
74% of the clerks interviewed described some problem in their 
relationship with lawyers who practised at their court. They 
descr ibed lawyers as underes t ima t ing them, as attempt ing to exploit 
1. The regulations governing qualifications of Justices' Clerks' 
Assistants are the Justices' Clerks (Qualification of Assistants) 
Rules 1979. Justices' Clerks themselves must be qualified 
professionally (with the exception of some who qualify under 
transitional provisions) by S20 Justices of the Peace Act 1949. 
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them or their colleagues who were not professionally qualified and as 
taking advantage of inexperienced clerks. This was so, whatever the 
type of court, whatever the types of advocates they saw. 
The sorts of incidents that clerks complained of ranged from 
advocates lending an ironical intonation to their voices when 
referring to "the learned clerk", to advocates misrepresenting the law 
in the hope that the clerk would not pick them up on the point. 
Clerks are frequently called upon to advise the magistrates on points 
of law which can be complex and of which they have very little notice. 
One clerk described a case where he had spent a lunch hour reading on 
a point of law in order to advise the magistrates. His advice had 
later been "upheld" by the Court of Appeal in a reserved judgement. 
Considerate advocates give clerks warning of such situations before 
they arise, and discuss the law with clerks. Inconsiderate advocates 
do not do so, and place the clerk in a difficult position. 
Magistrates' courts see their fair share of bad advocacy,and if 
the other side is unrepresented it falls to the clerk to discourage, 
for example, advocates who insist on asking leading questions during 
examination in chief. Some advocates respond badly to such 
interference by the clerk. 
Local solicitors who practised regularly 1n the same courts and 
who had heavy case loads were described as "taking advantage" by 
manoeuvering to have their cases dealt with early. They would, for 
instance approach an inexperienced clerk saying that their case would 
take half an hour to be heard. An experienced clerk automatically 
doubles an advocate's estimate of the time needed for a hearing. An 
inexperienced clerk may be taken 1n, and calIon a case which ties up 
a court for a long time and leaves other shorter cases waiting. 
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Such ploys on the part of advocates can cause an aggressive or 
antagonistic attitude from clerks. A young clerk who was not 
professionally qualified said 
"I am employed to advise the magistrates and if any solicitor 
plays me up I don't care how many qualifications he's got - if 
he's pushing his luck I'll tell him." 
Many of the tensions between advocates and clerks are caused by 
the conflicting needs of the profession and the court organisation. 
Advocates "trying to take advantage" are trying to exploit the system 
to their own ends to get away from court as soon as they can. But it 
1S difficult to ignore the high percentage of clerks who were 
convinced that the"re was a great deal of snobbery and unreasonable 
behaviour towards them by the profession. The clerk's resentment at 
this treatment was exacerbated by the fact that the legal profession 
frequently looked to them for advice. 
The clerk as cynical legal adviser 
"We get the comical situation at times where you get somebody 
rlnglng up for advice and you don't know who it is and then in 
the end you say 'Why don't you see a solicitor?' and they say 
'But I am a solicitor'." 
This story is told, with mlnor variations, by clerks at many 
courts. It captures the somewhat cynical attitude of the numerous 
clerks who believe that the legal profession do not regard them as 
equals, but yet that the profession exploits them by approaching them 
for help. 
96% of clerks reported that local solicitors came to them for 
legal advice. Some of them obviously resented this. One remarked 
"I tell them to look it up. They're paid more than me." 
Another, rather more mildly, made the same point 
" it goes against the grain a little when one realises that we 
give the advice and at the end of the day they reap a handsome 
reward for the advice given to their client - by virtue of the 
advice they've been given from the court." 
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It would seem that some solicitors do bother clerks 
unnecessarily, since several clerks remarked that they were asked for 
advice on points which the solicitor could easily have dealt with 
her/himself. One clerk reported that she had been irritated by a 
solicitor that morning who had telephoned the court to discover 
whether or not possessing an offensive weapon was an indictable 
offence. 
Not all clerks were cynical about the local profession looking to 
them for advice. Some clerks simply saw it as a quid pro quo - the 
clerk helped the solicitor with advice on magisterial law, the 
solicitor helped the clerk when the clerk was conveying his house. 
Possibly help g1ven to a solicitor might be a guarantee of good 
behaviour. 
"If you help them, alright you build up a better relationship and 
you expect that they would assist you in a similar circumstance, 
and certainly wouldn't try any funny business and be awkward and 
play it silly in court. 
There were also those clerks who were philosophical about the 
situation, and who reported no problem arising from solicitors 
approaching them for advice - beyond the necessity to ensure that it 
was a situation in which they could properly advise. But they were 
in a minority. 
Most clerks displayed some ambivalence towards the legal 
profession. They did not have any fundamental objection to 
solicitors approaching them for advice - they advise all of those who 
use the courts, where they can properly do so, because they are the 
experts. But nevertheless they resented the fact that solicitors 
looked to them for advice, but did not regard them as equals, preyed 
on clerk's expertise and then made things difficult for the clerks in 
Court. 
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conclusions 
The relationship between the legal profession and clerks IS 
regrettably bad. 
on both sides. 
There are undoubtedly instances of wrong behaviour 
Some clerks are obstructive to advocates. Some 
advocates are unreasonable towards clerks. 
Amelioration of the problems may be achieved to some extent by 
efforts by clerks to accommodate the needs of the profession - for 
instance by instigating liaison discussions with local solicitors 
which have the function of both education and determination of court 
pol icy. Efforts from advocates are also needed. Closer liaison at 
the level of individual cases from advocates would be helpful together 
with a more sympathetic understanding of the needs of the court. 
Also, although there is no excuse for the snobbery and bad 
behaviour towards unqualified clerks of which clerks accuse the 
profession, we will later be arguing (in Chapter Ten) that one of the 
most urgent priorities for clerks IS the institution of an all 
professional service. When there is greater exchange of personnel 
between legal professional practice and the courts service, then both 
sides are likely to achieve greater understanding of the other's 
problems. 
However such moves do not attack the root of the problem, which 
IS that the needs of the court organisation conflict with the needs of 
the advocates. This is a problem which cannot be solved by changes 
In individual attitudes. I t can be s ignif icant ly as s is ted, however, 
by relieving the pressures on the court organisation. If there were 
more magistrates, more courtrooms, more clerks, more court staff, the 
listing and allocation of cases in court would not be such an 
enormous logistical problem, and the needs of the profession (not to 
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mention the costs of the legal aid fund) could be better catered for. 
The legal profession might be best advised, instead of directing 
attention to the problems of individual courts, to direct its 
attention at a national level to the allocation of resources to 
• I 
magistrates courts. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CLERK AND PROBATION OFFICERS 
AND SOC IAL WORKERS 
The clerk and the probation serV1ce 
The influence of the clerk to the justices 
The clerk and social workers 
The history of the relationship 
Dressing for the part 
Identifying with the client 
Understanding court procedure 
Improving the relationship between court and social workers 
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The relationship between the clerk and probation officers and 
social workers 
In this chapter we exam~ne the relationship between clerks and 
probation and social serv~ces. Superficially both probation officers 
and social workers have a similar function so far as the court is 
concerned - the provision of information to the court about 
defendants to assist the court to make an informed decision. In 
fact there are very great differences between the jobs that social 
workers and probation officers do, and very marked differences in 
their relationship to the court. Whilst the relationship between the 
court and probation officers is almost universally one of friendly 
respect, the same cannot be said for that between the majority of 
courts and the social workers who appear in them. 
The clerk and the probation service 
The probation service has its or~g~ns with what were called 
'police-court missionaries' at the end of the last century. 
Probation officers and probation orders have been in existence since 
the Probation of Offenders Act 1907. 
Magistrates' courts have, therefore, known the probation serv~ce 
for a very long time. Some of the clerks interviewed for the present 
survey had very long service in magistrates' courts, but not even the 
longest serving clerk interviewed could recollect a court without 
probation officers. Several reminisced about the days when there had 
been so few officers that they were able to know them all personally. 
The longest serv~ng clerk described his relationship with probation 
officers ~n his early days as a clerk as "very close and very 
cordial", and he regretted that there were now too many officers to 
permit such a personal relationship with them all. But although the 
intimacy of earlier days is no longer to be found, probation officers 
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are In court every day, and over a period of time clerks do get to 
know at least some of the local officers. 
The relationship between clerks and probation officers is not 
confined to the courtroom. Clerks who serve on probation case 
committees come to have a close understanding of the way the probation 
service works, and similarly the probation officers develop a better 
knowledge of clerks and magistrates. There is also often involvement 
in training from both sides. Some clerks teach on training courses 
for probation officers. The probation service also provides training 
sessIons on the courses organised by clerks for the training of 
magistrates. 
All newly appointed magistrates must be trained. This training 
IS divided into two parts. Part One is introductory material and is 
followed by practical experience in court. Part Two is more detailed 
and contains substantial material on sentencing. The "B 1 ue Book", 
which specifies the areas to be covered by magistrates training, 
provides that magistrates shall examine 
"Probation and supervision. An explanation of the legal 
aspects and of the social work implications. Special 
requirements and breaches of orders. Function of the Probation 
Case Commtttee. The ranges of work undertaken by probation 
officers." 
Therefore the clerks to the justices who organIse these sessions, and 
the new magistrates who attend them gain a good basic understanding of 
the probation officer's job. At a magistrates' training session 
observed during this study a probation officer gave an excellent 
seminar on social enquiry reports, detailing the ways in which a 
probation officer collects and tests information for such a report, 
and explaining how decisions as to content and recommendations for 
1 • 'The Training of Magistrates'. 
1978.p.22. 
Lord Chancellor's Department 
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sentence are made. The justices' clerks runnlng the training 
session reported that they had exercised considerable care to find a 
probation officer who had an aptitude for training and who was a good 
speaker. These clerks regarded it as extremely important that their 
benches should have a thorough understanding of the way the probation 
2 
serVlce operates. 
The probation serVlce itself lS conscious of the need to 
maintain a good relationship with the courts, and it puts a great deal 
of effort into educating officers about the expectations, practices 
and procedures of the court. Carlen and Powell have shown that 
probation officers are expert at maintaining their credibility with 
the magistrates and their good relationship with other professionals 
k·· . , 3 wor lng ln maglstrates courts. Their study demonstrated that 
probation officers were jealous of their tradition of good standing 
with clerks and bench, worked hard to maintain it, and indeed were 
contemptuous of social workers who did not work to foster such a 
relationship.4 
The daily presence of probation officers in court, the out-of-
court contacts, and the efforts of the probation service to understand 
and accommodate to the needs and expectations of the court have 
2. No session on the operation of the Social Service Department was 
included - although such a session did form part of training for 
juvenile court magistrates. 
3. Pat Carlen and Margaret Powell. 'Professionals ln the 
Magistrates' Courts: The Courtroom Lore of Probation Officers 
and Social Workers' ,in Howard Parker,(ed.)' Social Work and The 
Courts.' Edward Arnold 1979. 
4. Carlen and Powell, ibid. detail a "set of precepts for 
maintaining credibility with magistrates" (p.1ll) which probation 
officers use which include making themselves visible and , 
appearing competent in court, talking to magistrates out of 
court dressing appropriately, providing positive re-inforcement 
for ~agistrates, and tailoring their report writing to the 
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expectations of the bench. 
succeeded in creating a very positive relationship. Almos t every 
clerk interviewed reported that her/his relationship with probation 
officers working at the court was good or excellent. One said 
"I don't think there 1S anything unsatisfactory 1n our 
relationship at all." 
Another commented 
"Well in fact I seem to know probation officers in court more 
than anyone else. I can relax with them whereas you've got to 
be on your guard against relaxing in the presence of police 
officers and solicitors because they are out to trip everybody up 
and get the best for their client." 
The only clerk to express reservations about probation officers 
(specifically, about their sentencing recommendations) nevertheless 
said that the probation staff at his court were good. 
Carlen and Howard (1979) have demonstrated the effort invested by 
the probation service in developing a good relationship with the 
court, and the s oph is t icat ion of probat ion of ficer' sunders tanding of 
the needs and expectations of the court. The present research 
demonstrates, however, that the positive relationship between 
probation service and court is also fostered by a system of mutual 
favours and assistance between clerks and magistrates and the 
probation service. 
The favours done by clerks for the probation serV1ce consist 
mainly of instances of free legal advice. To a great extent such 
advice concerns the business of the court. A probation officer may 
ask a clerk if the sentence s/he wishes to recommend in a report is 
one which is available to the court, or may ask what view the bench 
usually takes of a particular type of offence. Frequently probation 
officers will look for advice if they are considering proceeding for 
breach of a probation order - if, as one clerk put it, they want to 
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know "whether to bring proceedings to court or let things go a bit 
longer". 
However probation officers also use clerks for advice on matters 
which are not directly concerned with proceedings before the court. 
One clerk being interviewed commented that he had just given some 
advice to a probation officer 
"That was a matter that involved some civil law, and how the 
order that this court had made would be affected by orders made 
by a civil court." 
Many clerks reported that they were used by probation officers as a 
sort of unofficial advice agency for probation clients on all areas of 
law. 
The clerks expressed none of the cyn1c1sm or impatience 1n 
relation to requests for advice from probation officers that they 
expressed in relation to such requests from police or the legal 
profession. Several clerks said that they encouraged probation 
officers to come to them for advice - that they were happy to help. 
One said 
"I consider it my duty to help them in any way I can." 
Clerks see probation officers as part of the criminal justice 
process, but unlike solicitors they are not "making a handsome profit" 
from it, and unlike police they cannot be expected to know the law or 
employ their own lawyers. Also, helping the probation service does 
not open the clerks to any risks of acting partially. 
Helping the probation serV1ce also has its rewards, 1n that the 
favours done by clerks are amply repaid by reciprocal favours done 
for the court by probation officers. 
" •.. you're normally quite helpful 
they can help the magistrates 
advisers to go to." 
As one clerk commented 
to them because if they want 
- and they don't have legal 
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The favours done by the probation serV1ce for the court are many and 
varied. One of them consists of taking difficult, frightened or 
confused defendants off the hands of the court. 
We showed in Chapter Four an instance where a defendant whose 
case was remanded but who was under the mistaken impression that he 
was being sentenced to imprisonment was referred to the probation 
serV1ce, so that an explanation of what had happened in his case could 
be made. Commonly, even where there 1S no question of a social 
enquiry report or a probation order, a probation officer will be 
called upon to calm down and explain matters to confused defendants. 
Interpreting the language and ritual of the courtroom to defendants 
mystified by it is a speciality of the probation service. Dealing 
with "difficult" people is another. 
"I think the probation officers can be helpful in court where 
you've got difficult defendants - and particularly inadequate 
defendants. Then I think the probation service can be helpful to 
really see whether or not they are just trying it on or are 
backward, or whatever." 
" .•• they can have a word with them (defendants) in much more 
straightforward terms without the encumbrances of legal niceties 
in court, you know." 
Coping with "the nutcases" 1S yet another speciality. 
"I had a drunk about four or five days ago who came up wearing 
nothing but a pair of pants, and he couldn't remember where he'd 
lost his clothes. The magistrates .•• were worried about 
somebody out in the wide world with nothing but a pair of pants." 
It was, of course, the probation service who dealt with this. 
Helping the confused and inadequate seems to have been formalised 1n 
Some courts as a job for probation officers. 
"With this court, perhaps its because we don't have a duty 
solicitor scheme, the probation service try to weed out from the 
list people who look as though they might require some advice 
before they get into court." 
Other courts had a system of "stand down reports" or "day of hearing 
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reports" where a probation officer would take a convicted defendant 
aside and elicit background and mitigating factors and present these 
to the court in a quick oral reporrt. Such reports hardly fulfil the 
usual rigorous requirements of social enquiry reports. They are 
really used as substitutes for a lawyers plea in mitigation, or the 
more laborious process of clerk and magistrate eliciting the 
information direct from a frightened and inarticulate defendant. 
Such reports must often be helpful to a defendant too Overawed by 
the court to explain her or himself properly. 
However, such day of hearing reports are 1n Some senses 
problematic. Their usefulness must be limited in that there are no 
checks on the correctness or adequacy of the information in them. If 
used frequently they may have the effect of transferring the decision 
about whether a full social enquiry report is needed from the bench to 
the probation serV1ce. This may be a good thing, but it should be a 
decision consciously taken. The other danger is that such reports 
will be used as a substitute for legal representation. 5 
As well as making such reports, probation officers do other 
tasks. They find clothes and money for destitute people, check for 
bail hostel places, and even run errands and act as impromptu ushers. 
The proba t ion 0 f f ice rs in te rv ie wed by Car len and Howard 6 said tha t 
they were willing to do things which were no part of their proper 
duties because it kept them in good standng with the court. The 
5. Although some do not perceive this as a danger. Carlen and 
Howard (ibid) and Bottoms and McLean (1976) suggested that 
defendants may be happier with a probation officer than with a 
lawyer. 
6. See ibid. p. 102. 
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present research confirms that it is an effective strategy. Clerks 
like and respect probation officers. They see them as doing valuable 
work and doing it well. They are pepared to listen to what the 
probation serVice have to say. The probation service, therefore has 
a direct route to the good opinions of the magistrates through 
contact both in and out of court, and an indirect route through 
clerks. 
Many of the clerks interviewed were enthusiastic in their praise 
of probation officers for 'due process' reasons. Clerks recognised 
that some defendants could not present their cases adequately because 
of nervousness or other problems. Clerks also recognised that their 
own attempts to elicit information from defendants were not 
necessarily effective. Many clerks were, therefore,pleased that a 
relatively impartial person could render assistance. One clerk, with 
a mixture of cynicism and sincerity made the following comment 
"We find it not very useful in this area to hand out literature -
because it's made into paper darts, and all the bail forms are 
plastered allover the cell walls or stuffed into the ventilators 
.•• so I think if there's somebody not directly associated with 
the magistrates who can help, then that's fine. That's the sort 
of role I like to see them play." 
However clerks have organisational motives for their enthusiasm 
about the probation service. We have already seen in Chapter Four 
that explaining complicated procedures and provisions to unrepresented 
people is expensive of time, and that it is in the clerk's interests 
to save time. Referring "difficult" defendants to the probation 
service saves time, and clerks consciously use such referral as a time 
saving mechanism. One clerk remarked that deferring the case of a 
distraught defendant so that s/he could speak to a probation officer 
" .•• saves an awful lot of court time and a lot of money." 
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Another remarked 
"We had a case last Monday - it could have taken all day but 
after chats with solicitors and probation officers there was an 
agreement and it lasted about an hour." 
The probation service also resolves problems ar1s1ng 1n relation to 
defendants who do not fit into any of the recognised categories of the 
court or who are not susceptible to any established procedures. 
"I mean there are obviously cases of people coming to this court 
. , 
who Just oughtn t to be here, or who are not deserving of any 
punishment, and they can't really get help from any recognised 
agency because there just isn't an agency to deal with their 
particular problem. I think sometimes the probation service can 
be helpful there, dealing with cases that don't fit into any 
recognised categories." 
Referral of 'difficult' defendants to the probation serV1ce 
satisfies both the liberal in the clerk, S1nce the defendant has been 
referred to a car1ng agency, and the bureaucrat since the time of the 
court has been saved. 
The influence of the clerk to the justices 
The relationship between clerks and probation officers 1S 
generally sound, for the reasons we have explained. But still, given 
that in all courts the relationship was good, at some courts it was 
better than at others. 
Some of the reasons for this were rather mundane. At a few of 
the courts the probation service was housed in a separate building, 
possibly at a distance from the clerks' offices. Thus informal 
discussions and consultations between clerks and probation officers 
were made more difficult. It seems that even the layout of the court 
can make a difference. A clerk at one court commented that the 
courtrooms were so laid out that the probation officers sat behind the 
clerk. He therefore could not see them and it was difficult to talk 
to them so that he did not know them very well. 
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However problems of geography can be overcome if necessary and 
the attitude of the clerk to the justices can be influential. A clerk 
who is enthusiastic about the importance of probation officers will 
seek to foster a close relationship between the clerks, the 
magistrates and the probation service. 
A good example of a clerk with a favourable attitude was the 
clerk at Court L, who thought that probation officers were 
" ., 
••• amaz~ng. They're absolutely essential." 
This clerk was particularly conscious of the large number of people 
who came before the court which he categorised as "general social 
problems". He instanced prostitutes, alcoholics, vagrants and 
itinerants. He was of the op~n~on that such people needed help, and 
that the usual arsenal of remedies available to the magistrates was 
inappropriate. The probation serv~ce was, ~n his v~ew, invaluable in 
trying to find ways to help such people. This clerk consequently 
made great efforts to develop a close relationship between clerks and 
probation officers. At his court, there was a Probation Liaison 
Committee meeting three or four times a year, and a court clerks' and 
Probation Officers' Liaison Group meeting from time to time. 
Probation officers and clerks were encouraged to be friendly. 
Probation officers were invited into the clerk's office for coffee, 
and social meetings were arranged. The clerk to the justices claimed 
a close relationship with senior probation officers and with the 
community service officer, and encouraged formal and informal liaison. 
At this court, a great deal of effort was invested in keeping up 
a healthy relationship. Although clerks to the justices at other 
courts described their relationship with the probation service as good 
none of them put quite so much effort into maintaining it. An 
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enthusiastic clerk to the justices can, therefore, considerably assist 
1n the creation of a healthy relationship between probation officers 
and the court. 
The court 1S the focus of the probation officer's job. It 
creates the officer's work, directly by requiring reports, making 
probation orders and other sorts of supervision orders, or indirectly 
by passing the sentences which result in aftercare responsibilities. 
The efforts that the probation serV1ce invests in maintaining a good 
relationship with the courts have paid off 1n terms of magistrates' 
courts. The clerks - whose influence on bench attitudes 1S 
considerable - have a very high opinion of the probation service, and 
desire to help them to the best of their ability. Unfortunately the 
same cannot be said for the attitude of clerks to social workers. 
The clerks and social workers 
The history of the relationship 
Whereas probation officers have been working closely with courts 
for very many years, extensive contact between social workers and the 
courts is more recent. 
Magistrates and clerks have been used to appearances in court by 
social workers, where the social worker's client became the subject of 
court proceedings. However, contact between the court and social 
services was increased considerably by the Children and Young Persons 
Act 1969. 
Unfortunately the increased contact commenced in an atmosphere of 
controversy over the new legis la t ion. The Act had been preceded by 
7 two White Papers, 'The Child the Family and the Young Offender' and 
'Children in Trouble.'S The emphasis of both papers was on dealing 
7. 1965. Home Office 
8. 1965. Home Office 
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with children in trouble in the community, and on avoiding children 
gOing to court. The 1969 Act contained much less radical provisions 
than the first White Paper which had seen no role for juvenile courts. 
Neverthe les s, it did trans fer some of the res pons ibil i ty for making 
decisions about children from the courts to social service departments 
- for instance where the court made a care order under the 1969 Act, 
the decision about what happened to the child once the order was made 
lay entirely with social services. 9 The 1969 Act also came at the 
same time as the re-oganisation of social serVice departments under 
the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970. 
Magistrates resented the limitation of their powers under the 
1969 Act. 10 The Social Services Departments were perhaps not in the 
bes t s i tua t ion to begin to implement it. The relationship between 
courts and social workers under the new legislation did not, therefore 
begin in an atmosphere of cordiality. Anderson, in his study of 
representation in juvenile courts reports that there was "scarcely 
concealed hostility between magistrates and social workers at this 
time.,,11 
One of the problems was that social workers were often not 
experienced in the rules, procedures and expectations of the courts. 
Inevitably comparisons were made with those who were experienced. 
9. The Criminal Justice Act 1982 has reversed this process somewhat 
by allowing magistrates to specify the terms of care orders where 
an order is made subsequent to an offence. 
10. See Donald 
Constable. 
Ford. 'Children Courts 
Chapter Three. 
and Caring.' 1975. 
11. R. Anderson, 'Representation in Juvenile Courts.' Routledge & 
Kegan paul 1978. 
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Anderson asserts l2 that 
"Magistrates began to draw distinctons between the local 
authority social workers and the probation service; the latter 
with its longer professional links with the court was felt to be 
more capable of providing the 'right' attitudes, being more 
aware of the bench itself and their expectations." 
One of the clerks interviewed for this survey echoed the same 
sent iment. 
"The probation service has been with us a long time, and of 
course there is a special relationship in that they are officers 
of the court ••• the social workers approach is not anything 
like as professonal. 
In this atmosphere of mistrust, hostility and disadvantageous 
comparIsons wi th the probation service, magis tra tes began to use, it 
seems, some fairly crass stereotypes of social workers. Donald Ford, 
a magistrate intimately involved with juvenile courts writes of this 
period 
"The direction of many attacks was against the social workers and 
the social services departments of the local authorities. The 
idea that a 'young social worker' (they were always young!) could 
know better than an experienced bench was not an acceptable 
proposition. This gave rise to what has been called the 'mini 
skirted dolly bird' syndrome! It always seemed to be the 
judgement of a 'mini skirted dollybird' female social worker that 
the magistrates took greatest exception to ..•• It interested me 
that when fashion changed a new epithet emerged: 'the 
betrousered baggage,,,13 
The present research was begun on the naIve assumption that the 
relationship between social workers and the courts had improved. The 
parties have, after all, had ten years to acclimatise to each other. 
This assumption, however, turned out to be quite wrong, and it is 
regrettably obvious from the remarks of clerks that the relationship 
has not become any better. Court clerks, at any rate, still have a 
12. At pages 22-23. 
13. Ford, D. 'Children, Courts and Caring.' 
1975, at p.34-5. 
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Constable, London, 
very bad op1n1on of social workers and operate sterotypes of them as 
critical as those reported by Ford. A Selection of comments from 
clerks will illustrate this point. 
"They drift into court and drift out of court and they've got to 
'relate to their clients' and they're wearing roll neck pullovers 
and scruffy jeans." 
"There's this sort of picture of some social workers in jeans and 
long hair and you wonder if they are defendants Or social 
workers ••• but, I do take them seriously, obviously." 
"Social workers have got a bad reputation. Usually they are 
very young and you can't be sure they are going to be any better 
in their appearance or their reaction to court proceedings than 
the clients they're with •.• and they seem to be as aggressive as 
the juveniles they are there to help." 
"Any difference of view I have about social workers is down to my 
own individual bias, and I suppose its true to say that I tend to 
think of social workers as being a lesser breed of person." 
For clerks, "the betrousered baggage" seems to have been replaced 
by the lout in the Levis! 
The remarks quoted above are only a small selection of similar 
responses coming from clerks when asked about their relationship with 
social workers at their court. The quotations are all from clerks at 
different courts. 
The sterotypes are obvious and censor10US, and are cause for 
concern in themselves. It seems likely on the available evidence 
that magistrates share these opinions, or that they will be influenced 
by them, directly or indirectly. 
Although the Criminal Justice Act of 1982 has returned some of 
the discretion about disposal of juveniles to the juvenile court, 
nevertheless the close involvement of magistrates and social workers 
in the juvenile court is going to continue, and the opinions held by 
clerks and magistrates about social workers remain a cause for 
concern. The extent to which magistrates lend credibility to social 
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workers' evidence, reports and recommendations 1S at stake, as 1S the 
likelihood that clerks will foster effective liaison and a productive 
relationship with social workers. 
The history of the 1969 Act cannot be rewritten, but the 
conflicts and resentments it generated can be ameliorated in some 
respects. Some of the comments of the clerks interviewed for this 
survey clarify their attitudes to and opinions about social workers 
and contain valuable indicators of ways in which the relationship 
might be improved. 
Dressing for the part 
A significant part of the clerks' criticism of social workers 
seemed to revolve around what social workers wear in court. 
Magistrates' courts, 1n common with other courts, appear to be 
obsessive about dress. The standards they 1mpose on anyone 
associated with the court are high, and rigid. There was a time, for 
instance when much heart searching took place about whether it was 
proper for lady magistrates to appear in court without a hat 14 
although such informality is now commonplace. Men associated with 
the court are expected to dress smartly in a suit, or at least a 
collar and tie. Women are not usually permitted to wear trousers. 
In the formal setting of the courtroom, information as to the 
character and respectability of individuals are taken from dress. 
Probation officers are aware of this. One of the probabtion 
officers interviewed by Carlen and Powell said 
" if I'm going to court with a client in front of a magistrate 
whom I know to be very much of the old school, I will tie my hair 
back and I would wear a skirt, simply so that he's not 
antagonistic to the picture I present. Now that's daft if you 
think about it logically - the fact that I'm bothering to dress 
14. See for instance, The Magistrate. Editorial Vol.28 No.1. (1972) 
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up for a magistrate. But if its a court where I don't know the 
magistrate I tone down, because I think there's more chance of 
his taking what I say seriously. If he can dismiss me as a slip 
of a girl, or an unrealistic hippy, then there's less chance that 
he will read my recommendation seriously."lS 
This officer was aiming to conform to the expectations of the 
magistrate, but clerks, as well as magistrates take these matters 
seriously. Their stereotype of social workers focussed on the length 
of hair, the wearing of jeans. They saw the appearance of social 
workers as a failure to adjust to the expectations of the court and as 
a statement by social workers that their primary identification was 
with their clients, rather than with the court. The reason given by 
many clerks for objecting to the appearance of social workers was that 
" ••• sometimes you have a job picking them out from defendants." 
One clerk confessed 
"I have had the misfortune to think a social worker was a 
defendant and ask him which case he was." 
It would require systematic observation of juvenile courts to 
assess whether the appearance of social workers is in fact deviant. 
The present study included juvenile courts, but the largest part of 
the court observations took place in adult courts. However, given 
this limitation, eighteen months employment and many months of 
observation at different courts turned up very few social workers 
whose dress differed markedly from that of the probation service. 
One soc ial worker who did appear looking Its cruf fy" had been called in 
that day from a youth employment workshop at the request of the 
magistrates who did not want to delay a case for formal reports. 
This worker was very careful to make apologies for appearing at court 
in his working clothes. A social worker questioned about court dress 
15. Carlen & Powell (1979) p. 112. 
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said that although she was sometimes surprised by the informal 
appearance of some social workers nevertheless at her office everyone 
had "their court dress" - a smart outfit for appearances at court. 
It would seem that clerks' stereotype of social workers 
appearance is - like all stereotypes - a very imperfect reflection of 
reality. Almost certainly there are some social workers who resent 
the conventions about dress in court, and flout them. It is perhaps 
less likely that there are some who are unaware of the conventions and 
thus do not conform. But the most interesting aspect of clerks' 
stereotype of social workers appearance is the criticism that they 
look too much like defendants. This image is linked to another 
criticism made by clerks of social workers - that social workers 
identify excessively with their clients. 
Identifying with the client 
Clerks perceive social workers as having too little concern for 
the tasks of the court, and as seeing issues solely from the client's 
point of View. 
One clerk expressed his feeling forcibly. 
"I think some of them are deplorable, terrible! I think it seems 
to be that - I can't honestly say that whether they go through a 
brain washing system or whatever, but their training - well they 
seem to come out and look at things just from the client's side 
and how they can get as lenient a sentence for them, whatever the 
cost. Even if it means obstructing the court to some extent ..• I 
know most court clerks feel the same way." 
Another said 
"They want to be seen on the de fendan t' s s ide and not as of f icers 
of the court, whereas the probation officers on the whole manage 
a very successful balance between the two." 
And a third 
"I think generally social workers tend to be labelled differently 
to probation officers in that they tend to have a much more 
client oriented label." 
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Again these quotations are from clerks at different courts, and 
reflect the attitude of many other clerks. 
The comparison which is made of social workers with probation 
officers is very revealing. The clerks expect social workers to 
behave like probation officers, and because they do not always do so, 
the clerks are critical. However this is, to a large extent, a 
failure by clerks to understand the job of the social worker. 
The probation officer is an "officer of the court".16 The 
social worker is not. The probation officer's job is focussed 
specifically around the court which provides her/him directly, or 
indirectly via prison, with his/his work and clients. The social 
worker's job is not focussed on the court in the same way. Some of a 
workers' clients may come referred directly from the juvenile court, 
but very many do not. Social work clients originate in the main from 
the local community, and although court appearances may be a fact of 
life for many clients such appearances may well be a reflection of 
crises and failures in clients lives. For social workers their court 
appearances may not be a part of a process that originated with the 
court and is maintained because of the courts action over a set period 
with the possibility of referral back to the court, in the way of 
proba t ion or parole. For social workers court appearances are just 
one aspect of a relationship with a client - and usually the least 
successful aspect. A social worker in Carlen and Powell's sample 
, f '1 ,,17 said (of the adult court) - "its a parade of all your al ures • 
16. The Departmental Committee on the Probation Service (Cmnd. 1650, 
1962) defined the probation officer as "social case worker who 
is an officer of the court". 
17. Carlen and Powell, 1979, p. 110. 
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It is true that Since 1969 local authority social workers have 
had greatly increased involvement in juvenile courts, and that in 
respect of children they may be given responsibilities under 
supervision orders which are comparable to the responsibilities of 
probabtion officers. But for the social worker, clients referred in 
this way will form a small proportion of their case load. They are 
highly unlikely to ever have as much court experience as a probation 
Officer. 
However clerks expect social workers to have the same attitudes 
to their clients as they expect from probation officers. Most clerks 
do not seem to understand the nature of the social workers role -
although there are a few who are beginning to. A more informed 
attitude may be seen particularly in clerks who do a lot of work in 
the juvenile court. One commented 
"But I think in fact so often when you break it down, and you get 
to know them personally, as we do in the juvenile court ••. you 
begin to understand their way of thinking. I think so often it's 
a question of not understanding it, rather than actually being 
that far apart." 
Possibly where clerks have increased contact with social workers 
in the juvenile court they do begin to understand the differences 
between the jobs of social workers and probation officers. Some of 
the distortions in the clerks' image of social workers may thus be 
broken down. 
Understanding court procedure. 
Assoc iated with the cr it ic ism by clerks that soc ial workers are 
too client-orientated is another - that social workers are not 
sufficiently court-oriented. Clerks criticise social workers for not 
knowing the rules. 
" they've got no idea about report writing or report 
presentation or even what's expected of them when they get into 
court, and before long they've moved on and there's another." 
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"Some social workers are good but others tend to have a sloppy 
attitude to the court ••• they don't bother to find out what's 
expected of them." 
"They don't give their evidence so well - they don't seem to 
understand giving evidence as do probation officers." 
Again there is the same compar1son being made between probation 
officers and social workers, and again it 1S a comparison which is 
difficult to justify, since social workers will very rarely have the 
same amount of experience of courts as probation officers. 
However this criticism of social workers 1S one which 1S also 
made by probation officers. Carlen and Powell's study refers to a 
"professional rift" between probation officers and social workers and 
cites criticisms of social workers by probation officers for their 
being unfamiliar with the powers of the court, and ignorant of 
appropriate ways to approach the court. 18 
Probation officers are very aware of the need to have the respect 
of the court. They work hard to gain the credibility of the court so 
that the interests of their clients will be served. 19 They feel that 
if the magistrate respects them slhe will be more willing to listen to 
the officer in court and more willing to follow a recommendation in a 
report, even when it 1S a little unusual. 
Whereas clerks do trust probation officers - and try hard to 
ensure that the magistrates understand and trust them also - they do 
not necessarily respect the judgement of social workers 1n the same 
way. 
Some clerks saw social workers as living 'in cloud cuckoo land'. 
"Sometimes they do present a very rosy optimistic picture which 
doesn't help the defendant because the expectations of the 
defendant are raised too far." 
18. Carlen and Powell (1979) p.I09-110 
19. Ibid p.lli. 
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"I don't think I've ever had the same confidence in the social 
services that I've had in probation officers. I think this 
boils down to experience of them and not being satisfied that 
their enquiries are necessarily exhaustive and the information 
they put before the court sufficiently reliable to be 
dependable." 
One clerk who criticised social workers for their naivetywas 
nevertheless prepared to concede that they might be right. 
"I think clerks tend to see social workers, when they are writing 
their reports to the court,as seeing life through rOSe tinted 
spectacles or in a slightly naive way - and that's probably 
because we've become rather case hardened after many years of 
exposure to similar sorts of cases - perhaps their reality is 
better than ours - I don't know." 
This clerk was, however, in a minor i ty. Very few of his colleagues 
were prepared to concede that social workers might see defendants more 
accurately than they themselves did. 
In one sense it is not the clerks' V1ew of the social worker that 
matters. It is the magistrates who are responsible for taking 
decisions. However the evidence of magistrates like Ford (1975) 
suggests that their views of social workers may be little different 
from their clerks'. We have seen (in Chapter Three) that the clerk has 
cons iderab Ie infl uence on the bench in court, and we shall argue (in 
Chapter Eight) that the clerk also influences the magistrates through 
their training. The attitudes of clerks should not, therefore, be 
ignored. 
Improving the relationship between courts and social workers. 
There are a number of indicators in the data of ways in which the 
relationship between court and social workers might be improved. 
First, familiarity, it seems, breeds respect. Several clerks 
commented that when they came to know individual social workers and 
discussed their work with them they gained respect for them. 
"Well I suppose I'm slightly anti social workers generally, 
although individual social workers one gets to know after a time 
and you get to trust their jUdgement." 
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Many clerks felt that the poor relationship was 'just lack of 
familiarity' or 'entirely a question of the degree of personal 
contact' • 
There are some very obvious ways 1n which contact can be 
increased. One 1S by the clerk to the justices taking initiatives to 
create or 1ncrease discussions with social services. One clerk to 
the justices reported that he had liaison meetings with the local 
authority social serV1ces department as often as there were probation 
case committees, and that although he could never hope for the same 
relationship that he had with the probation service because social 
workers do not appear 1n court with comparable frequency, he 
nevertheless now knew the senior officers in the department. There 
was thus a chance of communication in case of problems, or 1ssues 
needing resolution. 
The participation of the clerk to the justices 1n training 
programmes for social workers was also welcomed by some clerks. One 
said 
" I go along to the Social Services Training Section from time 
to time and talk to social workers about their involvement with 
the courts and what I expect from them - or the courts expect 
from them - so that they're not living in cloud cuckoo land." 
At another court the clerk to the justices and his deputy "arranged 
meetings with clerks and social serV1ces staff because •••. 
magistrates, particularly the juvenile panel had a certain amount of 
susp ic ion of them". This clerk also arranged meetings between social 
services and magistrates and visits to var10US institutions. 
Such liaison meetings ought to be helpful 1n informing clerks and 
magistrates and, given that some of the problems seem to ar1se from a 
lack of understanding by clerks and magistrates of the role of the 
social workers, should improve the relationship between court and 
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social workers. 
More training for social workers in matters relating to the 
court, its powers, procedures and the job of the social worker in 
court should also assist matters. Social workers may argue that they 
attend court on few occasions, and that therefore the expenditure of a 
great deal of time in training for court appearances is not justified. 
However, the occasions when they do go to court, whilst infrequent, 
will be very important for their clients. It is short sighted to 
ignore the fact that the court has power, and power which affects the 
way in which social workers do their jobs. If social workers wish to 
have an impact on those who wield that power, then they must 
familiarise themselves with the expectations of the court. Training 
in the powers and procedures of the court for social workers could 
take place as in-service training in their departments, or as part of 
their professional training. Although one hesitates to add more to 
Certificate of Qualification in Social Work courses, they might 
appropriately contain more information, not only on the powers of the 
courts but also on procedure and evidence, and the court's 
expectations of social workers. 
Social workers also have a great deal to teach clerks. Some of 
the clerks responses to the questionnaire indicate a certain rather 
smug superiority which is unjustified. Other responses indicate a 
willingness to learn more. Either way, ongoing training for clerks 
about, inter alia, the job of the social worker may help to dispel 
Some of the misconceptions. The organisation of such training should 
be the responsibility of the clerk to the justices. 
The role of the "court liaison officer" or the "court team" is 
also another possible avenue for confronting the present problems. 
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Some social serV1ces departments have appointed a worker or a team of 
workers (depending on workload and other factors) who are are attached 
to the courts - in the sense that their duties are to liaise with the 
court, and with social workers appearing in court to ensure that the 
proceedings run smoothly. They are, at some courts, able to relieve 
social workers of appearing by presenting reports if the author of the 
report is not needed. If social workers do appear,they can brief 
them as to the court's expectations, and support them and deal with 
questions and problems. At courts where there was such a liaison 
officer, or where there was a court team almost all clerks reported a 
positive relationship with them. One clerk described the court 
liaison officer as 
" ••• a buffer between the court and the individual social workers 
- who no matter how hard they tried - could never get the same 
experience of court as a probation officer will. II 
Clerks were able to get to know the court social workers well and had 
a reference point for dealing with any difficulties. They were able 
to develop a relationship in which they could come to understand the 
needs and attitudes of social workers. Not all courts had a liaison 
officer or court team. Perhaps more social services departments 
could consider uS1ng them. They did, so far as clerks were 
concerned, play an effective role 1n developing understanding between 
court and social worker. Cordial relations at the level of the clerk 
to the justices and senior social workers may be less of a guarantee 
of understanding between the two groups than daily liaison between a 
social worker who demonstrates a familiarity with the court's needs 
and expectations and the court clerks. 
Anderson's study of representation 1n juvenile courts showed that 
the attitude of juvenile courts to social workers can differ 
considerably from court to court. For instance he showed that the 
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degree to which a court accepts the client orientation of the social 
worker var1es with the extent to which the court itself accepts a 
welfare orientation as opposed to a punitive orientation. 20 Parker, 
Casburn and Turnbull 21 also demonstrate wide variations in the 
approach of juvenile courts to social workers and social enquiry 
reports inter al ia. These differences of approach develop with the 
traditions of the bench over the years. They are perpetuated in the 
way the bench trains and educates its new members, and by the 
experlence those new members have when they begin to sit on the bench. 
The clerks, and especially the clerks to the justices, playa very 
considerable part in this process. 
Any attempt to influence the attitude of juvenile courts by 
educating new magistrates 1S not likely to have any substantial 
effects Slnce they must then react against their experienced 
colleagues and qualified and experienced clerks. Educating the 
educators - the clerks who run the training courses and sit in the 
courts - may be more effective. 
Certainly where there exists such a pervas1ve and continuing 
antagonism and lack of understanding between the court (clerk and 
bench) and social workers, some measures need to be taken to alter the 
situation. It is true that the juvenile court is still suffering 
from the legacy of conflicts associated with the 1969 Act. But these 
problems cannot be used as an excuse for failing to confront any of 
the difficulties of the present. It would of course be naive to hope 
that a better understanding between clerks and social workers would 
20. Anderson 1978. 
21. Howard Parker, Maggie Casburn and David Turnbull. 'The 
Production of Punitive Juvenile Justice.' 20. Brit. J. 
Criminol. 236. (1980) 
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solve all the problems of the juvenile court, but it must help some of 
them. 
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Chapter E igh t 
The influence of the clerk to the justices on magistrates and court 
staff out of court 
In Chapter Three we analysed the relationship of the clerk ~n 
court to the magistrates, and emphasised that this relationship ~s 
affected by the traditions of the court as to what constitutes the 
proper balance between the clerk and the bench. It was also noted 
that some magistrates taking the chair in court were competent and 
articulate in performing their tasks and that others were very 
tentative, unsure and prone to error. Several clerks emphasised the 
importance of training in relation to these factors. 
The influence that the clerk has through training ~s perhaps even 
more important than the clerk's infl uence ~n the court i tse 1 f, Since 
clerks teach magistrates not only about the nature of magistrates' 
jobs, but also about the correct relationship between clerk and 
magistrate. This can have a fundamental effect on the attitudes that 
magistrates bring to the job and on their behaviour in court. 
In addition to training for new magistrates clerks are also 
involved in ongo~ng training for all magistrates and many clerks also 
develop and discuss ~ssues of court policy with their magistrates and 
so can shape and alter the court's approach to ~ssues such as 
sentencing policy or legal aid. 
Clerks to the justices also have an influencee on court clerks at 
their court. Although it may be difficult for a clerk to the 
justices to affect the attitudes of a qualified and experienced clerk 
to any s igni f icant degree, s /he can neverthe less have a good deal 0 f 
impact on the attitudes of new and trainee clerks. The clerk to the 
justices may remain a reference point for standards for clerks 
throughout their careers. 
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The Education of Justices of the Peace 
origins and development of training for magistrates 
For many centuries justices of the peace carried out their duties 
without any training apart from the experience that they acquired as 
they sat on the bench. However, as was noted in Chapter One the 
present century has seen an increasing concern about the quality of 
justice meted out by magistrates. One of the consequences of this 
concern has been an emphasis on the need for magistrates to rece1ve 
some training for their duties, especially when they are newly 
appointed. Interestingly, the desirability of training for 
magistrates has been consistently expressed with reference to their 
relationship to their clerk. The perceived danger of untrained 
magistrates has been that their 19norance leaves room for dominance _ 
or at least the appearance of it - on the part of the clerk. 
The Royal Commission on Justices of the Peace reporting 1n 1948 
recommended that all jus t ices, on appointment, shou ld be required to 
give an undertaking to follow a scheme of instruction designed to 
educate them in the nature of their duties. The Commission expressed 
its opinions about the desirability of training in the following 
terms. 
and 
"In the course of court proceedings a justice must be 
sufficiently instructed to perform his duties, without constant 
reference to the clerk." 
"When justices know and understand their duties they and the 
clerk can work satisfactorily together: if they are ignorant the 
clerk must either watch them make mistakes that may be serious to 
the par tie san d tot h e j ~s tic e s, 0 r in t e r v e n e and t a k e too m u c h 
part in the proceedings." 
1. Roya 1 Comm is s ion on Jus t ices of the Peace.1946-48 Cmnd. 7463 ,Para 
89. 
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The recommendation of the Royal Commission that justices gIve an 
undertaking to be trained was not put into practice. The Justices of 
the Peace Act of 1949 instead imposed a duty on the newly created 
Magistrates' Courts' Committees to make and administer schemes for 
traInIng magistrates In their area. 2 This provision came into 
operation in 1952, and the Lord Chancellor's office circulated a model 
scheme for training. 
The success of these prOVISIons was uneven. This was due, at 
least in part, to the fact that althoughthe Magistrates' Courts' 
committees were under an obligation to provide training, the justices 
were not under an obligation to receive it. 
In 1964 the Lord Chancellor therefore established a National 
Advisory~Council on the Training of Magistrates which investigated the 
situation. A White Paper of 1965 3 announced the introduction of 
compulsory training for magistrates appointed after 1.1.1966. The 
White Paper stressed the necessity for training In VIew of the 
comp1exi ty of the job of lay magis tra tes, and in part icular it cited 
the paragraphs quoted above from the report of the Royal Commission. 
Again the need for training was perceived in the context of the need 
for a correct balance between bench and clerk. 
The White Paper envisaged that clerks would carry out a large 
part of the new training, since they were operating training under the 
existing schemes, and had the necessary expertise. 
The National Advisory Council was replaced by the Advisory 
Committee on the Training of Magistrates, which was given a brief to 
2. By Section 17 of the Act. 
3. 'The Training of Justices of the Peace In England and Wales'. 
Cmnd. 2856 
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keep training policy and the operation of training schemes under 
review. 
The Present Training Requirements 
The basic requirements for training set out ln the White Paper of 
1965 still apply, although they have been modified and updated. 4 
Training for new magistrates takes place in two stages. The 
First Stage, which must be completed before a magistrate sits to 
adjudicate consists of attendance at court on not less than three 
occasions as an observer, instruction at not less than four one and a 
half to two hour seSSlons and prescribed reading from the handbook for 
new magistrates. Periods of court observation are to be followed up 
by discussions. 
The Second Stage normally takes place after the magistrate has 
been adjudicating for at least six months but must be completed within 
twelve months of appointment. It consists of not less than ten one 
and a half to two hour sessions of instruction or practicalexercises, 
visits to penal institutions and attendance as an observer at a 
magistrates'court other than the one at which the magistrate normally 
adjudicates. There are also schemes of training for magistrates who 
. 5 become members of the juvenile court panel, and the domestlc court. 
The Participation of the Clerk in Training 
The organisation of training lS the responsibility of the 
Training Committee- a Committee of Magistrates on the Magistrates' 
Courts' Committee who "appear to have the appropriate qualifications, 
4. They are now set out in 'The Training of Magistrates', produced 
by the Lord Chancellor's Department, and known as The Blue Book. 
5. The requirements for juvenile court magistrates are set out in 
'Basic Training for Juvenile Court Magis~ra~es' ~The Or~n~e Book) 
and for domestic court magistrates ln BaS1C Tralnlng for 
Domestic Court Panels' (The Purple Book). 
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interes t and apt i tude". 6 Each Training Committee is served by one or 
more Training Officers who are usually justices' clerks. 7 
Most of the training of magistrates is done by clerks. Part One 
of basic training for new magistrates is generally carried out by the 
clerk to the justices for the Division to which the justices are 
appointed. Part Two is usually done over a wider area than a single 
Petty Sessional Division but it is again usually the responsibility of 
a clerk to the justices or several of them. 
Training for magistrates appointed to the juvenile and domestic 
panels is also carried out by the clerks. 
The ongoing training needed when a major new p1ece of legislation 
affecting magistrates' courts 1S brought into force (for instance the 
Bail Act 1976, the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 
1978 or the Criminal Justice Act 1982) is also the responsibility of 
the clerk who may, or may not, enlist the help of others. 
Clerks to the justices are encouraged to take advantage of any 
training provided by the Magistrates' Association, academic 
institutions or the probation service. The Chairman or Chairwoman of 
the bench and other senior magistrates will also often have some 
involvement in training,8 but there are many long serving clerks who 
6. The Blue Book. P.2. 
7. They do not need to be justices clerks, but if they are not they 
should be "persons with knowledge and practical experience of the 
duties and needs of lay magistrates, and their courts and 
committees". (The Blue Book. P.3.) 
8. An article in The Magistrate in 1975 (D.A. Crockatt 'The Chairman 
and the New Magistrate' Vo1.36 No.3), for example stresses the 
usefulness of involvement of the chairman in training new 
magistrates. Young and Clarke (Chairmanship in Magistrates' 
Courts. 2nd ed. 1926) emphasise the chairman's role especially 
during court observation. Hood, in "Sentencing in Magistrates' 
Courts" Stevens 1962 stressed the influence of a strong , , 
cha irman on other jus t ices pp.78-81. 
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will themselves have trained those senior members of the bench. The 
local liaison judge may also play a part in training programmes. 
But although there is input from other sources the people who 
educate the magistrates, who explain and interpret their role are, to 
a very large extent, the clerks. Of the eight clerks to the justices 
interviewed about training, all were responsible for Stage One 
training. Five were also Training Officers, and therefore 
responsible for Stage Two and any other training. Of the remaining 
three, two had been training officers and the third, a relatively new 
appointee, was keen to take on the job in the future. 
In the rest of this section we will examine what clerks teach 
magistrates, what they believe magistrates need to know, and also the 
impact that the clerk's training has on the bench. 
The Content of Training 
The basic syllabus for training magistrates is set out in the 
Lord Chancellor's Department's handbooks. The clerks interviewed on 
the whole approved of the training syllabus. Several of the longer 
serving clerks to the justices commented favourably on the improvement 
they had seen in training during their service. Most clerks pointed 
to the fact that training must be restricted since magistrates are 
volunteers and have a limited amount of time at their disposal. Also 
an uneveness of enthusiasm for training amongst those appointed to the 
bench would still seem to be a problem even given that new appointees 
must now undertake to follow the basic training course. One clerk 
remarked 
"You find at training sessions the same ones turn up every time 
and some don't even come at all, but there's not very much you 
can do about it." 
Similar comments were made by some other clerks. 
To counterbalance this however, the evidence available shows that 
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1n general magistrates are enthusiastic about training. Baldwin's 
research 9 showed that magistrates were satisfied with the training 
they received and that a great majority had pursued training beyond 
the basic requirement or intended to do so. It also showed however 
that the quality of training provided is variable. Baldwin showed 
that there was a relatively widespread disregard of the basic training 
syllabus and enormous variation in the depth and variety of courses 
offered among benches. 
It would be wrong to suggest that the training syllabus was 
disregarded at any of the courts observed for the present survey, 
since no evidence on this point was collected. Indeed all of the 
clerks to the justices interviewed were enthusiastic about, and 
involved 1n, some sort of training, and some very impressive training 
sess10ns provided by clerks were observed. 
Although no assessment can be made of the extent of adherence to 
the basic training syllabus for new magistrates evidence was collected 
about provision of training for magistrates taking the chair. We 
have already discussed in Chapters Two and Three the importance of a 
correct balance between the clerk and the magistrates in court. In 
practice this amounts to a balance between the clerk and whichever of 
the magistrates is taking the chair. If the magistrate in the chair 
1 sun c e r t a in, un sur e 0 f w hen t 0 s pea k and w hat t 0 say, the c 1 e r k w ill 
be required to intervene when slhe should not do so, or need not do 
so. A competent and confident chairman or chairwoman 1S necessary if 
an appearance of dominance by the clerk 1S to be avoided. For the 
purposes of the present survey, the 1ssue of chairmanship training was 
9. John Baldwin. 'The Compulsory Training of the Magistracy.' 
[1975] Crim. L.R.634. 
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particularly important, because it ~s one measure of the extent to 
which clerks - and magistrates - take seriously the question of the 
part ic ipa t ion of the magis tra tes in court and the "dom inance" of the 
clerk in court. 
Two of the clerks to the justices (out of eight interviewed) 
reported that there were no chairmanship courses available for their 
benches; the other six reported that such courses were available, but 
that enthusiasm for them was variable. One clerk stressed that 
everybody who took the chair went on a course, but another said 
"In ••. shire we have run Chairmanship courses but it's fair to 
say that the majority of chairmen do not attend those courses 
prior to taking the chair." 
A third clerk was of the op~n~on that although courses were available, 
good chairmen were born not made. 
It may be that training for magistrates to take the chair in 
court is an area which deserves greater emphasis. Taking the chair 
and playing a full role in court is a difficult job for a lay person. 
The importance of the chairman's role was stressed by the Royal 
Commission when it said that 
"The efficiency of the court and the repute in which it is held, 
depend ¥arhaps more upon the chairman than upon any other 
factor." 
This v~ew ~s reiterated ~n Young and Clarke's book, "Chairmanship ~n 
Magistrates' Courts'''. 11 
If we examine the matter from the point of v~ew of the clerks, 
one of their complaints is that they are wrongly criticised for being 
too dominant in court. They claim that there is an appearance of 
dominance which is deceptive; that although they take many of the 
10. Royal Commission on Justices of the Peace. 1946-48 Cmnd. 7463. 
11. 2nd Ed. 1976 Barry Rose. P. 15. 
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speaking parts in court they are not usurp1ng any of the functions of 
the bench. If this 1S correct, then an improvement in training for 
magistrates taking the chair would go a long way towards remov1ng any 
appearance of dominance. If the dominant clerk 1S not an appearance 
but a reality, then training for the chair is even more important. 
We have seen however, that an appearance of dominance on the part 
of the clerk may well not be the result of timidity or weakness on the 
part of individual magistrates taking the chair, but the result of the 
policy or practice of some courts where the Chairman or Chairwoman is 
not expected to participate beyond a bare minimum in court. Training 
for individual Chairmen or Chairwomen is unlikely to change these 
practices if such training takes place at a local level, since the 
clerk will be responsible for perpetuating, if not defining, the 
practice of the court. A clerk who believes that a minimal role for 
the magistrate taking the chair in court is an appropriate one is not 
likely to train his magistrates to go beyond this. Training which 
takes place on a wider basis than the division may be more useful in 
this respect, since magistrates will come into contact with clerks and 
magistrates from other divisions who may have different ideas. 
Young and Clarke's book on Chairmanship prescribes a much more 
robust role for the magistrate who takes the chair than is found in 
practice in some courts. Their recommendations have obviously not 
created uniformity between courts. 
In one sense, uniformity is neither possible or desirable. The 
balance between the clerk and the magistrate in the chair will depend 
on the character, confidence and experience of the chairman or 
chairwoman, and of the clerk. However, in Chapter Three it was 
demonstrated that some magistrates are not sufficiently confident to 
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announce the i r own dec is ions. The uneven enthusiasm of clerks for 
chairmanship courses may well contribute to magistrates' diffidence. 
Perhaps this is an issue which should be pursued by the Justices' 
Clerks' Society. 
Stage One Training 
Almost all of the instruction in Stage One training for new 
magistrates is done by the clerk to the justices for her/his own 
bench. This training is very important since it constitutes the 
magistrates' first contact with their new role. One clerk to the 
justices explained that 
"It's very influential indeed, because they come to me without 
very much idea. Having initially been appointed, had their 
letter of congratulations from all and sundry and so on they come 
here thinking they're going to set the world to rights. They 
very soon realise they can do no such thing. I warn them from 
the outset - "Now you've come here to an entirely different 
sphere of activities from that you've ever been engaged in." 
The content of Stage One 1S aimed at teaching magistrates background 
information about the court, and also how to act judicially. All the 
clerks to the justices interviewed were agreed that"the judicial 
approach" is the most important thing that they teach new magistrates. 
One explained it thus 
"I always start by frightening them to death on what can go wrong 
- there's certiorari, mandamus and all that sort of thing - to 
put all their prejudices aside and judge the case on the 
evidence. Don't listen to tittle-tattle and don't have anything 
to do with a case you know anything about. .. the judicial 
approach." 
One important aspect of a background information and a component 
of the judicial approach 1S the relationship between the bench and 
others 1n court. The clerk is thus responsible for explaining and 
defining the proper at t i tude for magis tra tes to take, for ins tance to 
an unrepresented defendant or to the police. The importance of this 
was explained graphically by one clerk to the justices. 
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" ••• the clerk can exert through training, a considerable 
influence, I think, on the tone of the bench. You see a clerk 
can start off by saying 'You are peace enforcement officers, you 
are part and parcel of law and order and so are the police. 
Your objectives are identical and it's up to you to help each 
other.' That is one thing. The magistrates would accept that. 
The other is 'You are judicial individuals and you enforce the 
law w~th an even hand, with complete independence, and you owe 
allegl.ence to no-one except the law, and that being so you will 
deal justice out with an even hand whether or not one side is 
wearing a blue uniform.' Now this is going to have a 
fundamental effect, and you build on it as you wish, and they 
have no means of knowing that you are right or wrong." 
A clearer description of crime control and due process models of 
justice would be difficult to find! This clerk was quite well aware 
that he was responsible for the model of justice operated by his 
bench. 
He stressed the important point that these are new magistrates, 
comIng to the job usually without any knowledge of the criminal 
justice system. Their introduction to their new role is provided by 
an expert in the job. They have no means of judging the clerk's 
evaluation of the correct way for them to carry out their new task. 
They will accept her/his interpretation. 
It may be very difficult for a new clerk to the justices to 
influence the approach or practices of established magistrates but 
s/he can certainly form the attitudes of new members of the bench to 
their job. 12 Therefore whilst a new and young clerk to the justices 
could hardly expect to have an immediate influence on the attitudes of 
her/his bench, s/he can have a gradual one, and there are many long 
serving clerks who will have been responsible for training every 
member of the bench at their court. In the long term the clerk can 
12. Burney (Chapter 10) cites the instance of a new clerk who did 
extensive Stage One training in which he encouraged.new 
magistrates to stand up to senior magistrates who were untraIned. 
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have a very significant effect on the attitudes and behaviour of 
her /h is bench. 
Another aspect of the judicial role which clerks are called upon 
to teach their new magistrates in Stage One 1S the relationship 
between clerk and bench. Within the framework of the legal rules it 
is the clerks who decide their own relationship to their bench. One 
of them put it 
"You've got to explain to them the relationship between them and 
the clerk. Here again if you were particularly wicked you could 
give them a completely wrong concept of this - and this is where 
you've got to have a high degree of professional integrity and 
self discipline. Because to an extent you are teaching them 
things which may not be to your own practical advantage." 
For those clerks who are not even "particularly wicked" there 1S 
still considerable legitimate leeway for interpreting what is a proper 
relationship between bench and clerk. For instance the traditions of 
benches which mean that in some divisions the chairperson participates 
considerably in the courtroom, and in others the chairperson scarcely 
speaks, have not arisen by accident. The definition of what is 
a proper division of labour in court will have been heavily influenced 
by the clerk - or possibly by several over a period of years. 
As the clerk cited above said, teaching a bench of magistrates to 
be independent of the clerk may not be to that clerk's practical 
advantage. A subservient bench is, up to a point, easy to work with 
for the clerk. The cases proceed quickly if the magistrates do not 
have to be assisted in their speaking parts. Conflicts of the sort 
described in the chapter on the clerk and the bench in court are less 
likely to arise. There is less uncertainty about who should take 
which speaking part. The magistrates are less likely to make 
mistakes - Slnce the clerk 1S doing a great deal of the work. 
Strictly within the legal rules, therefore, the clerk can have a 
371 
significant effect on the extent to which the magistrates play an 
active role in court. 
More seriously, of course, the clerk could gl.ve the magistrates 
"a completely wrong concept" of the clerk's role. It would be quite 
wrong to suggest that any indication that clerks do so arises from 
this research. It does not. But as the clerk to the justices 
already quoted pointed out, clerks police themselves on this issue. 
They interpret the rules about their own conduct to their magistrates. 
This means that two things are very important. First, that the 
rules themselves are clear and consistent, and second that the 
discipline and professional integrity of clerks should be capable of 
being relied upon. 
The rules, unfortunately, are not particularly clear or 
consistent, as was explained in Chapter Two, and they concern the 
visible manifestations of the clerk's relationship with the bench 
(whether slhe retires with the magistrates or not). It would indeed 
be difficult, if not impossible, to draft rules to govern a 
relationship as variable and intimate as that between clerk and bench. 
We have to rely then, on the integrity of the clerks - who would 
certainly claim that their integrity is to be relied on. 
Stage Two 
The second stage of magistrates' training, which takes place after 
they have been adjudicating for some time covers more topics and is 
more specific than Stage One. One of the most important and 
extensive aspects of Stage Two as laid out in The Blue Book 1.S 
punishment and treatment of offenders. 
Whilst it 1.S possible for clerks to g1.ve magistrates a purely 
factual account of the types of sentences available to them, there are 
372 
other aspects of sentencing which are more difficult to present in an 
objective way the objectives and philosophy of sentencing, or the 
situations 1n which particular sentences might be appropriate for 
instance. Here the attitudes of the clerk may have on impact on 
those of the bench. This may be for better, or for worse. 
In 1974 Mr. George Pratt described a 'magistrates' clerk' was 
quoted in the Daily Telegraph after he had spoken to "a group of crime 
and punishment reformers who are out to create a national campaign to 
bring about sterner punishments and deterrents." Mr. Pratt was 
reported to have been severely critical of rehabilitation as an aim of 
sentenc ing. He was quoted as say1ng 
"Apart from the inadequate types most criminals are bad; some 
are positively wicked. The attitude towards criminals has been 
largely determined by theoretical sociologists who despite 
protests of judges, magistrates and leading police officers have 
had a dire influence on successive governments." 
It is not difficult to see what attitude to sentencing policy Mr. 
Pratt would communicate to his magistrates, if he was quoted 
accura te ly. His attitudes would conflict sharply with those of many 
of the clerks spoken to for the present survey. Nevertheless those 
attitudes must have their influence on his bench. 
Although during Stage Two of their training magistrates will be 
exposed to a wide range of influences (depending on the skill and 
enthusiasm of the training officer) nevertheless their reference point 
whilst they are sitting, and when they have problems or difficulties 
will be their own clerk. 
So far as specific sentencing options are concerned, aga1n the 
clerk's attitudes may be important. The influence of the clerk at 
this stage is not, however, sufficiently recognised. Magistrates' 
. . h b the focus of a great deal of attention. sentenc1ng pract1ces ave een 
They are encouraged presently, for instance, to restrict the sentences 
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overcrowding. It may well be that attention to the instruction that 
magistrates rece1ve when they are nOV1ces and perhaps more 
impressionable could be more fruitful than exhortations to experienced 
magistrates whose approach may be less flexible. Attention to 
training means, of course, attention to the clerks and those things 
they teach new magis tra tes. 
New magistrates will usually be particularly vulnerable to wrong 
or biassed instruction. Experienced magistrates may develop their 
own V1ews on sentencing uS1ng wider sources of education than their 
clerk, but their colleagues who are nOV1ces will inevitably be guided 
by the respected expert who is responsible for their training. The 
standard of magistrates' sentencing practice owes a great deal to the 
standards of the clerks, and depends on the clerks being intelligent, 
informed and as far as possible unbiassed. 
The clerks to the justices who were interviewed for the present 
survey were few in number (there were eight). However they did 
represent as wide as possible a distribution of age, exper1ence, 
qualification, type of court and geographical spread. All were 
conscious of the importance of training for new magistrates andaware 
that the training for new magistrates they provided had an impact on 
the attitudes of those magistrates. 
"In Service" Training 
As well as providing training for new magistrates who are 
appointed to the juvenile court panel and the domestic court panel, 
clerks are also responsible for the ongoing training of the bench. 
This becomes part icularly important when there are major changes or 
developments in the law applied by magistrates. Clerks for instance 
had trained the magistrates in the Bail Act 1976 some little time 
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before the field work for the present survey - with what appeared to 
be a mixed success. 
The government has hardly been shy of increasing the jurisdiction 
. , . 
of magIstrates courts In recent years. For instance, the Domestic 
proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978 recently reformed and 
increased magistrates domestic jurisdiction. Training the newly 
created domestic court panel to operate this legislation must have 
been a formidable task. The statute did not simply make some 
alterations to the existing law but changed its philosophy - doing 
away with the old matrimonial offences and introducing new rules for 
the award and assessment of maintenance. The Act also introduced a 
new sphere of work to magistrates' courts by creating jurisdiction for 
domestic panels to deal with matrimonial violence. 
The responsibility on the clerk in providing training on such 
pieces of legis lat ion is onerous. The 1978 Ac t deals with pres sing 
and difficult social problems. At a time when the existence of any· 
domestic jurisdiction in magistrates' courts has been under attack, 
magis tra tes' respons ib il it ies have been increased. Clerks have had 
to train magistrates to use such legislation with very little 
assistance beyond a few Home Office Circulars. The approach of the 
clerks to this Act, and to others must have had a significant effect 
on the way the legislation is put into practice. 
It is not only in formal training seSSIons that clerks have an 
influence on the education of magistrates. Many benches have 
newsletters which the clerk to the justices and her/his staff will 
contribute to. Some of the clerks interviewed simply left copies of 
interesting articles In the magistrates' retiring room. Court 
libraries ranged from a few dusty volumes In a bookcase to extensive 
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and up to date collections of journals and monographs. The clerk's 
influence through court literature can be considerable. 
One clerk interviewed had grasped the nettle of his potential 
impact on his bench, and saw as a most important part of his role the 
production of papers dealing with important issues for the court. At 
the time he was interviewed he had recently circulated to his 
magistrates a paper which considered the use of imprisonment. This 
paper set out the problem, and explained what magistrates were being 
asked to do in general terms. It also explained the import of the 
problem in very specific terms, recommending that prison should be 
regarded as a scarce resource to be used for the deterrence of those 
who commit acts which seriously threaten lives and liberty. In terms 
of the offences dealt with by magistrates the clerk saw such acts as 
those involving personal violence of a serious nature, serious acts of 
public disorder, seriOUS sexual offences and child abuse and acts of 
gross vandalism. The paper conLinued with some forthright 
observations on the use of suspended sentences 13 and set out 
suggested amendments to the agreed tariff of penalties operated by the 
bench. 
This was an open statement of the clerk's Views. It was conCise 
and concre teo It cannot have failed to have its impact on the bench. 
It was a good deal more frank than many clerks would care to be, yet 
because of its frankness probably more open to challenge than the more 
subliminal methods of other clerks. It was written by a clerk who 
recognised his own power, and that power openly acknowledged and 
exercised was thus more open to challenge and criticism. 
13. For instance "For my part I cannot think of a .case in which a 
Suspended sentence is ever appropriate. Certainly I would ask 
you to think long and hard before imposing one". 
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The impact of training on magistrates 
The clerks to the justices interviewed for the present study all 
said that they thought that training had considerable impact on 
magistrates. Existing research confirms this view. Hood found that 
the most important factor in explaining variations in magistrates 
sentencing of simulated road traffic offences was that of bench 
. 14 
membersh1p. He considered that the development of a common policy 
of a bench was a subtle process influenced by clerks, and by sen10r 
magistrates. 
The fact that magistrates' training has influence on magistrates' 
attitudes is confirmed by Bond and Lemon.l S Their research, which 
separated out the influences of training and exper1ence, showed that 
both of these factors affect magistrates' attitudes. This influence 
exerts itself predominantly in relation to the procedural aspects of 
magistrates'work, to their perception of their role and their attitude 
towards specific sentencing options. 
It would seem, therefore, that it 1S precisely in the two areas 
which emerged as important from this survey that magistrates are 1n 
fact influenced by training. 
Conclusions 
The indication from this survey 1n conjunction with others cited 
above is that clerks have very real power through the mechanism of 
training. 
14. R. Hood. 
1972. 
'Sentenc ing the Motor ing Of fender.' London.He inemann. 
15. R.A. Bond and N.F. Lemon. 'Changes in Magistrates' Attitudes 
During the First Year on the Bench', in 'Psycholo~y, Law and 
Legal Processes'. McMillan 1979. See also N1gel Lemon. 
'Training, Personality and Attitudes as Determinants of 
Magistrates' Sentencing'. 14 Brit. J. Criminol 34 (1974) 
377 
They can influence whether their bench favours a cr1me control or 
a due process model of criminal justice. They have an influence on 
the sentencing patterns of their court. They give magistrates their 
definition of the magistrates' role, and they define, within the 
limitations of the law, what the role of the clerk is to be in 
relation to the bench. 
If we recognise the existence of this power, two questions become 
pertinent. First, should we continue to allow clerks to exercise it? 
Second, if we agree that they should, do we wish to seek to influence 
the way they do it? 
Several things suggest that the answer to the first question 
should be in the negative. The ma1n concern of the law has been to 
ensure that the clerk is no part of the decision of the bench, either 
on guilt or innocence or on sentence, but the relationship between 
bench and clerk is an intimate one and the legal rules only refer to 
one part of it. Given this, is it right that we trust the person 
from whom we perceive the danger of intrusion into trial by our peers 
to proceed, to define what is proper in her/his relationship with a 
lay tribunal? As the clerks surveyed pointed out we rely on the 
integrity of the clerk in this matter. 
However we do rely on the integrity of the legal profession in 
general to define what is proper conduct for themselves and to police 
tha t c onduc t. Most clerks are professionally qualified, and there 
seems to be no reason why we should place less trust in clerks than 
their colleagues in other forms of practice. 
Also, if we rely on clerks to operate 1n court a proper 
relationship with their bench, why should we not trust them also when 
. .? 
they teach their benches what will happen 1n pract1ce. 
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The possible answer to this is that the clerk's public behaviour 
1n court 1S often scrutinised by other members of the legal profession 
but the watchdog of the clerk's private behaviour is the bench. We 
must question how efficient the bench is as a watchdog if the clerk 
has told them what they are to watch for. 
The real, if not entirely satisfactory, answer to our question as 
to whether clerks should continue to train magistrates is pragmatic. 
There are very few others who could do it. 
Elizabeth Burney's reaction to the problems she perceived in 
magistrates'training was to say that "Nothing much is likely to change 
in magistrates' training so long as it is still primarily in the hands 
of justices' clerks.,,16 Perhaps this is so, but into whose hands 
could it be placed? Burney's own recommendations for an improved 
training scheme are not very different from the present 
17 
arrangements. They do include more participation from experienced 
magistrates, but one must bear in mind that the person who trained the 
experienced magistrates is the clerk. 
There are very few people outside magistrates' courtswho are 
competent or interested. Links between courts and colleges or 
universities exist, and in some cases they are strong links. This is 
particularly so in relation to those universities involved in training 
clerks on diploma courses. However opportunities for these links are 
by no means widespread. There are indeed, comparatively few 
academics who have the necessary expertise and understanding of the 
practical problems to be of use. 
16. E B 'J P - Magl·strate, Court and Community.' . urney, •• Hutchinson 
1979 Ch.lO. 
17. Ibid. 
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All the avenues for such links as exist should obviously be 
exploited, but even if they were they could not possibly cope with the 
necessity for providing local training for magistrates allover the 
country. 
It IS perhaps more practical, if not necessarily more 
satisfactory to consider whether we wish to seek to influence the way 
that clerks train their benches. 
Certainly the suggestion of "teacher training" for clerks is a 
useful one. The teaching of adults is not easy - it is a skilled job 
and it can only be useful for clerks to acquire those skills. 
However any courses for clerks would need to be specific to clerks, 
since they would need to concentrate not simply on teaching methods, 
but on how best to put over the sensitive subjects clerks are required 
to teach to lay magistrates - particularly how to approach teaching 
magistrates about the role of magistrate and clerk in a way that 
encourages an input from both experienced and new magistrates and 
possibly from others. Also the prOVISIon of courses IS not In itself 
sufficient. Clerks must rightly be rather tired of admonitions to do 
more and different things which come without the resources to enable 
them to do it. Magistrates' courts need more staff, Training Officers 
need more time. Improving magistrates' justice even to the limited 
extent we are proposIng demands that money be spent. 
All of this also begs the question of who teaches the teachers? 
Here perhaps the admittedly thin expertise in higher education could 
be exploited, but again there are resource implications. 
The attention at a national level of the Justices' Clerks' 
Soc iety and the Magis tra tes' As soc iat ion to the prob lems po inted out 
in this chapter would be constructive. Clerks have real power, which 
fact should not be denied, but should be considered carefully. 
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One clerk when asked if he thought that the clerk to the justices 
influenced the character of the court as a whole said 
"I think nowadays - more so than it used to be - the clerk has a 
very strong influence on the way the court is conducted by the 
magistrates themselves. Particularly through training. I 
think we have influence there." 
Is, then, the production of brief training syllabuses by the Lord 
Chancellor's office a sufficient investment of time and effort into 
such an important facet of magistrates' justice. 
Clerk and Magistrates out of court 
The training of magistrates 1S perhaps the most obvious and 
significant area where the clerk can influence the magistrates out of 
c our t. It is not, however, the only situation where the clerk 1S 
important. 
The relationship between the clerk to the justices and senior 
members of the bench will usually be quite a close one. The clerk 
who is on the Magistrates' Courts' Committee is also likely to know 
well the magistrates involved in that Committee. The closeness of 
the relationship between the clerk and senior magistrates and the 
clerk and the rest of the bench varies very widely from court to 
court. 
As we saw 1n the chapter on the clerk and the bench in court, 
some clerks know their magistrates very well, they socialise with 
them, they have magistrates as personal friends. Other clerks know 
few members of their benches. The nature of the relationship must 
depend on several things - not least being the size of the bench. 
The juvenile court panel at one of the courts surveyed was almost as 
large as the whole bench at one of the other courts. The possibility 
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of knowing 50+ magistrates well must be greater than that of knowing 
150 or more. 
Long serving clerks came to know their benches very well. One 
clerk pointed out that most of his magistrates were young enough to be 
his children, and that he had trained them all. He felt it a problem 
that they might hold his views in too much reverence for his own good. 
Magistrates felt that the closeness of their relationship with 
their clerk could depend on the personality of the clerk. One said, 
in the presence of her clerk 
"Well our clerks are alright, aren't you? I don't like a clerk 
who talks down to you. We get on very well here, but there is a 
clerk not a million miles from here •.•• I can't abide that -
treating you, well, as second class citizens!" 
The clerks were careful to stress that however much or little 
they knew the magistrates out of court it did not affect their 
relationship in court, except in so far as they knew which magistrates 
were confident and which might need help. 
One factor which influenced the extent to which magistrates knew 
each other, and to a lesser extent their relationship to clerks was 
the type of magistrates' rota operated at the court. There was an 
enormous variation in the way the rota was organised from court to 
court. Some courts organised it on a six monthly or a three monthly 
basis. Magistrates' availability was juggled against the requirements 
of the different courts and the sex and qualification of the 
magistrates needed. Two courts had computerised this process, which 
saved clerks their time in preparation, but not their tempers in 
sorting out problems and alterations after the rota had been produced. 
Some courts operated a fixed rota system - the same magistrates 
always came in on the same day each week or each fortnight. One 
court had its bench sitting for one, or two, full weeks in every 
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quarter. Some courts planned sittings S1X months 1n advance one , 
only two weeks in advance. 
Several clerks were very critical of the fixed rota system. 
They pointed out that if the same magistrates attended on the same day 
every week, magistrates knew one fifth of the bench well, and the rest 
hardly at all. They also mentioned the possibility of bench 
idiosyncracies being perpetuated, and argued that this gave clerks 
greater trouble 1n pointing out bench norms when one days' magistrates 
began imposing penalties out of conformity with their colleagues. 
Some clerks were keen on computerisation of the rota - usually 
those who had not already got it. One of the difficulties of the 
clerk responsible for drawing up the rota 1S that when it is prepared 
the clerk is importuned by magistrates expressing preferences for 
those of their colleagues with whom they wish to sit - or more 
frequently those they definitely do not wish to sit with. Such 
requests can apparently be expressed with a reprehensible lack of 
tact! However manual preparation of the rota has advantages for 
clerks, since they can take account of magistrates idiosyncracies to 
their own advantage - for instance by making sure that any eccentric 
magistrates are on rota with colleagues who can be expected to stand 
up to them. 
It is possible for the nature of the rota to influence the 
extent to which clerks know magistrates, especially at the larger 
courts where some clerks may specialise - for instance in juvenile 
work - and come to know a small group of magistrates very well. 
However it is not particularly significant, and size of bench 1S more 
likely to be important. Also seemingly trivial factors - such as 
whether the clerks take their morning coffee with the bench can affect 
the nature of the relationship - or perhaps are symptomatic of it. 
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Many clerks were observed to use conversation over coffee to discuss 
issues of procedure, sentencing, new law, etc., with the magistrates. 
The most important aspect of out of court relations between clerk 
and bench is that between the clerk to the justices and senior 
magistrates,especially the Chairperson of the bench. It is at this 
level that policy decisions relating to the operation of the court are 
introduced, discussed and implemented. The role of the clerk in this 
policy making role is discussed in a later chapter. 
The influence of the clerk to the justices on court staff 
We have examined the relationship between the clerk and the 
magistrates, and shown that the clerks, and especially the clerk to 
the justices influences them in many ways, in and out of court. 
Besides the role of the clerk as legal adviser, s/he also has a role 
as a manager of the court organisation. The clerk to the justices 1S 
respons ib Ie to the Magis trates' Courts' Committee for the runn1ng of 
the court. We shall exam1ne 1n ensu1ng chapters the policy making 
aspects of this part of the clerk's job, and also those areas where 
the clerk's administrative duties take on a quasi-judicial aspect. 
Another part of the clerk's task is the management of the staff 
employed at the court and particularly important here 1S the influence 
of the clerk to the justices on her/his staff of clerks who take 
courts. 
Many of the clerks to the justices interviewed were very modest 
about any influence they might have on their clerks, pointing out that 
clerks are professionals and have their own standards. Not all 
clerks are professionally qualified, however. Even those who are 
will be involved in areas of both law and practice that they will not 
be familiar with when they first come to work in a magistrates' court. 
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Whilst it is most unlikely that a clerk to the justices, however 
respected and experienced, will alter significantly the approach of a 
senior clerk who comes to the court with many years of experience, 
slhe will influence those new to the job and those in the process of 
. . 
traInIng. 
So far as new or less experienced members of staff were 
concerned, clerks to the justices were more willing to admit that they 
might have an influence. One clerk admitted 
"I think it must necessarily follow that the standards I set must 
rub off - or the standards I don't set!" 
Another said that he influenced his staff 
" ••. probably less than I imagine I do. 
to influence them a great deal." 
In other words I intend 
The clerks to the justices almost certainly underestimated their 
influence over new and junior members of staff. In interviews and 
conversations, court clerks frequently used the clerk to the justices 
where they had trained as a reference point for their standards. 
Many remarks came prefaced by "the clerk where I started wouldn't 
allow ••.•• " or "I was always taught at ----- that you should ....•. ". 
In the same way that clerks to the justices were surprised at 
magistrates who remembered their lessons from training, they would 
probably be surprised at the number of times they were quoted by their 
clerks or ex-clerks. 
This influence on new clerks does not come through formal 
training. Staff training programmes are not extensive - often the 
only schemes for staff training mentioned as available were regional 
ones run for more junior staff. Clerks who were in the process of 
acquiring qualifications, including articled clerks, often took courts 
of all types without supervision (provided that they were qualified 
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under the 1979 Qualification of Assistants Rules).19 Their expertise 
1n magisterial law had been acquired by sitting as an assistant with 
an experienced clerk for a greater or lesser period of time, the 
length of this apprenticeship depending on the aptitude of the 
individual clerk, and the discretion of the clerk to the justices. 
Such is the pressure of work at some courts that qualified but 
completely inexperienced clerks were thrown in at the deep end of the 
traffic court almost immediately upon appointment. Some floundering 
trainees were observed during the fieldwork. The staff training 
situation is far from desirable - but is not likely to be improved 
without the allocation of resources. 
However inadequate the apprenticeships of some clerks, the 
experience certanly has its effects on them - the standards set by the 
clerk to the justices do affect their practice and their attitudes to 
some extent. The approaches of different clerks and their effect on 
the methods of different courts were the subject of frequent comment 
and sometimes criticism by clerks. Certainly those most influenced 
were the clerks who had begun by being employed in the court office 
and who had, by the encouragement and attention of the clerk to the 
justices, become qualified to take courts. Such clerks may have had 
no other reference point for their standards than the clerk to the 
justices and other clerks at the court until they were constrained (by 
ambition or the 1979 Rules) to attend the Diploma course or a course 
leading to professional qualification. 
The record of some clerks to the justices 1n encourag1ng Jun10r 
members of staff to qualify was impressive. One clerk to the 
19. 5.1 1979 No. 570 provided for mlnlmum qualifications for clerks 
taking courts. A full discussion of the content and importance 
of these rules is in Chapter Ten. 
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justices pushed his secretary to qualify as a barrister, which she did 
in a very creditably short time. 
It may be that now that the Justices' Clerks' Society (if not all 
clerks) are looking for professional qualifications from all court 
clerks the sort of patronage which encouraged people "up the ranks" 
will wain. Clerks to the justices will employ staff already 
professionally qualified, and will seek to guide and influence them 
less. 
The clerk's influence is not likely to go altogether, however, 
and it is interesting to discover how they would wish to exercise what 
influence they have. To acqu~re some idea of this, clerks were asked 
what they thought were the most important attributes of a good court 
clerk. A characteristic response was that of a clerk to a large city 
court 
"First patience. Secondly temperament. Third ability to 
follow an intricate argument and get to the core of the problem. 
Fourthly knowledge. I think I'd put them in that order really. 
I don't mind any court clerk making a mistake on law at all. I 
would hope that generally speaking unless it was some finer point 
he'd make no mistake in practice. What I'd consider 
unforgiveable is treating witnesses or defendants or anyone 
badly. But I'd put patience firs t. " 
The emphasis of nearly all the clerks was on temperament. The need 
for patience was particularly given priority. One clerk said that 
"if a person isn't temperamentally suited to be a court clerk its the 
most refined cruelty to make him one". The need to be able to 
communicate with what one clerk called "ordinary folk" was also seen 
as important - and this clerk pointed out that it was not just for the 
sake of the defendants, but that magistrates are also "ordinary folk". 
Only one clerk gave priority to ability as a lawyer. His 
response was the converse of the clerk cited above 
"First of all he must be a lawyer. Secondly he must possess 
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intelligence ••. Thirdly he must possess patience because 
particularly when dealing with unrepresented defe~dants an , 
ability to understand that their intemperateness, bloody 
mindedness and differences of attitude, from you and people like 
you can irritate you and get in the way of your helping the bench 
to do justice to them." 
At a time when the desirability of professionalisation is urged 
by clerks it is perhaps surprising that ability as a lawyer was not 
stressed rather more. A legal professional qualification is not a 
guarantee however that a clerk will be patient, or able to put over 
legal ideas in a way which is easily understood by lay persons. The 
unique quality of theclerk's job is the necessity to be always 
interpreting the law to lay persons - both magistrates and the high 
percentage of unrepresented defendants 1n magistrates' courts. 
Unfortunately the enthusiasm of the clerks to the justices for 
patience and clarity in dealing with unrepresented defendants is often 
overriden in practice by the exigencies of workload. However the 
fact that clerks emphasised the need for patience is perhaps another 
indication that greater emphasis on the due process protection aspects 
of the clerk's role would be possible if the strains on the court 
organisation were relieved. 
Conclusion 
The opportunities exist for clerks to the justices to have a 
great deal of influence upon the bench and upon court staff through 
training. Most clerks appear to be aware of the influence they have 
with magistrates during their training courses. There is a great 
deal less awareness of the impact they have on staff and particularly 
on younger and less experienced clerks. 
At most courts, the clerk to the justices is a figure of very 
considerable respect. Court clerks and magistrates frequently 
referred to the opinions of "our clerk", and what he would or would 
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not approve of. The clerk to the justices was the constant reference 
point for standards. 
It is a matter for great concern, therefore, that very little 
time or effort is expended by the government ~n assisting clerks to 
the justices to fulfil their training role. It ~s also important to 
consider ~n this context the question of the sup~ne clerk - the clerk 
who does not fulfil his responsibilities or exert his influence where 
exertion is needed. Baldwin's research, referred to at the beginning 
of this chapter, showed that the basic training requ~rements for new 
magistrates were not being fulfilled by all magistrates. The present 
research shows that although some clerks produce regular discussion 
bulletins and papers for consideration with their magistrates, and 
provide an up-to-date library, others do not do so. Also it seems 
from the interview responses that all clerks are not aware of the 
extent of the influence they have on members of their staff. 
Some clerks to the justices could take a much more active role 
than they do. 
as in it. 
The supine clerk may be a problem out of court as well 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE POLICY MAKING ROLE OF THE CLERK 
Changing the practice of the court organisation _ 
the problem of delay 
The court organisation - fine enforcement 
The clerk and the character of the court 
390 
The Policy Making Role of the Clerk 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the extent of the 
clerk's control and influence over the court organisation by examining 
the ways in which the clerk to the justices can make policy for a 
court, and carry that policy into effect. 
In the chapters which considered the relationship between the 
clerk and other groups using the court there were numerous examples of 
the clerk's policy making role. In Chapter Three it was demonstrated 
that the balance between the clerk and the magistrates in court varies 
very considerably from court to court. There are some courts where 
the clerk takes a very prominent role in court and the magistrate in 
the chair very rarely speaks. Such variations in the balance between 
clerk and bench are not fortuitous. They are the result of policy 
decisions by that court about what is proper conduct in court. Such 
policies may have been formulated over a very long period of time, and 
it may be impossible to locate a particular decision which prompted 
the arrangements current at any court. However the clerk as legal 
adviser to the magistrates 1S responsible for interpreting to them the 
decisions of the courts so far as they define the proper balance 
between clerk and bench, and will probably also playa decisive role 
in defining what is to be done within the guidance arising from these 
decisions. The clerk 1S not the only person who will contribute to 
such policy decisions - the magistrates will have an important voice. 
However, the clerk's role as lawyer places her/him in a very 
infuential position. One of the clerks in Burney's study commented of 
her/his bench 
"The c Ie rks tend to do more he re than they wou 1 d in many c our t s 
because my predecessor trained them he was a bit old 
fashioned and in his view the less said by the chairman the 
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---;;'---ir' ~ 'S::::':{;;:,}-::'::::~::3 very dangerous if you open your mouth 
In court" so a number of the senior magistrates are afraid to say 
anything."l 
Through training therefore the clerk can influence considerably the 
policies of the court. 
In Chapter Five the role of the police in court was examined and 
a wide variation in the extent of police participation in court was 
demonstrated. It was argued that where the clerk to the justices 
chose to do so, slhe could minimise police presence in court. The 
example of court B was given, where the clerk was, at the time of the 
study, pursuing a policy of training court ushers and ensuring that 
clerks called the list so as to take these jobs out of the hands of 
the police warrant officers and minimise police power In court. 
In Chapter Seven the attitude of the clerk to probation officers 
and social workers was shown to have a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of liaison between probation and social serVlces, and 
the c our t. 
In the preceding chapter the example was glven of the clerk who 
produced a paper on the problem of prison overcrowding and the effect 
of magistrates' sentencing patterns on overcrowding. The paper 
expressed the clerk's views on such measures as suspended sentences in 
a frank and forthright way, and it is fair to assume that the clerk's 
paper and the clerk's opl.nl.ons provoked discussion and perhaps 
decisions about sentencing policy l.n court. 
The clerk will not be the only person to ral.se lssues like this 
for the consideration of the magistrates. Senior magistrates 
particularly will have a role, especially in relation to sentencing 
mat t e r s • But howe v ere nth us i a s tic the mag is t rat e sma y bet h ey are 
1. Burney 1979 p.156. 
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part-t imers, and they are not lawyers. The clerk to the jus t ices IS 
involved full time with the problems and issues of the court and the 
bench, and is experienced in and knowledgeable about the legal rules 
relevant to policy problems. S/he should also be familiar with 
re levant research and writing. 
The potential for clerks to raIse Issues relating to the conduct 
of the court or the functioning of the court organisation is limited 
only by the intelligence, enthusiasm and courage of the clerk and 
her/his perception of the role. Some clerks obviously do not consider 
it appropriate to be pressIng questions of policy. Others certainly 
do - for instance the clerk who said 
"I support strong clerks. I'm not talking about a dominant clerk 
In court, I'm talking about a clerk who believes that the job he 
is doing is important, and is prepared to spend a lot of time and 
trouble with his magistrates, with the local Law Society and with 
his court clerks telling them how he believes the system ought to 
operate." 
The clerk gave an illustration of the way In which he might raise a 
problem for a policy decision. 
"Say in a particular court area you have got a problem about 
violence in a shopp ing centre... Now it's the clerk's job to say 
to the bench 'Do you realise that this problem is constantly 
recurring?' - perhaps getting an input from the police as to the 
extent the problem, discussing it perhaps with the chairman, then 
making sure that it is on the agenda of a bench meeting - and 
perhaps putting to that bench meeting a set of proposals which 
can be discussed, modified, improved and acted upon by the rest 
of the bench. Now that should be part of the function of the 
clerk. It doesn't stop the magistrates doing the same thing -
but it does mean that somebody should be alert all the time for 
problems of a local nature." 
Such policy decisions by clerks can be very infuential on the 
experience of justice of the local population. Very occasionally, 
Court policy decisions also have a national impact, as was the case 
with the court policy decision which resulted In R v. 
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Nottingham Justices ex parte Davies. 2 The City of Nottingham is, 1n 
the understatement of Lord Justice Donaldson,3 not short of criminal 
business. In 1980 it had 320 justices and sat up to 25 half day 
courts on every working day. One entire day of court time was 
occupied by applications for remands. The Nottingham court discussed 
and agreed as policy that on and after the third succeSS1ve 
application for bail where the previous applications had been refused 
the justices would refuse to hear full argument in support of an 
application for bail unless there were new circumstances which would 
justify hearing full argument. This policy was not plucked from the 
air. It arose from certain remarks made by Lord Justice Ackner, and 
reported 1n the journal 'The Magistrate,.4 It was reported that Lord 
Justice Ackner, when Presiding Judge of the Western Circuit, had said 
that where a decision to refuse bail had been taken after a full 
enqu1ry, it was desirable that the second bench should stick to that 
decision unless circumstances had changed and that if any advocate 
persisted in seeking a review of the decison, the correct course was 
to direct the advocate to apply to a judge in chambers. 
The process whereby these remarks were translated into a policy 
of the Nottingham bench is nowhere revealed. The impetus could have 
come from a member of the bench, but it is perhaps more likely to have 
come from the clerk who has the overall responsibility for processing 
the formidable number of cases every day. Certainly the clerk must 
have been initially involved 1n determining the policy. The 
provisions of the Bail Act 1976 s.4 1mpose a duty on the court to 
consider bail whenever a defendant appears before the court accused of 
2. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 18. 
3. Ibid, at p.18. 
4. Editorial Vol.36 No.3. Page 34 (1980) 
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an offence. It is not an easy question of law to decide whether the 
policy of the Nottingham Justices described above complies with the 
requirements of s.4 of the 1976 Act and the advice of the clerk on 
this point must have been invaluable. The possibility of the practice 
being referred to the Divisional Court must also have been in the 
minds of those who formulated the policy. 
Whoever instigated the policy, it was put into effect and it 
caused some consternation amongst those Nottingham solicitors 
representing defendants in the magistrates' court. Mr C ED" 
. " aVles, 
one of their number became the nominal applicant to the Divisional 
Court in an attempt to question the legality of the practice. Lord 
Justice Donaldson upheld the practice of the Nottingham court holding 
that the justices, when considering a renewed application for bail, 
had no duty to reconsider matters previously considered but should 
confine themselves to circumstances arising since the last court 
appearance, or matters not brought to the attention of the court on a 
previous occasion. 
From the point of Vlew of the courts a great deal of time has 
been saved by the decision in R v. Nottingham Justices ex parte 
Davies. From the point of view of defence advocates throughout the 
country the decision has been less welcome, especially Slnce its 
effect has been heightened by a more recent decision that committal 
for trial does not necessarily constitute a change of circumstances 
1 " " 5 requiring the justices to hear a fresh app lcatlon. 
A policy decision for one court can, exceptionally, have very far 
reaching effects, therefore. Usually, however, such decisions will 
5. ~ v. Slough Justices ex parte Duncan and Embling. 1982 The 
Times July 24th 
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influence only what happens in the individual curt. The effect 
however may be very marked, and all courts have reputations amongst 
police, defence advocates, social workers. 
Of the many areas in which the clerk's influence on the court 
policy could be discovered there are two in particular that have been 
the subject of recent comment. One is the area of delay in hearing 
cases in magistrates' courts. The other is the area of enforcement of 
fines. In examining these two areas in detail the nature and extent 
of the clerk's influence through policy decisions will be more clear. 
Changing the practice of the court organisation - the problem of delay 
Concern about delay in trying cases is not a new phenomenon,6 but 
it is one which has recently been the subject of concern. 
In 1975 the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the 
Distribution of Business between the Crown Court and Magistrates' 
Courts 7 addressed itself to the problem. Responses to that report, 
and discussions which developed in its wake debated the causes of 
8 delay. Defence lawyers working in magistrates' courts were apt to 
blame the court organisation and to press for measures such as an 
appointment system for listing cases. The courts in turn blamed 
defence advocates for taking on too much work and for requesting 
d ' '1 9 a Journments unnecessarl y. 
6. For instance the Report of the Departmental Committee on Courts of 
Summary Jurisdiction in the Metropolitan Area of June 1937 
(printed by HMSO in 1959) was concerned with problems of delay. 
7. (James Committee) Cmnd 6323 1975. 
8, e.g. see N.C.C.L. 'Trial or Error; A reply to the James 
Committee'. See also 'Legal Servies in Criminal Cases', 
Legal Action Group, January 1976. 
9, See articles in L.A.G. Bulletin March 1980, and 143 JPN 646, 143 
JPN 661, 144 JPN 638, 144 JPN 700. 
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Discussion about the causes of delay and measures likely to 
alleviate it took place against a background of very little concrete 
information. Hardly any research had been done to discover for , 
instance, how long cases took to be dealt with, which types of case 
took unacceptably long to be processed, or what measures might be tried 
to alleviate long waiting times. 
Two recent studies have, however, begun to elucidate the problem 
and whilst neither lays blame for delay at the door of any agency in 
particular, both studies point to the key role which the court 
organisation can play in reducing waiting times. 
The Vera Institute of Justice published in 1979 the results of an 
exploratory study on .. . . . , 10 wa1t1ng t1mes 1n mag1strates courts. This 
study gave some indications of the nature of the problem, outined 
factors which affect waiting time, and pointed to the further research 
needed on this subject. The factors which the Vera Institute study 
identified as affecting the length of waiting time are particularly 
interesting for our purposes, they were 
10. 
(1) The size and nature of the court's workload; 
(2) The availability of resources, especially courtroom space 
but including other accommodation, court staff, 
magistrates, equipment and other resources; 
(3) The practices of police and prosecuting solicitors which 
affect the volume and nature of the cases that come to the 
court; 
(4) The availability of defence serV1ces - including 1n 
particular the way the legal aid system works; 
Barry Mahoney et.al. 
exploratory Study.' 
December 1979. 
, Wa i tin g Tim e sin Mag i s t rat e s' C 0 u r t s - an 
Vera Institute of Justice, London Office, 
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(5) The manner in which available courtroom time 1S utilized, 
including the times that magistrates actually sit, the 
efficiency with which cases are handled, scheduling 
practices, and transferring of cases between different 
courts; 
(6) Adjournment practices; 
(7) Adequacy of communication within the court and between the 
court and the parties or their legal representatives; 
(8) The record keeping practices of the court - both in relation 
to the progress of individual cases, and in relation to the 
total workload of the court; 
(9) Lack of any external pressures to process cases speedily, 
and the fact that some participants in the court process 
benefit from adjournments; 
(lO)Unforeseen and unavoidable events such as illness which 
disrupt court schedules. 
Although it 1S clear from these factors that any solution to the 
problem of delay 1n magistrates' courts must involve all the agenc1es 
participating 1n the criminal justice process, nevertheless the clerk 
to the justices has perhaps the most important role to play. S/he has 
a potential to influence if not actually determine the availability of 
court resources, the availability of defence services, the use of 
courtroom time, adjournment practices, communication with other 
agencies, and record keeping practices (Factors (2), (4), (5), (6), 
(7) and (8) above). The possibility of the clerk influencing the 
policies of police and prosecution departments should also not be 
ignored. 
The Vera Institute report itself identifies the role of the court 
as being particularly important. 
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" problems of delay are integrally related to fundamental 
problems of court administration. It is clear from the 
interviews conducted during the feasibility study that many 
persons involved in the work of magistrates' courts are highly 
sensitive to the administrative pressures and strains caused by 
rising workloads and increased complexity of court proceedings. 
These factors not only affect waiting times they affect every 
other aspect of court operation. The ways in which courts as 
institutions adapt to these pressures - what sort of steps they 
take to improve administrative capabilities generally, and how 
they integrate mechanisms for expeditious case processing into 
other aspects of their overall management - may have a major 
influence on the length of waiting times. Of particulr 
importance in this connecton is the extent to which the court 
itself assumes responsibility independent of the parties, for the 
expeditious resolution of cases." 
When the report refers to "the court itself" assuming 
responsibility for dealing with cases as quickly as possible it means 
in effect the clerk, since it is the clerk to the justices who is 
responsible for running the court organisation. It 1S the clerk and 
her/his staff who will be responsible for initiating measures to 
alleviate delay and carrying them through. 
The importance of the clerk's role was also recognised by the 
. 11 h· h report of the Home Office Working Group on Mag1strates Courts w 1C 
re-iterated the findings of the Vera Institute's study on the causes 
12 
of delay. 
This report 1S particularly interesting in that the terms of 
reference of the Group directed it to review in particular what kind 
of help might most usefully be given to courts to reduce waiting times 
11. Report of the Working Group on Magistrates' Courts, London Home 
Office 1982. 
12. The Working Group identified the factors affecting waiting time 
as: 
(1) the amount and nature of court business. 
(2) Prosecution attitudes and practices. 
(3) Defence attitudes and practices. 
(4) Court attitudes and organisation. 
(5) Resource problems. 
(6) Special problems with contested cases. 
(7) Factors outside the court's influence. 
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(and to improve fine enforcement procedures). The concern of the 
Group was thus with the court organisation in particular, and the 
remedies suggested by the Working Group were directed especially to 
changes in attitudes and practices on the part of the courts. 
The Working Group recognised at the outset that whether or not 
the clerk to the justices perceives there to be a problem of delay, 
and the energy with which slhe goes about solving the problem where it 
is recognised are very important. The Group noted that 
" ••• perceptions as to what might constitute unacceptably long 
waiting time differed: there is perhaps a tendency for certain 
time spans to come to be regarded as inevitable. Action taken by 
clerks to combat what they saw as unacceptable delay also varied, 
from the writing of exhortatory letters from time to time to 
local solicitors to the adoption of a special programme embodying 
several practical measures." 
One of the special measures devised by clerks to deal with 
unacceptable waiting times is the introduction of provision for an 
early appearance of the defendant before the court. Agreement has 
been reached between some clerks and local police that where 
defendants are arrested and bailed they are bailed to appear before 
the court at as early a stage as possible - usually seven or eight 
days after arrest. The effect of this is that the case is brought 
within the court's management at an early stage and the court can then 
monitor its progress. If there is to be a not guilty plea then a date 
can be fixed for a hearing soon after arrest. Another a1m of this 
scheme 1S to ensure that defendants seek legal advice as soon as 
possible, S1nce many do not consult a solicitor until after their 
first court appearance. 
The Working Group reported that where such fixed short bail 
periods had been adopted they had proved successful. However the 
operation of such a seemingly simple scheme is not an easy thing. 
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consultation between the court and the police and defence advocates IS 
necessary to set up the scheme In the first place. When it IS In 
operation it has some dangers. If a defendant is brought before a 
court very soon after arrest slhe will probably not have had time to 
consult a solicitor, and may therefore feel pressurised to plead 
guilty inappropriately to get the case over and done with, rather than 
delay the hearing and seek legal advice. The clerks who reported to 
the Working Group suggested that this was not a real problem, since 
clerks would refuse to accept a guilty plea where a possible defence 
existed. However in Chapter Four we showed that although such care 
from clerks is often forthcoming it cannot be relied upon in all 
cases. If an early appearance scheme is to work justly it relies upon 
the clerk In court making a priority of the defendants due process 
rights and ignoring the temptation to press on with a convenient 
guilty plea In a long list of cases. The Working Group suggests that 
the defendant's rights would be best protected by a duty solicitor 
scheme. This may indeed be the case - but the establishment of duty 
solicitor schemes in the past depended not only on local solicitors, 
but also on the initiative of the clerk. Not all clerks took such an 
initiative. 
Early appearance schemes appear to help reduce delay. If they 
are to be used at more courts the initiative must come from the clerks 
to the jus t ices, the neces sary 1 iaison with other bodies needs to be 
set up by clerks, and the measures necessary to protect the defendants 
rights may also be in the hands of clerks. 
Another measure to alleviate delay suggested by the Working Group 
IS the appointment of a listing officer at each court - particularly 
big and busy courts. It IS suggested that the listing officer be a 
person of status, operating an agreed policy and able to take 
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decisions about the listing of cases independantly of clerk and 
magistrates. Again the success of such a scheme depends on the clerk, 
who must liaise with prosecution and defence to set up the scheme, 
agree the policy on which it operates, and appoint a senior member of 
staff to the post, relieving her/him of other duties. During the 
court observation for the present study a court with such a listing 
officer scheme was observed. The scheme did not appear to be 
effective, since no-one could find the listing officer when he was 
wanted, and junior and inexperienced members of staff often filled in 
for him. The basic problem was that the listing officer had too many 
other jobs to do to operate effectively as a listing officer. The 
commitment of the clerk to the proper operation of all aspects of such 
a scheme is therefore vital to its success - as is the provison of 
resurces to allow her/him to instigate it. 
Most of the suggestions which are made by the Working Group rely 
on the initiative of the clerk. These suggestions include us~ng court 
ushers to control the calling of the list rather than police warrant 
officers - the dangers of which were analysed in Chapter Five; the use 
of "front sheets on case papers; the use of court assistants; the 
extension of court sittings; the use of sanctions against solicitors 
h . ,,13 w 0 waste court t~me. Some of the recommendations that the Working 
Group make are simplistic - for instance it ~s suggested that 
allocation of different types of cases to separate courts may help to 
save time. 14 Clerks are unlikely to be excited by the information 
that some of their colleagues deal with crime cases in the mornings 
13. The Working Group's recommendations in relation to delay are 
contained in Chapter Six of its Report. 
14. See para. 5.34 and para. 6.17. 
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and traffic cases in the afternoons - or that some courts deal with 
adjournments at the beginning of a sitting and the rest of the cases 
in order of their forecast length! The problems of listing, which we 
have examined in Chapter Five and elsewhere, are far too complicated 
to be solved by such measures. The real issue for debate concerning 
listing 1S whether or not magistrates' courts can operate an 
appointments system. In other words whether instead of scheduling all 
cases for 10.00 a.m. or 10.30 a.m., cases could be given appointments 
at intervals during the day. Some of the problems associated with 
such an idea have been touched on in Chapter Six when we examined the 
relationship between the clerk and the legal profession. The problems 
of an appointments system are glossed over by the report which simply 
comments that few have tried such a system and none successfully. It 
might have been useful if the benefits and problems of an appointment 
system had been canvassed, and either an experimental system for 
monitoring suggested, or the idea rejected. Then at least one of the 
sources of disagreement and tension between clerks and advocates 
appear1ng in magistrates' courts would have been confronted and the 
idea taken a little further. If the Home Office is to recommend that 
clerks adopt measure after measure to help reduce delay there are 
also things that can be done by the Home Office. Researching problems 
such as appointment systems for court proceedings is perhaps one of 
those things. 
The Working Group asserts that delay can be alleviated and that 
what 1S needed is 
" .•• not so much 
the a<!fftion of 
will. " 
15. Para. 6.1. 
extra resources or wholesale re-organisation as 
new attitudes and the making of an effort of 
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clerks do recogn1se the problems of delay and the Working Group says 
that what is needed is "initiative from the court" to combat them. 
Whilst a report that gives some recognition to the importance of 
their role must be welcome to clerks, their response to the Working 
Group's report has been mixed. Mr. Cliff Moiser, clerk to the 
justices at Plymouth 1S of the op1n1on that 
"There 1S noth1°ng on th R thO h 1 e epor w 1C any reasonably competent 
Justices' Clerk of five or six years standing does not know •.. ,,16 
The Justices' Clerks' Society is rather coy, protesting that 
" ••• where there is delay or inefficient practice these are 
unlikely to be put right solely by the activities of the Justices' 
Clerk, the active and interested participation of other court 
users is needed.,,17 
However the Society's response to the Working Group's report does 
accept and expand upon many of the Report's suggestions. The 
society's response demonstrates a depth of understanding of the 
problems, and a willingness to be critical of clerks' own shortcomings 
which is most laudable. It also points to a number of problems where 
commitment to change on the part of the Home Office is required. It 
is present ly the cas e, for ins tance, that a clerk to the jus t ices who 
needs money for more staff has to surmount the hurdles of both the 
Magistrates' Courts' Committee and the Local Authority, when some 
clerks are not even entitled to attend the meetings of the 
Magis trates' Courts' Committee! The recommendations of the Working 
Party on management do not approach a solution to the problems faced 
by clerks who want adequate financing to carry out their roles. 18 
16. 'Comments on the report of the Home Office Working Group on 
Magistrates' Courts' 133 N.L.J. 149 and 157. 
17. Justices' Clerks' Society. 'The Work of the Magistrates' Courts. 
Response to the Report of the Home Office Working Group and 
additional comments.' Ref. 9S 6310 March 1983. 
18. See recommendations 45 - 57 of the Working Group Report. 
404 
"Efforts of will" cannot solve all the problems of magistrates' 
courts. Even the most willing clerk needs resources to combat delay 
effectively. 
Whilst commitment to reducing delay from all court users is 
needed the clerk to the justices has a key role to play. Many of the 
factors identified as affecting delay are under the control or 
influence of clerks, and clerks are best placed to instigate the 
liaison between court users which could approach a total solution to 
the prob lem. The Home Office has correctly identified the clerks as 
having the most important role to play in reducing delay 1n 
magistrates' courts, but it has failed to do much that is constructive 
to help them to play it effectively. Most importantly it has not 
confronted the question of resources and the financing of the courts. 
The Court Organisation - fine enforcement 
A further area of court organisation which the Working Party 
examined was fine enforcement. The Working Party stressed the 
importance of fine enforcement because of two factors. 19 Loss of 
revenue to the exchequer was seen as the least important of these 
factors. 20 The credibility of the fine as a penalty was particularly 
stressed. Magistrates' Courts make wide use of the fine as a penalty -
for 1979 57% of all persons sentenced for indictable/hybrid offences 
were fined 89% of those dealt with for summary offences and 99% of , 
. ff 21 those sentenced for motor1ng 0 ences. The argument is that if 
19. Para. 7.1. ibid. 
20. Clerks would certainly endorse such an assessment. Cliff Moiser 
has pointed out that magistrates' courts are self financing on 
fines and fees. Bristol Magistrates' Court collected over one 
million pounds in fines and fees in 1980. (See Annual Report 
for that year.) 
21. Para. 7.1. Working Group Report. 
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such fines are not enforced, fines will become less useful as a 
penalty. 
There are also other reasons why enforcement is an important area 
for attention. Although the present study did not set out to collect 
evidence in relation to magistrates'sentencing patterns several months 
observation 1n many different courts seemed to show that the 
magistrates observed very rarely imposed a sentence of immediate 
imprisonment on an offender. However, when the courts came to deal 
wi th fine de faul ters, immediate committal (and suspended comm it taO to 
prison became much more frequent. Court observation alone cannot show 
how many of these defaulters actually went to prison since Some of 
them, having been taken to the cells,would pay their outstanding debts 
and be released very quickly. However, the impress ionis t ic evidence 
from court observation is supported by a study by N.A.C.R.O. of fine 
defaulters, civil prisoners and petty offenders in local prisons. 22 
This study examined prisoners in Winson Green Prison who had been 
sentenced to short periods of imprisonment. Of those prisoners 
serving six months or les s 26.5 % were fine de faul ters, and 16.5% were 
civil prisoners, nearly all of whom were imprisoned for non payment of 
wife maintenance. A total of 43% of the population of short stay 
prisoners of that local prison were there for failure to make money 
payments. 
Enforcement becomes important therefore, not simply because of 
the credibility of the fine as a penalty, but also in relation to the 
currently important subject of prison overcrowding. The ques t ion of 
the methods used by magistrates to enforce fines are important as well 
as the question of how efficiently they collect the money. 
22. Geoff Wilkins, 'Making Them Pay', NACRO. 1979. 
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We have already noted the influence of the clerk in court in 
relation to fine enforcement, and discussed the problematic situation 
of the clerk acting as legal adviser to the magistrate, and acting _ 
or appearing to act - as a prosecutor of the fine defaulter at the 
same time. 23 There also seems to be a tendency for the clerk to be 
willing to take a more directive role on disposal of fine defaulters. 
One clerk remarked 
"Say, for instance if you get an unpaid fine who you know is a 
notoriously bad payer and he comes up before a fresh bench who 
don't know him, then I usually put the boot in ..• I wouldn't 
presume to tell them how to deal with him, I'd just put that 
'he's a bad payer - this and this and this happened - you might 
consider sending him down, but its up to you', and I'll leave it 
at that." 
The N.A.C.R.O. report commented on the substantial role of the clerk, 
and the problems of the defendants in the courtroom. 24 
Outside the court, the clerk and her/his staff are also 
important. The attitude of the clerk to the justices on fine 
enforcement, as on anything else, will influence the attitude of the 
bench. The N.A.C.R.O. study quotes from the Annual Report of the 
Birmingham Justices which says 
"Justices will recall that in August 1977 the Clerk drew 
attention to the consequences of the Court's failing to fix 
immediate prison alternatives in cases where it is thought 
appropriate to impose fines on defendants who have no settled 
address at the time of the conviction •.• Regrettably indications 
are that there are still many cases in which Courts seem to be 
unaware of the likely avoidance of penalties by arrested 
persons." 
This is just one example of a clerk educating his bench on fine 
enforcement issues, an example of what is an ongoing process at most 
c our t s. Some of the clerks observed for the present study passed 
23. Chapter Four. 
24. Wilkins, supra Chapter Two. 
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comment on the aptitude of particular members of their bench for fine 
enforcement courts. Especially where a particular effort was being 
made to reduce the amount of outstanding fines, discussion and 
involvement of the bench was seen as a priority. The views of the 
clerk as to the most effective way of dealing with defaulters has its 
effect on the attitudes of the bench. 
The priority given to fine enforcement and the methods used to 
enforce fines also depend to a great extent on the clerk. The 
opInIons of clerks as to the best way to go about enforcement varies 
very widely. One of the clerks studied took the view that the more 
steps there were in the enforcement process, the more money would be 
collected before court appearance or imprisonment became necessary. 
He had therefore devised a system whereby a series of reminders, 
requests and threats of action were sent to defaulters before they 
were, if necessary, brought to court. 
Another of the clerks studied was of the opInIon that the more 
substantial the threat the greater the likelihood of payment. He 
therefore sought to bring defaulters before the court at theearliest 
opportunity, and to repeat such appearances at regular intervals if 
payments were not abolutely regular and full. He favoured suspended 
committal at an early stage since he believed that the threat of 
imprisonment was the most effective way to induce payment. The 
experience of fine defaulters dealt with by these two courts IS likely 
to have been very different. 
Not only does the attitude of the clerk to the fine enforcement 
process affect defaulters, but also the attitudes and practices of 
staff in the court office who administer the process is important. 
The influence of these court staff has been noted by several studies. 
Sparks' research in 1973 noted the degree of discretion of the officer 
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1n charge of the fines section at Birmingham court.25 Wilkins' study 
26 for N.A.C.R.O. also noted the discretion of court staff informally 
to allow further time for payment or to vary the amount paid. The 
Home Office Working Group also discussed this use of discretion at 
some courts, and acknowledged that it may be useful, 
" ln that over rigid adherence to the exact terms of court 
orders would simply result in more defaulters being brought 
before enforcement courts and not in greater receipts of fines.,,27 
The concern of the Working Group was not that such discretion was 
being exercised, but that no guidelines for its exercise were set down 
by the clerks to the justices at individual courts, or nationally. 
The Working Party recommended that the Home Office should examine the 
implications of the practice with a view to regulating it. 28 
The maln concern of the Home Office Report was with the 
administrative measures used to collect fines and fees, and with their 
efficiency. various methods for streamlining the process were 
suggested, along with the pious hope that problems could be solved by 
changing attitudes and redirection of effort rather than in increase 
1n effort. 29 
Rather more usefully the Report stressed the role of the 
Justices' Clerks' Society at a national level in emphasising the 
importance of fine enforcement, encouraging its members to take 
appropriate steps and ln disseminating information about good 
enforcement practices. 
25. R.F. Sparks. 'The Enforcement of Fines. The Process 
Sentence to Committal' (1973) 13 Brit. J. Criminol. 92. 
26. See supra. 
27. Report of the Working Group, Para. 9.24. 
28. Para. 9.26. 
29. Para. 9.10. 
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from 
Given the importance of the clerk in the fine enforcement process, a 
greater role for the clerks' professional organisation makes very good 
sense. The response of the Society to the Working Group's proposals 
has been a measured and sensible response. It avoided the more 
anguished protests of individual clerks,30 with considerable 
restraint. Since the members of the Society know more than anyone 
else about the problems of fine enforcement, it would make sense if 
the society were to be centrally involved in taking the question of 
fine enforcement further by working out possible reforms in detail, 
and monitoring trials of new systems and methods. 
At all stages of the fine enforcement process the clerk and 
her/his staff either define or influence events. The number of 
reminders or chances to pay that each defendant receives before being 
brought to court 1S determined by the clerk. The degree of sympathy 
and the extent of a formal discretion that defaulters find when they 
have problems in pay1ng depends on the clerk and his/her staff. The 
efficiency with which the defaulter 1S reminded of default and 
encouraged to pay be fore the matter is forgot ten by the de faul ter, 1S 
a matter for the clerk. 
In court, the severity of the reception that the defaulter 
receives will usually depend on the clerk who examines him/her about 
means. Even the policy of the bench who decide how to deal with the 
defaulter will have been influenced by the clerk. It would be 
ridiculous to underestimate the clerk's influence, and it seems 
obvious to focus on the clerk when considering how best to improve the 
system 
30. For instance C. Moiser 133 NLJ 149 and 517. 
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The Clerk and the Character of the Court 
The Home Office Report has given some welcome recognition of the 
important role played by the clerk in just two areas of the 
administration of justice. The recommendations of that Report 
recognise the need for informat ion to be spread throughout the many 
courts in the country so that new ideas and experiments will come to 
the attention of all clerks. They also recognise the need for the 
training of clerks to the justices and their staff in management and 
administrative skills. A centre for magistrates' courts is proposed, 
together with an inspectorate for magistrates' courts. 3l 
At least some of these measures will be welcomed by clerks. But, 
as usual clerks are asked to produce improvements to their courts 
without money being spent on them. The Working Party Report does very 
little to confront the problems of funding of magistrates' courts, and 
it expects great improvements in management and administration without 
staff to carry them out. One clerk interviewed said of this type of 
attitude 
"I feel that the administration of justice by magistrates - which 
is 97-98% of the whole of the criminal law - is not given the 
governmental respect that it ought to be I think the 
government is very niggardly financially in the way it does deal 
with magistrates' courts. It is the only contact many members of 
the public will have with democracy in action. It is therefore 
absolutely vital they should leave the court - whatever they 
think about the decision - with a certain respect for the way it 
was reached. And as you have got laymen as the judicial element, 
it is very very important that you get the highest possible 
standard of professional advice for them ..• I think the last 
figures showed that the Home Office received eighty four million 
pounds in fines, and paid out sixty million to local authorities 
- they were not even prepared to say that justice should break 
even." 
So far as it goes the attention, (even if belated) now given to the 
importance of the clerk's job outside the courtroom must be welcome to 
31. See the Report of the Working Group, Chapter 13. 
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clerks. Those interviewed were all too conSC10US of the importance of 
the job they do for the administration of justice, and frustrated at 
the lack of recognition accorded to their role. 
"The role of the clerk has been not undervalued, but totally 
ignored 1n the past, and people pretended that the clerk does not 
exist." 
Clerks did not however lay the blame totally at the door of the 
government, but recognised that their own standards needed to be 
improved and looked forward to a more robust role for the clerk. 
"In some courts I accept that the clerk does not exist as a power 
1n the land, and those courts are bad courts and don't do 
justice. What I maintain is that a court of lay magistrates 1S 
incompetent without a lawyer adequately to do justice. We 
need to build on this, not destroy it." 
The influence of the clerk 1S pervas1ve - so much so that many clerks 
were prepared to say that they influenced the whole character of their 
court. 
"I think the clerk 1S responsible - it is down to him •.• you can 
tell by looking at a court what the clerk is like." 
"Every Court will have the stamp of its clerk in some way." 
"I think nowadays more so than it used to be, the clerk has a 
very strong influence on the way the court is conducted by the 
magistrates themselves." 
Some clerks felt that their influence was inevitable, but should be 
exercised quietly. Others felt that it was desirable and should be 
openly acknowledged. It will be to the benefit of those clerks who 
wish to see their job recognised and their status increased if there 
can be greater openness about the clerk's role, and if clerks 
themselves are more assertive. 
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Quasi-judicial powers and the Future of the Clerk's role 
Origins and development of the clerk's quasi judicial powers. 
For some time clerks have been pressing for their administrative 
responsibilities to be extended and suggesting that they should be 
empowered to perform certain quasi-judicial functions. As early as 
the 1940's clerks suggested to the Departmental Committee on Justices' 
Clerks that their powers might be increased. Their initial ambitions 
were modest and limited to a request that they be empowered to issue 
d . 1 process an w1tness summonses. The Committee rejected even this 
idea, but conceded that the actual signing of all summonses by a 
justice might be burdensome and therefore recommended that the clerk 
should be authorised to authenticate process. 
Although even this recommendation of the committee was not 
immediately acted upon, the effect of the reforms consequent on the 
Report was such as to make extension of the clerk's powers more 
feas ib leo The amalgamation of divisions and the phasing out of the 
part time clerk created a body of professional full time clerks 
enthusiastic to increase their responsibilities and able to point to 
their qualifications and expertise when petitioning for reform. (See 
above Chapter One). 
It was during the 1960's when these changes had been consolidated 
that further suggestions for extension of the clerk's role began to be 
made and pressure for more powers for clerks grew. Glanville 
Williams in'The Proof of Guilt,2 pointedto improvements in the 
standards of clerks to the justices in the context of his prediction 
1. Cmnd 6507 para. 56. 
2. Stevens 3rd edition 1963 
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that it would soon be anomalous for the clerk not to be on the bench. 
In 1963 a significant article appeared in the Justice of the Peace 
Journal entitled 'The Future of Justices' Clerks,.3 It assessed the 
developments S1nce the Departmental Committee's report, and 
recommended that the powers of clerks be significantly extended. It 
argued that,although the law will always require that a trial be by a 
properly constituted court, nevertheless 
" ••. there 1S a vast field of quasi-administrative or even 
executive law with which the solicitor or barrister clerk of the 
future might be entrusted, to the advantage of the public and the 
administration of the law, if only because it could be done much 
more expeditiously than under the present system.,,4 
The author 0 f the ar tic Ie (un iden t i f ied) s ugges ted tha t c Ie rks 
should be responsible for the enforcement and variation of maintenance 
orders and the enforcement of fines, the issuing of process, 
uncontested committal proceedings, and the grant of certain permits 
and licenses. The arrival of an extended fixed penalty system for 
motoring offences was predicted 1n this article and it was recommended 
that clerks alone should be empowered to deal with such offences. 
The desire to increase the powers of the clerk was taken up at 
about the same time by the Justices' Clerks' Society. In 1965 the 
President of the Society told the Conference of the National 
Association of Justioes' Clerks'Assistants that the Society was having 
talks with 'high judicial officers' concerning the future of clerks.5 
The Society's proposals to those officers were concerned to remove the 
negative approach of East Kerrier, to improve training for clerks and 
their assistants and to empower clerks to perform certain sem1-
3. 127 JPN 633 
4. Ibid 
5. The Conference 1S reported at 129 JPN 452. 
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judicial functions including the . . 1ssu1ng of summonses and the 
extens10n of time to pay fines. 
This linking of the problems of East Kerrier with proposals for 
future change takes us back to the theme identified in the earlier 
chapter on the law relating to the clerk in court. The decision 1n 
the East Kerrier case was resented so much by clerks because it 
displayed a lack of trust in them at a time when they were anxious to 
improve their standards, their status and their responsibilities. 
However, whilst all clerks were united 1n their dislike of the 
decision in East Kerrier, they did not all see their future in terms 
of extension of quasi-judicial functions. The Council of the Society 
favoured it, arguing that the justices could be relieved of a great 
deal of rout ine work, and that a more appropriate divis ion of labour 
between the magistrates and their clerk could be achieved. However 
there were clerks who had doubts about the desirability of taking on 
anything but purely administrative functions. 6 
Despite lack of unanimity amongst clerks, some extension of 
powers has been achieved in a somewhat piecemeal fashion over a number 
of years. In 1967 the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 
relating to legal aid contained a rule making power 7 which specified 
that regulations under the act could provide for the exerC1se of 
powers under that part of the Act by 'a person entitled to sit as a 
member of the court or any officer of the court'. The effect of the 
Regulations 8 was to enable the clerk to the justices to grant legal 
6. See the report of the Annual Meeting of the Justices' Clerks' 
Society at 129 JPN 335. 
7. In Section 83. 
8. The Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings (General) Regulations 1968 
S.l. No 1231 as amended by SI 1970 No.1980, SI 1976 No.790 and SI 
1980 No's 705 and 1651 
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aid, to grant legal aid subject to a downpayment, or to refer the 
application to a court or a justice (in other words to grant, but not 
to refuse legal aid). 
Soon afterwards, ~n 1968, the Justices of the Peace Act, as well 
as defining the role of the clerk for the first time, provided a rule 
making power in relation to clerks to the justices. Section 5 (1) of 
the Act authorised rules to be made enabling a justices clerk to do 
those things which are the province of a single justice. The rules 
themselves - the Justices' Clerks' Rules - did not appear until 1970. 
The rule making power of the 1968 Act was seen as a great 
advance, and prompted some to predict considerable development in the 
clerk's role. Alec Samuels, ln an article in the Criminal Law Review 
of 19689 envisaged clerks taking uncontested committal proceedings, 
and in time having their responsibilities increased until they would 
be on the Commission and performing a role similar to that of a judge-
advocate, ruling on points of law and summing up for the bench. 
When the 1970 Rules were actually made, however, there was no 
startling extension of the clerk's role. The Justice of the Peace 
commented bitterly 
"Seldom can there have been such a forensic anti-climax as the 
making of S.l. No.231 of 1970 .•• We find it difficult to believe 
that the Lord Chancellor is really unaware that, with a couple of 
exceptions, clerks to the justices have for many years exercised 
all (and more) of their new powers, albeit in a de facto rather 
than a de jure manner." lO 
The Rules specified eleven functions which the clerk was 
thenceforth entitled to perform. Most of these are indeed of very 
9. (1968) Crim L.R. 662. 'Magistrates: The Justices of the Peace 
Act 1968.' 
10. 134 JPN 288. 
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little judicial significance. ll For instance, Rule 7 empowers the 
clerk to make a transfer of fine order - changing the court to which 
an offender should pay a fine. Rule 11 empowers the clerk to amend a 
probation order so that where a probationer over the age of 17moves 
to a new petty seSS10ns area, this can be reflected on the order. 
Such powers are undoubtedly useful for the clerk to possess, but they 
can hardly be regarded as significant extensions of the clerk's role. 
The 1970 rules did however g1ve clerks two powers which were of 
more substantial effect. Rule 2 empowers the clerk to 1ssue process, 
and this was a departure even though clerks had been asking for it for 
thirty years. Also Rules 3 and 4 empower the clerk to deal with 
agreed adjournments and agreed remands where the defendant 1S on bail 
and the remand is on the same terms and conditions of bail. The 
clerk cannot, however, remand in custody, nor can the clerk grant bail 
initially - which prompted the Justice of the Peace to comment that it 
could not see why the clerk to the justices should have less powers 
, 'f I' ,12 than a po11ce sergeant who can grant ba1l rom a po 1ce stat10n. 
The rules were added to 1n 1975, 1976 and 1978. 13 The 
additions were not matters of any great moment. Many of the powers 
which it had been suggested that the clerk might be given, such as the 
power to deal with uncontested committal proceedings, have not been 
added. Certainly there seem to be no indications from the present 
rules that the clerk can soon expect to be given any true judicial 
role or be translated into the judge-advocate of magistrates' court. 
11. For the text of the Rules see Appendix Five. 
12. At 134 JPN 288. 
13. By S.L 1975 No. 300, S.L 1976 No. 1767 and S.L 1978 No.754. 
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'Brougham', a regular commentator ~n The Justice of the Peace on 
., . 
the mag~strates courts scene exam~ned the rules, and recollected with 
amusement the seriousness of the campaign of the Justices' Clerks' 
society for the rules to be made. He referred to the apparently 
heated disputes about the rules between clerks themselves, and between 
clerks and magistrates. 14 The drama of the Society's campaign had, 
'Brougham' pointed out, been succeeded by an anti-climax. The 
feeling of clerks was that what had been given was a small recognition 
of the tasks in fact performed by the clerk, but certainly not an 
acknowledgement of what they were capable of or aspired to. 
Indeed not only did the powers g~ven to clerks not realise their 
ambitions for extension of their role they did not, in some cases, 
even g~ve the clerks sufficient freedom, as they saw it, to operate 
their courts efficiently. This was so especially in relation to the 
issuing of process. 
Quasi-judicial powers ~n operation - the power to ~sue process and the 
power to grant legal aid. 
Rule 2 of the 1970 Rules empowered the clerk to issue process. This 
was ini t ially very we lcome to clerks, since is suing process involves 
scrutinising large numbers of informations every day. The a~m of the 
scrutiny is to determine whether the informant has any necessary 
authority to prosecute, whether or not the summons ~s within time, 
whether the court has jurisdiction, and whether the information 
discloses an offence known to law. These are matters upon which most 
lay magistrates will require advice so that, before the rules,a double 
scrutiny was needed by both clerk and magistrate. Allowing the 
clerk to the justices to perform the task alone relieved the 
14. (1970) 134 J.P.N. 253. 
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magistrates of a burden which had little point to it, ln that the 
effective scrutiny was being done by the clerk anyway. 
However most courts have only one clerk to the justices and a 
busy court will lssue many hundreds of summonses every week. To use 
the time of the legal adviser to the magistrates and manager of the 
court organisation in reading several hundred summonses a week is to 
restrict considerably the attention slhe has to direct to other 
aspects of the job. Very many applications for summonses come in 
standard form from responsible prosecuting authorities and are highly 
unlikely to contain anything contentious. Whilst scrutiny of such 
applications may technically be a judicial task, it is not a difficult 
one. It requires technical expertise, but hardly the exercise of a 
great degree of judicial discretion. 
This fact, and the pressure of work, led many courts to adopt the 
practice of designating certain senior members of the clerk's staff to 
scrutinise informations afterwards affixing the facsimile signature of 
the clerk to the justices. This practice was in accordance with a 
circular issued in 1975 by the Council of the Justices' Clerks' 
Society. The practice was noted and, in effect, endorsed by the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 15 which proposed a removal of 
the requirement that informations issued by the police should be 
scrutinised by a magistrate or clerk to the justices. It noted that 
"this has become a virtual dead letter in practice and should be 
removed from the law,,16. The Royal Commission's proposal was that 
instead of the present system there should be a single procedure for 
initiating proceedings, called 'the making of an accusation'. 
15. Cmnd B092 19BI. 
16. See Ch.B p.171. 
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Accusations by the police or other government agenc~es should,the 
Commission proposed, be on their own responsibility and they should be 
accountable. Accusations by other agencies should be referred to the 
prosecution Agencies proposed by the Commission. Only if the 
Prosecution Agency declined to take the accusation would the matter be 
referred to the magistrates' court. The importance of this is that 
the Commission did not see the issuing of process as a judicial act, 
but as an administrative one, to be subject to scrutiny in the way 
other administrative acts can be scrutinised by the courts. 
The courts, however, have not agreed that the issuing of processs 
is an administrative task which can be delegated, and have held that 
it is a judicial act only to be done by persons authorised, and thus 
that either the magistrates or the clerk to the justices must 
scrutinise every application for a summons. The legality of the use 
of senior staff to ~ssue process was tested in 1981 in R v Gateshead 
Justices, Ex parte Tesco Stores Ltd and R v Birmingham Justices 
. . d 17 Ex parte D.W. Parkin Construct~on Lt Lord Justice Donaldson in 
that case commented that although it may be rare for the issue of a 
summons to be withheld it nevertheless happens, and that although most 
prosecutions are brought by experienced and responsible prosecutors, 
not all are so brought. He held that 
" .•• the requirement that a justice of the peace or a clerk to 
the justices acting as justice of the peace shall take personal 
responsibility for the propriety of taking as serious a step as 
to require the attentance of a citizen before a criminal court is 
a constitutional safeguard of fundamental importance. We have 
. f . . . d· . 1 1118 no doubt that th~s unct~on ~s JU ~Cla . 
Nor was he impressed by the argument that clerks to the justices alone 
17. [1981] QB 470 
18. At page 486. 
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could not deal with the volume of work - "the short answer to this 1S 
tha if the practice is unlawful, expedience will not make it lawful". 
The consequences of this decision in practice were dramatic. In 
courts allover the country summonses had been issued after scrutiny 
by court staff, not the clerk to the justices. Large numbers of 
people thus came to court to answer summonses, only to discover that 
the summonses were not valid. In such cases where the prosecution 
was within time a fresh information was la1·d and the t d 
, . rna ter procee ed 
with. Where the offence was out of time when the defendant appeared 
in court, the defendant was told that the summons against her/him was 
invalid and that s/he could go. There was enormous confusion amongst 
defendants appearing at court to answer summonses who did not 
understand why some were being 'let off' - as they saw it - and some 
19 
were not. 
The reaction of the clerks who had to deal with this confusion is 
probably best described as resigned indignation. They saw the 
decision in the Birmingham and Gateshead cases as further confirmation 
that the Divisional Court did not understand the realities of their 
job. The reaction of one clerk sums up their attitude. He said 
19. The decision in the Gateshead case also raised the question of 
what constitutes the laying of an information. Certain obiter 
remarks of Donaldson L.J. seemed to imply that even if an 
information had not been considered by a justice of the peace or 
a justices clerk,this deficiency could be remedied by the timeous 
appearance of the defendant before the court. The question of 
what constitutes the laying of an information was referred to the 
House of Lords in Hill v. Alderton & others 75 Cr. App. R. 346 
(which case is referred to as Hill v. Anderton in [1982] 2 All 
E • R. 963, and as R v. Man c h est e r S tip end i a r y Mag i s t rat e Ex Par t e 
Hill in [1 9 8 2 ] -3 W L R 3 3 1 ). T his cas e dec ide d t hat all t hat i s 
required for a written information to be laid is the delivery of 
the document to the office of the justices' clerk. If a summons 
or warrant is to be issued, then the information must 
subsequently be laid before a magistrate or the clerk to the 
justices, since the function of issuing a summons or warrant is a 
judicial function. The decision in the Gateshead case was thus 
overruled in part. 
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"I can't see why we had to suffer the indignities of that last 
decision by Donaldson". 
So far as the substance of the decision was concerned, some 
clerks agreed that the issuing of a summons 1S a judicial act - but 
nevertheless felt that it was one which court staff could be empowered 
to carry out. 
As another clerk put it 
" ••• I feel that the clerk, especially recently, has been put 
under great strain by the Divisional Court in one way or another. 
I think that the decision to issue a summons, for one example, is 
definitely a judicial task, but to compare that with a police 
officer who arrests and charges a person, and bails them - who 
may have far less experience than one of the senior clerks in 
court - 1S a bit ridiculous." 
Other clerks felt that calling the 1ssu1ng of summonses judicial was 
wrong. 
"Clearly there are jobs that a clerk can do just as well as a 
magistrate, and it would be useful if a clerk could do those 
jobs, but calling them quasi-judicial jobs confuses the role of 
the justice and the clerk. It would be better if they were 
rec las s ified in to adminis trat ive powers of a jus t ice or clerk ••. 
I think that, in reality, to continue calling that (the issue of 
summonses) a judicial decision is very foolish." 
None of the clerks interviewed dealt with the point made by Lord 
Justice Donaldson that scrutiny by a justice or by the clerk to the 
justices was a constitutional safeguard in the sense that scrutiny by 
the court safeguards against people being wrongly brought before the 
cour t. The point was taken up, however by the Justices' Clerks' 
Society which has argued that the 'constitutional safeguard' argument 
is weak in that no such safeguard exists in relation to charges. A 
charge, the society says is simply communicated to the court which has 
no discretion but to deal with the matter. 20 
20. In their Response to the Report of the Home Office Working Group. 
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However, safeguards do exist ~n relation to charges. There is a 
requirement that the defendant be brought before a court speedily. 
The court can then amend the charge under Section 123 of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, or under the same section adjourn the 
case, or ~n a proper case dismiss the charge. However the provisions 
of Section 123 apply equally to summonses. The safeguard of scrutiny 
of summonses at the earlier stage of laying the information can 
therefore only be justified in terms of the likely longer period 
before a defendant who ~s summonsed can appear before a court to 
contest the validity .of the summons. This argument becomes weaker 
when one compares the procedure on summons with the procedure on 
charge where the defendant is bailed from a police station under S43 
Magistrates' Courts' Act 1980. There the defendant will be charged 
and bailed to appear before the court some time hence, in the same way 
that a defendant will rece~ve a summons with a return date some time 
~n the future. 
The Justices' Clerks' Society recommends that there be no 
requirement of scrutiny by the court in relation to summonses until 
proceedings start, or alternatively that if reference to the court 
before the commencement of proceedings ~s thought necessary that it 
should become an administrative matter which could be delegated to 
members of the justices 'clerk's staff.2l (They do not argue that if 
scrutiny of informations is thought to be a judicial act it should 
nevertheless still be able to be delegated to their deputies.) 
Clerks are not convinced that there are constitutional safeguards in 
the scrutiny of informations by themselves or the magistrates. They 
see change in the system as necessary to ensure that it functions 
21. Ibid. 
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efficiently. In taking this position they are mov~ng away from a due 
process model (which would stress the necessity of safeguards in the 
system) and towards a crime control model, emphasising the need for 
the speedy and efficient processing of cases. However, it is fair to 
add that they are not exceptional ~n taking this view. Their 
position ~s substantially that taken by the Royal Commission which saw 
issuing of process as an administrative task, and the rights of 
defendants as sufficiently safeguarded by the scrutiny of the courts 
over administrative action. 
None of the powers given under the Justices' Clerks' Rules of 
1970 are particularly significant, in that they do not give the clerk 
a great deal of power in themselves. They have a symbolic 
significance, however, which is very important. They point the way 
towards one possible area of future extension of the clerk's role. 
Although the rules themselves do not particularly enhance the 
clerk's power, there ~s another area where the clerk has been given 
functions which carry a great deal of effective power to influence the 
exper~ence of criminal justice for those who come into contact with 
it. This ~s the area of legal aid. 
Under the Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings (General) Regulations 
1968 the clerk can cons ider an appl ica t ion for legal aid. (Re gula t ion 
4) When doing so the clerk must either make an order, make an order 
subject to a downpayment, or refer the application to the court or a 
justice of the peace. 
Apart from applications made in court, the general practice is 
for an application for legal aid to be assessed in the clerk's office 
and if it is to be granted, dealt with by the office. If the clerk 
is minded to refuse legal aid he will refer the application to a 
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magistrate. The magistrate will therefore usually see only those 
applications which s/he knows would be refused by the clerk. 
The question of whether legal aid should be granted or refused 1S 
governed by a number of factors. The basic rules are contained 1n 
the Legal Aid Act 1974,Section 29 of which provides that the power to 
make a legal aid order shall be exercisable "where it appears 
desirable in the interests of justice" and if the means of the 
defendant are such that he requires assistance in meeting the costs of 
a defence. Further guidance is given by the Widgery Criteria. 22 
These criteria specify that legal aid should be granted if the charge 
is a grave one in the sense that the accused is in real jeopardy of 
losing his liberty or livelihood or suffering serious damage to his 
reputation; if the charge raises a substantial question of law or the 
accused is unable to follow the proceedings or present a case because 
of language problems, mental illness or mental or physical disability; 
or representation is desirable in the interests of someone other than 
the accused - for instance in the case of sexual offences against 
young children when it is undesirable that the accused should cross 
examine the witness in person. 
As well as these criteria clerks are, from time to time, 1n 
receipt of exhortations from the Home Office in relation to legal aid. 
For instance Home Office Circular 97/1978 contained guidance to clerks 
on legal aid. It pointed out the large amount of public money spent 
on legal aid, and referred to a recent increase in legal aid spending 
(the circular was issued on 25.7.78). Clerks were to cut back the 
money spent on legal aid - without of course depriving anybody who 
22. Criteria of the Departmental Committee on Legal Aidin Criminal 
Proceedings, Cmnd. 2934 approved by the Lord Chancellor and the 
Home Secretary in 1972. 
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who needed it and complying still with the Widgery criteria. In 1981 
the Lord Chancellor's Department issued a circular (L.C.D. 81 (3)) 
which told clerks to eradicate waste in legal aid, refuse premature 
applications and be more stringent in requiring information from 
applicants. 
Within the legislation the criteria and the policy, there is 
still considerable scope for variation in grant of legal aid. Many 
courts will have worked out criteria of their own in more detail than 
the Widgery criteria. Here magistrates and clerk will have an 
influence on court policy, and one which seems to have a profound 
impact on refusal rates. Examination of the variation in refusal of 
legal aid indicates differences which are very wide indeed, even where 
petty sessional divisions with similar sized workloads within the same 
23 
areas are compared. 
It can be argued that the influence of the clerk 1S the most 
significant one here. It is the clerk who processes the applications 
and decides which are to be granted. Those the clerk feels inclined 
to refuse he refers to the magistrates. The magistrate therefore 
receives applications which slhe knows that the clerk to the justices 
would refuse, and the likelihood that that magistrate - who has 
probably been trained by the clerk and who respects the clerk's 
judgement and expertise - will then grant legal aid is not high. Ole 
Hanson, investigating the influence of the clerk on the grant of legal 
aid cited the clerk at one court who wrote an article in the court 
newsletter in which he said 
23. See H. Levenson 'Uneven Justice - Refusal of Criminal Legal Aid 
in 1979'. L.A.G. Bulletin May 1981. 
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"Under the relevant legislation I am not entitled to refuse an 
applicat ion outright. If, having cons idered an appl icat ion I 
think that legal aid should be refused, I am obliged to refer' it 
to a magistrate for refusal. Whilst such a magistrate is in no 
way bound by my reaction to the application and can in fact 
overrule me and grant it, I would submit that it is not a 
decision that should be taken lightly.,,24 
It appears that the clerk's decision on legal aid IS the 
effective decision. This is supported by Hanson's study which 
indicates that a change of clerk can effect a significant change in 
the refusal rate for legal aid. Hanson investigated waltham Forest 
Magistrates Court, and showed that where there was no change in the 
bench or bench policy the refusal rate for legal aid nevertheless 
increased from 5.1% to 23.2% over a three month period. The changes 
that had taken place at the court were the appointment of a new clerk 
to the jus t ices, and the is suing of the Lord Chance llor' s circular of 
1981 already referred to. The quotation above was from that new 
clerk at Waltham Forest, and his contribution in the court newsletter 
was a part of the efforts he saw as necessary to implement the Lord 
Chancellor's Circular. 
It would seem that a very significant change In refusal rate was 
achieved by his own actions and by his influence on the magistrates. 
The attitudes and actions of the clerk to the justices can therefore 
have a considerable effect on the grant of legal aid, and indeed it 
would appear that the clerk has more influence than anyone else in the 
court, including the magistrates, on the grant of legal aid. 
The power that the clerk has, here, IS not symbolic. It IS 
real. The real decisions about the grant of legal aid are almost 
always made by the clerk to the justices. It is important to bear 
24. Cited in Ole Hansen. "What a Difference a Clerk Makes". LAG 
Bulletin March 1982. 
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ln mind in relation to any future powers glven to clerks. Clerks 
inevitably influence their magistrates. The clerk is the expert who 
can protect the magistrate from error, and who has trained the 
magis tra teo If a process is set up where the views of the clerk are 
patently obvious to the magistrate, very few magistrates will see good 
reason to go against the clerks view. 
Society may be content that clerks take decisions about the 
refusal of legal aid. Clerks think, on the whole, that they should 
deal with the whole process, including refusal. If clerks are to do 
it, they should have their power openly acknowledged, for it is little 
more than a pretence to say that the magistrates have any effective 
discretion at the moment. (*See addendum page 456a.) 
Should the quasi-judicial powers of the clerk be increased? 
We have seen that the powers that clerks now posess have been 
fought for, and that clerks are ambitious for more than they were 
given under the 1970 Rules. It has also been argued that clerks are 
looking, in general, to extend their role in the courts. It is 
therefore instructive to see what clerks at all levels think about the 
possibility of extension of their quasi-judicial role. 
There was no agreement amongst the clerks interviewed for this 
study as to whether their quasi judicial powers should be increased. 
36% of clerks thought that their powers were appropriate as they are 
now. A few of then were concerned about whether it was inappropriate 
for the clerk to have a more judicial role, and one commented 
"If you start giving clerks those powers, where will it all 
end?" 
However this was not the predominant worry of this 36% of clerks. 
They felt that if the clerk's powers were increased it would only be 
to give her/him a number of minor judicial functions and they argued 
429 
that the clerk to the justices has enough to do 1n runn1ng the court, 
without performing m1nor judicial functions. One clerk to the 
justices commented. 
" if you are going to bulk him down (sic) with elementary 
minor powers I think this will be to the detrement of him doing 
the proper work and also to his status. I mean if for example 
he was allowed to remand people and do Section One Committals and 
written pleas of guilty by post, all this would speed things up 
but it would put him in court where he was dealing with trivia 
and his own deputy would be in a court probably with the senior 
magistrate doing important things. I think you've got to be 
very careful you don't get carried away with matters of 
expediency." 
The lesson of the Birmingham and Gateshead cases has been well 
and truly learned by some clerks! 
62% of the clerks interviewed, however, did think that their 
present powers should be increased. Th eli s t 0 f power s t hat the y 
thought clerks to magistrates could be given was long. It was 
suggested that they could do Section One committals, non-contentious 
licensing matters, remanding defendants where there is no dispute 
about bail, refusing of legal aid, postal pleas of guilty in or 
outside a fixed penalty system, granting of warrants and also, 1n 
emergency applications out of hours, the granting of place of safety 
orders. One clerk said 
"I think the clerk should have all the powers of a single 
jus t ice ••• " 
Perhaps the most frequently expressed desire for increased power, 
possibly resulting from the fact that many of the interviews took 
place not long after the decision in the Gateshead case, was the 
desire that the clerks to the justices be able to delegate the powers 
they have already to their deputies or to senior staff. 
Clerks at all levels expressed frustration at the Gateshead 
decision, and were in favour of deputies and senior clerks being able 
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to issue summonses, and perform other functions presently only the 
province of the clerk to the justices. 
The clerk's approach to increases in their powers was often 
pragmatic. Whilst they recognised, for instance, that committal to 
the Crown Court might essentially be a judicial act, they argued that 
the Section One procedure has created a situation where there is no 
dispute between the parties, no necessity to do anything beyond 
securing that the correct pieces of paper are collected and forwarded 
and the defendant (already represented by law) is warned of her/his 
rights. 
Some clerks therefore felt that 
" ••• anything in a magistrates' court that is going to boil down 
for practical purposes to a rubber stamping procedure could 
e f f e c t i vel y bed e a I t wit h by a c Ie r k. " 
and the actual example given by this clerk was of a Section One 
committal. 
Some of the powers desired by other clerks were much closer to 
true judicial role. Pleas of guilty outside a fixed penalty system 
for instance may be routine and a rather boring aspect of magistrates 
court work, but they do call for the exercise of some sentencing 
discretion. The issuing of warrants and the granting of place of 
safety orders would also be difficult to describe as other than 
plainly judicial acts. One can understand the concern of clerks that 
magistrates are disturbed, sometimes at night, by applications for 
warrants or orders when a clerk must also be disturbed to advise the 
magistrate whether the application can, in law, be granted. However 
this is not necessarily a sufficient argument for giving clerks the 
power to do the job alone. Only one clerk sounded a warning note 
when he said clerks could be given the power to issue warrants yet 
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"It's alright provided it's done properly, 
you get a weak clerk who can be pushed. 
in those circumstances." 
but the problem is if 
That's the difficulty 
The same reasoning, of course, applies to magistrates, which fact 
means that a combination of the two may be desirable! Most of the 
clerks interviewed thought first of the practical problems of their 
jobs, and their ideas for an increase of the clerk's powers were aimed 
at solving those practical problems. Few immediately saw the 1ssue 
as one of principle - as the 1ssue of the proper difference between 
their own role and that of the magistrates. When the issue was 
presented to them starkly, however, and they were asked if the clerk 
should be "on the bench" they all reacted strongly against the idea. 
Every single clerk rejected the idea, most of them in strong terms. 
"My first reaction is that it's quite absurd!". 
"Totally wrong". 
"I reject the suggestion completely". 
Their reasons were support for the lay system -
"I think the system works because you've got lay magistrates who 
bring a certain ordinary outlook to things." 
- and more predominately, the knowledge that if the clerk were on the 
bench, slhe would dominate the tribunal. 
" .•• 1 think by the fact of his training he would be 1n a very 
strong position to dictate to the magistrates." 
"If I was asked to be a Justice of the Peace I wouldn't want to 
be one. I wouldn't be in their shoes for anything You 
wouldn't need Justices of the Peace if Justices' Clerks were on 
the bench - you might as well do away with the system, have a 
system of stipendiaries." 
"Really I think you've got to decide what sort of magisterial 
system you want, this is the difficulty. Either you have the 
justices who decide matters or you have the lawyers. If you are 
going to have lawyers you might as well make the clerk a 
stipendiary magistrate." 
Clerks were not lacking in ambition, or complacent about the present 
magisterial system, but they did not see a combination of lawyers and 
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laiety on the bench as workable. An ambitious young barrister clerk 
said 
"I would be delighted to be made a stipe, quite honestly, feeling 
the way I do about magistrates'courts at the moment. On the 
other hand, I wouldn't want to be a hybrid - neither one nor the 
other." 
The clerks interviewed were overwhelmingly against being let in at the 
front door - being placed on the bench with a full judicial role. 
They were very much less precise about how far they should enter at 
the back door by being given quasi-judicial or limited judicial 
powers. 
They may perhaps be forgiven for this - prec~s~on about what is 
and what ~s not a judicial act is far from easy. When the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure considers that the ~ssue of process 
is not a judicial act and the Divisional Court thinks that it ~s, 
perhaps some indecision amongst ordinary court clerks ~s 
understandable. 
In contrast to the op~n~ons of the clerks interviewed, the 
Justices' Clerks' Society ~s fairly modest ~n the proposals it 
presently makes for extension of the clerk's role. It has asked 25 
that any decision to adjourn a case, where there is not to be a 
remand, should be capable of being taken by the justices' clerk, and 
that it should not be dependant on the consent of the parties, or 
there having been a previous decision to adjourn by a justice of the 
peace. The Society is not asking for the power to determine bailor 
eus tody, which they say "mus t remain a . .. 1 d . . ,,26 pr~me Jud~c~a ec~s ~on . 
25. In its response to the Home Office Working Group Report. 
26. Ibid at p.56. 
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However, it 1S asking for the power to deal with adjournments in 
the context of its comments that it is comparatively easy for a 
determined advocate to achieve an adjournment from a bench of lay 
magistrates who do not know what was said in previous applications for 
adjournment. The implication of this 1S that if the clerk was taking 
the decision, consistency on the part of advocates would be necessary 
and adjournments possibly less easy to achieve. 
The Society also asks for wider powers for staff in the fines 
office to vary orders to pay, to transfer fines from court to court , 
and to requ1re statements of means. These powers are powers which 
can now be exercised by the clerk or by a magistrate. The request 1S 
thus a request for delegation. The Society believes the functions it 
asks for to be administrative, even though they "flow from judicial 
functions". It asks that, should these powers be regarded themselves 
as judicial, the clerk at least be allowed to delegate to a deputy. 
The Society's paper also requests several powers of the same type 
as those presently contained in the Justices'Clerks' Rules of 1970 27 . 
Their main comment in relation to these powers is that at the present 
time they believe there to be too great an emphasis on the judicial 
nature of their powers, and a nervous regard for safeguards - the 
concern of justices' clerks 1S with swift disposal of cases by 
economical and simple means, thus serv1ng the interests of the parties 
and the administration of justice. 
The Society is, therefore, not asking for any radical changes 1n 
the clerk's role. Rather it 1S continuing along the road of 
piecemeal extension of the clerk's powers. However, whilst the 
27. Ibid p.9. 
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changes requested may be piecemeal they are not insignificant. We 
have seen the effect that exercise of power by the clerks can have on 
legal aid. A clerk with, for instance, the power to grant or refuse 
adjournments would be in a strong position to impose a coherent court 
policy on the granting of adjournments. Clerks would see this as a 
good move. Possibly defence advocates, who have protested against 
the clerk's exerc~se of power in relation to legal aid, would be less 
happy. Also the Justices' Clerks' Society's justification for 
requesting extension of their powers is almost a classic statement of 
the tenets of the cr~me control model. There is a great deal of the 
bureaucrat, and little of the liberal, in their desire for the most 
efficient and speedy disposal of cases and their criticism of too 
anx~ous a regard for safeguards to be contained in the system. 
Expanding the legal role of the clerk 
Although the question of whether the clerk ought to be g~ven more 
judicial powers is very contentious, both amongst clerks and others, 
there 1S rather more support for the idea that the legal role of the 
clerk could be expanded. 
A number of measures have been suggested. One of them is that 
the clerk in court should be empowered to rule on matters of 
. 28 
eV1dence. Since the magistrates are the tribunal of fact and law, 
it is presently the bench who should rule on the question of the 
admissibility of evidence. In practice of course they will usually 
be following the advice of their clerk but, even so, the identity of 
the tribunal of fact and law can give rise to real problems in a 
magistrates' court which do not arise in the Crown Court. One of the 
28. The suggestion has been made by M. Burton at 127 NLJ 728, by N. 
Crampton at 129 NLJ 208,by Brian Harris at 123 NLJ 360 & 384, and 
at 145 JPN 403 and by P. Darbyshire 144 JPN 233. 
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clerks in the sample gave an illustration. 
" ••• you get the stupid situation at times where magistrates are 
asked to rule on, say, the admissibility of a statement that 
contains a confession, and really in order to do that they must 
know what the statement contains. So they then having seen the 
statement and heard evidence of how it was taken decide "No _ 
we'll rule that inadmissible!" How can they then dismiss that 
confession completely from their minds? They may be able to do 
so, but there must always be a doubt, I woul~ay, with the 
defendant who is then ultimately convicted. It would be far 
easier in those circumstances to say 'Right' - to the bench _ 
'You retire', for the clerk to decide whether or not the 
statement goes in, and if it doesn't go in the bench don't know 
what it's contents are." 
The argument essentially is that it is unjust to the defendant if 
the bench rules an admissibility. Crampton in an article commenting 
on this problem, has argued that presently justice is not done or seen 
to be done and that the present tradition of the court should not be 
29 allowed to prevail any longer. 
Darbyshire has suggested that it may in fact not prevail. She 
has described half of the clerks she interviewed as preferring to 
"deal with certain legal technicalities in the absence of the bench, 
especially on issues over the admissibility of evidence".30 She 
alleges that these clerks knew that they were acting illegally, but 
that they justified what they did on the grounds of expediency. Of 
the clerks interviewed for the present survey, rather less than half 
wanted the power to rule on questions of evidence, and none admitted 
to actually doing so. Whilst many said that their advice to the 
bench would always be followed, none admitted to dismissing the bench 
and taking a decision in their absence. It would of course be quite 
2 9 • N. C ram p ton. ' C han g e Sin the r ole 0 f Mag i s t rat e s' C 1 e r k' 1 2 9 N L J 
208 at 209. 
30. P. Darbyshire 144 JPN 201. Darbyshire asked clerks if they 
would ask the magis tra tes to re tire wh i Is t clerk and advoca tes 
dealt with "a legal or evidential point". 
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wrong to do so, and it seems astonishing that over 30 of the 61 clerks 
interviewed by Darbyshire admitted to doing so. 
A related problem - in the sense that it involves the difficulty 
of magistrates hearing what they should not hear - arises when an 
unrepresented defendant puts his character at risk by attacking 
prosecution witnesses. In R v Weston-super-Mare Justices ex parte 
Townsend
30 
Lord Parker suggested that the way to deal with this 
situation is for the prosecutor to ask for an adjournment and then, 1n 
the absence of the justices, to enlist the help of the clerk 1n 
warn1ng the defendant of the risk he runs • 
. 31 h d h h· . Harr1s as suggeste t at t 1S approach m1ght be capable of 
extension to include issues of admissibility of evidence. It would 
of course be a considerable extension. Warning the defendant of the 
risk slhe runs 1n attacking prosecution witnesses does not involve 
exerc1s1ng discretion. Ruling on admissibility of evidence does. 
That is not to say that in theory clerks are incapable of ruling on 
admissibility of evidence, but there 1S an issue of principle 
involved, and the decision as to whether or not the clerks' powers 
should be extended in this respect should be taken on that basis. 
Another suggestion for extension of the clerks' powers which has 
been canvassed is that the clerk should sum up in a contested case for 
the bench. 32 Again this is a proposal suggested by Crampton ,who 
comments that in simple cases it will not be necessary for the clerk 
to sum up,and that in other cases the advocates will do it efficiently 
30. [1968] 3 All E.R. 225. 
31. Brian Harris. 'The Role of the Clerk. A New Direction.' 145 
J.P.N. 403 at 404. 
32. At 129 NLJ 208. 
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However he suggests that in other cases, without commenting on the 
evidence, the clerk should reV1ew the burden and standard of proof and 
the elements of the offence. This suggestion is rather closer to the 
practice referred to by Harris 33 of the clerk advising the bench in 
open court than the summing up of a judge to a jury, which does reV1ew 
the evidence. Harris comments that the practice of the clerk g1V1Ug 
advice in open court 1S . . 1ncreas1ng, and he welcomes it since it 
ensures tha t the part ies know the legal bas is on which the court 1S 
acting and thus enables them to challenge it. It does not, however, 
obviate the necessity for the clerk sometimes to retire with the 
magistrates, because the nature of the legal advice required by the 
bench will sometimes depend upon their findings on the facts. 
The trend of these suggestions 1S towards the relationship 
between clerk and magistrates becoming much more like that of judge 
and jury, with the clerk becoming the tribunal of law. The 
possibility, hinted at by Harris 34 , is that the clerk could decide 
whether or not there 1S a case to answer, or whether or not there is 
suff ic ient evidence for committal for tr ial. The clerk would also 
rule, rather than advise on questions of law were the clerk to become 
the tribunal of law. 
The clerks in the sample were asked whether or not they would 
support such a development of their role. Some of them were 
satisfied with their present situation on the basis that they had the 
power to rule on questions of law in reality, if not in theory. 
Characteristic of these clerks was the one who said 
33. 145 J.P.N. 463 
34. Ibid. 
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"I think perhaps this 1S gOlng to be an alteration without very 
much difference." 
Other clerks felt very strongly that they should openly be glven 
the power to rule on matter of law. One said 
"Unquestionably. Any other situation 1S really intolerable. 
It's absurd that a clerk shouldn't rule on matters within his 
professional competence." 
There was, however, a substantial minority who were unwilling to see 
their powers extended. They made comments such as 
"That would be putting too much power in the clerk's hands." 
" ••• I think the appearance of the fact that the magistrates are 
the ones in authority, and that there's one centre of authority 
in the court is very important. To start splitting it up I 
think would cause great problems." 
Perhaps the most frequent comment made ln response to the suggestion 
that the clerk should be able to rule on questions of law was the 
comment that such an extension of the clerk's role must depend on the 
qualifications of the clerk. 
The development of the quasi-judicial role of the clerk and the 
legal role of the clerk were both seen to be linked inextricably with 
the issue of the professional qualification of clerks. 
Future extension of the clerk's powers. 
Two possible areas where clerks might seek exenSlon of their 
powers have been examined. One of these is the area of their quasi-
judic ial powers. We have identified several problems, not the least 
of which is that there is the possibility that clerks to the justices 
may become occupied with routine tasks which are nevertheless regarded 
as having a judicial element to them - the obvious example being the 
issuing of summonses. We have demonstrated that the role that the 
clerk plays in court, the role that slhe plays in the court 
organisation, and the role that the clerk plays in the education and 
policy decisions of the bench are extremely important. Given this, 
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it makes little sense for the clerk to the justices to spend time 
scrutinising summonses or even, were the clerk's powers to be extended 
further, to spend time sitting in court dealing with Section One 
committals and adjournments. 
her/his time. 
The clerk has better things to do with 
Another problem is that, in the way that they have been argu1ng 
for the extension of their quasi judicial powers, clerks seem to 
emphasise the crime control aspects of their job. It has been argued 
that the clerk 1S a Liberal Bureaucrat who steers a variable course 
between the demands of the court organisation with its pressures to 
process cases quickly, and the demands of their role as guardian of 
legality 1n the court and protector of the rights of the 
unrepresented. In seeking to extend their quasi-judicial role clerks 
have emphasised the demands of the court organisation and have been 
critical of the Divisional Court's emphasis on constitutional 
safeguards. The clerks interviewed for the present study when 
discussing extension of their quasi-judicial powers also tended to 
think 1n terms of the practicalities of their jobs rather than 1n 
terms of the principles which might be at stake. Given the power 
that clerks have in the criminal justice system, any moves away from 
the due process aspects of their role towards a crime control model 
are to be regretted, and should be discouraged. 
It is very easy to understand the frustration of clerks, however. 
The aspects of their job which are in fact crucially important to the 
'consumers' of, and part ic ipants in, the crim inal jus t ice s ys tem are 
not accorded any recogni t ion, and it 1S thus natural that clerks who 
are ambitious should seek to expand other aspects of their role. 
Theother area of the clerks job which some have suggested might 
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be extended is their legal role. We have examined the arguments and 
clerks' reactions to the idea that the clerk might become, in effect, 
the tribunal of law, that the clerk might rule rather than advise on 
points of law and evidence, and that the clerk might offer more advice 
In open court, possibly summing up for the magistrates. 
Extension of this aspect of the clerk's role makes a great deal 
of good sense in many ways. It would be an extension of the things 
that all clerks already do, rather than a departure from their usual 
role. It would acknowledge what is in fact the reality in some 
cases, in that where points of law arise there are likely to be few 
cases where the bench will not follow the advice of their clerk. It 
would also solve some of the difficult evidential problems we have 
mentioned, since there would be a separation of the tribunal of fact 
and law. Such an extension of the clerk's role would also not carry 
with it the danger of the clerk moving towards a crime control view of 
the system. It would emphasise the clerk's roleas guardian of 
legality in the courtroom, rather than her/his role as controller of 
the court organisation. 
However extension of the clerk's legal role would mean an 
extension of power not just for the clerk to the justices, but for all 
court clerks. This raIses as an immediate problem the question of the 
qualifications of court clerks. Court clerks are extremely unlikely 
to be given any of the powers we have discussed unless they are all 
legally qualified. 
The key to future development -
Qualifications of Justices' Clerks and Court Clerks 
There has been a statutory requirement that the clerk to the 
justices be qualified in some way since 1877. The Justices' Clerks' 
Act of that year required that to be a clerk it was necessary to be a 
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barrister of 14 years standing or to be a solicitor (without any 
requirement of years' standing), or to have worked as a clerk for 
seven years, or, exceptionally, to have been an assistant to a clerk 
for 14 years. 35 
This prOV1S10n did not 1n fact secure professional qualification 
for most clerks. As we noted in Chapter One it perpetuated the 
situation where very many clerks were not professionally qualified, 
since clerks who were qualified by experience under the Act were 
succeeded by their deputies who were in turn qualified by 14 years as 
their assistants. 
The Justices of the Peace Act 1949 improved the situation 
somewhat. Section 20 provides that no person can be appointed a 
justices' clerk unless he is a barrister of not less than five years 
standing, or a solicitor of the like standing. There were, however, 
certain transitional provisions 1n the section allowing clerks in 
serv1ce to rema1n 1n their posts. As a resul t there are s till some 
clerks to the justices who are not professionally qualified. In 1979 
there were 362 clerks in England and Wales. 339 of them were members 
of the Jus t ices' Clerks' Soc ie ty and of these 205 were sol ic i tors, 76 
were barristers, and 58 were appointed or held office by virtue of 
years of exper1ence or . . f· . 36 spec1al qua11 1cat10ns. Of the eight 
jus t ices' clerks interviewed for th is research, four were sol ic i tors, 
three barristers and one was qualified by experience. 
However the task of advising the magistrates on the law is not 
carried out by the clerk to the justices alone. In many courts, of 
35. Justices' Clerks' Act 1877. Section 7. 
36. The Magistrate. Editorial. Vol.35 No.5 (1979). 
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allthose clerks who take courts, the justices clerk will probably do 
so the least often, because of her/his other responsibilities. 
However court clerks (by which is meant all those clerks who take 
courts except the justices clerk) were not required to have any 
qualifications at all until the Justices' Clerks (Qualification of 
Assistants) Rules 1979. 
Prior to these rules very many clerks taking a court had no 
formal qualifications. They were qualified solely by their 
experience in magistrates' courts. This situation was commented on 
adversely by those who felt that to have an unqualified clerk advising 
lay magistrates on law was tantamount to the blind leading the blind. 
For instance in 1963 the Committee of 'Justice' reported on 
. . 1 ., 37 Matr1mon1a Cases 1n Mag1strates Courts. The Committee pointed out 
that the law applied 1n magistrates' courts is complex and that legal 
issues arise frequently, as do difficult evidential points. The 
necessity of having properly qualified staff was stressed, and the 
report concluded that 
"The Committee 1S of the op1n10n that no one of the problems 
emerging from its investigation is more important than the 
staffing problem. Unless it is solved urgently, at best the 
standard of justice in magistrates' courts will seriously 
deteriorate38 and at worst the structure of these courts will break down." 
Within the magistrates' courts serV1ce itself there has been 
considerable debate and discussion about this 1ssue. The post war 
rationalisation of courts, the creation of new petty sessional 
divisions with full time clerks, and the increase in work load had its 
37. Report of the Justice Committee on Matrimonial Cases and 
Magistrates' Courts. 1963. 
38. Ibid at para.66. 
443 
effect not just on justices' clerks, but also on their staff. A 
clearer career structure developed and it fuelled moves towards some 
sort of qualification for clerks. 
Some clerks favoured professional qualification, and this was now 
necessary for a clerk with ambitions to become a clerk to the 
justices. There were however very real problems for clerks in 
service who wished to acquire qualifications. Many were older, 
established in their jobs and with family responsibilities. Some 
found that their Magistrates' Courts' Committees were unsympathetic 
about funding and time off to qualify39. There were difficulties, 
therefore for some clerks. There was also resistance from others, 
who stressed the value of experience against paper qualification. 
A three year diploma course for court clerks was started 1n 
September 1968. This course, largely a correspondence course, 1S 
aimed specifically at subjects relevant to the magisterial service. 
It is not a professional qualification, although it does provide some 
exemptions from professional examinations. 
The debate about the appropriate qualifications for clerks 
continued40 during the 1960's and early 1970's until it was resolved -
at least in part - by the Justices' Clerks (Qualification of 
Assistants) Rules 1979. 41 The rules provide that a person shall not be 
employed as a clerk in court unless slhe is qualified as a solicitor 
or barrister or has completed the Diploma Course, or has Part One of 
39. See the reports of the Conference of the National Association of 
Justices' Clerks' Assistants for 1964 at 128 JPN 414 and for 1965 
at 129 J.P.N. 452. 
40. For instance see 134 JPN 10, 135 JPN 386, 136 JPN 123 and 198, 
139 JPN 301. 
41. S.L 1979 No.570 amended by SI 1980 No.1897. 
see Appendix Six. 
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For text of rules 
the profes s ional exam ina t ions and two years experience, or has been 
granted a certificate of competence by a Magistrates' Courts' 
committee. 
The aim of those who believe that lay magistrates should have 
professionally qualified advisers are still far from complete. One 
of the courts surveyed for the present research had a clerk to the 
justices who was qualified by experience. His deputy had only Part 
One of the Law Society's qualifications and no intention of taking 
Part Two. The Principal Assistant and the court clerk had diplomas, 
but only the court clerk intended to go on to take professional 
qualifications. Another clerk employed at the courts was, at the 
time of the interviews, away taking the Law Society's examinations and 
intended to qualify. This court therefore had no clerk who was 
professionally qualified. At another court surveyed only the clerk 
to the justices was professionally qualified. 
These courts were, however, a minority. Most courts had several 
professionally qualified staff. Of the total of 50 clerks 
inteviewed fifteen were barristers and fourteen were solicitors. , 
Over half (58%) therefore were professionally qualified. Of the 
rest, fifteen had the Diploma, one was qualified by having Part One of 
the Law Society's examinations and experience and there were two 
trainees who were studying for the Diploma course. Ai though the 
sample size of fifty is not high, the results are still valuable since 
all types of courts spread over England and Wales are represented in 
the sample. A larger sample which concentrated for instance on 
London, or on all metropolitan courts would give a false picture -
probably weighted towards a larger percentage of professional 
qualifications. 
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The opinions of these clerks about the Qualification of 
Ass is tan ts Rules were in teres t ing. Almost all welcomed them on one 
bas is or another. Some thought that the Rules were right in their 
present form 
"I think they're fairly satisfactory. Clearly the totally 
unqualified clerk doesn't have a place in the modern judicial 
System at all, and the three alternatives of qualification seem 
between them to cover all the necessary heads." 
A few clerks saw them as "necessary evil". They recognised that 
the present climate demanded some qualification, but there were 
nevertheless resentments - about the difficulty of qualifying, the 
irrelevance of some heads of the professional examinations and the 
value of experience as opposed to qualification. These sentiments 
are typified by the reply of one clerk, who when asked for his opinion 
on the Rules said. 
"What does, and always has, annoyed me is that I think for many 
years the magisterial service has been the poor relation, that 
the courts have been run on a shoe string. The government - I 
feel because of the Law Society - haven't done as much as they 
could over the years to ensure that clerks receive proper 
training courses and to set up recognised legal qualifications 
for court clerks... The unqualified clerks - and I don't think 
it's a chip on their shoulder - have done far more for 
magistrates' courts than many people have with a legal 
qualification, be it solicitor or barrister. So - I accept the 
need for court clerks to qualify. I just argue at times that 
there ought to be an examination which is on the work that we do 
at these courts, and not on things that don't affect us at all." 
The most frequent comment about the Rules was, however, that they 
do not go far enough. The Justices' Clerk's Society is in favour of 
all clerks being professionally qualified. There are some courts 
which now advertise for professionally qualified applicants for 
clerk's jobs. The pressure is towards an all professional service. 
Clerks themselves are rather half hearted about this, however. 
Only 60% of them were in favour of professional qualification for all 
clerks. 40% were against it. 
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Those clerks who were opposed to a requirement of professional 
qualification gave a number of reasons. Many challenged the 
relevance of the subjects studied. 
"I think it's a complete waste of time to be quite honest, 
because I started the C.P.E. and it's totally irrelevant to the 
job I do." 
Others stressed the value of experlence 
"I am a firm believer in in service training, of coming in at the 
bottom and learning the jobs on the factory floor - and going on 
from there to qualify rather than somebody already qualifying 
outside of the service and coming in at court clerk level." 
"There are a lot of 40,45,50 year old clerks - clerks in that 
age bracket - who are darned good clerks who have learned right 
from grass roots level their experience is a lot more 
valuable than any upstart solicitor who wants to become a court 
clerk." 
These clerks were a large minority. The division of OPlnlon 
roughly corresponded to the qualification of the clerks - those clerks 
with professional qualifications thought they were necessary, those 
without did not. But the split was not entirely predictable. There 
were six professionally qualified clerks who nevertheless did not 
believe that all court clerks should be professionally qualified. 
There were four clerks who were not professionally qualified who 
thought all clerks should be so qualified. Of these four clerks one 
was a very young trainee just starting the diploma course. She would 
thus be considering eventual qualification. The other three had 90 
years experience between them! All were older men ln senlor 
positions whose opinions reflected their assessment that times had 
changed and that the pressure towards professional qualifications 
needed to be recognised. 
Those clerks who were critical of the idea of professional 
qualification did make some valid points - for instance that, if the 
court organisation is to be managed effectively, a knowledge of the 
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way it operates in practice 1S necessary. 
'Grassroots' exper1ence 
does have value. However this argument is not quite convincing 1n 
that knowledge of office practice and procedure does not have to be 
acquired before, or instead of, professional qualifications. If the 
courts operated under less pressure, adequate training 1n these 
matters could be provided for all new clerks, professionally qualified 
or not. 
Another comment made by some clerks 1S also true - that legal 
education suffers from a pre-occupation with the decisions of the 
appeal courts, and that the level of knowledge of the average 
solicitor or barrister about magistrates' courts 1S woefully 
inadequate. This point was made many times by clerks who were 
professionaly qualified and who lamented that they knew almost nothing 
about magistrates'courts before they started to work in one. This is 
something which should be rectified by legal education. However 
clerks who reject a professional qualification because it is not 
directly about magistrates' courts do fall into the trap of assuming 
that legal education is simply about learning an appropriate set of 
rules. Clerks said that the most important thing they taught to 
magistrates was "the judicial approach". If they believe it 
necessary to teach it to magistrates, do they believe that they 
themselves acquire it unconsciously and without study or effort? 
As one clerk put it 
"It's not just doing the job, it's a question of being trained to 
recogn1se what justice really is." 
A legal education 1S of course, about very much more than 
learning rules. It is about the principles behind them, about their 
origins and contents and the interests they serve. It should provide 
the opportunity and foster the intellectual ability to criticise the 
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rules. Further, it is wrong of clerks to assume that much of legal 
education is irrelevant to their job. Issues of, for instance, 
contract or tort may arise irregularly in a magistrates' court, but 
they do arise and clerks need to be prepared for them. 
The arguments in favour of professional qualification are strong. 
The clerk is required to know a great deal of law and procedure. 
Clerks have to advise on difficult legal points, often without time 
for preparation. Clerks are also dealing with professionally 
qualified prosecutors and defence advocates daily. 
The question of the future development of the clerk's role ~s 
also bound up with the question of professional qualification. A 
member of the Council of the Justices' Clerks' Society which passed 
the resolution that all clerks be professionally qualified said 
"One is looking to the day when one will have court clerks who 
are all professionally qualified - which will ~ncrease their 
status ••• I think it increases their ability as well." 
Many other clerks commented that their desire for professional 
qualifications was essentially a matter of status. 
Certainly if clerks are a~m~ng to acqu~re increased quas~-
judicial powers, or to develop their role as legal adviser ~n the ways 
we have discussed they must stress the necessity of an all 
professional service. They are not likely to be allowed to make 
essentially judicial decisions or to rule on matters of law unless 
they are qualified. Clerks to the justices have been asking for their 
powers to be extended, and to be able to delegate responsibility for 
certain tasks to their staff. Whils t the vast majority of clerks are 
qualified, th is ~s not true of their staff. The Qualification of 
Assistants Rules of 1979 do not go far enough if c Ie rks' ambitions to 
extend their role are to be realised. Whilst the Justices' Clerks' 
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society seem to realise this and is pressing for an all professional 
serv1ce, they appear to have still some work to do to convince some 
clerks of the necessity of the step. There are many clerks who are 
not convinced of the desirability of extending their powers and many 
who are not convinced of the need for professional qualification. 
Clerks who are ambitious for change need to conduct a campaign within 
their ranks, as well as outside them. 
Pay and promotion 
One of the questions which aroused the strongest feelings amongst 
clerks - as it probably does amongst most groups of workers - was the 
question of their pay. Clerks were asked if they thought that they 
were properly paid for the job they do. A total of 34% said that 
they were satisfied with the money they received, but 10% of these 
clerks had reservations about their answer. Several senior clerks 
and clerks to the justices said that their own pay was fair but that 
that of their junior colleagues was not. This arises because the pay 
of the clerk to the justices varies with the size of the court, and 
the pay of deputies and, it seems, sometimes a principal assistant is 
calculated as a percentage of the clerk·s salary. Even within the 34% 
of clerks satisfied with their own salaries, there were those who were 
critical of the general level of pay for court clerks. 
The majority of clerks - 66% - were not satisfied with their pay. 
This was so even though the interviews took place just after clerks 
had received a pay award. In 1979 clerks had felt so strongly about 
their pay that they had threatened industrial action. This was a 
very strong line for a group of professionals in the public service to 
take. The pay offer that was made to clerks in 1979 by the Joint 
Negotiating Committee for justices· clerks· assistants was based on 
comparisons between clerks and local authority workers. Clerks were 
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not satisfied either with the amount which was offered, or the nature 
of the comparison. They refused to accept the offer, and the matter 
was referred to the Comparability Commission. Magistrates court 
clerks felt that a fair comparison would be between themselves and 
Crown Court Clerks on comparable grades. However the Commission 
disagreed, and although clerks got pay rises, they did not get what 
they had asked for. There was a great deal of resentment. 
"I think the result of the recent pay scheme was unsatisfactory 
to say the least." 
"There's obviously a big bone of contention between magistrates' 
clerks and Crown Court Clerks. I think the differential between 
their salary and ours is absolutely ridiculous - preposterous 
actually!" 
" ••• look at the comparable clerk in the Crown Court, who needs 
no legal qualification at all, needs to give no advice and in 
fact is just another note taker in court .•• then obviously they 
shouldn't be paid as much as someone who has to give advice and 
be qualified. But of course they are paid quite a lot more, 
plus more holidays and more benefits by being civil servants." 
Clerks who were legally qualified also naturally compared themselves 
with local practitioners. One clerk to the justices said he thought 
his salary was good, but 
" ••• compare that with somebody who is doing their work ~n a 
little cubby hole conveyancing, they ought to be able to make 
much more than that." 
Other clerks compared their pay unfavourably with solicitors' legal aid 
rates. One set his comparison even lower 
"I think that considering even what police officers are paid, 
well clerking in comparison to that is a low paid job!" 
Whatever comparison clerks chose, they came up with the same 
answer. Even after a very recent pay rise they were dissatisfied 
with their pay. They felt that they carried a great deal of 
responsibility but that it was not recognised in their remuneration. 
Several clerks emphasised the necessity to attract "the right 
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calibre of person" to the job, and felt that the present levels of pay 
did not give sufficient incentive. Here again we have the problem of 
professionalising the clerks job. Those who were keen to attract 
professionally qualified clerks and, perhaps more importantly, to keep 
them in the service knew that levels of pay needed to be raised. A 
clerk to the justices commented 
"One of the problems with court clerks is, of course, that they 
are not all lawyers at present, so they can't really claim 
comparison with lawyers. This is extremely irksome to those 
that happen to be lawyers and beneficial to those that don't 
happen to be - so probably one set is overpaid and one set is 
underpaid at present. That's another good reason why we should 
move to a more uniform profession where everybody has the same 
qualification - and then they can reasonably claim parity of pay 
with lawyers in outside industry." 
The unqualified clerks did not agree with him - they felt that 
they were not well paid. Nevertheless the question of pay is bound 
up with the question of professional qualification which is bound up 
with the question of the future of the job. 
The job of the magistrates' clerk is 1n the process of change. 
It is developing towards becoming a legal professional job and clerks 
are anxious to increase their status. In the job are some who are 
content to leave things as they are, who are not anX10US to acqu1re 
more power and influence, and are not working for any of the things 
that go with an enhancement of their role. In contrast there are 
others - often young professionals - who are ambitious and who want 
the job to develop. One way in which their desire for advancement 
can be realised is to 1ncrease the status of the job. However, there 
are now many clerks who are being appointed clerks to the justices 1n 
their late twenties and early thirties. 
These are people who aspire to further responsibility, and they 
have reached the top of the magistrates' courts' hierarchy. They 
might look for another justices' clerk's job in a bigger division, but 
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they will be looking for further promotion as well. 
It has been suggested42 that such clerks go on into the Crown 
Court Service. 
Clerks are definitely not impressed by this idea. Whilst they 
would not mind parity of pay with Crown Court clerks, they regard 
Crown Court jobs as boring. Magistrates' court's clerks see their 
job as essentially that of a legal adviser - they would not wish to 
exchange this for a job which they perceive as essentially clerical 
and administrative. 
The other possible channel of promotion for ambitious clerks to 
the justices 1S promotion to a judicial role. A number of clerks to 
the justices have been promoted to stipendiary magistrate, a smaller 
number thence to recorder, and a very small number to Circuit Judge. 
There is thus the possibility of promotion. However, the demand for 
it 1S shortly g01ng to escalate. One clerk to the justices said 
"Well I think you've got a lot of young men and women coming 1n 
now who are exceptionally well qualified and able people. They 
are coming in at an age at which people used not to become clerks 
to the justices. When they get to my age they will want to go 
on and do something more than they are doing at present, so I 
think ••. in a few years time there will be a very strong demand 
for this." 
The clerks interviewed were asked whether there ought to be an 
accepted channel of promotion from clerk to the justices to judicial 
posts. 22% were opposed to the idea, 10% of them because they 
thought that the present situation was satisfactory, and that only 
exceptionally should a clerk be promoted. 
" ••. I think it's perfectly clear that 
On the other hand, what I deprecate 
magistrates' clerk who has continually 
to the bench." 
One said 
some should be appointed. 
is the person who is the 
got his eye on advancement 
42. For instance by "Brougham" - indefatigable commentator on the 
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magistrates' courts scene - at 145 J.P.N. 657. 
6% were not sure if it was a good idea simply because they had not 
thought about it. 78% were, however, in favour of the idea. Whilst 
none were 1n favour of automatic promotion, most were in favour of 
there being an accepted channel of promotion for good clerks. 
"Whilst I would like, obviously, myself to be considered for such 
an appointment at some stage I don't think it would enhance the 
bench to have every justices' clerk promoted tothe bench by 
virtue of so many years service ... but I would certainly like to 
see a larger number of clerks having opportunities of serving on 
the bench by virtue of their experience as clerks." 
"A magistrates' clerk with numerous years experience I would have 
thought,is the ideal person to progress to stipendiary magistrate 
and possibly higher." 
" if they've got the experience they are far better qualified 
to become recorders than some of the people who are appointed at 
the present time." 
The problem which ar1ses very quickly if more clerks are g01ng to 
look towards promotion to stipendiary magistrate 1S that there are a 
large number of clerks to the justices, and few stipendiary 
magistrates. Very few clerks could expect to follow this channel of 
promotion. The question 1S then raised as to whether clerks could be 
made recorders directly. Some clerks are of the opinion that they 
could. One clerk to the justices commented 
"The Lord Chancellor has acknowledged publicly that the avenue 
for promotion for justices' clerks who do not wish to seek other 
clerkships is to the stipendiary bench. Why he will not 
appoint, as a matter of policy, clerks to the judicial bench I 
hesitate to understand. He appoints solicitors in private 
practice who have never considered a question of sentencing in 
their life, to whom the whole subject of sentencing - which is 
90 %0 f the w 0 r k 0 f a mag i s t rat e s' c 0 u r t - is tot a 11 y s t ran g e and 
unfamiliar. He appoints them to the judicial bench but he won't 
appoint justices' clerks. That I fail to understand." 
This 1S a good point, although it 1S also true to say that many 
clerks do lack one exper1ence which 1S very important for a judge to 
have had, which is the exper1ence of acting as an advocate. 
Certainly there are clerks presently in serV1ce who are not content to 
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set their sights simply on one day becoming a stipendiary magistrate. 
The man quoted above was a clerk to the justices looking to his 
immediate future. A young barrister - clerk, who had been a clerk 
for only a little over two years said 
"My view is that if I ever were to become bored with this job the 
obvious temptation is to go back into private practice. 
However, the knowledge that it would appear now that I might 
become a chief clerk at say 33 or 34, and then a stipe at about 
40 gives you somewhere to go •.• I mean you would want about four 
or five years as chief clerk I should imagine. If you can hold 
a division, get it to run smoothly, I can't see why you should 
not then be able to put in for stipendiary magistrate as the next 
step up - and of course circuit bench from then on. Of course 
one looks forward to the day when one of those circuit judges is 
made up to a red dressing gown ••• !" 
The question of promotion is about to become a press~ng problem. 
Patterns of service in magistrates' courts have changed. Clerks to 
the justices who are now around retiring age often qualified after 
they had been in the job for many years. Rapid promotion was not 
expected, and only a few clerks were looking to go on beyond 
appointment as clerk to the justices. This ~s no longer the 
situation. Young ambitious professionals are coming into the 
serv~ce. They are being appointed clerks to the justices in their 
early thirties and, like the clerk quoted above, they want to go on. 
They will have an impact on the service, on the expectations of all 
clerks, and they will have an impact outside the magistrates' courts 
service when they move on. 
So far the system has coped by filtering off a few of the most 
eminent clerks into the judicial hierarchy. But the trickle of 
clerks with ambitions to go on to judicial posts is likely to become a 
stream, and is likely to require policy decisions rather than simply 
promotion decisions about individuals. 
There is, however, a certain reticence amongst clerks about 
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discussing this lssue. There are clerks who are not eager to 
publicly claim that they have ambitions to a judicial post. 
similarly there are some clerks who are reticent about seeking 
extension of their role. Their reason is that many clerks are 
pol i t ically shrewd, and do not w ish to be seen to be threa tening the 
lay system. More than one clerk to the justices commented that 
although the question of his ambitions was posed by the magistrates 
interviewing him for his post, it would have been unwise of him to 
have admitted to a desire for judicial appointment. Clerks believe 
that lay magistrates feel threatened by their ambitions - they believe 
that if magistrates up and down the country saw their clerks seeking 
judicial appointment those magistrates might begin to wonder if their 
clerks would like to be in their position, doing their job. 
Mag i s t rat e s' f ear s are, howe v e r, un f 0 u n d e d. C 1 e r k s are, 0 nth e 
whole, very committed to the lay system. They do not wish to be on 
the bench with, or instead of, their magistrates. They support lay 
participation in the legal system. Clerks' desires to 1ncrease their 
powers and clerks' anxiety that the rules be followed were not posed 
as a threat to lay justice but as a route to better lay justice. 
Clerks do not wish to arogate to themselves the key judicial decisions 
in the court - they expressly support these being taken by lay 
magistrates. Th e j u d i cia 1 r ole s tow hi c h the y asp ire are tho s e 0 f 
the existing stipendiary magistrates, and Crown Court Recorders. 
If the quality of magistrates' justice 1S to be improved, an 
important contribution must be made by magistrates' clerks. The 
courts should be run and the magistrates trained and advised by 
imaginative, innovative and intelligent lawyers. Such people will 
not be attracted into the serV1ce if it is a job without promotion 
prospects for its best perfomers. 
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Addendum (refers to page 429) 
* The points made in this section, exphasising the extent of the 
clerk's power in relation to legal aid are likely to be made more 
important by regulations made under the Legal Aid Act 1982. 
Account has not been taken of these, as they are very recent 
developments of the law. 
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conclusions 
This study of clerks has been made at a time when there 1S 
considerable pressure for the clerk's role to change. There have 
always been clerks who were ambitious and forward looking, but todays 
clerks are the product of a process started by the reforms of the 
Roche Committee which has not yet worked itself out. 
Only fifty years ago the majority of clerks were either 
unqualified, or were local solicitors who advised the magistrates 
part-time. Before the Roche Report the full time qualified clerk was 
not quite a rarity but certainly one of a minority.l 
The implementation of the Roche Committee's recommendations for 
amalgamation of divisions was probably the most significant 
development which has ever occurred in the long history of 
magistrates' clerks. Its effect was to create a situation where most 
clerks to the justices were full time and qualified. It also ensured 
that those clerks to the justices now administer divisions, or groups 
of divisions, large enough to necessitate their employing a number of 
court clerks for whom a career structure has had to develop. Since 
almost the same objections apply to unqualified court clerks advising 
the justices as apply to unqualified clerks to the justices doing it, 
the demand for qualification, and latterly professional qualification 
for all clerks has ar1sen. 
The clerks to the justices who manage magistrates' courts are now 
full time professionals. They are to a certain extent organised 
through the Justices' Clerks' Society, and some of them are ambitious. 
Their desire to consolidate and extend their role is being fuelled by 
1. The Departmental Committee on Justices' Clerks, 1944, Cmnd, 6507 
discovered 822 clerks, 90 whole time, and 732 part time. The 
survey excluded what the report called the "Metropol i tan Pol ice 
Courts". 
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the entry of more professional lawyers into the service as court 
clerks with expectations of rapid promotion. 
The clerks who were interviewed for the present research are 
representative of clerks allover the country. There were some who 
were lacking in ambition and who had given little thought to the 
proper limits of their role. There were some - usually, but not 
always, older men - who could see that change was taking place, but 
who felt that they themselves were fixed in an earlier era and could 
not become part of it. The re were othe rs who we re am bi t ious who , 
were looking critically at the nature of their role and who were 
wondering where their ambitions would take them after they had become 
clerk to the justices or run a division for a few years. 
If changes are to take place, decisions about the future of the 
clerk's job should be taken on the basis of a thorough understanding 
of the nature of the clerk's role and a proper appreciation of the 
extent of the clerk's power. Indeed not only should decisions about 
the future of the clerk's role be taken on this basis but any reforms 
which apply to magistrates' courts need to be made with theinf1uence 
of the clerk in mind. 
There are three areas 1n particular which we have identified as 
important - the role of the clerk 1n runn1ng the court organisation, 
the influence of the clerk on the magistrates and the clerk's role as 
guardian of due process. 
The clerk and the court organisation 
It 1S the clerk who 1S responsible for runn1ng the court 
organisation, and this is a role that carr1es with it a great deal of 
power. 
The policies and practices that the court follows in its day to 
day operation have a considerable influence on those who work in the 
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criminal jus t ice process. We have shown, for ins tance, (in Chapter 
Six) that the attitude of clerks to the legal profession varies widely 
from court to court. The conflict between the needs of the legal 
profession to deal with several cases ln each court session and to get 
away from court early, and the needs of the court for flexibility in 
listing cases between courts and for a listing policy that allows 
short cases to be dealt with first is a conflict which is resolved in 
different ways. Some courts accommodate the legal profession to the 
extent of operating an informal appointments system. others are much 
less sympathetic. 
Probation officers and social workers also are affected by the 
management of the court. Some courts having a close and sympathetic 
relationship with probation officers and social workers and others 
have a much more distant and formal attitude. particularly 
problematic are the attitudes of clerks to social workers, many of 
which are unsympathetic and cannot fail to have an effect on the 
effectiveness of social workers in the court. 
The part played ln court by the police also varles from court to 
court, so that at some courts Carlen's analysis of the police 
controlling the listing, the timing and the movement of persons, ln 
court is only too true. At other courts, however, all of these 
things are in the hands of the clerk, and the police playa very 
minimal role. The extent of the police presence ln court and 
therefore their power to influence events according to their own 
priorities can be affected radically by the attitude of the clerk to 
the police presence in court, and the energy with which the clerk 
pursues a policy of civilianising the court. Also, outside the 
courtroom we have shown that the police expect advice from clerks, , 
and that they sometimes get it - even in situations where this may be 
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improper. The clerk has a legitimate role 1n helping all agencies 
and individuals with advice 1n matters of magistrates' courts' 
procedure, because the clerk is the expert on this subject. But the 
police should neither expect nor receive from clerks advice on the 
substance of their cases such as might be given by an advocate for the 
prosecution. The need for adequate police prosecution agencies is 
thus emphasised. Clerks who take a view of their role which favours 
a 'crime control' model will see an identity in their task and that of 
the police, and fail to see anything wrong in giving advice to police. 
Those who favour a due process model will emphasise the need for a 
separation between the court and the police. 
The efficiency with which the court is run 1S also in the hands 
of the clerk. A problem which is of contemporary concern is that of 
delay. We have shown (in Chapter Nine) that the imagination and 
energy of the clerk must be a key factor in measures which will 
effectively reduce waiting times. Although clerks cannot be 
expected to deal with all of the problems without resources (as the 
Home Office would appear to wish them to) the likelihood that 
defendants will have their cases dealt with promptly depends to a 
large extent on the clerks. The likelihood that defendants will be 
granted legal aid also depends on the clerk, as does the vigour with 
which those defendants who are fined will be pursued. The sympathy 
with which defendants without representation are received in court 
will also be affected by the attitudes of the clerks as well as by the 
attitudes of the magistrates. 
The potential for the clerk to the justices to influence the 
character of the court 1S very great. Some clerks exploit this 
potential - others do not. Brian Harris has expressed concern about 
the supine clerk in court - the court clerk who does not do enough. 
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There may well also be sup~ne clerks to the justices who do not 
exploit their potential for influence in the management of the court 
and who are not innovative. 
The clerk, however good, does not dictate the policies of the 
court alone. S/he is affected by the Magistrates' Courts' Committee 
which holds the purse strings, and slhe must also work with the 
magistrates in many of the decisions about the running of the court. 
Nevertheless the clerk has some degree of autonomy, and for the 
magistrates slhe is usually a respected expert whose views carry a 
great deal of weight. 
The clerk and the magistrates 
Magistrates are lay people who do their job with little training. 
They are called upon to deal with a formidable quantity of legal and 
procedural. rules which which must be daunting even to the most 
experienced of them. In these circumstances they rely heavily on 
their clerk for guidance. We have shown that in some courts the 
dependance of magistrates ~s such that they are almost mute in court, 
and may even be incapable of announcing their own decisions. In all 
courts magistrates sometimes seek to resolve their ambivalence about 
difficult decisions by involving their clerks in decisions on fact. 
Clerks claim not to become involved in decisions on fact, and 
they insist that they make a scrupulous distinction between matters 
upon which they can properly comment and matters which they should 
leave to the magistrates. They do not wish to be involved in 
decisions on fact and do not have ambitions to become part of the , 
tribunal of fact. 
Nevertheless clerks can, and do, influence the decisions of the 
magistrates. First their legitimate area of influence is large. By 
their involvement in advising on law, and particularly by drawing 
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mag1strates attent10n to eV1dence clerks do affect decisions. Their 
role in sentencing is also extensive since they not only present 
magistrates with the available options, but also advise about 
decisions of appeal courts and the sentencing norms of the bench as a 
whole. 
Secondly, outside their legitimate role, some clerks are aware 
that they can influence the magistrates without directly commenting on 
a case - by inflection, gesture or by the way they frame their advice. 
It is perhaps more disturbing that there are some clerks who are not 
aware that they do this. Clerks were clear that if they wished to 
exceed the proper limits of their role they could do so, although 
improper behaviour would not be possible with all benches. Clerks 
insisted that their integrity 1n maintaining a scrupulous regard for 
the limits of their role was to be relied upon. 
The effect which clerks to the justices have on magistrates 
through training 1S especially important. Clerks clearly understand 
that they can influence the model of the criminal justice system which 
their magistrates employ by the content of the training offered to new 
magistrates, and this will affect the attitude of those magistrates to 
defendants, to the police, and to the whole criminal justice process 
and their role in it. The level of dependence of magistrates on the 
clerk in court is also to a great extent a function of training, and 
this is shown particularly in the uneven enthusiasm amongst clerks for 
courses for magistrates taking the chair in court. Clerks in some 
courts will continue to appear to take a dominant role in court until 
they can educate their magistrates to a level of competence where the 
chairperson in court can take more responsibility. 
All clerks stressed the necessity for them to take a prominent 
role 1n court because of the tendency for magistrates to make 
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mistakes. Magistrates would make fewer mistakes if they were better 
trained, especially in the art of taking the chair 1n court. However 
the good point was made by clerks that there 1S a limit to the 
obligations to train that can be placed on volunteers who are also 
busy people. 
Clerks' desires to protect magistrates from error has also led 
them to protest against the rules which limit their presence in the 
retiring room. Although clerks' concern arises from quite proper 
motives and not from any desire to become involved 1n matters of fact , 
nevertheless we have seen that magistrates do ask advice on fact, and 
that clerks can unintentionally communicate their opinions to the 
bench. The conduct of some of the clerks who were censured by the 
Divisional Court would surely be frowned upon by their colleagues. 
The statement of correct practice in the latest Practice Direction is 
phrased positively, and clerks should recogn1se the need for such 
statements. A greater willingness on the part of clerks to g1ve 
advice in open court may do something to reduce the problems relating 
to the retirement of the clerk. It would assist particularly in 
improving trust between the legal profession in court and court 
clerks, given that it is advocates in court who are responsible for 
referring the clerk's behaviour to the Divisional Court. However it 
may be that the tensions between clerks and advocates analysed 1n 
Chapter Six are not assisting any process of improving the 
relationship between clerks and advocates. 
The clerk as guardian of due process 
The clerk in court has to play two conflicting roles. One of 
them is the role of lawyer; the clerk 1S the legal adviser to the 
magistrates and 1S thus responsible for ensur1ng that legal and 
procedural rules are followed. This aspect of the clerk's role 
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includes see1ng that those legal and procedural rules which are 
designed to safeguard the defendant are followed. Thus the clerk 
becomes a guardian of due process in court. The other role that the 
clerk plays 1S that of manager of, or worker in, the court 
organisation. This role requires the clerk to arrange the business 
of the court so that it proceeds smoothly and quickly and that all 
cases are dealt with 1n the court's session. These two roles 
conflict. Protection of the defendant's rights, and ensuring the 
defendant's full participation in the court procedure when that 
defendant has no advocate is a very time consuming process. It holds 
up court proceedings and makes it difficult to get through the cases 
on time. The reality of justice for the many unrepresented 
defendants in magistrates' courts will be crucially affected by the 
sort of compromise made by the clerk between these two conflicting 
aspects of his/her role. 
One might have expected that clerks would make their comprom1se 
almost entirely in favour of the court organisation, S1nce that would 
give them personal bonuses in increased time out of court to deal with 
other work, or simply the ability to get away from the office on time. 
However they do not do so. Clerks are very insistent on the 
importance of their role as the court's lawyer, the preserver of right 
conduct in court, and the protector of the unrepresented. Some 
clerks see themselves as frustrated advocates, who are g1ven a chance 
to exercise their talents in favour of "the underdog" unrepresented 
person. Many clerks emphasise the importance of this aspect of their 
role, and gain particular enjoyment from it. 
Also, in their relationship with the magistrates clerks stress 
their role as protector of fair play. Their wish to be in the 
retiring room is motivated not by a desire to take over the judicial 
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functions of the bench, but by the desire to ensure that the rules (of 
law, procedure and evidence) are followed. Their fears in court are 
that the bench will make a mistake, and their concern is to protect 
the bench from this possibility. However clerks will withdraw their 
protection and abandon their magistrates, even consigning them 
intentionally to the reprimands of the Divisional Court if those 
magistrates flout the r~les wilfully. 
The enthusiasm and effectiveness with which clerks protect due 
process rights in court 1S influenced by many factors. The attitude 
of the individual clerk 1S important and personality and training must 
playa part. But particularly influential is the position of the 
clerk in the court organisation. Pressures on the clerk to hurry 
through'the list can come from many sources - particularly from the 
police where police call the list and/or act as ushers in court. 
Senior and experienced clerks will be much less susceptible to these 
pressures than junior or less experienced clerks. However another 
very important factor is the availability of resources to the court. 
If there are enough qualified staff, enough magistrates, enough 
courtrooms, enough administrators, the demands of the court 
organisation are reduced and there 1S more time for the unrepresented 
de fendan t. Government measures which place greater stress on an 
already overworked court organisation, reduce the chances of the 
rights of unrepresented defendants will be protected. 
However, although the 'due process' aspects of the clerk's role 
should not be forgotten because they are important to explain the 
clerk's behaviour ln court, we should not be carried away by 
enthusiasm for them. There are a number of problems. 
First, some clerks operate a model of the criminal justice 
process which is much closer to a crime control model than a due 
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proces s mode 1. The clerk is unreliable as a protector of the 
defendant's rights. The interviews for this research revealed clerks 
who were apathetic about helping the unrepresented, and a few who 
actively disliked doing it. The court observations also revealed 
clerks who did not help unrepresented defendants and who bypassed 
their needs and their lack of understanding of the court's proceedings. 
Secondly, those clerks who placed great emphasis on the due 
process aspects of their role sometimes had an inflated idea of their 
own effectiveness. They believed that they could be as effective as 
a defence advocate, despite the fact that they had not taken 
instruction from the defendant, and were restricted by their position 
from pursuing an aggressive defence. Other clerks, whilst admitting 
that they could not be as effective as a defence advocate thought that 
they could be "good enough". They used an idea of "good enough" 
justice which is characteristic of Bottom's and McClean's Liberal 
Bureaucrat who is "a prac tical man who real ises tha t th ings have got 
to get done" and who believes that "the system must not become so 
bogged it does not operate".2 
This concept of "good enough" justice can distort the clerk's 
perceptions of the need for legal representation of defendants. If 
the clerk believes that s/he or her/his staff, can usually do a good 
enough job in protecting the rights of defendants, then the defendant 
in a simple case does not need an advocate. Given the enormous 
influence clerks have on the grant of legal aid, this could actually 
affect whether or not the defendant gets a legal representative. It 
2. Bottoms and McLean. 
Paul 1976. p.229. 
'Defendants in the Criminal Process' R. & K. 
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may go some way to explaining the differences 1n levels of legal aid 
orders at different courts. 
Thirdly it must also be admitted that the Justices' Clerks' 
society has scarcely been vocal in its demands for more resources to 
improve the protections it can offer to unrepresented defendants - the 
society has asserted that magistrates' justice is much improved and has 
urged that magistrates be given increased responsibility,3 but its 
emphasis has not been with the problems of unrepresented defendants. 
Nevertheless the assistance given by the clerk to unrepresented 
defendants is sometimes good and often the only assistance such 
defendants are likely to get. When demands for more legal 
representation for defendants in magistrates' courts seem unlikely to 
be met, there is temptation to turn instead to measures which might 
1mprove the assistance given to defendants by the clerk. However it 
should remain clear that by settling for the help given by the clerk 
society is settling for the compromise of the Liberal Bureaucrat -
"good enough" justice. 
The future 
The extent of the clerk's power 1n the criminal justice process 
and the nature of the clerk's role as an ambivalent protector of due 
process should influence the pattern of future reforms. 
One way in which clerks have sought to develop their role 1S by 
looking for an increase in the jurisdiction of magistrates' courts. 
The Justices' Clerks' Society in its paper 'A case for summary trial' 
(referred to above) has argued that magistrates' powers should be 
3. See especially "A case for summary trial: p~opo~als fo~ 
redistribution of Criminal Business" by the Just1ces Clerks 
Society. 
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extended. This has prompted criticism from some lawyers 4 who point 
to the problems of magistrates' justice, including delay, lack of 
facilities, procedural disadvantages compared with jury trial, and the 
unrepresentative nature of many benches of magistrates. Certainly 
the emphasis on speed, efficiency and cost which mark so many of the 
Justices' Clerks' Society's requests for change are unlikely to 
reassure those advocates who represent defendants in magistrates' 
courts. A greater emphasis by clerks on the quality of magistrates' 
justice and the problems of defendants might secure more support from 
the rather vocal lawyers who both experience magistrates' justice and 
wri te about it. 
Another way in which clerks have sought to develop their role is 
through the acquisition of quasi-judicial powers. Those powers which 
they have been granted in the last decade or so have, however, only 
tended to load the clerk to the justices down with some trivial, if 
convenient minor powers. There does not seem to be any indication 
that the clerk might be given more extensive judicial powers. 
Although the clerks who were interviewed for the present research 
wanted sometimes quite substantial increases in their powers the 
request which has recently come from the Justices' Clerks' Society is 
for the power to adjourn cases without the necessity for the agreement 
. 5 
of the parties or for a previous adjournment by a magistrate. 
This request for an increase in powers is made on the context of 
an implied criticism by the Justices' Clerks' Society of advocates who 
ask for adjournments unnecessarily. It is again not a request likely 
4. See M. King "Against Summary Trial" in L.A.G. Bulletin April 1982 
and J. Morton "Forceable consent to Summary Trial" 132 NLJ 579. 
5. See the response of the Justices' Clerks' Society to the report 
of the Home Office Working Group, supra. 
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to rece1ve the support of the legal profession as a whole. Given 
that there have been criticisms of the way in which clerks have used 
their power to grant legal aid (discussed 1n Chapter Ten supra) and 
criticisms of the policy which resulted 1n the Nottingham Justices 
case (discussed in Chapter Nine supra), advocates are perhaps unlikely 
to be sympathetic to proposals to give the clerk greater power to deal 
with adjournments when the indications are that it will be used 
substantially to refuse their requests for adjournments. 6 
There may be rather more support for the idea that the legal role 
of the clerk be extended. We have argued that allowing the clerk to 
rule on evidence, rule on matters of law and perhaps 'sum up', for the 
magistrates would be a more logical extension of their role. It 
would extend the things that clerks already do, rather than altering 
their role. It would acknowledge the reality, which 1S that 
magistrates are unlikely to go against the legal advice of their 
clerk, and it would solve some difficult evidential problems. Such 
an extens ion of the clerk's job would also emphas ise the clerk's ro Ie 
as guardian of legality in the courtroom, rather than her/his role as 
controller of the court organisation. Such measures would be aimed 
at protecting defendants, rather than increasing efficiency 1n court. 
Extension of the legal role of the clerk also coincides with 
moves towards an all professional service. Also for those clerks 
6 • I bid. par a. 5.6, the do cum en t say s .. One 0 f 0 u r colI e a g u e s had 
made the following comments with which we agree. 'The refusal 
of an adjournment is a theoretical step which the court may take, 
but it is of very limited practical value. If there is any 
dispute, hardly anyone champions the shortening of adjournments 
or the refusal of adjournments. A court can exert some 
pres sure, but if it pres ses too hard the part ies will ~llege, the 
den i a 1 0 f jus tic e, the h 0 s til i t y 0 f the ben c h ••• A s t ,1 pen d 1 a r y 
magistrate who remembers what is said on each occaSlon may be 
able to exert more control but a bench of lay magistrates with 
ever changing compos it ion 'is no mark for a de term ined advoca te 
who wants an adjournment." 
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with ambitions towards judicial posts a demonstration that clerks are 
capable of taking good decisions on law is likely to be more useful 
than proof that magistrates can deal with bigger and better offences. 
Magistrates may feel that this would be a diminution of their 
powers - and it would in fact be so. However there are sound 
reasons for allowing clerks to rule on evidence quite apart from any 
pressure to 1ncrease the clerk's role. Also the occasions when lay 
magistrates would legitimately wish to go against the considered legal 
advice of their clerks will be very few, so that if clerks were to be 
allowed to rule on law the real encroachment on magistrates' powers 
would be small, although its symbolic significance might be large. 
Whether or not the role of the clerk is increased, there remains the 
fact that clerks will be looking for avenues of promotion from clerk 
to the justices to judicial roles in larger numbers in the near 
future. Some consideration should therefore be g1ven to the role of 
the clerk as a whole. 
Bottoms and McLean found the values of the Liberal Bureaucrat 
everywhere in the criminal justice system. They also felt that the 
system needed to be given a decisive push in the direction of due 
process. Given the position occupied by the clerk in magistrates 
courts, perhaps the opportunity could be taken to give the clerk a 
decisive push towards those aspects of her/his role. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
preliminary 
Before we begin the questions perhaps I should explain that I am 
doing research for a doctoral thesis on the role of the clerk in 
magistrates' courts. I am looking at the nature of the clerk's job, 
and, as part of that, at the way in which the clerk relates to other 
people who work in or appear in magistrates' courts. Perhaps I 
should also say that I have worked as a court clerk myself. 
Some of the questions which I will ask may seem rather obvious to 
you, but I ask you to bear with me in this. The reason I must ask 
such questions is because I am not allowed to assume the answers, and 
because the state of knowledge about what clerks actually do is 
regrettably very limited. 
The answers you give me will be strictly confidential. You will 
not be referred to by name or identified in anything that I write. 
Your name and place of employment will be recorded on this separate 
list, and your questionnaire will be identified only by number. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 
POS ITION HELD 
SECTION 1 - QUALIFICATIONS 
1.1 What qualifications for your job do you have? 
1.2 When did you acquire these qualifications? 
IF ANSWER TO 1.1 = SOLR. OR BARRISTER PROCEED TO 1.6 
1.3 Are you in the process of acquiring any other qualifications? 
IF YES PROCEED TO 1.4 - 1.5. IF NO PROCEED TO 1.6. 
1.4 What qualifications are they? 
1.5 When do you expect to complete them? 
1.6 Can you tell me for how long you have been taking courts? 
SECTION 2 - THE CLERK RETIRING WITH THE BENCH 
2.1 What practice do you usually adopt in court so far as retiring 
with the bench ~s concerned? 
2.2 On what sort of issues do you find that benches ask you to retire 
with them most often? 
2.3 What is your opinion of the present state of the law on the clerk 
retiring with the bench? 
2.4 Do you think that the law needs to be altered ~n any way? 
SECTION 3 - RELATIONSHIP WITH MAGISTRATES 
3.1 I am interested in how the clerk and the chairman divide up the 
"speaking parts" in court. Can you explain what the divis ion of 
work is ~n your court? 
3.2 Looking at some specific examples, who explains about the right 
to trial to the defendant? 
3.3 And who would explain to an unrepresented defendant the courses 
open to him in making his defence? 
3.4 Who would explain the meaning and effect of a decision about 
bail? 
3.5 It has been suggested that there is a tendency for clerks to 
dominate the bench in court. Do you think that this is so? 
3.6 If the bench called you out to the retiring room to advise them, 
and you thought that they were going seriously wrong in their 
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decision as to the guilt or 1nnocence of a defendant what if 
. , , 
anyth1ng would you do? 
3.7 If you had been called out by the 
sentence, and you thought they were 
their decision, what would you do? 
on bench to advise them 
g01ng seriously wrong 10 
3.8 If you wished to influence the decisions of the bench on matters 
which strictly would be outside your proper role, could you do 
so? (Probe: Can you give an illustration of the way in which 
it could be done?) 
3.9 If the bench announce a decision 1n court which 1S wrong 1n law, 
what do you do? 
3.10 Has a bench ever disagreed with your advice on the law? 
IF YES GO TO 3.11, IF NO GO TO 3.12 
3.11 How did you deal with this situation? 
3.12 How would you describe your relationship with the magistrates 
outside the court? 
3.13 Does your relationship with the magistrates out of court affect 
the way you relate to them in court? 
3.14 How 1S the magistrates' rota drawn up at your court? 
3.15 Do any problems ar1se 1n relation to the drawing up of the rota? 
SECTION 4 - RELATIONSHIP WITH UNREPRESENTED DEFENDANTS 
4.1 It has been said that unrepresented defendants are nervous and 
afraid in court. Do you agree? 
4.2 Do you find that unrepresented defendants have difficulty 1n 
understanding the language and procedure in court? 
4.3 What are the things which you find most difficult to explain to 
unrepresented defendants? 
4.4 Do you think that the clerk can help an unrepresented defendant 
to present her/his case as effectively as if the defendant were 
represented by a solicitor or barrister? 
4.5 Do you enjoy helping unrepresented defendants? 
4.6 Do you have any experience of a duty solicitor scheme? 
IF YES PROCEED WITH 4.7 - 4.8. IF NO GO TO SECTION 5. 
4.7 Do you/did you find the scheme successful? 
4.8 Did the scheme make the clerk's job easier? 
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SECTION 5 - RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICE 
5.1 What tasks if any do the police officers from the court office 
perform in court? 
IF THEY HAVE A ROLE IN COURT GO TO 5.2 - 5.3 
IF NOT GO TO 5.4 
5.2 Do these officers wear uniform in court? 
5.3 Do any problems arise from this? 
5.4 Who controls the order in which cases are called on? 
5.5 When you are sitting in court how do you get information as to 
which cases are ready to be heard? 
5.6 Are there ever any conflicts or problems about the order in which 
cases are called? 
5.7 Local police officers must appear regularly in your court. Do 
they ever attempt to take any advantage of their familiarity with 
the court? 
5.8 Is there a police prosecuting solicitor's department in your 
area? 
IF YES GO TO 5.9, IF NO GO TO 5.10 
5.9 What is the division of cases between the prosecutor's department 
and the police themselves? 
5.10 If police are not legally represented who advises and assists 
them to present their case? 
5.11 Do the police ever come to you for legal advice? 
IF YES GO TO 5.12, IF NO GO TO 5.13 
5.12 Do any problems arise in this respect? 
5.13 How would you describe your relationship with the local police 
outside court? 
SECTION 6 - RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
6.1 On a scale of very good, good, average, poor, very poor, how 
would you rate the standard of advocacy of the following: 
(a) Prosecuting solicitors 
(b) Local solicitors 
(c) Members of the Bar 
6.2 Approximately how many firms of local solicitors operate inyour 
court? 
6.3 Does any firm (or firms) do a particularly large part of the 
work? 
476 
6.4 
6.5 
Do you regularly run more than one court at once? 
IF YES GO TO 6.S - 6.7, IF NO, GO TO 6.8 
Do some solicitors represent more than one client 
session? 1n one court 
IF YES GO TO 6.6 
6.6 Do any problems arise from this? 
IF YES GO TO 6. 7 
6.7 How are such problems resolved? 
6.8 Do defendants who are legally represented have any priority 1n 
the court list? 
IF YES GO TO 6.9, IF NO GO TO 6.10 
6.9 Does this cause any conflicts or problems? 
6.10 Do you think that members of the legal profession who appear 1n 
your court regard court clerks as being of equal status to 
themselves? 
6.11 Do local solicitors come to you for legal advice? 
6.12 Do you find any problems 1n this respect? 
SECTION 7 - RELATIONSHIP WITH PROBATION AND SOCIAL SERVICES 
7.1 How would you describe your relationship with the Probation 
Officers who work at your court? 
7.2 Do probation officers come to the clerks for legal advice? 
7.3 In what ways if any do you find that probation officers are 
useful or helpful to clerks? 
7.4 Do you find differences in the way in which you relate to social 
workers as opposed to probation officers? 
SECTION 8 - STATUS AND JUDICIAL ROLE OF CLERK 
8.1 
8.2 
8.3 
8.4 
8.5 
What 1S your op1n10n of the "1980 Regulations" 
(The Justices Clerks (Qualification of Assistants) Rules 1979?) 
Do you think that all court clerks should be qualified as either 
solicitors or barristers? 
Do you think that clerks are properly paid for the work they do? 
Should clerks be able to rule - rather than advise - on questions 
of law? 
Should the J'udicial or quasi-judicial powers of the justices' 
, , 1 k' 
clerk - for example the powers given under the Just1ces C er s 
Rules 1970 - be increased? 
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8.6 What is your opinion of the suggestion that the clerk should be 
on the bench? 
8.7 Should there be an accepted channel of promotion for Clerks to 
the Justices, for example to stipendiary magistrate or to other 
branches of the judiciary? 
SECTION 9 - QUESTIONS FOR JUSTICES CLERKS 
9.1 What part do you play in the training of magistrates? 
9.2 What ~s your opinion of the present training syllabus? 
9.3 Do you have any special training for magistrates who take the 
chair in court? 
9.4 What are the most important things that you teach new 
magistrates? 
9.5 How influential do you think their training ~s on magistrates? 
9.6 Do you have any staff training programmes here? 
9.7 To what extent do you influence the attitudes and practices of 
clerks working in your court? 
9.8 What do you think are the most important attributes for a court 
clerk to possess. 
9.9 To what extent do you think that a Clerk to the Justices should 
define the character of his/her court? 
SECTION 10 - CONCLUSION 
10.1 Have you any comments on the questions I have asked? 
10.2 Is there anything else you would like to say? 
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APPENDIX TWO 
PRACTICE DIRECTION [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1416 
[Queen's Bench Division (Lord Goddard, C.J.,), November 16, 1953] 
Justices-Clerk - Presence in retiring room while justices consider 
dec is ion. 
Lord Goddard, C.J.: In three recent cases* this court has had to 
consider :he ~uestion when, and for what purposes, it is proper for a 
clerk to Just1ces to accompany them when they retire to consider their 
decision, or to remain in their room while the case is under 
consideration. It is evident from letters received both by the Lord 
Chanc e.ll or and u: ys e I ~, and fr.om c orres pondence in ne ws pa pe rs, tha t 
there 1S uncerta1nty 1n the m1nds of magistrates on this subject and 
indeed, some degree of misunderstanding as to the effect of what wa~ 
said in the cases to which I have referred. They are the cases 
concerning the East Kerrier justices (l), the Welshpool justices (2) 
and the Barry justices (3). I propose, therefore, to endeavour to 
clear up this matter, and have the authority of the Lord Chancellor to 
say that he concurs in the statement I am about to make, as do all the 
judges who were parties to the decisions I have mentioned. 
There are two questions which arise in this connection. 
first is: On what matters may magistrates consult their clerk? 
second, and one of equal importance, 1S: In what manner should 
consult him? 
The 
The 
they 
On the first question, it is clear that they may seek his advice 
on questions of law, or of mixed law and fact, and also on questions 
regarding the practice and procedure of the court. The latter are, 
indeed, questions of law. There are other matters on which justices 
may requ1re the assistance of their clerk and on which they are 
entitled to ask his advice. They may, for instance ask him for 
information as to the sentences which have been imposed by their 
bench, or by neighbouring benches in respect of similar offences to 
that which they are trying. It is, indeed, most desirable that 
penalties for such matters as obstruction by vehicles, lack of lights 
and other what may be called public order offences should have some 
degree of uniformity. Moreover, it would be proper for the clerk 
himself to call the justices' attention to the fact that a question of 
law does or may arise if they do not appear to be already aware of , , . 
it. It would then be for them to consider whether they wanted hlS 
further advice on that question. In no circumstances however, may 
justices consult their clerk as to the guilt or innocence of the 
accused so far as it is simply a question of fact, but, if a question 
arises 'as to the construction of a statute or regulation, they may 
consult him on whether the facts found by them constitute an offence, 
*0) R. v. East Kerrier JJ. Ex.parte Mundy, [1952] 2 All E.R. 144; 
[1952] 2 Q.B. 719; 116 J.P. 339; 3rd Digest Supp. 
(2) R. v. Welshpool JJ. Ex.parte Holley, ante, p.807; 117 J.P. 511. 
(3) R. v. Barry (Glamorgan) JJ. Ex. parte Kashim, ante, p.l005. 
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because that would be a question of mixed law and fact. They may 
also ~roperly ~sk the clerk ~o refresh their memory as to any matter 
of eV1dence wh1ch has been g1ven. They can take with them, or send 
for, any nO.te the clerk n."ay ~ave taken, and if there is anything in 
the note wh1ch needs eluc1dat10n, or if they think ~omething has been 
omitted or w:ongly taken down, it would be perfectly proper for them 
to consult h1m. They must not ask his opinion as to the sentence 
which they ought to impose, but they may, as I have said ask for 
information as to the sentences imposed for comparable offe~ces and 
. , 
they most certa1nly may consult him on what penalties the law allows 
in any par~icular case if they already do not know it, and on any 
consequent1al matters that may follow on conviction. One obvious 
instance would be with regard to certain motoring offences whether 
reasons which they are prepared to give can amount to speci~l reasons 
for not disqualifying a driver according to the decision of this court 
on that subject. They may also want to know whether it is a case in 
which they can require sureties for good behaviour in addition to 
imposing a penalty. 
As regards the manner in which justices may consult their clerk, 
the court,I think, made it clear in the East Kerrier case (1) that the 
decision of the court must be the decision of the justices, and not 
that of the justices and their clerk, and that, if the clerk retires 
with the justices as a matter of course, it is inevitable that the 
impression will be given that he may influence the justices as to the 
decision, or sentence, or both. A clerk should not retire with his 
justices as a matter of course, nor should they attempt to get 
round the decisions to which I have referred merely by asking him in 
every case to retire with them, or by pretending that they require his 
advice on a point of law. Subject to this, it is in the discretion 
of the justices to ask their clerk to retire with them if, 1n any 
particular case, it has become clear that they will need his advice. 
If, in the course of their deliberations, they find that they need 
him, they can send for him. On this matter I would str~ss one 
further point, and that is, that if the clerk does retire w1th the 
justices, or is sent for by them, he should return to his place in 
court as soon as he is released by the justices, leaving them to 
complete their deliberations in his absence and come back into court 
in their turn. I wish to add that the rulings this court has given 
on the subject derive from, and are really part of, the rule so often 
emphasised that justice must not only be done but must manifestly 
appear to be done, and, if justices bear that in mind, I feel sure 
they will have no difficulty in loyally following the decisions of 
th is court. 
I should add that the rulings of this court do not apply to 
justices when exercising jurisdiction in matrimonial cases a~ they are 
then subject to the directions and control of the Probate, D1vorce and 
Admiralty Division. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
PRACTICE NOTE (JUSTICES' CLERKS) [1954] 1 W.L.R. 213 
Husband and Wife - Justices - Retirement of justices - Presence of 
clerk. Justices - Clerk - Retirement with justices - Matrimonial 
case. 
Lord Merriman P. In a statement made in the Divisional Court of 
the Queen's Bench Division on November 16, 1953, about clerks to 
justices being present when the justices have retired to consider 
their decision, Lord Goddard C.J. said that the ruling of that court 
did not apply to justices when exercising jurisdiction in matrimonial 
caseS, as they were then subject to the directions and control of this 
Division. Before making any pronouncement in response to several 
requests for a ruling by this court on the subject, I wished to 
consult the judges of this Division. I now have their authority to 
say that they agree with the statement I am about to make. I am also 
authorised by the Lord Chancellor to say that he approves of it. 
Vaisey J. also asks me to say that he agrees with it. 
I wish to say at the outset that it rarely happens that an 
allegation of undue interference by the clerk in the decision of a 
complaint under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Acts is made 
a ground of appeal to th is Divis ional Court. Neverthe less, it is at 
least as important in cases of this class as in other cases dealt with 
by magistrates' courts that the decision should be that of the 
justices themselves, and not that of the justices and their clerk; and 
that not only should this be so in fact, but that nothing should be 
done to give the parties or the public the impresson that the clerk is 
influencing the decision. I am, therefore, in complete agreement 
with the Lord Chief Justice that it should not be regarded as a matter 
of course that, if justices retire to consider their decision, the 
clerk should retire with them; moreover, whether the justices invite 
the clerk to retire with them, or send for him in the course of their 
deliberations, I agree that the clerk should always return to his 
place in court as soon as the justices release him, leaving them to 
complete their deliberations alone. 
Bearing in mind that domestic proceedings are often lengthy and 
may involve points of law in relation to the complaint itself or to 
the amount of maintenance, and that this court insists that a proper 
note of the evidence must be kept, and that, in the event of ~n 
appeal, justices must be prepared to state the reas~ns for their 
decision, I recognise that more often than not magist~ates may 
properly wish to refresh their recollection of the eVidence by 
recourse to the clerk's note or to seek his advice about the law, 
before coming to their decisi~n. Having regard to the high standard 
of care which is generally shown by magistrates' courts in dealing 
with these domestic proceedings, I do not think it is necessary. for me 
to say more than that I am confident that justices taking part in them 
may be trusted to act, and to ensure that th~y appear to act, on the 
fundamental principle that they alone are the Judges. 
J.B.G. 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
PRACTICE DIRECTION [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1163 
Magistrates-Clerk - Functions - Advice on questions of law, mixed law 
practice and procedure - Evidence and issues - Penalties - Manner of 
performance of functions. 
1. A justices' clerk is responsible to the justices for the 
performance of any of the functions set out below by any member 
of his staff acting as court clerk and may be called in to advise 
the justices even when he is not personally sitting with the 
justices as clerk to the court. 
2. It shall be the responsibility of the justices' clerk to advise 
the justices as follows: 
(a) on questions of law or of mixed law and fact; 
(b) as to matters of practice and procedure. 
3. If it appears to him necessary to do so, or he is so requested 
by the justices, the justices' clerk has the responsibility to 
(a) refresh the justices' memory as to any matter of evidence 
and to draw attention to any issues involved in the matters 
before the court, 
(b) advise the justices generally on the range of penalties 
which the law allows them to impose and on any guidance 
relevant to the choice of penalty provided by the law, the 
decisions of the superior courts or other authorities. If 
no request for advice has been made by the justices, the 
justices' clerk shall discharge his responsibility in court 
1n the presence of the parties. 
4. The way in which the justices' clerk should perform his function 
should be stated as follows 
5. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
The justices are entitled to the advice of their clerk when 
they retire in order that the clerk may fulfil his 
responsibility outlined above. 
Some justices may prefer to take their own notes of 
evidence.There is, however, no obligation on them to do so. 
Whether they do so or not, there is nothing to prevent them 
from enlisting the aid of their clerk and his notes if they 
are 1n any doubt as to the evidence which has been g1ven. 
If the justices wish to consult their clerk solely about the 
evidence or his notes of it, this should ordinarily, and 
certainly in simple cases, be done in open court. The 
object is to avoid any suspicion that the clerk has been 
involved in deciding issues of fact. 
For the reasons stated in the Practice Direction of 15 January 
1954 ([1954] 1 All E.R. 230, [1954] 1 WLR 213), which remains in 
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full force and effect, in domestic proceedings it is more likely 
than not that the justices will wish to consult their clerk. In 
particular, where rules of court require the reasons for their 
decision to be drawn up in consultation with the clerk, they will 
need to receive his advice for this purpose. 
6. This Practice Direction is issued with the concurrence of the 
President of the Family Division. 
2nd July 1981 Lane C.J. 
483 
APPENDIX FIVE 
JUSTICES' CLERKS RULES 1970 
(5.1. 1970 No.231 as amended by S.L 1975 No.1767, d S I an •. 
No.754) 1978 
1. These rules may be cited as the Justices' Clerks Rules 1970 and 
shall come into operation on 1st April 1970. 
2. The Interpretation Act [1978] shall apply for the interpretation 
of t~ese Rules as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of 
Par11ament. 
3. The things specified in the Schedule to these Rules, being things 
authorised to be done by, to or before a single justice of the 
peace for a petty sessions area may be done by, to or before the 
justices' clerk for that area. 
SCHEDULE 
1. The laying of an information or the making of a complaint, other 
than an information or complaint substantiated on oath. 
2. The issue of any summons, including a witness summons. 
3. The adjournment of the hearing of a complaint if the parties to 
the complaint consent to the complaint being adjourned. 
4. (1) The further adjournment of criminal proceedings with the 
consent of the prosecutor and the accused if, but only if, 
( a) the accused, not having been remanded on the 
adjournment, 1S not remanded on the 
adjournment; or 
prev10us 
further 
(b) the accused, having been remanded on bail on the 
previous adjournment, is remanded on bail on the like 
terms and conditions. 
(2) The remand of the accused on bail at the time of further 
adjourning the proceedings in pursuance of sub-paragraph (1) 
(b) above. 
5. The determination that a complaint for the revocation, discharge, 
revival, alteration, variation or enforcement of an affiliation 
order or an order enforceable as an affiliation order be dealt 
with by a magistrates' court acting for another petty sessions 
area in accordance with the provisions of Rule 34 or 49 of the 
Magistrates' Courts Rules 1968. 
6. The allowing of further time for payment of a sum enforceable by 
a magistrates' court. 
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7 . Th e om a kin g 0 fat ran s fer 0 f fin e 0 r d e r, t hat is t 0 sayan 0 r de r 
mak1?gopayment by a p~rson of a sum adjudged to be paid by a 
conv1ct10n enforceable 1n the petty session area in whi h h 0 
o 0 c e 1S 
res1d1ng. 
8. The making of an order before an inquiry into the means of a 
person under section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 that 
that person shall furnish to the court a statement of his means 
in accordance with section 44(8). 
9. (Repealed). 
10. The giving of consent for another magistrates' court to deal with 
an offender for an earlier offence in respect of which, after the 
offender had attained the age of seventeen years, a court had 
made a probation order or an order for conditional discharge, 
where the justices' clerk is the clerk of the court which made 
the order or, in the case of a probation order, of that court or 
of the supervising court. 
11. The amending, in accordance with paragraph (2) (1) of Schedule 1 
to the Criminal Justice Act 1948 (h), of a probation order made 
after the probationer had attained the age of seventeen years by 
substituting for the petty sessions area named in the order the 
area in which the probationer proposes to reside or is residing. 
12. The signing of a certificate given to the Crown Court under 
section 16(4) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 as to 
non-compliance with a community service order. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
The making of an order under section 32A of the Children and 
Young Persons Act 1969 for the purposes of an application within 
subsection (1) (a), (b) or (c) of that section before the hearing 
of the application. 
The appointing of a guardian ad litem of a child or young person 
under section 32B (1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. 
The requesting under subsection (1) of section 6 of the 
Guardianship Act 1973 of a report on a matter relevant to an 
application to which that subsection applies before the hearing 
of the application. 
The acceptance under subsection (4A) of section 24 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1967 (i) (which relates to process for minor 
offences) of service of such a statutory declaration as is 
mentioned in subsection (3) of that section. 
The fixing under section 44A(3) of the Criminal ~ustice ~ct 1967 
(j) of a later day in substitution for a da~ pr~v10~sly f~xed for 
the appearance of an offender to enable an 1nqu1ry 1nto h1S me?ns 
to be made under section 44 of that Act or to enable a hear1ng 
required by subsection (6) of the said section 44 to be held. 
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APPENDIX SIX 
JUSTICES' CLERKS (QUALIFICATIONS OF ASSISTANTS) RULES 
1979 
(S.I. 1979 No. 570 amended by S.I. 1980 No. 1897) 
1. These ~ules may be cited as the Justices' Clerks (Qualifications 
of AssIstants) Rules 1979 and shall come into operation on 1st 
October 1980 except that for the purposes of rule 4(2) below 
these Rules shall come into operation on 1st July 1979. 
2. - (1) In these Rules -
"assistant" means a person employed to assist a justices' clerk; 
" . f . f certI Icate 0 competence" means a certificate granted in 
accordance with the provisions of Schedule 1 to these Rules; 
"employed as a clerk in court" means employed to assist a 
justices' clerk by acting in his place as a clerk in court in 
proceedings before a justice or justices; 
"Joint Negotiating Committee" means the Joint Negotiating 
Committee for Justices' Clerks' Assistants; 
"magistrates' courts committee" includes the committee of 
magistrates for the inner London area; 
"preliminary professional examination" means -
(a) the Common Professional Examination recognised by the 
Council of Legal Education and the Law Society, or 
(b) Part I of the Qualifying Examination of the Law Society, or 
(c) Part I of the Bar Examinations of the Council of Legal 
Education; 
"relevant course" means the course of an institution or body 
specified in Schedule 2 to these rules leading to an examination 
designed to qualify persons for the purposes of these Rules; 
"training certificate" means a certificate granted in accordance 
with the provisions of Schedule 3 to these Rules. 
(2) For the purposes of these Rules a person shall be deemed to 
have passed an examination if he has been granted an exemption In 
relation to it by the appropriate examining body. 
3. Except as is provided by rule 5 or 6 below, a person shall not be 
employed as a clerk in court unless that person is -
(a) qualified (any age limits apart) to be appointed a justices' 
clerk by virtue of section 20 of the Justices of the Peace 
Act 1949, or 
(b) qualified by virtue of the provISIons of rule 4 below. 
4.- (1) A person is qualified for the purposes of rule (3)(b) above 
if he possesses one of the following qualifications, that is to 
say -
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(a) he is a barrister or solicitor of the Supreme Court or has 
passed the necessary examinations for either of those 
professions; 
(b) he has successfully completed a relevant course. , 
(c) he has been employed as an assistant for not less than two 
years (whether or not continuously) and has passed a 
preliminary professional examination; 
(d) he has been granted a certificate of competence by a 
magistrates' courts' committee. 
(2) Schedule 1 to these rules shall have effect in relation to 
the grant of a certificate of competence by a magistrates' 
courts' committee. 
5.- (1) An assistant who is not qualified for the purposes of rule 3 
above may be employed as a clerk in court if he holds a valid 
training certificate granted by a magistrates' courts' committee. 
(2) Schedule 3 to these Rules shall have effect in relation to 
the grant of a training certificate by a magistrates' courts' 
committee. 
6. Notwithstanding the prov1s10ns of rules 3 to 5 above, the 
Secretary of State may grant authority for any such person as may 
be specified by him to be employed as a clerk in court for such 
period not exceeding six months as may be so specified if he is 
satisfied -
(a) that the person so specified is, in the circumstances, a 
suitable person to be employed as a clerk in court, and 
(b) that no other arrangements can reasonably be made for the 
hearing of proceedings before the court. 
Rule 4 (2) SCHEDULE 1 
CERTIFICATES OF COMPETENCE 
1. - (1) This Schedule applies to an assistant who -
(2) 
(a) is not qualified for the purposes of rule 3 of these 
Rules, and 
(b) 
(c) 
was born on or before 31st May 1950, and 
has or if he continues to be employed as an assistant 
wili have been employed for five years (whether or not 
continuou~ly) as an assistant prior to 1st January 1980. 
A magistrates' courts' committee may, n?t later than 3~st 
March 1981, grant an assistant to. wh.om th1.s S~hedule appl1es 
a certificate of competence if 1t 1S sat1sf1ed that he has 
had before 31st December 1979, experience employed as a 
cle:k in court for not less than five years (whether or not 
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(3) 
continuously) of all types of proceedings in a magistrates' 
court (including proceedings in domestic and juvenile 
courts) and is competent to be employed as a clerk in court. 
Notification of the 
shall be sent by the 
Secretary of State. 
grant of a certificate of competence 
. , 
magl.strates courts' committee to the 
2. Before refusing to grant a certificate of competence a 
magistrates' courts' committee shall give the assistant in 
question an opportunity of making representations in writing and 
orally to that committee. 
3. (1) An assistant who is refused the grant of a Certificate of 
competence by a magistrates' courts' committee may, within 
three months of that refusal, appeal against the refusal by 
notice in writing to the Joint Negotiating Committee who may 
determine the appeal. 
(2) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1) above the assistant and 
the magistrates' courts' committee shall be given an 
opportunity to make representations in writing and orally to 
the Joint Negotiating Committee and may be represented at 
the hearing of the appeal. 
(3) If an appeal by an assistant under sub-paragraph (1) above 
is allowed by the Joint Negotiating Committee, the 
magistrates' courts' committee shall thereupon grant to that 
assistant a certificate of competence. 
(4) In the case of an assistant employed in the inner London 
area this paragraph shall have effect as if for the 
references to the Joint Negotiating Committee there were 
substituted references to the Secretary of State. 
Rule 2 (1) SCHEDULE 2 
Institutions and Bodies with Courses 
Bristol Polytechnic 
Committee of Magistrates for the Inner London Area 
Manchester Polytechnic 
National Association of Justices' Clerks' Assistants 
Polytechnic of Central London 
Rule 5(2) SCHEDULE 3 
1. 
Training Certificates 
, . A magistrates' courts comml.ttee may, after consultation with the 
training certificate to any appropriate justices' clerk, grant a 
assistant who -
(a) has passed a preliminary professional examinatio.n and has 
been employed as an assistant for not less than SIX months 
(whether or not continuously), or 
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(b) 1S attending a course leading to a preliminary professional 
exa~ination (or to an examination which exempts the 
ass1stant from the requirement to pass a preliminary 
p~ofessional examination), has successfully completed the 
f1rst year thereof and has been employed as an assistant for 
not less than one year (whether or not continuously), or 
(c) is attending a relevant course and has successfully 
completed the first year thereof and has been employed as an 
assistant for not less than one year (whether or not 
continuously). 
2. (1) A training certificate granted by virtue of attendance at 
any such course as is mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) Or (c) 
above shall cease to be valid if the assistant Ceases to 
attend the course or fails an examination to which the 
course leads or any part thereof: 
Provided that, if a magistrates' courts' committee 1S 
satisfied that an assistant who has failed such an 
examination intends to re-take the examination or any part 
thereof, it may, after consultation with the appropriate 
justices' clerk, renew the certificate. 
(2) A training certificate which has been renewed 1n pursuance 
of sub-paragraph (1) above shall be valid for a further 
period of 18 months from the date of the first examination 
which has been failed, except that it shall cease to be 
valid if the assistant fails the re-taken examination. 
(3) A training certificate shall in any event cease to be valid 
if the assistant to whom it has been granted ceases for any 
. , , . 
reason, to be employed by the mag1strates courts comm1ttee 
which granted him the certificate. 
3. A magistrates'courts' committee may withdraw the certificate, 
after consultation with the appropriate justices' clerk, if it 
considers that it should no longer be continued. 
4. Before withdrawing, or refusing to grant or renew, a training 
certificate a magistrates'courts' committee shall give the 
assistant in question an opportunity of making representations in 
writing and orally to the committee. 
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APPENDIX SEVEN 
Description of the job of clerks 
An outline of the job of the clerk can conveniently be divided, in the 
way that the body of this thesis is divided into the clerk's tasks in 
court and the clerk's tasks out of court. ' 
In Court 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Advising the magistrates on law, procedure, evidence and as to 
sentences available and sentencing norms. ' 
(The law governing this is in Pr t· D· . [198] 1 ac 1ce 1rect10n 1 W.L.R. 
1163 at Appendix Four). 
Controlling the order of cases called. 
Detailed discussion of the importance of this function is in 
Chapter.Five. It is usually a task performed by the clerk, not 
the po11ce. 
Controlling the proceedings of the court. 
This is formally for the magistrates, but is usually done by the 
clerk. (For detailed discussion of case law see Chapter Two, 
pp. 149-158.) 
Assisting those who appear unrepresented. 
(For detailed discussion see Chapter Four.) 
5. Completion of documentation relevant to all cases - e.g. Bail 
forms,committal forms, warrants, collection of driving licences, 
witness statements etc. 
Out of Court 
The Clerk to the Justices 
It is impossible to give a simple job description for a clerk to the 
justices, since the job varies very widely from clerk to clerk. 
For instance, a clerk to the justices who holds a position with the 
Justices' Clerks' Society may spend a very great deal of her/his time 
on the Society's business and thus may have to delegate many functions 
to deputies and other staff. The clerk to a large busy city division 
may very rarely go into court, but will be concerned in the main with 
managerial, staff and policy matters. The clerk to a small division 
may go into court almost every day and be able to fit other 
commitments into the remaining hours. There were examples of all of 
these situations in the interview sample, and of other differing 
roles. 
. . , C ,1 . t 
The Home Office booklet 'A Career 1n the Mag1strates ourts p01n s 
to this variation in the clerk's job. 
1. Home Office and the Central Office of Information. 
H.M.S.O. 1979. 
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"I n ~ 1 a ,r g e
l 
c l
k
' t Y the vol u m e 0 fad min i s t rat i v e w 0 r k han dIe d by the 
Justices C er may be so great that the Clerk himself rarely sits in 
court but is available as a point of reference should the Court Clerk 
deputising for him be in need of advice. 
In most medium and small petty sessional districts, however, the Clerk 
to the Justices spends part of his time in court acting as Court Clerk 
and part in his office or attending Committees.,,2 
Clerks have almost complete autonomy over how they define their own 
jobs, and over most aspects of the way they run their courts. 
Obviously the magistrates have an input, as do court staff and there 
are financial constraints from the Magistrates' Courts' committee. 
However there is so much scope for individual variation within the 
constraints that it would be impossible to give a description of what 
the clerk to the justices does which would be true for all Or even 
mos t clerks. 
In a study of management in magistrates' courts John Raine has pointed 
out that 
" managerial responsibility for the administration of justice 
is left almost wholly to the justices' clerks, 
appointed to the office by the Committee, enjoy 
autonomy of operation hardly matched in other public 
who, while 
a degree of 
services.,,3 
However, given the caveat that generalisation carries dangers, a 
number of areas can be indicated. 
1. Legal adviser to the magistrates. This involves not only giving 
advice in court, but also acting as adviser to the court clerks 
since the clerk to the justices is formally responsible for court 
clerks' advice. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
2. 
3. 
Training of magistrates. 
Eight. ) 
(Discussed in detail in Chapter 
Selection and training of staff. 
Chapter Eight.) 
(Discussed in detail in 
Exercise of statutorily conferred powers. (For detailed 
discussion see Chapter Ten and see Appendix Five, the Justices' 
Clerks' Rules 1970.) 
Managing the Court Organisation. . .. 
The type of decisions made by clerks varies from trlvla~ (such as 
the purchase of a coffee making machine ~o~ ~he magistrates' 
retiring room) to significant (such as acquiSition of a co~puter 
to deal with fines and fees.) The autonomy of the clerk is, as 
p. 12. 
John W. Raine 'Management 
Magis tra tes' Courts'.M imeo. 
of Local Government Studies. 
Needs and Responsibilities in the 
University of Birmingham, Institute 
1983. 
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Raine pointed out, very great. Some clerks see their role as 
essentially managerial, and pursue this aspect of their jobs 
actively and innovatively. Others do comparatively little. 
The nature of the division affects the clerk's tasks here. For 
instance, at one court observed fines and fees were collected in 
an old tobacco tin to be taken back to the neighbouring division. 
Fines and fees at other courts observed were collected and 
recorded with the aid of a computer. One court visited employed 
72 staff, another employed less than 20. The managerial role of 
the clerk will vary widely in these two courts. Some clerks 
take the view that they are primarily the legal adviser to the 
magistrates and that their place is in court, no matter how big 
their division. Others rarely go into court. 
In Chapter Nine the importance of the decisions which the clerk 
to the justices takes on matters of policy is examined. But 
which policy decisions the clerk will take - and whether slhe 
will take many or any - is not susceptible to generalisation. 
6. Acting as clerk to committees. Again this task is not one 
performed by all clerks. Some clerks act as clerk to the 
Magistrates' Courts' Committee. Others do not. Some clerks 
act as clerk to Probation Liaison Committees. Others delegate 
the task. 
Court Clerks' duties out of court 
The Home Office booklet referred to above points out that 
"No two Magistrates' Courts 
generalisations about careers 
dangerous.,,4 
are ever exactly alike, so 
in the Magisterial Service are 
It also says that 
"When a court has very few staff they may all sit in the same 
room and the decisions between 'who does this' and 'who does 
that' may not be clearly cut. •• In large courts staff te~d 
generally to specialise in a narrow range ~f work, whereas In 
small courts they may tackle a wider spread." 
These comments apply to court clerks as well as administrative staff. 
Again, given this qualification a number of general areas may be 
indicated. 
1. 
4. 
5. 
Completion of the court register. The register IS the official 
record of the decisions of the court, and is usually completed by 
each clerk for the court they have taken after the cour~ has 
finished for the day. However some clerks complete the regIster 
Page 7. 
Page 9. 
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in court. 
register. 
At a few courts the magistrates complete the 
2. Processing of legal aid applications and payments. 
3. Licensing work. 
4. Betting and Gaming applications. 
5. Registered Clubs. 
6. Adoption applications. 
7. Listing cases. 
8. Liaison with probation and social serV1ces. 
9. Maintaining the court library. 
10. Compiling the magistrates' rota. 
11. Collection of fines, fees and other money payments. Most of 
this work will be done by clerical and administrative staff, but 
a court clerk may have special responsibility for this area of 
work, or may do some of the work in smaller courts. 
12. Dealing with enquiries from the public. 
13. Processing applications for summonses and warrants. 
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COURT 
A 
B 
C 
LOCATION DESCRIPTION OF DIVISION 
London Satte1ite town Court serves moderately 
Population 87,000 sized industrial town 
with a fairly large 
immigrant community. 
Outer London court. 
Division mainly in 
a Borough of pop. 
232,500. 
A town in the North 
of England. Pop. 
75,513 
Busy division, with 
population augmented 
by many thousands of 
workers coming into 
division to work. 
Northern industrial 
town in an area of 
high unemployment. 
APPENDIX EIGHT 
TABLE OF COURTS OBSERVED 
PATTERN OF SITTINGS 
3 morn1ng courts 
twice weekly traffic 
courts in afternoon 
Weekly juvenile and 
domestic 
4 courts dealing with 
adult crime. Twice 
weekly juvenile and 
domestic courts. 
3 courts a day. 
1 juvenile court a 
week. 2 domestic 
courts a week. 
CASE LOAD 
Approx. 100 per day 
Traffic list 200+ 
Approx. 100 - 150 
cases per day. 
Approx. 50-60 
cases per day. 
PERIOD OF OBSERVATION 
One month 
One month 
Two weeks 
~ 
0: 
~ 
COURT 
D 
E 
LOCATION 
North of England. 
Two Divisions. 
Division 1 
covers two small 
industrial towns 
with total pop. 
50,000. 
Division 2 
Small market town 
and rural area. 
Pop. 13,000 
Large city in 
West of England. 
Pop. 426,657. 
DESCRIPTION OF DIVISION 
Division covers two 
small towns and several 
country villages. Also 
an area of high unemp-
loyment. 
Division covers a very 
small market town and a 
large sparsely populated 
rural area. 
Large city with very 
busy court. 
PATTERN OF SITTINGS 
3 courts a day. 
One juvenile court a 
week. One domestic 
court a week. 
Two courts a week 
covering all cases. 
Small court over the 
local police station. 
Eight courts a day. 
4-5 juvenile courts 
each week. 
1-2 domestic courts 
each week. 
CASE LOAD 
Approx. 50 cases 
per day. 
Approx. 10-20 
each sitting. 
cases 
PERIOD OF OBSERVATION 
Two weeks 
Two weeks 
High degree of Two weeks 
specialisation in 
each court. 3-4 
courts dealing with 
50+ criminal cases. 
Other courts dealing 
with traffic cases, 
Local Authority cases, 
Fine defaulters, 
Listing court. 
COURT 
F 
G 
LOCATION 
Midlands manufac-
turing town. 
Pop. 10 7 , 095 • 
Large city in Wales. 
Pop. 279, III 
DESCRIPTION OF DIVISION 
Medium sized manufact-
uring town in the 
Midlands. 
Busy court, in a city 
with a port and univer-
sity. One stipendiary 
magistrate. 
PATTERN OF SITTINGS CASE LOAD 
3 courts dealing with Adult courts dealt 
adult criminal with 50+ cases per 
offences. 2 juvenile day. 
courts per week. 2 
domestic courts a 
week. 
6 courts a day 
dealing with adult 
cases. 2 juvenile 
courts a week. 2 
domestic courts a 
week. 
2,-300 cases per day 
PERIOD OF OBSERVATION 
Two weeks 
Two weeks 
In addition to the courts described above two courts in Inner London (Courts Hand I)were observed for periods of 
only a few days each, to gain greater experience of clerks sitting with stipendiary magistrates. 
Also to increase the interview sample and to interview more senior and experienced clerks, clerks were interviewed 
at Court K, a court in a South coast town with a population of 107,000, and at Court L, another Outer London court. 
Inter-
v 1 ew 
no. 
Court C 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Court D 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Court E 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Sex 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
F 
M 
M 
M 
F 
F 
M 
M 
M 
M 
position Held 
Clerk to Justices 
Principal Assistant 
Court Clerk 
Deputy 
Principal Assistant 
Court Clerk 
Trainee 
Clerk to Justices 
Deputy 
Trainee 
Court Clerk 
Court Clerk 
Deputy 
Court Clerk 
Senior Court Clerk 
Court Clerk 
Qualifications 
Experience 
Diploma - 1976 
Diploma (?1979) 
Part 1 Law Soc. 
Diploma 1978 
Dip.1976 CPE 1980 
o levels 
Solicitor 1967 
Diploma 1956 
Solicitor 1978 
Barrister 
Diploma 
Experience 
Diploma 1978 
Solicitor 1976 
APPENDIX NINE 
Table of clerks interviewed 
Acquiring more 
Qualifications 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Possibly 
Diploma 
No 
Yes 
No 
Type 
acqu1r1ng 
CPE + Law Soc 
Solicitor 
Diploma 
Diploma 
Completion date 
CPE 1981 Pt 1982 
Length of time taking courts 
39 years 
10 years (1971). 
9 years (1972) 
18 years 
8 years 
If pers.circs.ease 5 years 
1982 
1983 
6 months 
17 years 
23 years 
18 months 
4 years 6 months 
3 years 
12 years - 23 years exper-
ience of court service. 
15 years this court. 
Several years before. 
5 years 
3 years 
Intpr-
Vlew Sex Posit ton Held Qualifications Acquiring more Type Completion date Length of time taking courts 
no. Qualifications acqu1r1ng 
Court F 
17 M Court Clerk Diploma 1980 Yes Solicitor Poss.3 yrs (1984 ) 3 years 
18 M Dip~oma 1974 Diplof!1a 1974 No 10 - 15 years 
19 M Senlor Clerk Exper1ence No 14 years 
20 M Clerk to Justices Solicitor 1966 13 years 
21 M Solicitor 1980 Solicitor 1980 3 years 
22 M Deputy Solicitor 1970 13 years 
23 M Deputy Diploma 1971 No 28 years 
Court G 
24 M Court Clerk Diploma 1976 No 11 years 
25 F Court C lerk Barrister 1977 1 month 
26 M Senior Clerk solicitor 1974 3 years 
27 M Court Clerk Barrister 1977 2 years 
28 M Principal Assistant Diploma 1967 app. No 20 years 
29 M Deputy Barrister 1975 11 years 
30 M Clerk to Justices Solicitor 1939 35 years 
31 M Court Clerk Barrister 1979 3 weeks 
32 F Senior Clerk Barrister 1975 6 years 
Court H 
33 M Chief Clerk Barrister 1958 21 years 
34 F Deputy Chief Clerk Barrister 1958 10 years 
35 M Deputy Chief Clerk Barrister 1954 13 years 
Inter-
View 
no. 
Court K 
36 
37 
38 
Court B 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Court L 
48 
49 
50 
Sex position Held Qualifications Acquiring more 
________________ g~~~ifi£~tions 
M Clerk to Justices Solicitor 1934 
M Clerk to Justices Barrister 1960 
M Principal Assistant Barrister 1980 
F Court Clerk Diploma 1978 Yes 
F Senior Court Clerk Solicitor 1979 
F Court Clerk solicitor 1981 
F Senior Court Clerk Barrister 1976 
F Court Clerk Barrister 1979 
M Court Clerk Diploma 1981 Thinking about it 
M Senior Clerk Solicitor 1981 
M Deputy Clerk Solicitor 1974 
M Trainee Clerk Solicitor Just started 
articles 
M Clerk to Justices Barrister 1974 
M Senior Clerk Diploma 1981 Thinking about it 
M Senior Clerk Barrister 1979 
Type 
acqulrlng 
Bar 
Completion date 
1982 
Length of 
51 years 
18 years 
t imp 
7 - 8 years 
6 years 
3 years 
2 years 
4 years 
taking court 
1 year 6 months 
5 - 6 years 
3 years 6 months 
12 years 
6 weeks 
1- years 
4 years 
1 - 2 years 
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